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VALUE, BEAUTY, AND PROFESSOR PERRY

ALL philosophy begins—or should begin—with the obvious but unfathomably profound statement that there is something which is what it is. That "something" is the datum of all realistic, that is to say of all true, metaphysics. Descartes and his ever more bewildered and wavering followers, from Locke and Berkeley to Hume and Kant and so on to Dewey and Bertrand Russell, assume too much at the very beginning when they declare that this "something" is a thought or mental event. Soon after a child first opens his as yet uncorrupted eyes he comes to a realization of that "something" which will some day lead him, if he does not become a self-indulgent sophist, to the discovery of that other and infinite "Something" which is God. This tiny sage will become aware of the actually infinite "Something" by becoming aware of himself as perceiving potentially infinite, or indefinitely finite, "somethings" which fringe on mystery. Thus, after he has discovered beings in general, he discovers his "I" long before he knows the word for it, an "I" which he verifies continually during his waking hours and sooner or later during some of his

sleeping hours, through his growing memory, that treasure-house of wonder. Of such an "I" he is absolutely certain, unless in due time he becomes a skeptic who in practice denies his own teaching that the "something" which he observes cannot be both itself and something else at the same time and under the same aspect. Any apparent departure from this experience will make him start and stare and look for what he will later call a "cause" which he will always find necessary to explain whatever does not completely explain itself. In due time he will find out, unless he allows himself to be led astray by men like Kant and William James, that the only "something" which adequately explains itself and so needs no cause is the "Something" who once said to Moses, "I am who am."

Until this infant discovers Him "who is," however, he suffers acutely from that restlessness which Saint Augustine describes so eloquently in the first paragraph of his *Confessions*. The babe wants something, and he wants it the more because he is far from certain just what he wants. In our distracted pagan era he will flounder from the bassinet to the crematory without ever knowing what he really wants—unless he accepts revelation. He is restless; he wants something. And just as "something" is the datum of all speculative philosophy, that is to say, of metaphysics (both ontology and epistemology) this "act of wanting" is the datum of all practical philosophy, that is, of axiology, or general theory of value, which includes both ethics, the science of the righteous or happy life, and aesthetics, the science of the meaning of beauty and its transcendental significance throughout and around the universe.

I

Many modern philosophers have written about this wanting or valuing as if it were somehow essentially or basically in conflict with facts, as if it could not validly hope for a real object with which to come into vital union or even, with more detachment, to contemplate. George Santayana, for instance, turns with contempt from the world of reality which seems to him to be mere matter in meaningless flux to a pseudo-spiritual

world of shadowy thoughts or values which are unreal but, to his urbanely disillusioned mind, charmingly untainted in their very unreality. But the overwhelming majority of pure-hearted children of all ages and the few adults who are not merely learned but wise, have always recognized that acts of valuing are facts and that they always, at least ultimately, refer to other facts which are equally real.

Everyday folk and the greatest of the philosophers have always found themselves impelled to associate somehow value with *both* object-beings *and* desire-beings (appetitions, interests). The Scholastic philosophers are fond of the words, "appetition" and "conation" (contrasted with "cognition") and these cannot be bettered. Of late, Professor Perry has given a great deal of currency to the word "interest" which he carefully defines and describes biologically and psychologically, not in the narrow senses of "curiosity" and "prejudice," but to include "instinct, desire, feeling, will and all their family of states, acts and attitudes," in short the entire "motor-affective life." I will use "conation," "appetition," "desire," and "interest" by turn in this same sense; but I will always prefer "appetition," which, as the schoolmen used it, may even include the gravitational "attractions" and "repulsions" and the valences of lifeless planets and molecules, atoms and electrons.

Everyday folk and philosophers have always been tempted to associate value with some sort of desire and with a desire that, ultimately, always is oriented toward a real object. But some contemporary philosophers, such as G. E. Moore, Professor John Laird, and Bertrand Russell (in an earlier mood diametrically opposed to his present egoistic attitude), in their zeal to justify what seems to be common-sense realism or in their solicitude to establish reasonable scales or standards of value, the better and the worse, the worst and the best, have sought to locate value entirely in the object valued. Other philosophers, as well as many artists and sybarites, recognizing the invariable appearance of desire when things are found or sought as somehow good materially or spiritually, have been

seduced into investing such interests (as Bertrand Russell does today) with a sort of creative power and hence over-emphasize the physiological or mental state of the values, the subject, the *ego*, at the risk of condemning us to a helplessly subjective or even skeptical attitude toward economics, morals, taste, and worship.

Professor Perry deals with the first group of thinkers, the pan-objectivists and kindred extremists, in his analysis of the first logically possible definition, or rather class of definitions of value, " value as irrelevant to interest." His main concern is to show that definitions of this class too readily accept indefinability or make the definition so comprehensive as to be meaningless or wander in circles. He shows with considerable success that many of these objectivists more or less unwittingly readmit the subjective element, the desire, from which they strive to emancipate us. On the other hand Professor Perry falls into the danger of ignoring the first of two facts equally important for the understanding of value: there must be or appear to be something desirable; this is quite as inescapable as the fact that there must be a desire for the real or ideal something. And when Perry comes at last to the fourth, his own definition, he seems often to forget, like a number of his philosophical contemporaries, that valuing (which he confuses with value) cannot exist by itself and that interest, desire, appetition without an object is a mere abstraction. Even if value should prove to be, as Perry sometimes (not without inconsistency) maintains, a "relation," like betweenness or beforeness, then we must remember with St. Thomas Aquinas that a relation is the weakest and most tenuous kind of a being, indeed a non-being but for its absolute dependence on the terms which it relates, in this case the object-valued and the subject-valuer. There must be both something desired and someone who desires it, otherwise value would not exist; it would at best be merely potential. Even the most fantastic desire must have an object either possible or actual. If nothing existed except God, then God would be both the object and the subject of value, and indeed, in a supereminent sense, that

is precisely what He *is* eternally. "Before Abraham *was made*, I *am*."

In addition to the object valued and the valuer there is a third constituent of what we may call the value situation. This is the end or purpose which certainly has much to do with influencing the valuer in his relation to the object which he values. In his two constructive books, *Philosophy of Value*, and *Values and Reality*, Father Leo Richard Ward, C.S.C., has shown that the comparative neglect of this end or purpose (a term anathema to the mechanistic "psychologist" though no longer so to the physicist on whose findings he professes to base his investigations) is a fertile source of sophistry among our contemporary post-Cartesian philosophers.

II

Professor Perry begins his masterpiece with all the magnanimity of true scholarship, and throughout his work he maintains this magnanimity. Snobbish hothoused a-priori methods have no appeal for him. He is democratically empirical; he observes what everybody wants, what even the most deluded man or non-rational brute thinks delectable. He seeks a definition of good (value) which will include all interests, the most vicious and the most virtuous, the most frivolous and the most exalted, the most saintly, the most animal, the most humanly sub-bestial, the most obscene. What could be more workmanlike? Moreover he enumerates, classifies, and criticizes all definitions of value with the ripe erudition of a fair lifetime of research. Yet I wonder if here he does not begin too prematurely to diverge a little from his own devotion to empirical method. Next (perhaps he should have done this before) he defines and describes interest, wanting, liking, disliking. He does it on a vast scale, enumerating once more all conceivable biological and psychological wants and not wholly negligent of the analogous attractions, repulsions, affinities of lifeless but certainly active atoms, electrons, protons, neutrons, positrons and the rest of the entities explored by the physicist and of what, with cautious, implied comparison and contrast, the chemist calls valence.

Would Professor Perry have been more accurately empirical if he had begun, not with definitions of value, but with definitions of valuing, of interest? Doubtless he would answer, "No, for in this case, I would not be fair to these definitions of value which ignore or seek to ignore interest altogether." But he himself shows that no such definition really succeeds when we come to examine its implications. His first class of definitions of value as "irrelevant to interest" seems logically possible a-priori, but not a single specimen of its pan-objectivism endures the test of application to the facts. I suspect that Professor Perry's exposition would have proved more consistently empirical if he had begun, not with groups of definitions, but with the brute fact of unceasing and ubiquitous appetition, which—if we substitute this term as the schoolmen used it for "interest"—may be applied to everything finite, whether organic or inorganic and, by a duly proportional analogy, to the infinite Being, Almighty God, Creator of heaven and earth, the infinitely active but Unmoved Mover. Although appetition involves an imperfection (a need) as reason involves a process, we predicate will (and love, justice, mercy, and all its other operations) for they involve perfection in their formal concept, and we predicate intellect (which involves knowledge) as "attributes" of God.

The philosophical science which deals most comprehensively with all motion or change, of which all finite appetitions are certainly specimens, is called by Scholastic philosophers cosmology, the first branch of natural philosophy which has the closest interrelations to the particular experimental sciences, such as physics and chemistry, astronomy and geology, botany and zoology in all their branches anatomical and physiological, and all the so-called social sciences in so far as these are really sciences in the modern restricted sense. The second branch of natural philosophy is rational psychology which goes much more deeply, broadly, and consistently into the nature of all life, vegetal and animal and human, than do those loosely organized and groping last chapters of physiology which, although admirable in many of their achievements, are unfortu-

nately miscalled psychology in modern universities. After natural philosophy comes the tremendous and most precise science of metaphysics which deals much more exclusively with eternal verities (although still not arrogantly negligent of the findings of the particular sciences) than do the twin branches of natural philosophy. Metaphysics, most of which is practically unknown in modern universities since Descartes, Hume, and Kant more or less unintentionally did so much to discredit it, includes first ontology, the science of all being, then epistemology which scrutinizes the relations between the being known and the being who knows, and finally natural theology or theodicy which proves by the pure reason without recourse to authority the existence and something of the nature of the uncreated infinite Being, God. Only after all these investigations does the Aristotelian-Thomist turn to the practical science of axiology (ethics and aesthetics). From this perspective of the *philosophia perennis* which at the outset is certainly fully as empirical as Perry's, some of his problems seem wrongly formulated, some of his conclusions unduly narrow. It is unfortunate that nearly all non-Scholastic philosophers, since the days when the Leibnitzian Wolff muddled things so badly for his disciple Kant, have apparently forgotten this, the only impeccably logical classification of the philosophical sciences, a classification which of course presupposes logic as a discipline for all the fields.

Scholastic philosophers are not, as Perry seems to want to be, empirical first and last; rather they make the most exhaustive use of all the ways of knowing—empirical, a-priori (rationalistic), pragmatic, authoritarian (dogmatic) which St. Thomas called the weakest of all the arguments in philosophy, and even, in the proper places and in the case of those few who are much more gifted than most of us, mystical. Scholasticism may be said to begin (as all enlightened philosophy must), empirically, that is with the observation of sense impressions. It then, at the proper moments, makes use of all the other four ways of knowing. The *philosophia perennis*, unlike all its rivals, is not sectarian and therefore is not, at some crucial

point, blurred and inconsistent; it has its unresolved difficulties, but it is free of impossible assumptions and undetected fallacies.

III

The scholastic philosopher, who begins, empirically enough, at the level of common sense and the particular sciences, with cosmology, the speculative science of all bodily changes or motions, and who goes on to reach his speculative climax in natural theology where, with St. Thomas Aquinas, he proves *a posteriori* from the observation of moving objects, and apodictically from the analysis of motion the existence and nature of the Unmoved Mover, God, is bound, when he arrives at the practical sciences of axiology, to take as his point of departure the actions or kind of motions which he observes in those who seek, love, and hate. Professor Perry comes very close to this point of view when he says that the philosophy of value is the philosophy of life. As Father Ward notes at the outset of the constructive part of his *Philosophy of Value*: "That we act is a *sine qua non* of our living, and a *sine qua non* of our action or of any acting is that it be for something." He shows that in the last analysis, it is the task of philosophy of value to show us *why* we act at all.

While the particular experimental and statistical sciences should, as such, be content with seaching out the *how* of things, the philosophical sciences are in quest of the *why*. Until lately the more restricted scientists, imprisoned in their precisely delimited but artificially abstracted fields, were wont to sneer at the *why* as irrelevant or even unknowable for even those outside their own circle. Of late however the more severely disciplined of them, the mathematical physicists, astrophysicists, and physical chemists, for instance, have begun to see that their own work suffers from their neglect of the *why*. Unfortunately, instead of going for advice to the natural philosopher and the metaphysician, they often indulge in amateur philosophizing with, in the case of men like Einstein, Eddington and Jeans, some rather bewildering results.

At all events, the *why* is not to be contemptuously sniffed at or snubbed; the *what* is because of the *why* in all being except God. In axiology we must get at the *why* of all action if we would understand all values, including beauty. Action, although it is not to be equated with the much more comprehensive concept of motion, is indeed a kind of motion, and the actions called "wanting" or "appetition" are species of motion (change). Motion is a fact so universal that some philosophers, from Heraclitus to Bergson and Bertrand Russell, with many others of our contemporaries who otherwise differ widely, would deny all meaning and reality to permanence, scoff at all substances (which, since the days of Descartes and Locke, they have forgotten how to define) as fictions, and analyze the totality of reality into a vast congeries of non-existent mathematico-logical abstractions which they call "point-instant events." This is because they have forgotten what motion (change) really means. Motion, change, whether of lurching planets or hurtling beta-particles, photosynthesizing plants or breathing, eating, growing, child-bearing animals, human reasoning or surging and waning emotions, the disintegration or reintegration of molecules, the degeneration of a sinner or regeneration of a saint—all motion or change—is the transition from potentiality to actuality. Motion or change without some accompanying permanence would be intrinsically contradictory, an unknowable nothing. But the scholastic philosopher who begins at the level of common sense and the particular sciences, with cosmology, the philosophical science of the changes or motions of all bodies, reaches in theodicy a sublime climax where he proves from the glorious spectacle of these galaxies of restless beings the necessary existence and the absolutely and boundlessly perfect nature of the infinitely active Unmoved Mover, God. All this, assuredly, is momentous matter for the practical science of axiology which begins like the speculative science of cosmology with the same datum of motion. Although this sort of motion, appetitive action, is of but a limited kind, one will not plumb its depths, one will not find the "why," until one establishes the manifold relations of this sort of motion, cona-

tion, with all the cosmic and supercosmic motions which began when the Unmoved Mover, where there was nothing, made by His omnipotent creation and now prepetually conserves innumerable and splendid hierarchical ranks of finite beings.

IV

In every one of the four families of definitions of value which Professor Perry has so comprehensively classified for us, there are some scattered implications that are perfectly valid—as far as they go. Professor Perry, I believe, has erred in committing himself to one family so exclusively; rather he has erred in principle but happily not always in his deeds. Here I intend no more than to make more explicit and flawless what he has, less consistently but with admirable catholicity, already accomplished. I propose quite mercilessly and affectionately to enlist him, willy-nilly, under the gonfalon of the Angel of the Schools.

Professor Perry's title for his first family of definitions, "Value as irrelevant to interest," is somewhat prejudiced. If he had said "Value as purely objective" he could not have proceeded so doughtily to demolish it. He admits that common sense is, at least in one of its not always consistent moods, disposed to find value in the object perceived. The object is valuable if it has or is value. When we value it we find or expect to find it to be in some sense good, good to eat, good to love, good in itself, so superlatively good that we may even call it "holy." Like most non-Scholastic philosophers today Perry does not deign to tarry with common sense. He does not drive directly towards its refutation, but he warns homely folk quite correctly that their sophisticated pan-objectivistic champions defend their pet conviction with sophistries against which they themselves would protest heart and soul. Perry is right. The pan-objectivists, in their zeal to correct the fatal subjectivistic tendencies of the idealists who ruled so despotically in their hothoused philosophical republic a generation ago, have recklessly jettisoned all criteria by which we might distinguish between facts and illusions. Why should the pure in heart be made to suffer for the epistemological monstrosities of those

whom learning not fully assimilated hath made, not truly wise, but, alas, a little mad?

Professor Perry falls afoul of those who claim value to be a quality in an object, a "*quale*" which we all can clearly perceive, like red, or round, or square. Well perhaps red is *a* value. According to my mother, I found it so in my babyhood. It was, I am told, necessary only to present me with a red rag and at once my tantrums dissolved in beatific calm. But Professor Perry will say that we must have a "generic" definition of all values. So we must—if we can—but are we sure that we can find a generic definition of value which can always be absolutely abstracted from a catalogue of specific values? Then there is this matter of perception itself. Professor Perry, like all non-Scholastics since Descartes, forgets that we perceive not only with the senses but also with that faculty, or power, which we call intellect or the mind. "I see," says the blind man. His usage of the word "see" is confirmed in all the languages I know and even, so I am told, in Japanese. Perhaps the mind sees the objective quality or character or attribute which is value-in-general. As the mind ranges abroad, tireless adventurer that it is, it discovers that value is everywhere and therefore, in a logical sense, indefinable, not because it is in some beggarly meaning "a simple notion" as George Moore (whom Perry holds rightly suspect) affirms in *Principia Ethica*, not, at least, a vacantly simple notion like Hegel's notion of being which he identified in his reason-destroying dialectic with non-being, but an indefinable simple notion because it is *absolutely comprehensive*. Value (the good), as Scholastic ontology proves, is a transcendental property of being, that is to say, a characteristic which flows from any nature as rationality flows from human nature, a property which transcends all genera and species (and therefore all *logical* definition) because it flows ubiquitously from everything actual or possible, ideal or real, that in any sense *is*. The supremely good God looked at all his creations and at his eternal exemplar "ideas" of future creations on the first sabbath and saw that all of them were "very good."

All this underlies, implicitly, the primordial and perennial

conviction of common sense that value is somehow primarily in the object. Common sense has been much maligned because it has been known to contend that the earth is flat. But genuine common sense, which is not by any means invariably identifiable with convention or superstition, cannot be accused of clinging to error even after error is demonstrated. Such perversity is more likely to be found among the so-called intelligentsia. Common sense is humble. It is not inflexible. You can fool all of the people (in a given locality) some of the time; you cannot fool all of the people (over all the continents and across all the millennia) all of the time. This is strong testimony to the unlimited moral certainty that value is somehow in or of the object valued, nay perhaps the very object itself, a moral certainty that is established as an absolute, a metaphysical certainty by Aristotelian-Thomistic thought.

For a decade or two in the immediate past, a few philosophers were tempted to identify values with what they called " tertiary " qualities. We were already familiar with a distinction as old as Aristotle and as modern as Galileo and Locke between " primary " qualities (or " common " sensibles) such as shape, figure, rest, or motion which tradition has always regarded as inherent in the object, and " secondary " qualities (or " proper " sensibles) such as color, sound, odor, and taste, which physicists and physiologists have held to be mental reactions to dissimilar causes in the object. Our contemporaries proceeded to advocate a so-called " tertiary " quality or characteristic which was localized as a purely subjective but which, by a process which Ruskin called the " pathetic fallacy," we project, as it were, into the object. " Tertiary " qualities, in other words would be affects or emotions which we rather fancifully read into objects, as when we forget our own clumsiness by damning the supposedly recalcitrant golf-ball. For a striking and, for us, a very pertinent example we may turn to Santayana who once was very fond of playing with this concept. " Beauty," for instance, he defined as " pleasure regarded as a quality in the thing " or, somewhat more soberly, as " pleasure objectified." But when we go on to examine at length the warm and luminous description of the

experience of beauty which this most sensitive philosopher gives us—and assuredly he has described "the sense of beauty" for many and perhaps for all, future generations—we find that all that is intelligible in his brilliantly cryptic definition is that when we experience beauty we are self-forgetful. In other words, the process of aesthetic valuing, although intensely and massively conscious, is a purified un-self-conscious experience. Generalizing from this we may venture the thought that the concept of tertiary qualities is a quibble characteristic of non-Scholastic post-Cartesians, striving ever ineffectually to escape from utter scepticism or at best solipsism, and that desperately irrational attempt to evade the issue which has been swaggeringly accoladed as "positivism." In so far as the concept of tertiary qualities means anything it is a sort of pleasantly and irresponsibly poetic definition not of value but of valuing which may be safely consigned to oblivion since it tells us little about longing and loving and less about the good. This then is one member of the family of definitions of value as "irrelevant to interest" which without a twinge of conscience we may, with Professor Perry, reject. We reject it, but not for his reasons. He handles it far too tenderly in his desire to wean us away from the common-sense location of value in the object, in favor of his inclination to make the valuer the creator of value, a view which we might take of God, but of God alone.

Because he cannot discern a value such as beauty or moral goodness in the same way he discerns an objective quality such as red, which may be seen with the fleshly eye, and because he forgets that the intellect might directly see (understand) a value in an object as it certainly does see a cause or a substance, the post-Cartesian, neo-Humean, positivistic sensist is fain to conjure up such will-o'-the-wisps as tertiary qualities. He comes nearer to the truth, in fact he tells the truth as far as he goes, when he suggests that value is a "logical indefinable." Like Professor Perry I derive little comfort from Professor A. P. Brogan's brilliant hypothesis that if we regard value (the good) as "relatively indefinable" we can find our bearings if we take "better" to be "the fundamental value universal" and with

" worse " as its " logical converse " we shall be able to conclude first that " 'A is worse than B' means 'B is better than A' " and so be permitted to conclude this much of good that " 'A is good' means 'the existence of A is better than the non-existence of A.' " Perry concedes that Dr. Brogan has furnished us with a " self-consistent hypothesis " but adds that its application to the facts is not clear unless, with Professor John Dewey who favors it, we interpret it in terms of " preference " or " selection-rejection " in which case, as Perry notes, it must be subsumed in some family of definitions which make value " a function of interest " and thus give up the effort to locate value in the object with its aid. I would say that if Dewey and Perry are correct then Brogan is following post-Cartesian, post-Kantian footsteps and confounding " value " with " valuing." Even so, I should demur, because when I attempt to apply the Brogan-formula to various specific acts of valuing I do not find " preference " invariably present. As Father Ward has pointed out we do not begin life by *preferring* it to non-life. Life we certainly value, but non-life we do not, at least normally, desire at all.

Well, then, what of the view that " the good " is " *absolutely* indefinable," that is to say, logically? Professor Perry's skillful arguments against George Moore, Santayana, and other contemporaries who flirt with this theory do not come to close grips with the position of the Thomists of either yesterday or today. Anything that anybody can think in terms intrinsically consistent can in some sense, the schoolman holds, both exist and be valued. Whether it exists or is, as a fact, valued belongs to another tale of which more anon. But " being " and its transcendental property " value " are limitless, indeterminate concepts and are therefore, indefinable logically because they cannot be subsumed under any genus or differentiated from any species, unless we except nothing, which is, however, no thing. We arrive at our comprehension of " being " by the highest of all the acts of abstraction, the third. The first reveals concrete individuals and qualities, and certain laws of their governance. This is the way of the particular physical sciences from

astronomy to zoology. The second way, mathematical, focusses on bare quantity, which recks not whether a cube is changing or immutable, pure or composite, of clay or marble, adamant or gold. The third way and, in spite of modern ill-informed prejudices, the most precise as well as sublime, is the way of the metaphysician who fixes his attention upon what is common to all things.

"Being" is not, as we observed before, the empty concept which Hegel thought. Although of all terms it is the narrowest in comprehension, intention, connotation, it is of all things widest in extension, denotation; it is applicable, both potentially and actually, to the infinite. Although, therefore, it cannot be confined by a strict philosophical definition, it may be described with spacious universality as whatever is not nothing. It becomes more and more vivid for us as we catalogue its amazing varieties—logical, real or ideal, substantial or accidental, finite, relative, infinite, absolute. It may be contracted to its logical inferiors, substantial beings (incorporeal ones, or corporeal bodies which may be organic or inorganic, and, if living, non-sentient, or sentient and therefore animal, irrational, or rational and so human) and, within or along or adjoining these substances (beings which exist in themselves), the accidents (quantity, quality, relation, action, passion or reaction, time, place, place-in-space, posture and habit). Its ultimate ground of possibility is the essence of God Himself, the transcendent Creator of all beings not Himself. Vast as is "being" the term is not applied to its innumerable kinds equivocally, never with entirely different meanings; yet it may not be applied univocally, in a strictly uniform manner, to such endless varieties, but it is applied analogously with due attention, not so much to identities, as to similarities. It does not completely embrace or swallow its kinds as the pantheist blurringly believes.

Convertible with "being," identified with each being that exists or ever can exist, the Thomist finds at least three "transcendental properties" already mentioned in these pages: "oneness or unity," "truth," and "goodness." Should not "beauty" be a fourth? It would be hazardous to venture a final answer

without a thorough review of the relations of beauty with all the other three. Meanwhile we must note that every simple being is obviously one, for it is partless; that every compound being is one, since its parts are not totally separated; and that every entitative unit, in contrast with the mathematical standard for measuring abstract quantity, every transcendental unit is a being since it cannot be a one made up of nothing. As for truth, considered ontologically, it refers to being regarded as intelligible. Since all beings are intelligible to some one—certainly to God—all beings, as such, are true since God, supremely intelligible to Himself, is Truth. Being and goodness are similarly convertible, according to the scholastic philosopher. Goodness is for him the suitability of anything for the nature of some being which strives for it; the good is the desirable and the desirable is the good. Professor Perry does not neglect this view; he finds ample room for it in his second family of definitions. Let us leave it therefore, a little while until we have followed our leader in his appraisal of the other kinsmen of the first stock.

"To be good means to further something," wrote Professor George Herbert Palmer in *The Nature of Goodness*, and Father Ward tells us that value is perfective; value (the good) helps. If however, so Perry fears, we ignore the valuer who is being helped and seek our definition in the fitness of the object we will identify value with cause and "theory of value would lose its subject-matter." Well, what is cause? It is that which in any way gives or transforms being. Why would it be calamitous to identify value and cause? If value helps the valuer toward the perfection to which his nature ordains him it is indeed some sort of cause. "Then," warns our exacting guide, we must "define the type." In due time we shall. Perry associates this view with the definition of value as form. If we hold with Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism that substantial form is that which actualizes or determines a nature we may be drawing nearer to the light; both substantial and accidental form are fundamental for at least the valuable object which we call beautiful. Value in general, as some sort of perfective form, could be

thought of as that which helps the valuer in any way to realize himself. Here the concept of value draws near to that of end. St. Thomas, happily free from the cant of the recent socialisms, does not flinch from saying that the end is precisely the agent himself. Does this make the Angelic Doctor a rugged rapacious individualist? Not at all. For St. Thomas Aquinas this identification of value with that which helps toward self-realization means nothing less than the ultimate ascription of self-realization to the grace of God which responds at once to the valuer's humble impetration. When the valuer is full of that grace he will not forget that his fellow-men are travelling at his side; as St. John the beloved disciple pointed out, he who claims to love God and hates his neighbor is a liar.

Professor Perry at this point edges us toward his own subjectivistic bias by declaring that "It is not unqualified being which common sense takes to be good, and whose help or hindrance it therefore accepts as also good, but it is being *in so far as desired.*" On the very next page he puts it better, I think, but with a significant difference which, with *my* italics, I will accept: "'Good for' does not ordinarily mean 'conducive to,' but 'conducive to something *recognized as* desirable.'" Now is it not clear that recognition implies that there is something valuable that may be found in or of the object? It does not follow at all that, because desire, interest, or appetition is inevitably thought of with value, therefore, value itself must reside in the valuer. An object "recognized as desirable" becomes an objective for the subject precisely because he discerns in *it* some good. Perry has separated cognition from conation too sharply, forgetting that cognition (understanding) must occur before conation (desiring, valuing) is possible. Value then, must somehow be in the object understood as something valuable.

For the Thomist, any good (value) physical or moral can be measured in terms of its fulfilment of the demands of any given valuer. Any deed, for instance, which perfects *human* nature is a *moral* good. Professor Perry is well acquainted with the expressions of this self-realization theory in Greek philoso-

phy, its associations with Platonic "ideas" and Aristotelian "forms" (between which he does not discriminate as carefully as he should); but he makes no allusion to the development of this doctrine in the *Summa Theologica*, for instance, in the eighteenth to the twenty-first questions of the *Prima Secundae*. Consequently he can write, quite mindless of the distinction between potential and actual being, "If *a* is better *m* than *b*, it follows that *b* is a better *n* than *a*. Everything is the most shining example of something. The worst specimen of a man may be the most perfect specimen of inebriety or feeblemindedness." For St. Thomas this would not present the slightest difficulty. Man is a rational animal. The child and the idiot are, however, only potentially rational. The child will grow up and become actually rational. The idiot, unless the sciences can cure him, will not become actually rational until he gets to heaven whither he is much more sure of arriving than many men much more rationally endowed than he. Feeblemindedness is not a being; it is a privation of being. Drink is good but drunkenness is an excess in the use of drink which leads to a tragic privation of other goods, that is to say to evil. The inebriate is or has become only potentially human. Since, unlike the babe and the idiot, he is responsible, if he ever was normal, he has become more or less inhuman.

A valuer, then, acts for himself. His self-perfection is his end. Any object which can further this end may become an objective; it has value, it is good. The rugged individualist knows this. He errs only because he has an altogether too trivial or sordid conception of himself. Altruists are more or less unconscious egoists and would be much more helpful in healing their fellowmen if they began by healing themselves. A man's perfection, his bodily and spiritual health, his wholeness may be evaluated by measuring the depth of his peace, and genuinely peaceful men are never selfish. Check this point in the lives of the true supermen, the saints.

It will not surprise us that Professor Perry turns next to definitions of value in terms of "organic unity and reciprocity of parts" as exemplified by "the physical organism," "the work of art," and "systematic thought," the three outstanding

examples of what Professor George Herbert Palmer used to call "intrinsic goodness," the purest goodness in which, as he said, "each part is both means and end, . . . each aids and is aided by all the others." We have already seen that for the Thomist, unity, oneness, whether composite or simple, is a transcendental property of all being. In a discussion like this, then, we may expect to see the concepts of unity and value recur again and again in the closest association. The unity-definition of value led Palmer and others of his generation straight into arms of the amorphous, pantheistic Hegelian Absolute, although the gentle Harvard professor was wont, unconvincingly, to deny that his master intended to submerge the individual in the One. At any rate, the view has led others back to Spinoza, concerning whose monism there can be no question, despite certain indications of his rather inarticulate desire to escape it. There is little doubt that Spinoza could have avoided his annihilating confusion of all values and evils in a pantheistic monistic blur if he had been acquainted with the pure source of that Scholastic philosophy which was so decadent in so many quarters in his day. The Thomistic concept of creation, which can be proved philosophically, whether or not the universe ever had a beginning in time, leads us straight to a God who is a transcendental, not immanent, source of all finite unities and so exonerates the unity-definition of value from the helpless and hapless monism toward which, as Professor Perry justly observes, so many of its modern proponents, from Spinoza to Bosanquet, are oriented. Once we have grasped the meaning of creation-conservation, as Aquinas defended it, it is possible to say that all finite beings are valuable at least partly because of their unity (whether this be simple or a composite, organic reciprocity of parts) and that in God, the Source of all these beings, unity and value are identical in His infinite Simplicity which they reflect in a hierarchy of multitudinous perfections of every imaginable kind.

V

We have been drawing nearer to those families of definitions which, according to Professor Perry, recognize interest or appetition as either a constituent of value or, in the case of the fourth,

actually constitute value. I will consider first, with a sympathy not exclusive but much warmer than Perry's, those which he garners under the heading, "Value as the qualified object of interest." Professor Perry, at least in the days when he wrote this chapter, was nobly loyal to that suspicion of the reality of purpose which prejudiced the adolescent outlook of the brilliant and fertile but over-confident naturalists of the nineteenth century and which still warps today the purview of the practitioners of the youngest and the more inaccurate sciences such as sociology and behavioristic psychology, although it does not nullify the great importance of a good deal of their work.

Of the definitions so far reviewed I agree with Perry in the conclusion that they are all wrong in so far as they ignore or tend to ignore the role of interest, conation, appetition, in the value situation. On the other hand I should contend that they are all justified in their insistence that value is in the object and that most of them have provided us with valid hints of the nature of that objectivity. If the objectivity of value is ignored, then axiological solipsism is inevitable and the validity of all standards must be denied. Finally I maintain that we can refer all these fragmentary aspects of finite to the Value of values if we reason, as St. Thomas did, by that *analogia proportionalitatis* which finds all pure perfections supereminently in God their Creator as His "attributes" which we discover (thus attaining a golden mean between anthropomorphism and agnosticism) when we realize that they are distinguishable conceptually in our minds and yet are grounded in the reality of God's Unity, Simplicity, and Unicity. The angelic Doctor's dialectic reaches a point here where his logic, always so studiously cold, seems to span the very threshold of supra-rational mysticism without allowing the faintest hue to warm that passionless austerity which he, the greatest of mediaeval lyric poets, maintained so relentlessly throughout every paragraph of his philosophic writing.

At this point the Harvard scholar's discussion takes a turn so critical that, despite his attempt to clear himself—with which we will deal later—his whole axiology would founder on the

Charybdis of idealistic subjectivism, in a relativistic philosophy of value for which the problem of moral and artistic standards of conduct and taste would be meaningless, were it not for the fact that his own position is not rigorously sustained. The crucial problem for Perry here is: shall we conceive the "value of an object" and its "relation to interest . . . after the analogy of the marksman and his target, and say that the interest *directs itself* toward the object? Or shall we conceive it after the analogy of the magnet and the iron-filing and say that the object draws the interest toward itself."

Both analogies, to the first of which he plights his troth, are expressive but rather treacherous. It is very questionable, moreover, whether what he regards as the crucial problem is a problem at all, for in *both* analogies there is certainly *some* truth. The second and more objective account of the value-relation Perry attributes to philosophers who in their zeal to make theory of value a normative science, a study of canons of conduct and of taste, unduly subordinate the findings "of biology, psychology, and sociology, which merely describe what animals, men, and societies as a matter of fact want." What he charges is quite true of the great legion of modern philosophers who have been more or less influenced, wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly, by Kant. It is not at all true of St. Thomas Aquinas who devotes some ten volumes (the fourth to the thirteenth of his *Summa Theologica* as translated by the English Dominican fathers) very largely to such a description of what man wants as would furnish material for a Shakespeare and all his fellows and followers. Of course the schoolman's language is not scientifically up to date, but for those who will patiently peruse his work it will have incessantly a startlingly familiar ring. Even Professor Perry's own encyclopedic account in chapters six to nineteen of *General Theory of Values*, which includes, as St. Thomas does, an examination of the interrelations of appetition and cognition and of the individual and society, is not as rich and comprehensive as that of the Angelic Doctor. In Professor Perry's appraisal of the variations of definition, in both his second and third families, he devotes

much space to Kant, his diverging followers, and their search for norms at the cost of facts. I cannot here outline this, but I feel bound to record my belief that his criticisms are keen, kindly, and just.

Nevertheless I repeat that our contemporary's analogies of marksman and magnet are not comprehensive and precise enough. Neither fully describes the real value-situation which is this: the valuer certainly finds himself somehow drawn toward the valued thing. How shall we account for this? The most importunate answer, as our guide shows, is that the object itself has an interested and therefore an interest-evoking origin, that it is the product of intelligence, is in a word, purposive. It is just here that Perry disposes of the subtle but faltering Kant and also of Plato who, although he struggled far in the right direction, wavered to the end and just missed the Pisgah sight to which, his fortunate pupil, Aristotle attained.

If it can be proved that an almighty and good God exists, if He created all things and made them good, even though He permits perverse wills to warp them or to thwart them temporarily in their strivings toward the realization of their own ordained perfections in the tremendous hierarchy of beings, then we can say that, while all objects are certainly valu*ed* whenever they are wanted in any way whatsoever by any being, an object is truly, not apparently, valu*able* when it is wanted for the purpose for which God eternally intends it. Opium is good, but opium is not good for the drug-addict in his weaker moments, no matter how intensely and sincerely he may desire it. Yet opium is good for all of us medicinally in proper doses or in appropriate combination with other ingredients.

The full circle of a complete philosophy is peculiarly embarrassing for the spiritual pilgrim because, no matter with which one of its segments, natural philosophy, metaphysics, or axiology, he begins, he will often find himself compelled to rest momentarily on some assumption which is justified only in some philosophical discipline perhaps for the moment quite remote from that of his immediate concern. Pilgrims may have begun their journey at varous points. They can never rest secure until

they have completed their circumnavigation. I have chosen the Aristotelian-Thomistic order of divisions which I outlined at the opening of this discussion and which I will review toward the end.

While scholastic philosophy in general begins with no assumption whatsoever, with the bare recognition of being which is what it is, in a treatise on aesthetics with which one must plunge *in medias res* I must content myself from time to time with rather Parthian salutations to other branches of Aristotelian-Thomism wherever they impinge. I shall, for instance, dwell briefly from time to time on all of St. Thomas' "five ways" of proving the existence of God. Here we must pay our respects to the fifth, the teleological. It is important to realize that the Angelic Doctor presented first three strictly metaphysical arguments each one of which begins with the most obvious facts observable, that he builds up from his analysis of the unmoved mover and the uncaused efficient cause to a powerful climax with the third, the argument in terms of the necessary being, that he enriches the contents of all three with the sumptuous fourth argument in terms of the various kinds and degrees of perfection and their common ground, and then only, with these immense perspectives, turns to the fifth argument from the "governance" of the cosmos which now introduces the relation of purposes—whether internal or external as regards finite things, animate or inanimate—to the final cause. In contrast with this serried procession of arguments the version of the teleological proof which Kant, not without a wistful qualification, undertook to refute and Paley's creaky comparison of the watch with God's design, which Perry rightly, but far from conclusively criticizes, seem almost frivolous.

According to all Scholastic philosophers "a cause is that which in any way whatever exerts a positive influence in the production of a thing." Some moderns challenge the reality of any cause. For the moment we assume that they are wrong and pass on to deal specifically with final cause, purpose, intention, end, that cause "*for the sake of which* an efficient cause (by *which* something is produced) acts." Professor Perry argues

with great plausibility that the mere existence of various organisms and gravitational harmonies in the universe is not a conclusive proof of the existence of a cosmic or a super-cosmic purpose. He has admitted the existence of unities, even a pervasive uniformity without which as he sees clearly, all the proud erudition of the naturalist, all hope of scientific advance would be nonsense. But he believes that these unities are sufficiently explicable in terms of "necessary relations." He is—or was—a mechanist, although a very discriminating and liberal one. He would be the last to deny the presence of intelligible purpose in at least some living beings, but he sees no reason for imputing purpose, interior or exterior, to electrons and stars. Men, indeed, do act obviously and consciously with some definite end in view. Animals evince no evidence of understanding an end *as an end* but they reveal persistent desires and strivings that are more or less purposive. When we come to the actions of chemical compounds and physical bodies we pause. They certainly are subject to "natural laws." But such a "law" is a mere fiction unless it is a manifestation of some inner tendency of the self-preserving nature of a thing, a sort of selective orientation. In organisms it is spectacular. I was completely converted from mechanism when, no longer content with reading the ingenious speculations of Jacques Loeb and Perry, I went into the laboratories of the Johns Hopkins University and for several years observed for myself the embryological developments of frogs, birds, pigs and men, the exfoliation, sometimes under my very eyes, of billions of cells, first specializing, then co-operating, often migrating unerringly together from remote distances, in the construction of tissues and of organs as marvellous as the ear and the eye; I believed in finality. And I set out on my long journey from a stubbornly maintained agnosticism to a gradually clarified belief in God. Assuredly the end at which a tadpole or a chick is ultimately to arrive cannot be a cause unless it already exists. It does so exist—in some mind or Mind. I began to see, moreover, that the end must be nobler than the blind means of cellular behavior which is not enlightened by any conscious search for the

good. It makes a tremendous difference when one ceases to read, takes off his coat, and gets to work with scalpel and microscope, with microtome and alcohol, paraffin, turpentine and staining chemicals. For my part I became less and less satisfied with "blind force" as an explanatory substitute for a "purpose which shapes our ends, rough hew them how we may." I saw that "chance" is no less an avowal of ignorance after it has been spelled with a capital "C." I saw, in due time, with the help of Aristotelian-Thomists, that a "chance" which is a collision of two or more clearly discerned chains of cause and effect leads our thoughts irresistibly at last to a superior intelligence which foresees both the chains of events and their—for us—unexpected conjunction. I was not surprised in 1936 to read in *The Philosophy of Physics* of one of our most distinguished contemporaries, Max Planck, of quantum-theory fame: "The most perfect harmony and consequently the strictest causality in any case culminates in the assumption that there is an ideal spirit having a full knowledge of the action of the natural forces as well as of the events in the intellectual life of men; a knowledge extending to every detail and embracing present, past and future." I knew just who that "ideal spirit" is, because for three years I had been a Catholic.

One of the most striking features of the Thomistic version of the argument from design is that, instead of making any indispensable use of analogy, as Paley does with his watch (although this argument is by no means worthless), the Angelic Doctor's reasoning is based on the whole sweep of the cosmic order contemplated, as Mozart heard his symphonies with his inner ear in his most ecstatic moments, not in the temporal flow of their melodies, but *zusammen*. Everywhere we find tendencies inherent in the nature of things and these tendencies are vastly harmonious. Lately the British astrophysiast, Reginald Dingle, has suggested that the Heisenbergian "principle of indeterminacy" (the discovery of the scientists's inability to measure simultaneously the velocity and the mass of an electron), far from justifying the impulse of certain tychistic philosophers to enthrone chance, is merely the result of looking at the events

from the wrong angle. And Sir Arthur Eddington has lifted his eyes from his star-gazing to observe that if we are to speak of "causation" as a one-way procession of efficient causes and results we must have another word (he offers "causality") for a very real and significant two-way relation of events for which the past-present flow has no bearing; in other words he seems to be groping toward a recognition of the fact that we must recognize the result, the end, as one kind of cause. Scientists, as J. K. Heydon points out in *The God of Reason*, are beginning in many quarters to realize that a thing is not explained or even adequately described when it is picked to pieces. Biologists, with their theory of emergent evolution, are realizing that a man is not the mere sum of his anatomically dissectable parts but a unity, parts plus form. And this form must have a formal, not a merely efficient or material, cause. As Alfred North Whitehead has written (I add italics) in *Science and the Modern World*, "An electron within a living body is different from electron outside it, by reason of the *plan* of the body." Then he adds, most significantly for us, "But the principle of modification is *perfectly general* throughout *nature, and represents no property peculiar to living bodies.*" Lo, the scoffer of Aristotle shall be scorned and the scientists may yet discover the Angel of the Schools.

"Whereas Heracleitus," as Mr. Heydon observes,

> said that we could not cross a river twice, forasmuch as it did not remain the same river but always changing, Aristotle observed that we must look deeper than the changing drops of water, for the river remained the river for all that. Now the science of the last century sided with Heracleitus, in effect, for we could not look deeper than the changing drops of water, or rather the atoms of which they were composed. . . . But now the ultimate in the direction of picking to pieces has receded into mystery, and we come back to the other end of reality, unities having a form or plan; having, in particular, parts which are unities in themselves, such as eyes, but which may yet serve the greater unity as means whereby it may attain its natural ends.

Empedocles, partly anticipating the drift of Darwin's thought by more than two thousand years, had argued that causes

are not oriented toward a goal but if they merely happen to reach an end which has survival value it will outlive less fortunate results. As Heydon reminds us, Aristotle answered by showing that Empedocles was merely assuming a tendency to permanence in the case of lucky chances, without accounting for the source of this tendency. Darwin, although he never could bring himself to abandon absolutely the teleological view and still wrote reverently of the likelihood of a divine purpose, Providence, even after he had felt agnostic pangs, yet with his lofty conscientiousness so cautiously formulated his theory of "natural selection" as to tempt his less discrete followers to hail his work, with a sort of adolescently satanic glee, as the doom of theology. Still there remained the necessity for finding the sufficient reason for that very competition which the great evolutionist found so prevalent (though he did not himself ignore the mutual aid) in nature. Darwin himself was careful to confess that for him the word "fortuitous" was but a confession of his own limited understanding of the phenomena. The humble truth-seeker was beyond fear and beyond reproach. And now since Mendel and his followers have found out so much more about variations, evolution, as Thomas Hunt Morgan has noted in his *Critique*, assumes a much more "peaceful aspect." Today scientists of all kinds are finding at work among "chance" happenings some force so positive that one desperate philosophical atheist, determined at all cost to keep God from returning to hamper "progress," is compelled to substitute for Him an hypostatized anti-god called a "Vector" with a capital "V."

Nevertheless we are compelled to see all around us and beyond us a colossal hierarchy of beings which are themselves unities and parts of unities yet more vast. In the midst of everything we find ourselves to be wonderfully integrated societies of cells, tissues, and organs, each one of us finally integrated in a point which we know as the "I." We are microcosms which in some way mirror the macrocosm or its Source. For this entire macrocosm all the king's scientists and all the king's men have failed to find the universal "efficient" cause for

which the moribund materialists have so long been seeking. They must therefore regard this stupendous unity as acting at random. "But," as Heydon concludes,

> it is impossible that all things that are should constitute a harmonious unity, each attaining its end and each contributing to the ends of the whole, if that efficient cause acted at random; because then each being might, with equal probability have been other than it is, in a strictly infinite number of ways, and it is not merely highly improbable but absolutely impossible that they should constitute a unity. Such a universe would not be a universe but a mere multitude of unlike things without law or order. Therefore, not at random but by design did the First [the Uncaused] Cause work; therefore He is an intelligent Being and we call Him God.

All this means that everything inanimate or animate in the universe is appetitive and that this appetition, perhaps in all living things and certainly in men is a valuing activity which reflects God who values Himself and also values, with a love that will brook no ultimate frustration, the minutest and most evanescent of His creatures as well as His saints. It means that the end is the first principle of every action. Every being seeks its perfection, its realization. Man is no exception. His end is himself. Valuing is self-realization. The end desired, as St. Augustine says, is "not that which is consumed so that it be not, but that which is perfected so that it fully be." But sooner or later, in his search for his own perfection a man will find, even if too late, that only God can fulfil him. "Thou hast made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they find rest in Thee."

The objects which contribute in any way to this end may be said to have value or be desirable. It is not necessary to assume within them some occult "force," a gratuitous assumption which Professor Perry wishes upon all of us who hold this view and then accuses us of the pathetic fallacy. He is right as far as he has certain agnostics or pragmatically theistic philosophers in mind. He would be wrong as far as Aquinas is concerned; but to the Angelic Doctor he does not here allude. Perry is also very suspicious of theories that hold an object to be valuable in the sense of being capable in any way of being

desired. Here again, however, he devotes his energies to certain nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers who are more or less befogged with post-Kantian idealism no matter how much they knead it into strange and novel shapes. Nowhere does he really refute the perfectly lucid commonsense conviction that value is in the object, that it possesses some quality or qualities discernible by sense or intellect or both and in some manner capable of satisfying desire or at least of being desired whether or not a finite valuer happens to be around. It is not necessary to pin our faith on one quality or *quale*. Any character or quality or complex of qualities will do, provided it serves the end—the end too often, as we saw, forgotten by contemporary axiologists in their analysis of the value situation. Now the end, as we have here described it, is the perfection, the fulfillment of the valuer himself. And the valuer realizes his perfection solely and precisely to the degree in which he attains to the presence of God. And this involves the recognition that all his neighbors, including his enemies, are equally loved by God. "O my God," let us reiterate the act of Charity, "O my God, I love Thee above all things because Thou art all-good and worthy of all my love. I love my neighbor as myself *for the love of Thee*." It is only a society of such valuers who can ever hope to create a community which, in the words of Christopher Dawson,

> is neither an inorganic mass of individuals nor a mechanized organization of power, but a living spiritual order.
>
> The ideal of such a community was the dream that inspired the political reformers and revolutionaries of the last two centuries [and the Communists, Facists, Nazis and "Liberals" of today], but since they rejected [and still reject] the power of the Spirit their ideals proved [and prove] unreal and Utopian, and they achieved [and achieve] either freedom without order, or order without freedom.

If then an object is valuable by virtue of an indeterminate number of qualities which make it desirable in the sense that it in any way furthers or seems to further the beatification of the valuer, we may infer that for different qualities there will correspond in the soul of the valuer different modes of appeti-

tion, interest, and conation whether these be sybaritic or rational, perverse or noble. This brings us to Professor Perry's third family of definitions: "Value as object of qualified interest." An expressive version of this view was made current by Brentano at the beginning of this century when, in *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, he asserted: "We call something good when the love relating to it is right." Before this, it was championed in various ways by Kant and his more voluntaristic satellites as opposed to his more intellectualistic followers. Some of its roots may be traced in some of the schoolmen, backward to the ancient Stoics, and even in certain phases of Plato's protean thought. Any Thomist, mediaeval or modern, can readily fuse one variant of this view with certain variations from the other three families, namely the qualification of human appetition that describes it as a *more or less implicit* love of God which certainly characterizes any rational will which has not become utterly reprobate. But if we remember our former observation that many modern axiologists are prone to blur value with valuing, we will realize that all members of this third class of definitions are more likely to characterize the latter than the former. We will do well also to keep constantly in mind Professor Perry's just criticism that all definitions of this class tend to limit the concept of value to the higher values although we might temper his position by adding that the more distinctively human the process of valuing becomes the more explicit will be its orientation towards man's perfection, his self-fulfillment, his end—fellowship with his Creator.

The oft-quoted passage in the *Symposium* of Plato (whom along with Aristotle St. Justin Martyr called "the pedagogues of Christ") is the most promising point of departure here.

> He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love, and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and succession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, will be the final cause of all our former toils), a nature not fair in one point of view and foul in another, . . . but beauty absolute, separate, simple and everlasting, which . . . is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties

of all other things. He who ascending from these under the influence of true love, begins to perceive that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is.

Professor Perry himself points out the development and broadening of this "hierarchical conception" in Aristotle and in St. Thomas Aquinas. To the latter, throughout his whole long work, Professor Perry refers but thrice, each time contenting himself with brief quotations from comments on the Angelic Doctor in the *Mediaeval Philosophy* of Professor Maurice De Wulf, but the quotation in this context is well worth repeating.

Doubtless the man who desires good as such, perfect good, does not at once perceive that it is God alone who can fully satisfy the aspirations of his mind and heart. His reason arrives at this conclusion by the gradual elimination of objects other than God. Until this process of reasoning is performed, man seeks for happiness, unaware that God is his happiness.

Professor Perry's sceptical attitude toward such an outlook because it assumes "that the ultimate end of the process should be conceived as directing all of its stages" does not take into account the Aristotelian-Thomistic ordering of the mansions of philosophy. We must remember once more that the schoolman does not approach practical philosophy, axiology, until after he has proved in speculative philosophy (by a long process of reasoning that takes full account of all the facts available from ages of human experience and from all the latest findings of the particular sciences from astronomy to zoology) that all cosmic changes are the results of causes (cosmology), that all causes derive from an uncaused efficient and final cause who is God (ontology and theodicy), and that the nature of God (as expounded in the last chapters of metaphysics) makes it perfectly clear how all His creatures respond with their hierarchy

of appetitions growing ever more explicit, if they are not warped, from the "blindest" electron hurtling out of an exploding atomic nucleus as a beta-particle to a Saint John of the Cross in a supra-rational ecstasy crowning years of the most intense discipline as he meditates on the Blessed Trinity.

It is very significant to note that Professor Perry's animadversions against this doctrine of the "final will or the implicit love of God" together with the closely related theories of "the all-harmonious will or desire in accord with nature," "the absolute will as a necessary presupposition," and "the authoritative or obligatory will," are levelled mainly at versions which are distinctly pantheistic or deistic, at a conception of God either utterly immanent and so either absorbing or absorbed in the totality of finite beings or utterly transcendent and so indifferent and alien to His creatures. Nowhere does he clearly formulate the golden mean of traditional and strictly orthodox Christian theism with its God both transcendent and immanent and His hierarchy of creatures ranging from electrons and stars with their "blind" appetition through plants with their dim immanent actions and animals with their quasi-mechanical but resourceful instincts up to more or less free beings partly or wholly spiritual and torn, precisely because free to make that great surrender which is love, between impulses toward ego-idolatry and impulses to lose themselves to save themselves, reborn with grace, as no longer the merely created but now the adopted children of the only unequivocal Giver, God. In any completely comprehensive axiology one should also have much to say about Augustine's Christian clarification and enrichment of Plato and the tremendous Christian supplementation of Aristotle by Aquinas.

The doctrines of the "all-harmonious will," which was an attenuated Stoical form of Platonism and Aristotelianism, and of the "absolute will," which is a modern idealistic perversion of Christianity, lead us with Perry to the efforts of philosophers to unify or to find a common ground for beauty, goodness, and truth. It makes all the difference in the world whether such a unity is attempted on an epistemological basis, as by the

post-Kantians like Green and Bradley, Windelband, Muensterberg, and Royce, with whom Perry is almost exclusively concerned, or on an ontological basis, as by the Augustinians and Thomists whom he ignores.

The two great Christian philosophers undoubtedly derived a great deal of inspiration and factual material from revealed religion, though never, at least in the case of Aquinas, to the point of basing their philosophy on theology. It must be remembered too that from the beginnings of Christianity, from the days of St. Paul himself on to sub-apostolic writers of the next generations, like St. Justin Martyr and Origen, and so on to Augustine and from Augustine to Anselm and from Anselm to Cajetan, the Christian philosophers were always ready with an apologetics to defend revelation by the reason: the natural philosophical proofs of the existence of God, the historical, archaeological, philological and psychological defense of the Gospels and the divinity of Christ. Since the so-called reformers such as Luther and Calvin and their descendants have done so much to discourage research into what the Catholic calls the rational preamble to faith, modern philosophers of the various non-scholastic, post-Cartesian persuasions have sought, alike from friendly or hostile points of view, to reduce religion to mere emotional or at best vaguely voluntaristic expressions. It is not surprising therefore to find Professor Perry practically ignoring the traditional Christian view, which is the contemporary Catholic view, of human nature as neither all bad, as Calvin and Luther, like the Buddha, tended to describe it, nor all good as Rousseauists liked to believe, nor neither good nor bad (morally neutral) as so-called evolutionary naturalists hold with frequent self-contradictions. In the Christian view, human nature can be both good and bad under the fundamental inspiration of those practical moral judgments called conscience and the more superficial and more feeling-toned impulses toward the primrose path called concupiscence, our heritage of original sin which does not mean for Catholics, as it did for the first Protestants, total depravity, but merely a weakness, a disposition to forget our distinctively human end,

self-realization through attainment to God, for self-attenuation through the idolatrous confusion of values-as-means with values-as-ends.

To this point we will return when we are engaged with Professor Perry's fourth family of values. It is more relevant here to focus on the efforts of some modern post-Cartesians to establish a fundamental identity of beauty, goodness, and truth. This, as has been said, has been unfortunately attempted by modern philosophers on epistemological grounds. More ununfortunately still, these epistemological grounds are less intellectualistic than voluntaristic and consequently make of truth-seeking a mere process of more or less pragmatic valuing by virtue of which truth may even be subordinated to beauty and goodness.

We are here already committed to an ontological view of the interrelations of truth, goodness, and beauty, their fundamental *convergence* in finite beings and their fundamental *identity* within the infinite being who is the creative source of all finite beings, producing these, not out of Himself, but, because He is omnipotent, out of nothing. This view accords a certain primacy to the intellect over the will. So far as man is concerned he must somehow, more or less adequately, *understand* an object before he can *desire* or *value* it. Some being, which is whatever it is, not necessarily one of his own thoughts, is his first object. He finds first that this being is more or less intelligible, that is to say true. As he understands it more or less adequately he finds it more or less apparently or actually desirable, good. Sooner or later he will, if he develops normally, become more or less aware of the fact that the highest good is identical with the Supreme Being, " He who is," God.

What then of beauty in this trinity of spiritual experiences? St. Thomas Aquinas has called it a kind of good. His followers, to the very days of our great contemporary, Jacques Maritain (in his *Art and Scholasticism*), have been unable fully to agree whether this means that beauty is merely a very general property of being or, like good itself, a transcendental attribute with boundaries as wide or rather as limitless as those of being itself.

Here I present, briefly, my own view. God, we have seen, is both transcendent and immanent. He is transcendent because He is absolutely distinct from his creatures. But He is also immanent in the sense that He is not content with creating his creatures *in fieri* but He does, nay He must, if they are not to lapse at once into nothingness, perpetually conceive them *in esse*. He is therefore present in them in many different senses, but for our purposes here we may be content with the recognition of what in ontology and theodicy is called His *operative* presence. Upon this basis I offer the following hypothesis: an object is beautiful to the extent that it reveals—or can reveal—to anyone in a properly contemplative mood the operative presence of Almighty God.

Does this mean that all objects are beautiful? I answer unflinchingly: in so far as they are beings, yes. In so far as they have arrived at their perfection—and all beings, in contrast with non-beings, have gone some distance on the way of fulfillment—yes. In so far as they do not suffer from a lacking, in so far as they are not privative—yes. It is obvious that this beauty, however discernible, is not always discerned even by painters and poets, sculptors and dancers, architects and musicians, be they most sensitive and sane. This brings us to an important set of facts which will also transport us to an appraisal of Professor Perry's fourth family of definitions, his own allegiance, value defined as "any object of any interest."

This formulation seems at first in irreconcilable conflict with the other three types of definitions particularly the third, which has been the most befriended here, the definitions of value in terms of the desirability of an object and of its capacity to arouse desire. We may make ample provision for Professor Perry's favored definition, for our own, and indeed for all four types, by the employment of a distinction which, so far as I know, is in our own day most clearly formulated by Father Ward in his *Philosophy of Value*. Let me quote him with my italics:

> Wherever there is action, there certainly is value; indeed, at such a place, value is demonstrated. But unmistakably there is *static*

value in the mere existent [object] from the beginning, because the existent is a possible aim [end] of action. Yet functional value needs something in addition to *ens* or existent and in addition to this as desirable: to *ens* as desirable, *functional* value adds the element of being desired. This makes a *logical* difference [but not *so* far as the object valued is concerned a real difference, that is to say a difference which is independent of the valuer's mind]. . . . Value . . . *is resident within the existent* [*object*] *always and is functionally there when this is object* [*objective*] *or is sought.* And " good," says Saint Thomas, " is anything " is the thing itself—" in so far as it can be striven for and in so far as it *is the end of conative action.*"

With Father Ward's words in mind we should have no difficulty in accepting wholeheartedly Professor Perry's chosen definition exactly as he phrases it in the title of his fifth chapter: " Value as [is or is in] any object of any interest." To this formulation, however, Perry himself does not hold steadfastly true. He is forever veering towards that subjectivism which is the curse alike of post-Cartesian sceptical or solipsistic epistemology and its parallel relativistic axiology which, consistently held, implies the denial of metaphysics and which, if held with the consistency of despair, must eventuate as intellectual nihilism, the denial of the validity of the reason. The occasions for the Harvard philosopher's divagations, which lead him, when he is more conservative, to attenuate value almost into nothing by identifying it with some mere relation between object and value: and, when he is less wary, to speak of the interest of the valuer as " conferring " value on the object valued—these occasions are real temptations; for he is seeking to account for *all* desires and *all* objects, no matter whether the moralist or the aesthete would call them bad or good. He seeks, with perfect justice, a generic definition which will include every value, angelic or diabolical or, perhaps we should say more precisely, every act of valuing. It is practically impossible for Perry to pass from his too exclusively empirical all-inclusiveness to any sure-footed discovery of the origins and establishment of accurate measurements of the higher values, of the better and the best. This need not arrest

us here. We may safeguard ourselves from the empirical debacle, the same kind of debacle that wrecked the epistemology of Hume, with a revision which will be far from necessitating a rejection of all definitions of the fourth type. All that is essential is to keep consistently in mind Father Ward's contrast of value as functional and value as static. We can illustrate and exemplify the point sufficiently by applying this contrast to the particular value, beauty. We may, with a proper use of the third type of definitions, which pays due emphasis to the different kinds of appetition, apply the same distinction, to all kinds of value. We will indeed observe, as I promised, that there is truth in all four types: that value as static, is quite irrelevant to interest; that the object whether valued or not, is always *valuable, has* value, because it *does*, if functional, or *can* in any case, arouse interest, appetition; that *specific* values arouse specifically qualified conations; and that any object, in so far as it has positive as opposed to privative (a lack of) being, has or is value. To illustrate and to apply then—an object is beautiful in so far as it reveals or has the capacity to reveal the operative presence of God; it is *recognized* as beautiful when that operative presence is—whether consciously or unconsciously, dimly or vividly—*discerned.*

Scholastic philosophy, contrary to much opinion among our contemporaries who ought to know better, begins without any assumption whatever, but merely with the inescapable recognition that there is *something* which is what it is and cannot be itself and something else at the same time and in the same respect. Almost in the same instant, with the recognition of being, we accept the inevitability of becoming, that mutability of things that forever stirs the nostalgia of singers old and new. There is flow everywhere. Yet this very flow would never be discerned as such were there not also permanence. The spiritual pilgrim becomes more and more widely aware of similarities as well as of differences, nay of identities or somehow, somewhere at least one *Basis of* identity. So while poets dream of forgotten beauty and long to conquer immortality with their sighing verses, the philosopher, at the relatively uncritical level

of common sense, becomes a cosmologist and talks of change and quantity, time and space, matter, form and cause, always, it is to be hoped, in healthy give-and-take with the specializing experimental observers of various abstracted aspects of nature, the astronomers and botanists, chemists and geologists, physicists and zoologists.

It is not long before the child and the philosopher are spellbound before the exciting differences between things that live and things that do not, and, among living things, the essential differences between the dainty violet, the gorgeous tiger, and the dazzling knight-at-arms. This is the field of philosophical or rational psychology which ought to flourish in fruitful symbiosis with the physicists and physiologists of the laboratories. From such mutual aid should bourgeon rich wisdom concerning desire, wishes, hope, sorrow, joy. It is just at this point that our investigator would derive immense profit from the encyclopedic enumeration and classification of "modes of interest" surveyed by Professor Perry from biological, psychological, sociological and philosophical points of view in the second part of his *magnum opus*.

It is not, however, until we arrive at the first stage of metaphysics, ontology, that we become critically precise, equally suspicious of the naiveté of common sense and the occasional speculative presumption of the specialist in the particular sciences. Now, in ontology, from the tremendous perspective of all being in every sense of the word, not only living and nonliving but perfect and privative, real and ideal, possible and impossible, relative and absolute, finite and infinite, we learn how to discern in everything positive, approached from the appropriate angle, beauty, goodness, and ontological truth.

In epistemology, the second stage of metaphysics we re-examine truth, this time not from the point of view of being in general but from the point of view of judgments about beings; truth from this aspect appears more distinguishable but even now not wholly isolated from the values pleasant, useful, righteous, and beautiful.

By means of natural philosophy and metaphysics, we come

from our first recognition of something that is what it is, through the observation of billions of billions of moving and changing things minute and immense, to the ultimate source of that ubiquitous change. From our classification of things from the point of view of their unity, truth, goodness and beauty, from the point of view of their substantial existence in themselves or their accidental existence in adjoining substances, we are steadily advancing toward theodicy or natural theology, the crowning stage of metaphysics, wherein we contemplate with awed eyes the meridian reality of the uncreated being, the absolutely one, true, good and beautiful God.

From this height we turn back, in the axiological or practical philosophies of economics and morals and art, to reconsider man's place in the universe from the point of view not of his understanding but of his appetitions, his yearnings trivial and fathomless, in the light of the vistas of the speculative philosophies. From this perspective, we can fully appreciate why all the greatest philosophers from Plato to Augustine, from Augustine to Aquinas and from Aquinas to Kant, have united in defining aesthetic appetition as contemplation, non-possessive, disinterested, sheer delight. If I am correct in calling an object beautiful to the extent that in it the operative presence of God is or can be discerned, wittingly or unwittingly, we can understand how the artist or art-lover or nature-lover thrills, suspended as it were in an ecstasy of the purest joy, content with the intense activity of adoration, on tiptoe with a mood preludial to what the dogmatic theologian, in describing the Sacrament of the Eucharist, calls "the fervor of charity." Valuing, from its homeliest to its highest, is, if wholesomely carried out, whether we are aware of it or not, nothing less than an evolving imitation of Christ who showed us how to strive to be perfect as His heavenly Father is perfect. Human valuing, at its homeliest and highest, when it is unequivocally human—in eating, loving and dying—as our deeper conscience prevails over our shallower conscience, valuing in all its forms, utilitarian, moral and aesthetic, is, I repeat it, an imitation of Christ. Of these values desired, the utilitarian ones merely

serve as means to discover further values, intrinsic goods, some of which adumbrate more and more luminously the beatific vision, none more alluringly than beauty which is, as Keats said in *Endymion*, " a joy forever," because as Keats more clearly divined in " The Ode to a Grecian Urn " it is ultimately identifiable with truth in God, for, when we discern the beauty in an object, we discern in it and under it the perpetually sustaining hand of God.

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IN SEARCH OF A HAPPY ENDING

O'er land and sea love follows with fond prayers
Its dear ones in their troubles, grief and cares;
There is no spot
On which it does not drop this tender dew,
Except the grave, and there it bids adieu,
And prayeth not!

—STODDARD, "*In Memoriam*"

THE foregoing lines seem to sum up rather well the conclusion with which the novels which we read in our maturity supplant the endings of the fairy tales we read in childhood. Once our stories ended: "And so they lived happily ever after." Now we are older and more enlightened and the better stories, though marked with passing bliss, prefer to reach their term in stark despair and utter dashing of hopes. If the happy couple do not find shipwreck before, the sacrificial novelist leads all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave—but to the grave. And there he "bids adieu and prayeth not."

Our Prince elopes with Cinderella—only to divorce her some time later. They had hoped for too much; the gods do not smile on such dreams. Cinderella moons away on her alimony and the Prince drags his bruised and battered heart sadly through an unfeeling world. Grant them the prospect of happiness without alloy, then just as Cinderella and her Prince are about to drive off in the pumpkin carriage to some castle of dreams, a mad goblin will appear on the scene and stab our Prince to the heart, leaving him to expire in the arms of the heart-broken Cinderella. This situation occurs in Maurice Baring's *Friday's Business*,[1] wherein the hero, having at last discovered his beloved, is more or less casually murdered in a Balkan revolution which promptly melts away a few moments

[1] Maurice Baring, *Friday's Business* (London: 1932).

later. The tragic future of the beloved is left to the reader's imagination. As he closes such a book, he can hear the spirit of the author saying: "Sorry, old man, I'd like to give you a happy ending, but life is just not like that, and as a truthful observer of life, I can't lie to you and delude you." As far as *life* goes, we must admit the author has done a good job of reporting.

The champions of fairy tales may denounce modern authors as downright pessimistic and perverse, but most of us feel more inclined to applaud them for their effort at truthfulness, even if it must hurt. If they do not settle the problem, at least they do not evade it but follow their human models to their logical, even if tragic, conclusion.[2] The problem is age-old. Love, that perfect union of hearts which has the tendency to be complete and eternal, is constantly menaced by the whims of fate and fortune, and is ultimately sundered by its inexorable enemy, death. In story-telling it is quite possible to overcome ill fortune by the stroke of the pen and to evade death simply by saying "they lived happily ever after" in keeping with Pascal's maxim: "Men, unable to remedy death, sorrow and ignorance, determine, in order to make themselves happy, not to think on these things."[3] In life, not so. Hence stories which aim to be a mirror of life, and not mere products of the imagination and momentary "opium for the people" feel obliged to

[2] Such cannot be said of *all* modern novels. Some, no less successful, shake off the logical implications leading to a tragic conclusion. Thus, in *Marriage Is A Private Affair* by Judith Kelly, whereas logically and psychologically husband and wife are cutting themselves adrift from one another by an abortion, this tragedy, by an insidious and post-childhood use of the fairy tale technique, is neatly transformed into the prospect of a glowing future of fast-knit happiness for the guilty pair.

Novels incorporating such unjustifiable metamorphosis of evil into good and such gratuitous re-routing of human nature evade the problem encountered by novels in which the characters strive earnestly and rationally for happiness, yet seem relentlessly baulked by fate. The former thus prematurely nullify what value they might have as insight into human destiny while the latter throw up the problem squarely, if cruelly. The latter occupy our attention here.

[3] Les hommes n'ayant pu guérir la mort, la misère, l' ignorance, se sont avisés, pour se rendre heureux, de ne point y penser (*Les Pensées*). Cf. C. Kegan Paul, *The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal* (London: 1885), p. 38.

present their blissful unions as menaced by adversities and ultimately destructible by death.

Confronted by such inevitable reality, one must, on comparing the heart's desires with the fruition they attain, pronounce existence as something truly tragic, since love, which is life at its best and fullest, is irretrievably doomed. However, the heart does not give up easily, driven as it is by its perpetual yearning. It enshrines the histories of those who have fought the battle for love's victory over fortune and death. The tales that have lived the longest among men are, at their core, love stories, whether mythical or historical. Such are the stories of Pygmalion and Galatea, Abelard and Heloise, Dante and Beatrice, Romeo and Juliet. The most touching stories of the Old Testament are of love and friendship, as those of Abraham and Sara, Isaac and Rebecca, Jacob and Rachel, David and Jonathan.

> Love rules the court, the camp, the grove,
> And men below, and saints above.[4]

Tragic and unsatisfactory as it may be, love can still exact and obtain the highest sacrifices from man. "A man shall give all the substance of his house for love, and count it as nothing." It is more than a banal commonplace to say "Love makes the world go round." Love is the union of man with what he most desires, a union embracing all that is good to him. It is this urge which drives him through the years and to all his enterprises. Somehow, man cannot be convinced that love cannot survive the hinderances of fate and that one final obstacle which incorporates them all, death. Even if the transition from childhood to maturity, from dreams to life, is paralleled by the transition in our reading tastes from imaginative fairy tales to realistic novels, nevertheless one retains at heart a penchant for the fairy tale *motif*. Even if those cynical people, contemporary authors, have ceased to believe in fairy tales, deep down we have not.

While grown-ups torture their hearts with the most sombre

[4] Alfred Lord Tennyson, *The Lay of the Last Minstrel*, Canto III, Stanza I.

and melancholy tales which drip from the pens of our self-sacrificing writers and drown love in wells of despondency, as in *Winesburg, Ohio*,[5] nevertheless they carefully keep this horrid truth from their children. With sublime optimism they feed their young on fairy tales wherein all is sunshine, and true love shortly attains its goal over the carcasses of several easily skewered dragons. Somehow they do not feel deceitful about cramming youth with such illusory optimism. Deep down in their hearts they are still playing Cinderella and the Prince, still hoping that their dreams will come true, if not for them, for these little ones.

When, on growing older we discover to our chagrin that after having put a few scaly, flame-throwing dragons—or their contemporary equivalent—out of the way, we are not necessarily going to live happily ever after, that is not sufficient reason to dismiss fairy tales as an insult to the intelligence. When we are politely reminded that good bookkeepers are more in demand than potential giant killers, it is not quite fair to reproach the fairy tales with having ill-prepared us for life. The myth of Santa-Claus gradually evaporates as one becomes more and more aware of his parental understudy, yet the dismissal of the jolly old gentleman in the red suit from the realm of reality is not an excuse to cease all giving and to strike Christmas from the calendar because Santa Claus is not real. Santa Claus is a symbol of Christmas adapted to childlike minds. He is not to be supplanted by a void, but by a truer, deeper, and far more sublime understanding of Christmas. The basic concept is sound and unchanging. So with fairy tales.

To despair of life because fairy tales do not come true is like doing away with Christmas because there is no Santa Claus. Authors, those seers of the people, have sought to see fairy tales come true in life, to satisfy us. Tracing the lives of the modern counterparts of the stout hearted knights in armor and their fair and loyal damsels, they have seemed to perceive, to their disappointment and ours, that fairy godmothers are noticeably lacking, that wicked stepmothers often carry off the day,

[5] Sherwood Anderson, *Winesburg, Ohio* (New York: 1919). See "Mother."

and that modern economics and bureaucracy are far more devastating than the most ill-humored dragons. Our Prince may not be a good business man, yet Cinderella must have her hats. After many ups and downs the whole affair is just as liable to end in the moat instead of the dream-castle. The ending lines ". . . and so they lived happily ever after," are simply out of the question. Hence they sorrowfully conclude to the bankruptcy of the fairy tale and put it aside as a design for living, to give us in its place the apparently hard, unimaginative facts of reality, momentarily brightened by a heroism pathetic with despair and hopelessness.

This indictment of the fairy tale we wish to challenge. Like Santa Claus, fairy tales are prompted by a concept that is fundamentally sound and of which they are the imaginative and sketchy representation. This concept is of the possibility of human happiness which consists in the union of hearts. If the concept embodied in the fairy tale fails to attain realization in life, one possible explanation is, of course, that the concept is false and illusory. However, if the concept is sound and fails to attain realization, then the explanation must be that it is the application of the concept and not the concept itself which is at fault. Just as Christmas seems to lose its freshness and joy as one grows older because one has failed to grasp its inner meaning, so it is our aim to show that it is also a misconception that leads to the discarding of the visions and hopes of childhood embodied in fairy tales. Our thesis is to show that, if properly understood, fairy tales really do come true in life.

As already mentioned, we here consider the novel of maturity as the natural successor of the fairy tale of childhood. In it we shall try to perceive whether there is not some misconception which causes it to attain conclusions so diametrically opposed to those of its precursor, the fairy tale. We do not seek a defect of literary form, but rather a defect of philosophy. Having detected such a defect, we shall try to trace the conclusion a novel should reach, at least *implicitly*, if it is really to embrace life in all its meaning. Here again the intention is not literary, but philosophical. Just as the fairy tale embodies the philoso-

phy of childhood, so the novel aims to embody the philosophy of maturity. We feel the philosophy thus presented is unnecessarily pessimisitic and obscure, and we would like, in the interests of truth, to oppose it with a philosophy at once more real and more optimistic. For the satisfaction of other disappointed readers and our own, we should like to lay bare and verify the principles which allow a sanguine interpretation of destiny and supply its logical conclusion.

The facts of the modern novel of the dead-end finish are not here in question. It is possible to admit that in their depiction of trials and hardships they are true and unassailable. It is the *interpretation* of these facts which is in question. It is vain for an author to protest that he has no desire to interpret, that he merely wishes to hold a mirror to life and leave interpretation to the reader. One must inevitably have a concept of the end to which the story will tend before beginning the story. It is this concept of the end which determines the evolution the characters follow. It is solely the end which distinguishes the fairy tale from the pessimistic novel. If our hero and heroine live happily ever after, after chalking up the last dragon, it is a fairy tale. If they do not live happily ever after, it is a modern novel. Whether the hero is encased in shining armor or merely a ready-made suit, whether the heroine goes to the ball in glass slippers or something quite conventional, whether the dragon breathes fire or is merely a pneumonia germ, whether the witch has a hook nose and rides on a broom by the light of the moon, or disseminates advice on birth control in an irreproachably polite way, is purely accidental. Cinderella and our Prince have quite as much to contend with in the modern novel as they did in the fairy tale. Above all, they must contend with death, which in fairy tales is only reserved for the wicked. Will they, can they, " live happily ever after? " Can their union not only survive

> . . . the whips and scorns of time,
> The oppressors wrong, the proud man's contumely,
> The insolence of office, . . .

but even the departure of one of them to

The undiscovered country from whose bourn
No traveller returns, . . . ?[6]

If we wish to see the verification of the fairy tale ending, ". . . and so they lived happily *ever* after," that union must survive.

However, very few self-respecting novelists permit themselves such a happy ending, even temporarily, on this side of the grave, let alone eternally after death. To present a so-called movie finish except in rare cases would be felt naïve and would be mildly scoffed at. Nevertheless, despite our outward cynicism, the heart refuses to be disillusioned. Are we to believe that chapters of life's story replete with heroism quite worthy of the most inspiring *conte de fé* must end, blankly and bleakly? Must all " that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave . . . lead but to the grave? " Two who have lived and loved are torn asunder by the cruel circumstances of rank, money, hatred, misunderstanding, distance, loss. Shall they never be united? Shall that yearning union of two strong hearts which, through the firm hope of eventual union, can survive and surmount the separation of distance, of station, of time, of force, of calumny, be annihilated by death and left forever undone? Take for instance this brief recital of a tragedy of the present war, written by a Polish girl who served in one of her country's hospitals. " Sister Mary was engaged before the war to a young lieutenant. They were to be married in September. War broke out. He left for the front. She went to work in the hospital. The third day of the war a cannon ball tore off the head of the lieutenant. Precise and energetic, Sister Mary went on working in the hospital every day, as if nothing had happened." And the writer ends, " the war had destroyed the home, the life, the family, the youth of each of us." [7] Is he who proves his love by dying to be less rewarded than he who lives to enjoy the presence of his beloved? Souls have sworn eternal love. Have they sworn in vain? Is this to be but an empty jest, a childish dream that death sweeps away?

[6] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. I.

[7] Marta Wankowicz, " I Nursed the Nazis in a Polish Hospital," *America*, Nov. 2, 1940.

Not only does the public from time to time, claim from its writers a good straightforward happy ending, but in daily life men go on making supreme sacrifices in the hope of love's ultimate triumph, no matter how dark the future may be painted. This hope and confidence cannot be eradicated by any amount of somber philosophy or sad experience, because it is an innate desire of human nature, and as such is indestructible, no matter how much its fruition, may be thwarted or misled. "The friendship was never true that can have an end" (St. Jerome).

Some few authors, recognizing the heart's indestructible conviction, leave us rays of hope shining through the darkening twilight as in Hilton's *We Are Not Alone.*

"But never—*never*—to see you again!"

"Maybe you will. If there's a next world, I'll try to find you in it as I found you in this. There will be other worlds, surely, or maybe this world over again . . . worlds in which the things we have won't be wasted like this."

* * *

"Come with me, go with me, I don't know where, but there are a few of us, we make a good company already, we carry love in our hearts, we are not alone. . . ."[8]

Some seem to envision a greater love lifting human love to greater, eternal heights, broadening it into a love of all men, merging it with an infinite, eternal, all-powerful and divine love, as in Ernest Raymond's *A Family That Was.*[9] But these few are vague, groping, merely refusing to smother the last sparks of their hearts' yearning as the final darkness closes in around them. That is all that we are left of childhood's ". . . and so they lived happily ever after."

Where can be found a story which will embody at once the realism of the novel and the happy ending of the fairy tale? Where is there a philosophy which dares to face life at its worst and yet promise clearly defined victory and the satisfaction of all the heart's desires? One has not far to search. Both the fairy

[8] James Hilton, *We are Not Alone* (New York: 1937), pp. 201, 215.

[9] Ernest Raymond, *A Family That Was* (London: 1929).

tale and the novel are half-truths. The fairy tale is only half-true because by artificial and purely imaginative means it arrives at a happy ending. The modern novel is only half-true because by a real portrayal of life it arrives at an ending which is both somber and fictitious. Taking the half which is true in both the fairy tale and the novel and uniting them one has real life with a happy ending. This perfect, substantial whole is found in the source from which both the fairy tale and the novel have wandered.

This source is, as a story, the *Lives* of the saints as written about them; as a philosophy, the lives of the saints as lived by them. A perfect union is achieved in the *Lives* of the saints, a type of reading which once occupied both the place of fairy tales in child life, and that of novels in grown estate. The saints give us the perfect realistic novel with the perfect fairy tale ending. They do not leave their heroes and admirers with a technical knowledge of how to dispatch imaginary monsters, but rather teach the child how to overcome the very real dragons of life: sadness, poverty, sickness, loneliness, disappointment, and that worst ogre of them all, death. They write that last chapter which turns the tragic ending of the novel into a triumph.

At the time of the Reformation, so called, the notion of human destiny was revised by Calvinism. Henceforth the good were to be rewarded in this life, and wealth and prosperity became the mark of virtue. It was very easy to incorporate this philosophy into tales for children. If they were good and honest, they should grow up rich and prosperous, marry happily, and live on the fat of the land. The novels of the eighteenth century became pleasantly naturalistic. Rousseau's *Emile* would grow up in the woods, where his naturally good nature would flower into virtue. Later he would marry a wife equally virtuous by her naturalistic upbringing, and both would live on happily, with their children, among the fields and flowers, unhampered by care or trouble. Heaven had been brought right down on earth. The Heaven above could now be dispensed with and forgotten, which it was.

However, it did not take long for clear thinking and honest writers to perceive that such was not the case. Despite any amount of wishful thinking, the good, beginning with Job, rarely prosper materially in this vale of tears. Now came the tragedy. The Heaven above had been forgotten, the heaven on earth had vanished into thin air once it ventured from the pages of the imaginative novel. There was no Heaven where true love might find its perfection. There was only the, at best, passing happiness of a few brief moments of bliss for the few here below, for the many hardship and disaster, and for all the bitter ending of death cutting short the heart's hopes of enduring happiness with those it loves. Witness Lamartine in *Le Lac*, a key strophy of which may be crudely rendered as follows:

Let us love, therefore, let us love!
With haste enjoy the fleeting day!
Man has no port, and time no shore;
It flows on, and we pass away! [10]

Hence the modern pessimistic novel, shortsighted, hopeless, but true as far as it goes, which is a very short way. The fairy tale has survived precisely because it does not pretend to be real. It was destined to be a vehicle for childhood dreams of happiness. It answers and corresponds to the very real and innate desire of the human heart for perfect happiness. If the terms in which that happiness was couched were made unnecessarily materialistic and earthy, they were left sufficiently vague and fantastic to be unattackable. These terms are just realistic enough to cause disillusionment when one grows up and really puts one's dreams to the test. The result of the test is incorporated in our pessimistic novel.

Our modern novelists and our modern philosophers have not been able to lend an optimistic contour to the shape of things

[10] Aimons donc, aimons donc! de l'heure fugitive,
Hâtons-nous, jouissons!
L'homme n'a point de port, le temps n'a point de rive;
Il coule, et nous passons!

(From *Le Lac*, printed in *Les Méditations Poétiques* of Alphonse Louis de Lamartine.)

to come. They are well aware of the desires and aspirations of the human heart, but when they confront them with what seems should be their accomplishment in this vale of tears, the result seems very sad indeed, and as such is committed to their copy books. They cannot explain why man, so naturally good, can become the slave of his passions and quite unreasonable, despite every logical inducement to do that which is good. The painfully consistent pattern of front-page romances which begin with all the glamor and eclat of the fairy tale and end in the uninspiring and ungallant atmosphere of the divorce courts defies them. Worse still, while it is not beyond comprehension that certain marriages of convenience wherein youthful beauty becomes the bride of ancient wealth, or a title is wed to a gold mine, should go on the rocks, yet how can they explain why a loyal and loving couple who are good, industrious, and kind to all, should be visited by a merciless fate with adversities innumerable, poverty, and human malice? They are obliged to throw up the sponge as far as ultimate happiness is concerned, in favor of a sacrificial stoicism eventually rewarded with a merciful oblivion, an attitude well expressed in Alfred de Vigny's poem, *La Mort du Loup*, in which the hunter reads in the eyes of the fierce, dying wolf brought to bay, which has paid with its life to make good the escape of the she-wolf and its cubs, this grim exhortation:

> Do with energy thy task long and heavy,
> In the Fate-chos'n way not of thy seeking,
> And then, as I, suffer and die without speaking.[11]

[11] Fais énergiquement ta longue et lourde tâche
Dans la voie où le sort a voulu t'appeler,
Puis, apres, comme moi, souffre et meurs sans parler.

(From *La Mort du Loup*, printed in *Poèmes Philosophiques* by Alfred de Vigny. The poem is said to have been inspired by a passage in Byron's *Childe Harold*:

> . . . Mute
> The camel labors with the heaviest load,
> *And the wolf dies in silence*, not bestow'd
> In vain should such example be: if they
> Things of ignoble or of savage mood,
> Endure and shrink not, we of nobler clay
> May temper it to bear,—it is but for a day.)

It is more mildly put in Elizabeth Bowen's *Death of the Heart.* Major Brutt endeavors to console Portia whose heart has been broken by a callous youth who has grown weary of her affection.

"How can you say 'first?'" she said. "This can't happen again."

"Oh, one forgets, you know. One can always patch oneself up."

"No. Is this being grown up?"[2]

The only possible optimism available is by promising one a collective, impersonal happiness in the ultimate evolution of humanity to an era of supreme longevity and comfort, which is not a very comforting explanation to two people who hope to see one another again and are told that in the future they will not be themselves at all, or, in fact, anybody. Of course, there is no proof of all this. It is a way out and not a very cheering one, which our hopeful visionaries ask us to take on faith. The modern era began by rejecting faith, and now its only solace is to contrive a faith of its own, inadequate and contradictory and groundless. They realize the necessity of a vision, the vision discarded by the Reformation.

This vision, which is Christian Faith, can alone face the disasters and hardships of life, and bring about a happy ending. We do not say *promise* a happy ending, but bring about a happy ending. Just as the philosophy of the modern novel, if lived out, will lead to tragedy, so the Faith, if lived out, will lead to happiness. Modern philosophies are first concocted, disseminated in literature, and then followed with disastrous results. The Faith is first lived, and the results of living it are set down in those perfect "novels" which are the *Lives* of the saints. Reading them we find all the trials and hardships of novels and of life, but in the end we find a truly happy ending triumphing over death and pain. They look upon the world as it really is—and seek elsewhere for the solace of its troubles. These lives are no mere literary artifice. They were lived first and their result set down. Those who live according to the same principles, will attain the same happy ending.

[2] Elizabeth Bowen, *The Death of the Heart* (New York: 1939), p. 384.

Both novels and *Lives* of the saints teach and influence us consciously or unconsciously since both treat of life, and every deliberate act of a human being, either at work or at diversion, is aimed at discovering and securing a perfect happy life. Just as novels seek to ferret out a happy life without the faith, so the *Lives* of the saints portray the pursuit of a happy life with the faith. The subject matter, humanity, is the same. It is the presence or absence of the faith which leads to the diametrically opposed conclusions. Hence we shall endeavor, by outlining the design for living embodied in the faith, to show how it, applied to life, can both face far more adequately the facts of life portrayed in the novel, and infinitely surpass the fairy tale in its attainment of a happy ending. Once again this is not done by way of proposing a new literary genre, but by way of providing an outline of happiness parallel to that which the novel, the unconscious Bible of so many, endeavors to do but at which, if it is true to life's realities, it must admit that it is not a success. We have said that love is at the core of all stories of striving for happiness, just as the love of God and man is at the core of all life's striving for happiness. Hence we shall see how the faith makes this love come true far better than the novelist's imagination.

The faith solves the problem of life's hardships and disappointments coupled with the simultaneous yearning of the heart for unlimited, perpetual happiness by setting them in their true perspective with the doctrines of original sin and eternal life. The ignorance of these doctrines on which human destiny is based leads to disaster and chaos. The embracing and living of them leads to happiness, for they represent the divine economy by which man is to attain the fruition of the desires implanted in him by his Creator. These two doctrines complement each other. The first explains why man does not attain to natural happiness on this earth despite its apparent possibility; the second brings within reach the happiness which he desires but no longer finds here below.

The desires of man's heart for earthly happiness do not deceive him. They once found their perfect fruition in the

garden of Eden, and would have continued to do so for all men but for the fall of our first parents. The mistake of writers who seek earthly happiness for their characters does not lie in the fact that such desires are illusory, but in the fact that the state in which they found their fruition no longer exists. It is the ignorance of this fact which brings the dreams of natural happiness to the dead-end they encounter in life and in the novel which strives to portray the facts of life. However, by way of strengthening our confidence in the future happiness we are to enjoy, it is well to note how the God who will give it to us, knew how to provide an earthly happiness for our first parents such as the most optimistic of our naturalistic novelists never dared to envisage in the most generous concepts of his imagination. With this illustration that no one can make man happier than God, that no one can devise and provide man with greater happiness than God, we will be better prepared to conceive the infinity and satisfaction of the future happiness He will give to us in Heaven.

The joy which our first parents enjoyed in the garden of Paradise is more easily grasped by our sensible natures. In order to bring out the sublimity of the future joy which those who love one another will enjoy in Heaven, it is fitting to describe the joys of our first parents, which are at once only a token of the joys of Heaven, and yet far surpass in human earthly happiness anything that a novelist or a teller of fairy tales would have desired for his hero and heroine. If Divine Providence could satisfy the desires of man so knowingly and well, certainly when it promises greater joys, it will fulfil its promise proportionately. All of which is not surprising when one stops to consider that man's desire for love and happiness are not creations of his own but appetites placed in him by the God Who made him. It is God Who made a wife for Adam from his own rib, and caused him to love her. The joys he hopes for from this union are not something that he has snatched from a bitter fate, but a gift which God has given him and of which he owes even the minutest pleasures to God's benevolence.

Considering the garden of Paradise as the end of a perfect

novel, let us consider what the reader would exact for his hero and heroine and how these things could be achieved, or rather how they would be achieved. In one word, what is demanded is happiness. Happiness consists in the possesion of the good which one desires. The goods which our heroine and hero would desire are the following. First come the goods of the heart and soul: their peaceful love and possession of each other and their children in a single happiness; next are the goods of the mind: perfect, clear all-fathoming knowledge that could appreciate all the beauty of their situation. Then comes perfect control over the body—no sudden fits of impatience or sadness that the mind could not control. Lastly there are the goods of the body itself: beauty, health, immortality. Externally they would require a world so equipped that it would yield them its fruits without the curse and burden of uncongenial labor, a climate that would always shield them. Finally, since no man can be happy while his fellow men are in distress, an equal happiness must be claimed for all men, for all the children of Adam and Eve. All this was perfectly fulfilled in Paradise, all and more.

The first surpassing thing about Paradise is that our first parents did not have to wade through hardships and overcome obstacles to become happy; they were created in perfect bliss. To emphasize even more the close union of these two who loved one another, Eve was taken from the rib of Adam so that he might love her more, and cleave to her inseparably since he knew that she had been taken from himself.[13] Of the passions the happy pair had only the pleasing ones, and an imperturable love of God. Of fear and pain and unrequited desire there was none, only joy, and love, and hope of a future good to be had in due time, desire and hope which did not afflict.[14] Though some would be stronger, more intelligent, more beautiful, yet none would suffer any defect of mind or body.[15] As long as Adam and Eve and their descendants obeyed God, they were to be preserved from death.[16] Divine Providence and his own

[13] Cf. Summa Theol. I, q. 92, a. 2.
[14] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 95, a. 1.
[15] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 96, a. 3.
[16] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 97, a. 1.

reason preserved man from every ill.[17] They would live together in such concord that there would be no need for a division of property.[18] The sensible pleasures which the descendants of Adam and Eve would have had, would have been even greater than any experienced now, since their nature was purer and their physical make-up more sensitive. They were not to live as angels but as men. Continence then would not have been laudable as now, because there was no danger of lust to be avoided.[19] There would have been as many men as women, each sex contributing to the perfection of human nature, just as the diverse degrees of things contribute to the perfection of the universe.[20] Yet Adam and Eve had not yet reached the peak of their happiness; they had not yet seen God. Of the place where they lived, the garden of Eden (which means, translated from the Hebrew, *pleasure*) St. John Damascene wrote that it was a divine region and worthy of the life led there which was according to the image of God. What work Adam would have done would not have been laborious as now, but joyful because of experiencing the power of his nature.[21] After a period of enjoying this heavenly Paradise, man was to be brought to Heaven to share the infinitely more joyful angelic life of the angels and the divine life of God.

Few, if any novelists in their most extravagant descriptions of earthly bliss could approach the description of the mutual happiness of Adam and Eve as described by St. Augustine in the *City of God*. "There is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race. And human nature has nothing more appropriate, either for the prevention of discord, or for the healing of it, where it exists, than the remembrance of that first parent of us all, whom God was pleased to create alone, that all men might be derived from one, and that they might thus be admonished to preserve unity among their whole multitude. From the fact that the woman was made for him from his side, it was plainly meant that we would learn how dear the bond

[17] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 97, a. 2, ad 4.
[18] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 98, a. 1, ad 3.
[19] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 98, a. 2, ad 3.
[20] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 99, a. q, ad 3.
[21] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 102, a. 3.

between man and wife should be. . . . Their love for God was unclouded, and their mutual affection was that of faithful and sincere marriage; and from this love flowed a wonderful delight, because they always enjoyed what was loved." [22] Here one has the "happily ever after" for which the heart intuitively gropes—existing not as a fairy tale but as a reality.

"Adam had food that he might not hunger, drink that he might not thirst, the tree of life that old age might not waste him. There was in his body no corruption, nor seed of corruption, which could produce in him any unpleasant sensation. He feared no inward disease, no outward accident. Soundest health blessed his body, absolute tranquillity his soul. As in Paradise there was no excessive heat or cold, so its inhabitants were exempt from the vicissitudes of fear and desire. No sadness of any kind was there, nor any foolish joy; true gladness ceaselessly flowed from the presence of God. . . . The honest love of husband and wife made a sure harmony between them. Body and spirit worked harmoniously together, and the commandment was kept without labor. No languor made their leisure wearisome; no sleepiness interrupted their desire to labor." [23] Here we recognize the setting of the perfect fairy tale come true.

The mistake of the novelists is to conclude from the fact that one does not live happily ever after here below to the fact that it is impossible to live happily ever after anywhere. Faith shows us by the example of our first parents that our intuition of such happiness is correct—and effaces its inaccomplishment here below by its ineffably happy fulfilment in Heaven. *Vita mutatur, non tollitur.* "The body will not only be better than it was here in its best estate of health, but it will surpass the bodies of our first parents ere they sinned" (St. Augustine). It is with this wisdom of faith that Pope Leo XIII writes in *Rerum Novarum*: "The things of earth cannot be understood or valued aright without taking into consideration the life to

[22] St. Augustine, *The City of God* (Translated by Marcus Dods: Edinburgh: 1878), bk. XXVII, 27.

[23] *Ibid.*, bk. XIV, 26.

come, the life that will know no death. Exclude the idea of futurity, and forthwith the very notion of what is good and right would perish: nay, the whole scheme of the universe would become a dark and unfathomable mystery. The great truth which we learn from Nature herself is also the grand Christian dogma on which Religion rests as on its foundation—that when we have given up this present life, then shall we really begin to live." [24] "Even the righteous himself does not live as he wishes, until he has arrived where he cannot die, be deceived or injured, and until he is assured that this shall be his eternal condition. For this nature demands; and nature is not fully and perfectly blessed till it attains what it seeks." [25]

The garden of Eden was to have been surpassingly the happy ending which modern novelists would like to place at the end of their books and the modern reader would like to read. But even those who have the "simplicity" to believe in the existence in the past of such a heaven of delights on this our uncertain planet, are inclined to murmur wistfully: "It might have been." That is in keeping with pessimism and despair. But the God who devised such delights for man as he himself would not dare to hope for, is not petty in His providence. In His justice, He deprived mankind of its earthly Paradise, but in His mercy He restored to mankind the goal and the overflowing, inconceivable bliss of the term of earthly Paradise, namely, the eternal joy of Heaven, fully and abundantly won for us all by His own infinitely loving Son. Some people, conceiving Heaven as a place whose inhabitants sit on clouds and play harps, consider it a monotonous and none too desirable prospect. They conceive Heaven precisely as the loss of all earthly joys in return for a vague, colorless and insensible spirituality—as if God had not given them the very joys they fear to lose in Heaven. It is impossible to pause and examine the inanities, fallacies and all manner of inconsistent reasoning embodied in this concept. Suffice it to outline the particular aspect of Heaven as it is the goal and completion of all the very real desires of this earthly, fleshly life. We consider Heaven as the

[24] Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum.* [25] St. Augustine, *op. cit.*, bk. XIV, 25.

unwritten last chapter of life. If life limits itself to the rigid present, it comes to a dead-end and a very hopeless one at that, since the garden of Paradise, once man's, is now no longer to be had. Heaven remains as the one other possible alternative for the happy fulfilment of man's innate longing for love and happiness.

The future happiness of Heaven is believed by our faith in our risen Lord. The joys of Heaven are joys promised by Him to us, and which we are to share as His brothers and sisters. Although the principal and essential happiness of Heaven consists in the spiritual vision of God, we here consider Heaven as it also completes and fulfils the desires of terrestrial life. The happiness of our first parents, around which all their other joys centered, consisted in the loving friendship and society of Adam and Eve, of man and woman, forming a single entity which was the prototype and essence of all human existence. In this union still consists the natural happiness of man in general. Nature itself has ordained it, and the experience of all ages has confirmed it. The attainment of this happiness is the theme of the fairy tale, the impelling motive of the modern novel. To the bewildered novelist who has reached the end of the thread ruthlessly cut in twain by the Parcae, we offer Heaven as a happy ending. This is not said jocosely. We are not presenting Heaven as a literary device, but since we have considered the novel as a mirror of the thoughts and aspirations of the times, as a certain setting forth of the problem of mankind accompanied by its solution, as a kind of device by which humanity may look at itself and consider various solutions to its problems in a theoretical way, using characters and personages to represent the people of real life, in short, just as the novel is presented as a transcript of life and its ending not only as literature but as a real evaluation of the outcome of human existence, so also we present the ensuing description of Heaven, not as a way of adding synthetic cheer to novels but rather as a happy solution, or frankly, the one and only solution, of life's difficulties.

Life is not one thing and Heaven another, each with its own beginning and ending. Life is the beginning and Heaven is the

ending of one complete existence. Heaven is part of life, its completion. To consider life without Heaven is to look at the leaf and ignore the tree, to hear the single note and ignore the symphony, to look at an eye or a tooth as a complete entity and expect to see in them the beauty of the human face to which they are ordained. In a certain country churchyard there are graven on a moss-covered tombstone the words David spoke of his dead child: " I shall go to him rather, but he shall not return to me." [26] We cannot call our loved ones back to us, but we have not lost them. Rather we shall soon go to them, which is far better. Such is the thought so beautifully expressed in the Preface of the Mass for the Dead: " For the life of thy faithful, O Lord, is changed, not destroyed; and when the home of this earthly life is dissolved, an everlasting dwelling in Heaven shall be gained." This life is so real, that we cannot conceive of anything but darkness and oblivion beyond its pale, whereas with all its reality, this life is but the transitory shadow of the even more real, more vivid, more definitely full and living life to come. But just as sunny days make us gay and rainy days make us sad according to our manner of letting the emotions do our reasoning, so we let the absence of sensible persuasion infer to us that Heaven cannot compare with " the warm precincts of the cheerful day." [27] Songs and stories, unstrengthened by any definite concept of the future, not daring to claim any such brimming happiness for miserable man, at best lose themselves in vague, vaporous generalities when they reach death.

But Heaven is most definitely a place, even more of a place than this world, which shall be overtaken by a complete change on the last day. There in the city of God, husband, wife, father, mother and children, lovers, friends, shall be united. God is love and the happiness of the blessed is love, a love so all-absorbing that it has been the tendency of heretics to augment the union of this love to the annihilation of all personality in divine substances. This, of course, is false, as the blessed shall love God, and one another with infinitely satisfying divine love

[26] *II Kings*, xii, 23. [27] Thomas Gray, *Elegy in a Country Churchyard.*

while remaining themselves, as the members of the Holy Trinity love and enjoy one another infinitely while constituting Three Persons. It is noteworthy that the infinite, eternal, divine happiness, the prototype and cause of all happiness does not consist in the happiness of one, but in the happiness of society, that of the Three Persons of the Most Holy Trinity. Indeed, it is in this happiness and all-encompassing mutual love that the blessed share. "O how blessed is this company! The least of them is more beautiful to behold than the whole world; what will it be to behold them all? But, O my God, how blessed they are! They ever sing the sweet canticle of everlasting love; they ever rejoice with a gladness that is unfailing; they exchange one with another ineffable pleasures, and live in the consolation of a happy and indissoluble society." [28]

Here at last is found the happy ending of the story which broke off so tragically on earth. The young wife who has gone through life without her husband will find him again, never more to be separated from him, and will love him with a love made all the greater by the years of sacrifice endured for her beloved's sake. Here the mother will find again her dear children, taken from her flesh, whose being and happiness are so dear to her as to be a part of herself. Here the lovers whom this life parted and kept asunder, will meet in mutual love, proven and rendered priceless by perpetul fidelity or the supreme sacrifice of the giving of one's life. Friends will meet again united by bonds of affection of equally great love. The thought of this future reunion is the driving force of great souls. It is mirrored in this letter of Mother Seton to her son: "Oh, my soul's dearest, deny me not the only meeting where we will never part. You know well, it depends on yourself. The agony of my heart, as I carry your beloved name before the Tabernacle, and repeat it in torrents of tears, which our God alone understands, is not for our present separation; it is our long eternal years which press on it beyond all expression. To lose you here a few years of so embittered a life is but the common

[28] St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction to the Devout Life*, I, ch. 16.

lot, but to love as I love you, and lose you forever—oh, unutterable anguish." [29]

Whereas the love of man and wife in this life is limited to themselves, nevertheless, the human heart, made in the image of the divine will, is capable of loving not one other soul but an indefinite number, since its love has the same infinite and therefore unlimited character as the divine love. It is plain to all that while in this life love in its sensible effects is limited by the claims of duty and material limitations, nevertheless the affection in its wishing good to others, which is the essence of love, can be quite boundless. A woman must render to her husband a love which is measured by her whole existence and which is entitled to all the devotion in her power not stopping short of life itself, nevertheless this does not exhaust her capacity for love. The essence of her love for her husband and for others does not consist solely in the good which she herself can give them which is necessarily limited, but since she loves with the divine love of charity she wishes those she loves the divine good which is infinite and inexhaustible and can be given to an infinite number of beings and in an infinite degree to all. In Heaven where love is the divine love, she will love her husband even more than before, and will love all the blessed in the same unlimited way. In Heaven there shall be no more marriage, but that does not mean that conjugal love shall cease. It means that it shall be extended and deepened to an even greater love of all. As in marriage love is extended by union with another, so in Heaven the love of God is extended to all the blessed, uniting them among themselves in a closer bond than any marriage. It is notable that even in this life this bond of charity among all Christians is even greater than the marriage bond considered in itself, since the latter is parted by death but the former is destined to endure perpetually. "The first unites bodies only, while the second, more pure, more blissful, unites soul to soul." [30] Those who seek the satisfaction of the infinite longing of their heart from one sole human being are doomed

[29] Leonard Feeney, S. J., *An American Woman* (New York: 1938), pp. 260-261.
[30] St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Viduam Juniorem*, III, 4.

to disillusionment since only the love of God and of all men can properly fill the heart's capacity.

Some people are attracted by the intellectual or moral qualities of another; others are attracted by physical beauty. Some are attracted by the riches of another, which makes that one desirable, others are attracted by the honor with which another is surrounded and which, it is hoped, will suffuse his associates. The absence of all or any of these qualities makes a person less desirable. They may be ignorant or vicious. They may be ugly and repulsive. They may be poor and consequently show small promise of entertainment. They may be without wordly honors and consequently offer little glamor to their associates. The absence of such attractions makes love or friendship that much less spontaneous and that much more difficult, since love is based on a sharing of good, some good, whatever it is.

If one were to review those friends whom one loves very willingly, one would find no doubt that each possesses one or the other of the aforementioned goods. It is indisputably easy to love a person who is intelligent, good, fair, rich and honored. If one were to pass in review those people whom one cannot feel any great attraction for, one would see how the addition of one or the other of the above-mentioned qualities could make each desirable. Perhaps he or she should have more education, perhaps more money, perhaps a slightly more comely visage. Granted the possession of these qualities, this is still not enough for perfect love, love of friendship, which is based on a common basis or sharing, that is, the will on the part of both parties by which each wishes the good of the other as though it were his own in such a way that both are united in a common love and happiness. Quite obviously there are many barriers to this in the present life. It is difficult for people on different planes of society to have any of their worldly interests in common. It is difficult for people separated by distance to have much sensible communication. People's mentality, temperament, and a thousand other things set up barriers which give each individual his own sphere of life into which it is difficult for any one else to enter fully.

In Heaven these barriers will be eliminated. No one will want any longer for wisdom, virtue, beauty, riches or honor. Each in his own peculiar way will be quite supremely attractive and charming. Those things he lacked here below will be supplied. And there is no one whom even our own feeble imagination cannot doctor up by adding the things we like to him, who could not become a very lovable person while still remaining himself. Thus in Heaven is fulfilled that which even the most optimistic stories do not dare to dream of. "There shall be no deformity resulting from want of proportion in that state in which all that is wrong is corrected. . . . The body shall be of that size which either it had attained or should have attained in the flower of its youth, and shall enjoy the beauty that arises from preserving symmetry and proportion in all its members." [31] No one will be too short, no nose too long. Though stories may have a handsome hero and a beautiful heroine, though to the two favored characters they mete out physical perfection abundantly, they do not dare to hide the ugliness and sordidnes of the remaining ones, thinking it much if only a few among men are thus blessed. In Heaven beauty is the lot of all.

What is the good which the blessed share in a common and that will unite all in a single love? In Heaven when all the blessed will be raised to a perfection and beauty surpassing anything conceivable by our feeble minds, they will all have a bond, a love which will draw them closer than any human love, namely the divine love, the love with which God loves Himself, the love which is responsible for all the beauty and all the love the world can possess or can conceive, a love which is founded on the sharing of infinite goodness and happiness.

A foretaste of this heavenly love is already perceivable in the lives of the saints. They truly loved everyone on earth, because of the intensity within them of charity, the love with which God loves all He has made. They loved the poor and despised, they kissed the sores of lepers, they embraced the disgruntled and peevish, they became enthusiastic with the boring. Nor was this mere pretense on their part; their love was genuine and

[31] St. Augustine, *op. cit.*, bk. XXII, 20.

heartfelt, the only kind that cheers. It was because their clear vision could see the beauty of an immortal soul, any immortal soul.

Above all, that which will perhaps mean most to us here and now, is that in Heaven we will intimately love those whom we loved on earth more intensely for various reasons. Here again we have the testimony both of sober theologians and exalted mystics. "The causes of honest love shall not cease from the soul of the blessed," says St. Thomas [32] St. Catherine transcribes in her *Dialogue* the words of God the Father: "And they (the blessed) rejoice and exult, participating in each other's good with the affection of love, besides the universal good that they enjoy together. And they rejoice and exult with the angels with whom they are placed . . . being all bound in the bonds of love. . . . And they have a special participation with those whom they closely loved with a particular affection in the world . . . and, in the life everlasting, they have not lost their love but have it still, participating closely, with more abundance, the one with the other, their love being added to the universal good, and I would not that thou shouldest think that they have this particular good, of which I have told thee, for themselves alone, for it is not so, but it is shared by all the proved citizens, My beloved sons, and all the angels for, when the soul arrives at eternal life, all participate in the good of that soul, and the soul in their good. . . . They exult in Me in the good of that soul, which good she has received through my goodness. . . . In those bonds of love in which they finished their life, they go on and remain eternally." [33]

Nevertheless, the reason for love which derives from the nearness of the one loved to God will incomparably surpass all other motives for love. While none of the love had here below will diminish in intensity, to it will be added that very just love whereby the blessed will be loved in the measure that they are

[32] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 13.

[33] St. Catherine of Siena, *Dialogue* (Translated by Algar Thorold: New York: 1907), pp. 110, 111.

pleasing to God, for the love of the blessed in Heaven is the love of God and in accord with His in all things.

It is the perspective of this perfect love in Heaven that enables the saints and the true followers of Christ to triumph over those difficulties which shipwreck purely passing, ephemeral love. It is their confidence in ultimately attaining their goal that enables them to push on joyously. Traces of it are everywhere visible in their writings. They have the practical solution that other musers upon human destiny lack. Just as the courses of the planets seemed vague ineffectual wanderings as long as all things were considered to turn around the earth, but became beautiful, rhythmic orbits when it was understood that their course was around the sun, so love, if its fulfilment is desired on earth, seems doomed to hopeless chaos, but when considered as a participation of the eternal divine love, and the blissful union of mankind with God, its course becomes something measured, irresistible, and sure, attaining to ultimate perfection with God, as the planets turn around the sun in a perpetual, perfect harmony.

This love does not begin in Heaven, but with the first light of Faith. Its happiness is already enjoyed, and it is enhanced by those precious sacrifices of this life, which as they are greater evoke a greater love and will find all the greater fruition in Heaven. In all this the exemplar is our divine Saviour. It was not enough for Him to labor a little before enjoying His love for us; first He must give all, even His life to prove His love. And this is in itself a proof that true love will find its fruition in Heaven. For love consists in the society and union of those that love, but yet the greatest love is that which brings about the greatest separation as far as this life goes, namely death. It is the thought of the imperishableness of every human being that makes separation bearable, for no soul that exists will ever perish but is destined, if it will, to live in eternal happiness with God and those it loves, after a sojourn on earth which will one day appear infinitesmal.

Some modern novels, as already mentioned, do attempt to see beyond present tragedy the prospect of future happiness, as

in Maurice Baring's *The Coat without Seam*[34] or Erik von Kuhnelt-Leddihn's *Gates of Hell*.[35] But this perspective seems somewhat vague and devoid of outline, so abstract by its generality that it seems more of a *deus ex machina* than a very real, three-dimensional conclusion of an earthly drama. Nevertheless, Heaven is a very real place, just as hell is. If our hope is to be full of immortality, if Heaven is to be the end for which we are willing to make all sacrifices in this life, if it is to draw us, to appeal to us, as an answer to our present desires, we must have a definite idea of it. It is a philosophical truism that it is the desire for the end which impels a man onward; the only way he can spur himself to greater efforts is by seeing the end as more desirable. His efforts will be proportionate to the measure in which the end appears attainable, real. If the end is something vague and unsatisfactory, he will not strive for it very eagerly, or make great sacrifices for it.

We have no doubt about our end; that is not in question. And we also know speculatively that it is perfect happiness. But the more we can envisage it as the fulfillment of very real, specific desires, the more powerful will be its influence in helping us to overcome momentary sadness by the thought of the certain joy and reunion to come. Thus St. Paul banned immoderate sorrow for the dead because of the certainty of reunion: "And we will not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them that are asleep, that you be not sorrowful, even as others who have no hope" on which St. Thomas tersely comments: "These latter think such defects to be perpetual, but not we."[36] Thus too, we are meant to console ourselves for passing separation by the thought of Heaven, so much more real and definite than earth. Thus the saints have done: St. Ambrose: "O my brother! what comfort remains to me but the hope of soon meeting you again."[37] St. Augustine: "We have not lost those who leave a world from which we

[34] Maurice Baring, *The Coat without Seam* (London: 1929).
[35] Erik von Kühnelt-Leddihn, *The Gates of Hell* (New York: 1934).
[36] *In I Thess.*, iv, 12.
[37] St. Ambrose, *De Excessu Fratris Sui*, bk. II, 135.

must ourselves depart; but we have sent them before us into that other life, where the better they are known to us, the dearer to us they will become."[38] St. John Chrysostom consoling a young widow: "You will abide with him, not only during five years, as on earth, not only during twenty, a hundred, a thousand, two thousand, ten thousand, or many more years, but during ages without end."[39] St. Bernard on his dead brother: "In fine, since 'charity never falleth away,' you will never forget me."[40] St. Francis Xavier writing to St. Ignatius: "It is all over, we shall never meet again on earth otherwise than by letters; but in heaven—oh! we shall meet face to face. And then with what transport shall we not embrace one another."[41] This is the excuse for having tried to write a final chapter to tragic novels and to complete their mirror of life.

It is not a plea for every novelist to add a last chapter wherein the hero and the heroine are happily united forever, from which they very wisely refrain, since words can poorly, rather not at all, describe the joys of Heaven. Let them stick to the facts of life, let them give us the earthly tragic endings. In that they are rendering a service to mankind as great as the novel with the artificial "and so they lived happily ever after" ending is deluding. If they and we can understand this ending in the proper perspective, it will be a help and a consolation. We will understand that God sends us such trials and tribulations which prevent us from being peaceful and content in our earthly love to make us look to Him where our real happiness is prepared and which we might lose if we were content on earth. It is not to crush and extinguish our love, but to enlarge it from something small, selfish and earthly to a love of our friends which is infinite and divine, to make us realize that love is not something that man snatches for a few brief hours in the midst of a hostile world, but that man was

[38] St. Augustine, *Epist.* XCII, 1, 2.
[39] St. John Chrysostom, *loc. cit.*
[40] St. Bernard, *In Cant., Serm.* XXVI, 8.
[41] St. Francis Xavier, *Letters.*

created by love and for love eternally. God does not merely grant us love as a gift, God *is* love, and for love He created us, a love of Him and His creatures that is so great that Dante realized that only God could make us comprehend it, and so he ended his *Divine Comedy*:

> Here vigor failed the lofty fantasy:
> But now was turning my desire and will,
> Even as a wheel that equally is moved,
> The Love which moves the sun and the other stars.[42]

The Church, meanwhile, sings this joyous antiphon on the feasts of Many Martyrs: "O how precious is the death of the saints, who ever stand before God and are not separated from each other."

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[42] Dante, *The Divine Comedy* (Translated by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow: Boston: 1871), Canto XXXIII, 142-145.

CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

[*Second Installment*]

III. MODERN THEORIES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION RELATED TO CHARITY

I. Historical Development of Individualism (1350-1800)

Any attempt to sketch the course of modern theories of social reconstruction which claim love in some shape or form as a principle is subject to definite limitations. Doctrines on love of self, of country, of race or the brotherhood of man might be catalogued in logical fashion under the heads of individualism, statism, racism, and communism, their respective progenitors listed and criticized, their good points noted and their fallacies exposed. On the other hand, these various schemes of social reconstruction might be viewed as they appear in the course of historical development, the principles of one giving birth to the other, one doctrinaire borrowing, distorting or expanding the ethic of his predecessor. And though both the logical and historical treatment are fraught with complications, it seems better, in the interest of continuity, to pursue the latter course. For all its meanderings amidst the warp and woof of historical processes, it is freer from the lack of perspective engendered by "pigeon-holing" men and doctrines under their respective "isms."

Since this thesis is concerned with charity and the modern world, its definite preoccupation in this part will point to the development of the so-called "modern spirit," by which is meant the social idea or ideas contrary to the Christian love of neighbor. This spirit is often characterized, rightly or wrongly, as the *capitalistic spirit*. The capitalistic spirit, it is true, is not the only spirit behind social reconstruction today, but, as we hope to show in the progress of this paper, the other social "isms," statism, racism, and communism, are developments of, or oppositions to, this capitalistic spirit; as such they can best

be understood by taking this spirit as a point of reference. The capitalistic spirit is not to be confused with the words "capital" or even "capitalist" as they are used in common parlance today. It is rather to be considered the realization of the philosophy of liberal individualism, a spirit which did not suddenly appear on the stage of history but which is rather the product of a long evolution. Fanfani estimates the development of the capitalist spirit to have taken nearly ten centuries, from the ninth to the eighteenth.[68]

The capitalist spirit is not exclusively an economic spirit, though it certainly has revolutionized economics; it is a complexus of economic, political, philosophical, and even theological theory. It might safely be likened to liberal individualism as defined by Christopher Dawson.

> It denies the sovereignty of the moral law in the economic world, the principle of authority in politics, and the existence of an objective divine truth in religion. It makes self-interest the supreme law in economics, the will of the majority the sovereign power of the state, and private opinion the only arbiter in religious matters.[69]

If the adjective "capitalistic" be often retained to signify the liberal, individualistic spirit, it is because the authoritative writers whom we are to quote use the term quite generally; it better emphasizes the socio-economic implications of the individualist, secularist philosophy of life.

The capitalistic conception, as Fanfani points out,[70] is founded on a separation of human aims, fixing its gaze on natural goals to the exclusion of supernatural, religious ends. Its essential characteristics are three: no limit is placed on any means of acquiring wealth that are by positive legislation lawful and economically useful, the appraisals of value in the economic sphere are to be governed by an economic criterion alone, and priority is given to economic rationalization to the hurt, and not seldom to the exclusion of moral, religious supernaturaliza-

[68] A. Fanfani, *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism* (New York: 1939), p. 37.

[69] C. Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State* (New York: 1935), p. 133.

[70] *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

tion. Opposed to this is what might be called the pre-capitalistic spirit, the primary characteristic of which is that the choice of the means of acquiring goods is determined by criteria, not of pure utility, but of utility only insofar as is compatible with the vigorous existence of extra-economic, moral criteria.[71] Its second characteristic is the social use of wealth, implying both a conformity to social morality guaranteed either by church or civil laws, and a limitation in favor of the supernatural end of the individual or the natural end of society, a limitation at the expense of the natural-individual and purely economic ends.[72]

The precise relation of this capitalistic spirit to the love of neighbor remains yet to be determined. The virtue of charity directs man's actions to the ultimate end which is God. As such it is the drive directing all of man's actions, personal and social, endowing them with a supernatural significance.[73] The capitalistic spirit is opposed to charity in that it conceives of at least some of man's actions as without relation to the supernatural goal; some economic and social relationships possess an autonomy that considerations of a higher end cannot control. In the realm of economics, the negation of charity means that wealth, instead of being a means to virtuous living, becomes an end in itself. The social functions of wealth cared for especially by almsgiving, operating in charitable institutions, guilds, corporations, monasticism, the mendicant orders, are surrendered to considerations of individual utility and self-interest. The unlimited retention of wealth and its frightful social consequences becomes but one of the more evident products of the capitalistic spirit unregulated by the higher demands of charity.

The relationship of the capitalistic spirit to the Christian spirit of charity encompasses practically the whole of Christian history. Obviously, such an extensive survey cannot be made here. Some writers have dated their study of the capitalist spirit from the age of the classical economists in the seventeenth

[71] Cf. *idid.*, p. 25.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[73] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, aa. 7, 8.

and eighteenth centuries; others have sought in the Reformation the genesis of modern individualism; and still others go back to the Middle and Dark Ages. For our study it seems best to begin with the Middle Ages. This *terminus a quo* is by no means an arbitrary one. For two reasons it is especially pertinent. Ernst Troeltsch, in his monumental work *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*,[74] shows that although the Christian ethic of love was operative from the very beginning in the early Church despite the opposition of a pagan, individualistic world, it was only in the Middle Ages that a "Christian unity of civilization"[75] became apparent due largely to the complexus of the times. Without accepting Troeltsch's theory of the evolution of the Church's doctrine, we may nevertheless admit that with the Church organized as a religious hierarchy through its centralization in the Papacy, with the opposition of the independent secular powers broken, with the structure of society and its charitable institutions, guilds, corporations, monasticism, and the popular mendicant orders so conducive to the realization of the ethic of love, the Middle Ages mark a point of perfection as far as the relation of charity to the social order is concerned. Not only did the Middle Ages create a Christian unity of civilization; a "comprehensive Christian sociological fundamental idea" appeared in this era, a view of the universal social philosophy of Catholicism which, Troeltsch observes, arose out of Thomism.[76] Since we have already discussed the doctrine of charity as expounded by St. Thomas, the beginning of our historical sequence at the time in which he wrote should tend to bring the doctrine of charity and the capitalistic spirit into sharper contrast. Having already become acquainted with the Thomistic doctrine which is reflective of and was reflected in the thirteenth century, we need only recall the words of a modern Thomist, Jacques Maritain, to place the Thomistic synthesis in historical perspective:

[74] E. Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (New York: 1931), I, 303-307.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[76] *Ibid.*

Need it be observed that the whole ethical theory of St. Thomas is based upon that doctrine which he derives from the Gospel and St. Paul? He has erected upon that teaching of the Gospel an infrangible theological synthesis, in which he shows how love, which makes us undeviatingly desire our last end, enjoys an absolute practical primacy over the whole of our individual and social life and constitutes the very bond of perfection, how it is better for us to love God than to know Him, and how no virtue, lacking such love, is truly virtuous or attains its perfect form, not even justice. And St. Thomas knows that such love really dominates human life, is effective love of God above all things and of one's neighbor as of one's self, only if it is supernatural, rooted in faith, proceeding from the grace of Christ, which makes us, in the image of the Crucified, sons and heirs of the God Who is Love. If we follow the Angelic Doctor, we shall realize that peace in man and among men (the direct work of charity, *opus charitatis*, 'for love is a unifying force and the efficient cause of unity') descends from that super-essential Peace and from that eternal Love which resides in the heart of the Trinity.[77]

Even the casual student of history realizes that the architectonic social theory and system of the thirteenth century did not long survive. The Protestant revolt in the sixteenth century brought the collapse of medieval society into open relief, and since the time of the "reformers" a concept of society totally at variance with that of the Middle Ages has marked the historical process down to our own day. But while the revolt is a dividing point as far as the religious unity of Christendom is concerned, still from the socio-theological viewpoint another division has to be made. For though the revolt burst asunder the society that was Christendom, there were disunities long before the sixteenth century that are highly significant for the social historian; though the reformers ushered in a new theology of life having a definite influence on the formation of the modern spirit, it was not until a later date, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the age of the classical economists and the moral sense philosophers, that the theological revolution was completed. Accordingly, our treatment of the historical development is thrown into two broad

[77] J. Maritain, *The Angelic Doctor* (New York: 1931), pp. 79-80.

sections: the first extending from the late Middle Ages to the eighteenth century of Adam Smith and the Utilitarian School; the latter continuing the progress of the individualist spirit down to our own day. Furthermore, the first section is treated in two periods characterized as: (1) the appearance of the capitalistic spirit (1350-1550); (2) the adolescence of the capitalistic spirit (1550-1800).

Period One

The first period from 1350 to 1550 is essentially one of transition. It is a preparation for that great historical event, the Protestant revolt. In this period we may note various factors tending to the decline of the traditional spirit, factors which are distinguishable in their beginnings like tiny rivulets coursing down the mountainside of the thirteenth and the three following centuries, finally to be absorbed in the bewildering eddies of the maelstrom that was the Reformation. We may distinguish intellectual, moral and material factors that co-operated in the initial transition from the sacred to the secular society.

Foremost among the intellectual factors was the apathy of a Scholasticism which failed to appraise sufficiently the problems of changing Europe, to catch up, unify and sanctify in the ethic of love the trends of the times as St. Thomas had done so masterfully in his age.[78] While some scholars were apathetic, still others, like Pierre du Bois and Marsiglio of Padua, were coining a new theory of secular absolutism which promoted the conciliar theory, attacked the temporal power of the Pope, the secular holdings and authority of the Church, and paved the way for sectarianism and nationalism by destroying the universalist concept of the medieval Church. Machiavelli was to emphasize further the individualist element in society through his *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy*. He it was who maintained that the ultimate ground for all social activity among men is self-interest, and that men

[78] Cf. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: 1926), p. 65.

are satisfied with material prosperity. Another factor, humanism, offset the supernaturalism of medieval Christianity by a new preoccupation with the things of this world, and so contributed to the intellectual metamorphosis.

From the moral point of view, there was a noticeable inversion of the order of charity. Really voluntary giving, loving man through God, was gradually watered down to a philanthropic service of God through man, with custom and expediency taking the place of true almsgiving. Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* no doubt puts the case too strongly when he says that once the clergy found in the produce of arts, manufactures and commerce something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon themselves, "their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse."[79] Still, the disillusionment that followed upon the not too successful Crusades which were perhaps the most enormous projects ever conceived and executed in the name of Christian charity, the increased demands upon the charity of the faithful on whom the Western Schism had laid the burden of supporting several anti-popes and their courts, the wealth of some mendicant orders which led to abuses in almsgiving, and the scandals over indulgences which arose from emphasis on the gift rather than on the motive of the giver—these are some of the factors which conspired to sap the strength of the pristine medieval love of neighbor by beclouding the supernatural motive behind acts of charity.

This externalization of charity was further complicated by material factors which, if not directly opposed to, were at least distractions from true love. With the returning legions of Crusaders came not only strains of an Oriental passivism so noxious to charity, but also a stream of Levantine goods and customs which soon broadened into a torrent. The commercial revolution began. The Italian city-states, now repositories of a new financial power, attracted, like social magnets, the offspring

[79] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (Cannan edition, New York: 1937), p. 755.

of a weakening agricultural feudalism in a veritable frenzy of urbanization with its consequent loss of the old neighborliness, the breakup of family and regional ties, absentee ownership, and an alarming growth in usurious business practices. Some of the Popes of that period were somewhat prone to accumulate wealth, and so were less adamant in face of the rising tide of secularization.[80] The guilds, once potent instruments of social charity, were static in the midst of tremendous change; they failed to capture the new forces for the hierarchic ethic of love and then gradually lost face. New inventions multiplied the availability of material goods to allure the fancy of man. New discoveries in the direction of Africa and America brought European Christians into contact and commerce with rather strange human beings they called savages and whose title to inclusion in the orbit of love of neighbor was quite practically and horribly contested. "An accessible, secular society, made accessible by the Crusades and secular by commerce, began to take form and shape." [81]

The bewildering panorama of new ideas and new interests, new forces and new faces, proved too much for late medievalist minds who did not have sufficient vigor to order and cast this new society in the mold of a burning Christian love, to find place for new peoples and new goods in the order of a comprehensive charity. The molten forces, left to themselves, flowed hither and thither, to congeal and harden—separate, disparate, and self-contained. Individualism was on its way.

At the dawn of the Protestant revolt, then, there could be detected an individualistic, capitalistic spirit rising out of the complexus of factors listed above. Even before Luther tacked his theses on the door at Wittenberg, European men were claiming for themselves a new sovereignty. They were vividly conscious of a new power sprung from the discovered lands and novel inventions they controlled; the coins of profit, acquired despite the Church's protest of usury, jingled pleasantly in their pockets, while the love of the brotherhood

[80] Cf. Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

[81] H. A. Barnes and H. Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science* (New York: 1938), I 263 (With the permission of the publishers.)

faded with the absorption in commercial interests. Supernatural charity had not flown out of the window as yet. But it no longer reigned over all man's actions; economic life had been ceded to a rival—self-interest. For the succeeding three centuries man was to weigh the suitors for his allegiance, finally to deny supernatural charity altogether and constitute the principle of self-interest as the dogma of social activity. To a study of that struggle in the soul of Western man we shall now turn.

Period Two

In sketching the development of the doctrine of self-interest, in what might be called the adolescence of the capitalistic spirit, we shall conceive of it mainly in terms of the Protestant revolt and the commercial revolution, since these two historical influences most prominently effected the transition from the medieval ethic of love to utilitarian self-interest. First the theological relationships between the two will be treated, in general and in particular; then the socio-economic aspects, or the reflection of these forces in the society of the period. Lastly we shall consider, as the *terminus ad quem* of this section, the doctrine of Adam Smith and the Classical School, in which the dogma of self-interest, after a long evolution, is finally promulgated as the new social ethic.

Theological Aspects

The revolutions, at once religious, political, and social, which herald the transition from the medieval to the modern world, were hardly less decisive for the economic character of the new civilization than for its ecclesiastical organization and religious doctrines. The economic categories of modern society have their roots in the economic expansion and social convulsions which accompanied the age of the Renaissance and the Reformation.[82]

A) *General relation of the religious revolution to the economic.*

All social historians are agreed that a new phase in western civilization was entered upon in the fifteenth and sixteenth

[82] Tawney, *op. cit.*, ix.

centuries, and many of them concur in pointing out the Protestant revolt and the commercial revolution as the two prime factors conspiring in the evolution of the modern capitalistic spirit. Max Weber in *The Quintessence of Capitalism* and Ernst Troeltsch in *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* give the credit for the new spirit to Calvinism. Tawney inclines to place the emphasis on Calvinism as the active and radical force of change, although he allows for other factors. H. M. Robertson, in *The Rise of Economic Individualism*,[83] maintains that Protestantism did not influence capitalism, but capitalism influenced the social ethics of Protestantism. Amintore Fanfani, considering all these opinions, concludes:

> Protestantism encouraged capitalism inasmuch as it denied the relation between earthly action and eternal recompense. . . . Protestantism by this principle did not act in a positive sense as Weber believes, but in a negative sense, paving the way for the positive action of innumerable impulses which . . . led man to direct his action by purely economic criteria.[84]

With the help of these authors we shall proceed to examine the problem more particularly.

First of all, the capitalistic spirit does not seem to have been a *direct* consequence of the Protestant revolt, especially if we consider the attitude of Luther and Calvin. Luther, far from encouraging capitalistic enterprise, inveighed against the capitalism of the Church and the age. He invoked the traditional economic doctrine against the usurious traders and urged a return to the faith and charity of the early Church (perhaps as described by Troeltsch),[85] a religion freed from the encumbering structure of a hierarchic Papacy. According to Tawney, Luther was attacking the perversion of the order of charity which grew up in the latter Middle Ages. As mentioned above, the tendency had been away from love of men through God to a philanthropic love of God through men. Luther claiming to sound the clarion call to the true love of God and man, cut

[83] H. M. Robertson, *The Rise of Economic Individualism* (Cambridge, 1933), *passim*.

[84] *Op. cit.*, pp. 205-206.

[85] *Op. cit.*, I, 134-38.

away the whole fabric of organized religion with the blasphemous trivialities of a religion of works.

> The difference between loving men as a result of first loving God, and learning to love God through a growing love for men, may not, at first sight, appear profound. To Luther it seemed an abyss, and Luther was right. It was, in a sense, nothing less than the Reformation itself. . . . The question of the religious significance of that change of emphasis, and of the validity of the intellectual processes by which Luther reached his conclusions, is one for theologians. Its effects on social theory were staggering.[86]

With Luther's desire to return to the true order of charity we have no quarrel; but we may well question the probity of a theology which teaches the ethics of a Christian love and yet attacks its very basis and the corporate organization by which it operates. " He preaches a selfless charity, but he recoils with horror from every institution by which an attempt had been made to give it a concrete expression." [87] As will be shown later on, Luther's fundamental nominalism prevented him from making the distinction necessary to a true understanding of the love of God and neighbor, and he became involved in hopeless contradictions. Simplicity is not so simple as it seems.

While it is true to say that Calvin approached the commercial revolution with a more positive attitude, still his benediction on the order of the day was not such as to give it a theological *carte blanche*. He quoted St. Thomas anent the social justification for commerce, condemned as unlawful all gain obtained at a neighbor's expense and urged moderation in the use of material goods. He sought to restore a primitive life of Christian love at Geneva which was more collectivist than individualist. But for all his Gallic legal acuity, Calvin, like Luther, overlooked the necessary differences in the order and intensity of true love of neighbor, and his enforced communism of love proved abortive.

Capitalistic yearnings were, however, *indirectly* aided by the doctrinaires of the Protestant allegiance. The overthrow of Papal power by them sufficiently silenced the teaching on

[86] R. H. Tawney, *op. cit.*, p. 97. [87] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

mutual love, almsgiving, and ethical commercial practice, doctrines which had proved highly irritating to the new world of business. The emphasis on the autonomy of the individual conscience in the doctrine of private judgment gave new sanction to the ever-increasing desire of gain. Calvin's forthright recognition of the economic *status quo*, plus a somewhat left-handed blessing on the same, was most encouraging. Add to these the economic upheavals consequent on the reformers' orgies—the seizure of monasteries and lands and their conversion from instruments of universal charity to political rewards for fanatical greed, the suppression of the free bargaining associations, such as the guilds, the tremendous increase in the labor market following the secularization of religious—all of which were eminently useful to capitalistic enterprise. Though they perhaps little realized it, the reformers were playing into the hands of the predestined, not of God, but of mortal, moneyed man.

B) *Particular influence of the theological revolution on the economic.*

The interrelationship of the Protestant revolt and the rise of capitalism will become clearer through a more particular study of the doctrines of the new religions, Lutheranism and Calvinism.

Luther, while often reiterating the medieval economic teaching with almost slavish literalness, systematically attacked the rules and ordinances in which it received positive expression, rules which, for all their imperfections, were nevertheless curbs on the individualistic spirit. The doctrine of salvation by faith alone robbed good works of the stamp of eternal merit. Denying such merit to good works, Luther denounced the institutions of medieval charity, fraternities, guilds, mendicant orders, festivals, and pilgrimages, and thus cut away from the individual the organs of group action so essential to man's social nature, and left men helpless in the face of the new concentration of political power in the State and economic power in the rising corporations. The hierarchic order of the medieval ethic

was reduced to a pitiless contest between extremes in the social scale. Moreover, the denial of free will by Luther was catastrophic for a true appreciation of charity. Love implies preference, devotedness, union of mind and heart; none of these are possible without free will, either in the natural or in the supernatural order. There can be no order in charity on man's part if man has no free will with which to choose. Finally, the fundamental dualism of the Lutheran theology rooted in that fatal error of minds which confuse separation with distinction—faith without works—was fraught with far-reaching implications. In philosophy, Descartes was to divide body and soul; in politics, the Liberals separated Church and State; in social economics, the Utilitarians divorced economics and ethics. Of the logic of Luther's religious premises, Tawney remarks: "It riveted on the social thought of Protestantism a dualism which, as its implications were developed, emptied religion of its social content, and society of its soul." [88]

The contribution of Calvin to the new capitalistic spirit was even more pronounced. It is the opinion of Tawney that the most characteristic and influential form of Protestantism in the two centuries following the Reformation descends from the teaching of Calvin. Whereas Lutheranism has been socially conservative, Calvinism was an active and radical force. Calvin accepted the main institutions brought into being by the commercial revolution and supplied a creed to the classes which were to dominate the future. At the root of the Calvinistic creed was the theory of predestination which quite effectively eliminated man's labors for supernatural reward, and later paved the way for other deterministic concepts of society less theocentric than Calvinism. The question of salvation or no was cut and dried. Good works could not merit eternal reward for man, though they are indispensable as a proof that salvation has been attained. The elect of God were, therefore, the men who produced results. The appeal of this doctrine to the ever-growing bourgeois class upon whose activity and prosperity the Church had frowned, and upon whom Calvin

[88] *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

now smiled, was tremendous. Calvinism grew apace in urban centers, frankly recognizing the necessity of capital, credit and banking, large-scale commerce and finance, and the other practical facts of the new business life. "It was on this practical basis of urban industry and commercial enterprise that the structure of Calvinistic social ethics was erected." [89]

Calvinism not only fostered a new theological influence in its doctrine of predestination and a new economic trend with its systematized approval of the economic virtues; it contained social tendencies which later centuries and varied soils were to develop. From Calvinism could be deduced both an intense individualism and a rigorous collectivism. The moderating influence of charity which had traditionally reconciled these two human tendencies was now gone. The two flew apart and went their unholy ways. The "omnicompetent" church in Geneva is a classic example of the collectivist trend, an urban Christian socialist state; and as we shall see, Puritanism in England followed the individualist urge. Long after, even when the clash and clamor of the theological revolution had died away, and religion had thrown in its lot with capitalism, the individualist-collectivist antimony was to persist and to call down on the heads of religion and capitalism alike new social revolutions.

Socio-Economic Aspects

Having sketched the theological aspects of the religious and economic revolutions, it now remains to consider hurriedly the working out of the new theology in the social world. In the interest of brevity and in view of the rise of England to economic supremacy in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, our comments will quite particularly concern England which was definitely committed to the Protestant ideology. The influence of the physiocrats in France is also highly important in this period, but can merely be mentioned here.

Some historians of social thought distinguish three phases of doctrine in the evolution of modern socio-economic science:

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

(1) mercantilism, which flourished from about 1600 to 1750; (2) the physiocratic doctrine of the eighteenth century developed as against the restrictions of the mercantilist system; (3) the quasi-synthesis achieved by Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations*.[90]

Without going into an exposition of all the tenets of the mercantilists, we may observe that mercantilism was, at root, an effort to apply the traditional medieval social concepts, robbed however of their supernatural significance, to the new economic conditions. Of prime interest is the socio-theological implication behind their "favorable balance of trade." Starting from the principle (definitely unethical and even uneconomical) that the available supply of metals is the all-important measure of the wealth of a nation, and accepting trade as the chief means of accumulating these precious metals in the shape of specie, they held for a favorable balance of trade which would secure their specie, a balance which could be maintained only if colonies were acquired to supply raw materials and buy the finished products of the mother country. Production was for gold, not for the common good. In England the reign of mercantilism was ill-omened. The English State, independent after the break from the Church of Rome, rich from the loot of the monasteries, the income from the privateering, customs duties, fees for chartering monopolistic enterprises, and powerful through the army and officialdom maintained by these "revenues," assumed autocratic control of the life of the people. The revolt had destroyed the guilds and the monasteries with their charities; these burdens now fell upon the state. At first the state met the problems with the traditional social ethic, but with the instruments of that ethic gone, the inference was useless. The personal, individual relationships associated with the charity of the medieval period gave way to impersonal, corporate relationships between the needy individual and the powerful state. That the state was not too benign or provident a benefactor may be realized from a study of the reign of Charles I of England. Financial evils were rife,

[90] Cf. Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, I, 514-15.

and despite all the efforts of the crown to direct the ebb and flow of socio-economic forces, the tide finally overwhelmed those mercantilistically inclined. Mercantilism required a home economy geared to a colonial economy—a favorable balance of trade. With the home economy so disastrously out of gear, the crown found it quite impossible to regulate the vast, unorganized activities of its citizenry. Even the Church of England, which was little more than an arm of the civil government, finally succumbed to the anomalies brought about by the new social forces, and substituted in its ethics the analogy of a self-regulating mechanism for that of the organic, mystical body as the prototype of society.[91] The cross of gold had proved, as is oft the case in history, much more onerous than the Cross of Christ and His charity. And yet the underlying concept of mercantilism, production for sale and profit instead of for human betterment, was to survive.

The physiocratic theory was a reaction against mercantilism, and its practical significance is largely bound up with the economy of France. However, in England there was also a definite resurgence against mercantilist practices, partly inspired by the French physiocrats; and it is the more interesting to us in that it had a definite theological drive to it. That drive was Puritanism.

Puritanism in its early form had to some extent been responsible for mercantilist rule. There was a striking, though perhaps undesigned, affinity between the main economic dogma of the mercantilist and the main ethical dogma of the Puritan. As has already been pointed out, production, not consumption, was the pivot of the mercantilist economic system, and consumption was useful only in so far as it offered a new market for productive energies. To the Puritan, the cardinal virtues were precisely those which found in the toils of industry and commerce their most natural expression. On the other hand, it was Puritanism which, as a non-conformist group centered in the cities, consolidated the growing discontent of the urban big business interests with the mercantilist state and the

[91] Cf. Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-93, 281.

Church of England. As a minority group in the early Reformation period, it had necessarily adopted an attitude of passive conformity and polite discontent; but as the inefficiency of the crown and the mitre became more patent, the ire of business men became greater and their quest for free commerce more rapacious, Puritanism, by way of the democratic agitation of the Independents, came more into the open, championing the new individualism and opposing the whole mechanism of ecclesiastical discipline and compulsory conformity. The social order, they could well maintain in accord with their theory of predestination, should be left to the beneficent control of God. The multitudinous laws regulating commerce enacted by the mercantilists were only futile interferences of man in the economic world. With no interference from human legislation, the free play of business would realize the designs of Providence in society.

The pursuit of commercial enterprise found ample justification in the doctrine of the "vocation" or "calling," which seems to have been the Calvinist substitute for the doctrine of meritorious good works in the Catholic theology. Since conduct and action, though availing nothing to attain the gift of salvation to which men are predestined, are a proof that the gift has been accorded, what is rejected as a means is resumed as a consequence, and the Puritan entrepreneur flings himself into business with the daemonic energy of one who, all doubts allayed, is conscious that he is a sealed and chosen vessel.[92] Though Robertson and Fanfani disagree with Weber's identification of the early Puritan doctrine of the "calling" with the capitalistic urge,[93] history at least seems to bear out the contention that the rationalistic type of conduct inaugurated by the Calvinistic concept of the "calling" gave to the entrepreneur a clear bill of conscience in the race for commercial success.[94] Tawney agrees with Fanfani in saying that the

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[93] Cf. Robertson, *The Rise of Economic Individualism*, p. 6 ff.; Fanfani, *op. cit.*, pp. 200 ff.

[94] Cf. Barnes and Becker, *op. cit.*, I, 326-28.

"capitalist spirit" antedates the doctrine of Puritanism, but he also contends that the capitalist spirit found in certain aspects of later Puritanism

> a tonic which braced its energies and fortified its already vigorous temper. . . . Like traits of individual character which are suppressed till the approach of maturity releases them, the tendencies in Puritanism, which were to make it later a potent ally of the movement against the control of economic relations either in the name of social morality or of the public interest, did not reveal themselves till political and economic changes had prepared a congenial environment for their growth. . . . It had begun by being the very soul of authoritarian regimentation. It ended by being the vehicle of an almost utilitarian individualism. . . . So little do those who shoot the arrows of the spirit know where they will light.[95]

Not only did the Puritan "theology" lead to new political concepts as its growing number of adherents sought to achieve its social and ethical aims by political action,[96] but it gave birth to a rationalized and revolutionary "law of nature" which was to influence the course of social thought down to the present day. Whereas the law of nature in the pre-capitalist, medieval ethic had been considered as the reflection of the eternal law of God in man, the Puritan idealization of personal responsibility in the doctrine of the "calling" gave rise to a theory of individual rights which, secularized and generalized, so as to conform to the demands of economic expediency, caused the "law of nature" to be conceived of as the expression of the free play of human appetites.

> The law of nature had been invoked by medieval writers as a moral restraint upon economic self-interest. By the seventeenth century, a significant revolution had taken place. 'Nature' had come to connote, not divine ordinance, but human appetites, and natural rights were invoked by the individualism of the age as a reason why self-interest should be given free play.[97]

Adam Smith and the Classical School. The practicalist theology of the Puritan divines, with its "law of nature," the

[95] *Op. cit.*, p. 227.
[96] Cf. Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* (London: 1823), *passim.*
[97] Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

sacrosanctity of human appetites, and the dogma of self-interest, was soon translated into socio-economic terms. The one man who caught up the trends of his time and synthesized them in compact form was Adam Smith (1723-1790), famed as the author of *The Wealth of Nations*. In him the social revolution initiated by the later medievalists, accelerated and expanded by the reformers Luther and Calvin, and further entrenched by Puritanism in England, a revolution leading from the medieval ethic of charity to the doctrine of self-interest, came to its full realization. He represents a turning point in the history of social theology and philosophy; with him socio-economic life is stripped for the most part of its supernatural orientation, self-interest as the basic social force is given official benediction, and the era of the classical school of economy, whose influence is felt to this day,[98] makes its debut on the stage of history. Smith was considerably indebted to Quesnay, Turgot and other continental physiocrats, those hardy champions of liberty and property as the keystones of rational social order, who maintained society is governed by private self-interest which is "the born servant of the general interest."[99] But for his social philosophy he owed more to Locke, Ferguson, Hutcheson, and others who inspired his faith in a divinely ordained harmony of egoistic and altruistic impulses in man.[100] Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who thought that a few simple egoistic principles, such as self-interest, could adequately explain human behavior, may be considered one of Smith's intellectual forebears, even though Smith devotes part of *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments* to a criticism of Hobbes.[101] Great was his indebtedness to John Locke (1632-1704), apostle of "the reasonableness of Christianity," the one who systematized the economic interests of Puritan England into a political theory which held that the state which inter-

[98] Cf. E. R. A. Seligman, "History of Economic Thought," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: 1937), V, 347.

[99] Cf. G. Weulersse, "The Physiocrats," *ibid.*, p. 349.

[100] Cf. K. Diehl, "The Classical School," *ibid.*, p. 351.

[101] Cf. Adam Smith, *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments* (London: 1853), p. 463 ff.

feres with property and business destroys its own title to exist, and for whom the ideal seems to have been a state of non-government—"If men could live peaceably and quietly together, there would be no need at all of magistrates or politics, which are only made to preserve man in this world from the fraud and violence of one another."[102] Nor was Smith without intellectual affinity to David Hume (1711-1776), "the Voltaire of Great Britain," who developed Locke's sensationalist psychology and maintained that passions and sentiments rule mankind, who opposed to religions of priestly "superstition" religions of enthusiasm favorable to progress, and, since good and evil, both natural and moral, are entirely relative to human sentiments, virtues are to him but expressions of social and public utility. Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) was a contemporary of Smith. Like Smith he carried out the implications of Hume's social philosophy, adopting a naturalistic, psychological concept of human society. "All the actions of men are equally the result of nature."[103] Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), the teacher of Smith at the University of Glasgow, is commonly believed to have impressed upon his pupil the psycho-sociological significance of sympathy as a social factor as well as having given a cast to Smith's analysis of economic life. Smith, however, while attaching great import to natural sympathy, recognized weaknesses in it, and accepted self-love as a more basic factor. Disagreeing with his mentor on this point, he wrote:

> Dr. Hutcheson was so far from allowing self-love to be in any case a motive of virtuous action, that even a regard to the pleasure of self-approbation, to the comfortable applause of our own consciences, according to him, diminished the merit of a benevolent action. . . . In the common judgment of mankind, however, this regard to the approbation of our minds is so far from being considered as what can, in any respect, diminish the virtue of any action, that it is rather looked upon as the *sole motive* which deserves the appellation of virtuous.[104]

[102] Quoted by C. A. Ellwood, *A History of Social Philosophy* (New York: 1939), p. 133.
[103] Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 263.
[104] *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments* pp. 444-45.

While Adam Smith is famous as the author of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), it is his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* (1759) that provides us with a broader view of his social philosophy and a key to a proper understanding of his masterpiece. We mention a few ideas of the *Theory* which quite peculiarly reflect the doctrine of self-love. The subjectivist approach of Smith is clearly illustrated in the early pages of *The Theory of the Moral Sentiments*. He says that the sentiment of the affection of the heart from which any action proceeds and upon which its whole virtue or vice must ultimately depend, may be considered under two different aspects: first, in relation to the cause which excites it, or the motive which gives occasion to it; and, secondly, in relation to the end, or the effect it tends to produce. Maintaining that recent philosophers have considered chiefly the tendency of affections with little attention to the cause which excites them, he inclines to the causal approach, the rule or canon of which is the affection of the self.

> Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.[105]

As if recognizing at once the possible abuses of this subjectivism, Smith counters the suggestion of selfishness with an appeal to mutual feeling and sympathy. In the *Theory* these two principles of self-interest and social sympathy are continually argued one against the other; in *The Wealth of Nations*, and even more in the works of his followers, the precision is less noticeable and self-interest unhappily proves the better of social sympathy. Yet this very sympathy possesses an unhealthy subjectivism, as appears from the following extract:

> The principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise the like judgments concerning the conduct of

[105] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

other people. We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man, according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it.[106]

This confusion of principles of social behavior is further illustrated by Smith's comparison of the law of supernatural love with the law of nature. "As to love our neighbor as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbor, or, what comes to the same thing, as our neighbor is capable of loving us."[107] Positing this contrariness of the supernatural and natural orders of affection is the more serious for having been written in an age when the fire of Christian charity had grown cold and self-interest disgustingly robust. Such a concept of the precept of nature destroys the foundation for true order in the love of neighbor, and even more disastrously, denies the validity of "the law of Christianity." It is true that Smith later seeks to save both by identifying one with the other, but in view of his earlier statements, the conclusion sadly miscarries. Though stating that the will of the Deity ought to be the supreme rule of our conduct,[108] he also says that by acting according to the dictates of our moral faculties, which are the natural senses of merit and propriety by which the general rules of morality are formed,[109]

> we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance, as far as in our power, the plan of providence.[110] Since these, therefore, were plainly intended to be the governing principles of human nature, the rules which they prescribe are to be regarded as the commands and laws of the Deity, promulgated by those vicegerents which he has thus set up within us.[111]

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[107] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.
[108] *Ibid.*, p. 241.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 224.
[110] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[111] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

For an application of this naturalist doctrine of moral sentiments, we select one more passage from the *Theory*:

> To compare, in this manner, the futile mortifications of the monastery, to the ennobling hardships and hazards of war; to suppose that one day, or one hour, employed in the former should, in the eye of the great Judge of the world, have more merit than a whole life spent honorably in the latter, is surely contrary to all our moral sentiments; to all the principles by which nature has taught us to regulate our contempt or admiration.[112]

Without failing to appreciate the keen psychological analysis of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, and giving due notice to its references and allusions to the supernatural, Christian ethic of love, we may safely question the validity of the author's thesis. And even if we forgive Smith's practical exclusion of supernatural love as a social force, there still remains the fundamental opposition between the altruistic and egoistic sentiments in natural man which he failed to resolve. The antimony was unhappily decided in favor of self-interest in *The Wealth of Nations*, in the second chapter of which Smith was to say:

> But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favor. . . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.[113]

The Wealth of Nations, though it has often been classed as an economics classic, is considered by the American, Albion Small, essentially a work in social philosophy, a sociological treatise, and he speaks of modern sociology as being virtually "an attempt to take up the larger program of social analysis and interpretation which was implicit in Adam Smith's moral philosophy, but which was suppressed for a century by prevailing interest in the technique for the production of wealth."[114]

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 190. [113] *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 14.
[114] A. W. Small, *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology* (Chicago: 1907), p. 238.

The fundamental thesis of this work is that human happiness and "the wealth of nations" can most rapidly and effectively be increased by bringing about complete industrial and commercial liberty. This thesis is founded on two basic assumptions: first, that the prime psychological drive in man is self-interest;[115] secondly, the existence of a natural order in the universe through which the collective self-interests add up to the common good.[116] As we have seen, the latter is an outgrowth of Puritan predestinarianism via the natural scientists after Newton, the *philosophes* and the physiocrats; the former is a necessary corollary of the doctrine of the "calling" as rationalized by Locke, Hume, and Ferguson.

In Book Five of *The Wealth of Nations* where Smith treats of the education of youth and religious instruction, one may see quite clearly how thoroughly the medieval ethic is thrown overboard by this philosopher of the capitalist revolution. When moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology, and the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come, the most important branches of philosophy became corrupted.[117] The Church of Rome, in the Middle Ages, "may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind . . ."[118] The industry and zeal of the lower clergy of the Catholic Church are kept more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest [sic!] than perhaps any established Protestant Church.[119] And as for the mendicant orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, who derive their whole subsistence from the voluntary offerings of the people, "it was with them as with the hussars and light infantry of some armies; no plunder, no pay."[120] It was concepts of the Church such as these that were assimilated by later generations along with the economic doctrines of this high pontiff of individualism;

[115] *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 651.
[116] *Ibid.*, pp. 423, 508.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 726.
[118] *Ibid.*, p. 754.
[119] *Ibid.*, pp. 741-42.
[120] *Ibid.*

and if a casual fealty to religion persisted, it was to the highly sectarian type advocated by Smith, a type which would not prove too embarrassing or formidable for organized commercial interests. The religion that counted was business. As Harold Laski observes in his *Rise of Liberalism*: "With Adam Smith the practical maxims of business enterprise achieved the status of a theology." [121]

Along with the denial of a real supernatural orientation to human life and the promulgation of the dogma of self-interest, the breakdown of the organic concept of society and the substitution of a doubly mechanistic capitalism, Smith is also responsible for the theory of labor value which has proved a two-edged sword for social thinkers ever since his time. Through Ricardo, James Mill, and their followers, the theory became the cornerstone of the exploiting, highly capitalistic Manchesterism; Karl Marx utilized the same theory in the interests of a scientific socialism bitterly opposed to the system of the economic liberals. But all these and other developments are material for a separate consideration. Smith, like his namesake the father of the human race, was to have many intellectual offspring, not a few of whom were, like Cain and Abel, to be at each other's throats ere their father was long dead.

II. Individualism and Its Successors

Having traced the development of liberalism or the capitalistic spirit to the time of Adam Smith, we continue the study of the modern social "isms" in relation to the Christian ethic of love of neighbor. Though the sketch of the rise of the doctrine of self-interest led us through a rather tortuous maze of theological heresy, economic revolt, and social upheaval, the period ahead is even more complicated. It was not merely that the destruction of the unity of faith, and the definite substitution of the doctrine of self-interest for the fundamental sociological idea of Christendom set loose a veritable torrent of divergent social philosophies. The multiple problems rising out of the commercial and industrial revolutions fostered the growth of a new

[121] H. Laski, *The Rise of Liberalism* (London: 1936), p. 182.

science of society—sociology—the devotees of which, lacking unity of theological and philosophical approach and further divided by social and geographic climes, were, and are, legion. Obviously we cannot give space here to all these social philosophers and sociologists. Nor can we even presume to deal with the complete doctrines of the social systems which have direct bearing on the subject of this thesis. Laboring, then, under the double onus of limitation of subjects and partial treatment of those selected, we must be content to restrict our inquiry to the "isms" which most vitally affect contemporary society—liberal individualism, classism as represented by scientific socialism and communism, the statism of the Fascist ideology and the racism of the Nazi school—and, excluding consideration of all but their socio-theological implications, to delineate such salient features as bear upon the Christian ethic of love. This selectivity and partiality does not necessarily imply a distortion of social history. As will be seen, these "isms" are not at all unrelated, arbitrary targets for the sociological sharpshooter; there is a common social principle running through them all, an ethical continuity which weaves them into an intelligible pattern. And the socio-theological aspect of each is sufficiently deep and vital and far-reaching to provide a fundamental grasp of the whole system.

As we have seen, naturalistic self-love, conceived as a social principle in the late Middle Ages, born in the travail of the Protestant revolt and the commercial revolution, nourished to a vigorous adolescence by Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Puritanism, finally became of age in the doctrines of Adam Smith and the classical school of political economy. The story of its maturity extends from the time of Adam Smith to our own day. To change the metaphor, if we take this philosopher of the capitalist revolution as the point of departure, we may conceive of subsequent socio-theological theory as two great rivers tracing back to the headwaters of the classical school. In the preceding section, mention was made of the conflicting tendencies in the persons and philosophies named—the individualism and collectivism of Calvin, the organic and mechanistic

trends of Puritanism, the antimony of self-interest and social sympathy in Smith's *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*. After the publication of *The Wealth of Nations* and its translation into societal reality, these fundamental divergencies became more apparent. We see one stream stemming from the headwaters, intensely individualistic, tending more and more to a mechanistic concept of society, confident in the orthodoxy of self-interest. Another current, less perceptible at first, but growing in volume, flowed along collectivist, organismic, and professedly altruistic channels. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, aided respectively by rationalist and romanticist tendencies, these streams flowed wider and wider apart, catching up the new springs of social thought. The industrial revolution, which occurred in this period, with its tremendous social changes—the factory system, machine manufacture, steam and rail transportation—might be represented as a huge storm which blew across the course of both streams, whipping up their waters into a froth of activity, charging them down their divergent courses with accelerated speed and deepened channels, now and then cutting a furrow from one to the other, but most generally preserving the main course of the two currents. We might mention also that in the nineteenth century a third stream could be detected, flowing midway between the individualistic and collectivistic rivers and arising, it seems, from well-springs tapping a powerful subterranean river identified with neither of the others. This was the social Catholicism of Le Play, Ozanam, Ketteler, Leo XIII, and others, a reappearance of the currents of the Church's fundamental social ethic which had been diverted underground by the flotsam of the Renaissance, the Protestant revolt and the commercial revolution. We shall draw on this third source for our concluding comparison of the Christian ethic and the modern " isms."

I. Individualism

The development of the capitalistic or individualistic spirit from the time of Adam Smith to the present will not occupy us long. The synthesis achieved by Smith in *The Theory of the*

Moral Sentiments and *The Wealth of Nations* furnished the rising bourgeois class with a comfortably comprehensive social philosophy. The general acceptance of Smith's thesis is not surprising if we recall that the intellectual world into which Smith introduced his masterpiece not only shared the common Calvinistic heritage and was familiar with the tenets of physiocracy and the Gallic *philosophes*, but also had already been metaphysically cultivated by the reflexive sympathy and utilitarian societal concepts of Spinoza, the deism of Shaftesbury and his "gentleman-god," and Berkeley's "social physics." Writers of the English school especially carried on the individualist trend, namely, Bentham, Malthus, Ricardo, McCulloch, James, and John Stuart Mill.

Bentham (1748-1832) molded the contemporary radicalism into utilitarianism, regarding unrestricted competition and enlightened self-interest as the chief means of attaining the "greatest good to the greatest number."[122] Malthus, McCulloch, and Ricardo developed particular aspects of economic liberalism; the latter's famous "subsistence theory of wages" was definitely individualistic, and yet certain implications of it anent labor-value were to prove highly useful to Karl Marx later on. James Mill brought into economic liberalism the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham, and his son, John Stuart, rigidly schooled in the discipline of his parent and Bentham, was responsible for "the final synthesis of all the essential contributions to classical theory from the time of Smith to his own day."[123]

While it is true to say that John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) broke with the economic liberals in holding that the processes of production alone, and not those of distribution, were subject to the control of the rather anomalous "natural law," thus opening the way for some social legislation on the distributive process, he nevertheless continued the secularist trend in social philosophy. The "greatest happiness principle," which "holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote

[122] Cf. *The Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), *passim.*

[123] K. Diehl, "The Classical School," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, V, 351.

happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness "[124] apparently had, as its ultimate end, not supernatural beatitude, but "an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments both in point of quantity and quality."[125] Mill refers specifically to charity in this connection, but it is not the supernatural love of the medieval ethic:

> In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangement should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole. . . .[126]

In another place, the younger Mill protests against the accusation that the doctrine of utility is a *godless* doctrine, and explains that if it be a true belief that God desires above all things the happiness of His creatures, then the doctrine of utility is "more profoundly religious than any other."[127] The distinction of material and spiritual happiness would hardly be out of place here. Treating of the ultimate sanction of the principle of utility, Mill conceives of the external sanction as the hope of favor and fear of displeasure not only of fellow-creatures but also of the Ruler of the universe, along with whatever we may have of sympathy or affection for them, or of love and awe of Him, inclining us to do His will independently of selfish consequences.[128] However, the natural sentiment seems to predominate over the supernatural, objectively as well as subjectively. At least this is the way the author of *Utilitarianism* puts it:

[124] J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Everyman's Library, New York: 1936), p. 6.
[125] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[126] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[128] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

But there *is* this basis of powerful natural sentiment; and this is it which, when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind: the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures, which is already a powerful principle in human nature, and happily, one of those which tend to become stronger, even without express inculcation, from the influences of advancing civilization. . . . If we now suppose this feeling of unity to be taught as a religion, and the whole force of education, of institutions, and of opinion, directed, as it once was in the case of religion, to make every person grow up from infancy surrounded on all sides both by the profession and practice of it, I think that no one, who can realize this conception, will feel any misgiving about the sufficiency of the ultimate sanction for the Happiness morality.[129]

Mill's intellectual progeny, particularly those lusty Manchesterians, were less cosmopolitan in their concept of his utility principle. Not caring too much for the faded religion that stood as god-parent to the new principle, and with an eye to the founder of Protestant modernism, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), whose philosophy of the "unsocial sociability of men"[130] argued sufficiently for the superiority of the egoistic impulses over the altruistic, they pushed utilitarianism to its ultimate and horrible conclusions. Readers of Dickens will recall his plea to their charity (apocalyptic in view of Marx) in the novel, *Hard Times*:

Utilitarian economists, skeletons of schoolmasters, Commissioners of Fact, genteel and used-up infidels, gobblers of many little dog-eared creeds, the poor you will always have with you. Cultivate in them, while there is yet time, the utmost graces of the fancies and affections, to adorn their lives so much in need of ornament; or, in the day of your triumph, when romance is utterly driven out of their souls, and they and a bare existence stand face to face, Reality will take a wolfish turn, and make an end of you.[131]

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), the greatest British social thinker after Ferguson and Smith, and the sociological grandfather of innumerable writers in the present, is most often

[129] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

[130] Cf. Wm. Hastie, *Kant's Principles of Politics* (Edinburgh: 1891), pp. 10-12.

[131] C. Dickens, *Hard Times*, Book II, c. 6.

identified with the organismic philosophical school. And yet it was in his writings that the philosophy of individualism received its most complete formulation. Although evolutionism inclined him to a consideration of the organic structure of society, much as Smith inclined to the sentiment of sympathy and Mill to altruism, his discussion of the concept is reckoned merely "an incidental, unimportant, and rather illogical phase of Spencer's social philosophy."[132] He stood for a system of natural liberty in moral and social realms as well as in industry; and "probably no more consistent exponent of all-round, *laissez-faire* principle is to be found among modern thinkers, with the possible exception of the philosophical anarchists."[133] The concluding lines of *The Principles of Sociology* politely epitomize this philosophy:

> The ultimate man will be one whose private requirements coincide with public ones. He will be that manner of man who, in spontaneously fulfilling his own nature, incidentally performs the functions of a social unit; and yet is only enabled so to fulfil his own nature by all others doing the like.[134]

Spencer interests us precisely as the most influential philosopher of individualism in the last half-century, one whose lectures still echo in the halls of learning. His intellectual genealogy includes the Newtonian cosmic mechanists, the English Deists, the French *philosophes* and physiocrats, Comte and the social Darwinists, if not Darwin himself. With his doctrine of cosmic evolution, he buttressed anew the *laissez-faire* theory much as the physiocrats and classical economists had championed it on the socio-theological deductions of Newton's celestial mechanics and the Puritan law of nature. Man should, for the most part, leave things to the inexorable process of evolution, thus "uniting philanthropic energy with philosophic calm."[135]

There was no place for supernatural charity in Spencer's

[132] Barnes & Becker, *op. cit.*, II, 799. (With the permission of the publishers.)
[133] C. A. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 458.
[134] H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology* (New York: 1897), III, 611.
[135] H. Spencer, *The Study of Sociology* (New York: 1874), p. 403.

scheme of society. In his *First Principles* (1862) he had disposed of theology by assigning its object of study to the realm of the ultimately unknowable, and in the *Principles of Sociology* (1876-96) he made the religious idea an evolutionary concept of waning vigor. As he observed, in his *Principles of Ethics*, "Now that moral injunctions are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the secularization of morals is becoming imperative." [136] To Spencer, love of neighbor according to the Catholic ethic was of the "ghost-idea" past. We find among the interdicted activities listed in his *Social Statics* (1850) commercial regulation, state religious establishments, charitable activities tending to interfere with natural selection, etc.

However, looking through Spencer's *Principles of Ethics*, one does find references to the commandment "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Still his evolutionary concept of religion robs the precept of its supernatural object and sanction, and he appeals from its theoretical "ethics of amity" [137] to the practical "ethics of enmity" of the world in which he moved, in substantiation of his agnosticism. Quite obviously, Spencer's notion of divine commandment was unduly influenced by Protestant voluntarism, and this misunderstanding caused him to reject the supernatural import of ethics. This misunderstanding is manifested when, after establishing that egoism has a permanent supremacy over altruism as a truth which ethics has to recognize,[138] Spencer opposes experience to the dogma of charity, to conclude: "Those who repeat with emphasis the maxim 'Love your neighbour as yourself,' do not render up what they possess so as to satisfy the desires of all as much as they satisfy their own desires." [139] The Thomistic exegesis of the words "as thyself" might have altered his conception of the commandment immeasurably. Instead he concludes to individualism against charity. Where "transcendent altruism in theory co-exists with brutal egoism in

[136] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics* (New York: 1897), I, xiv.
[137] *Ibid.*, p. 307 ff.
[138] *Ibid.*, p. 187 ff.
[139] *Ibid.*, p. 199.

practice, so, conversely, a more qualified altruism may have for its concomitant a greatly moderated egoism. For asserting the due claims of self, is, by implication, drawing a limit beyond which the claims are undue, and is, by consequence, bringing into greater clearness the claims of others."[140] His is an ethical system, egoistic-altruistic in theory but egoistic in practice, in which the complete living of each man consists in, and conduces to, the complete living of all.[141] Its principle is that of justice and liberty as defined by Spencer in the *Principles of Ethics*: "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."[142] This "law of equal freedom" is "an ultimate ethical principle, having an authority transcending every other. . ."; [143] on this is erected the social philosophy whose influence has been profound in nations of the capitalistic persuasion for the last half-century.

II. Collectivism

We have traced the course of individualism from Adam Smith through the classical school and the utilitarians to Herbert Spencer who completely formulated the philosophy of *laissez-faire* in his voluminous writings. It now remains for us to retrace our mental course up the river of individualism and proceed down the stream representing the collectivist, organismic, romanticist tradition in social thought since Adam Smith. Whereas the philosophy of *laissez-faire*, breaking with the fundamental sociological Christian ethic of love, made the individual and self-love the center of its system, we may distinguish other philosophies, collectivist in nature, which, though alien to the Christian ethic in their denial of supernatural charity, are attempts to recapture the organic structure of society that accompanied this ethic of love. In a sense, these other social "theologies" or philosophies are at once individualistic and collectivistic. They share in the individualistic, capitalistic spirit in so far as they conceive of society in terms

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 200.
[141] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[142] *Op. cit.*, II, 46.
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

of socio-economic criteria, without reference to extra-economic, supernatural criteria; the autonomy of man is asserted against the universal rule of God. On the other hand, they are collectivistic in that they consider the focal point of society to be, not the individual as such, but a group as the family, the class, the nation or the race. The individualist opposes love of self to the love of God; the collectivist opposes love of the group (which is but a projection of man's love of self) to the love of God.

Strangely enough, we may observe an almost hierarchic progression in the great collectivist concept of society. Comte considered the family the true unit of political society; Marx, the class; Mussolini, the nation; Hitler, the race. Comte himself remarked in the *Positive Polity*[144] that as far as moral progress is concerned, man's social nature finds satisfaction, first in the family, then in the state, and lastly in the race; in another place[145] he mentions the class as another complex social group flowing from the family. We shall briefly consider each of the collectivist concepts as they bear on the subject of this paper, treating summarily their nature and their relation to the capitalistic spirit and the medieval ethic of love of neighbor.

Comte. Before proceeding to a study of the "isms" of the collectivist species which have been put into practice today, it might be well, for the sake of historical continuity, to mention a collectivist philosophy which originated prior to these others, and which, by laying stress on the family as the true unit of society and not the individual, initiated the trend towards a more organic concept of society. This philosophy was the positivism of Auguste Comte (1798-1857).

Comte's social polity is not so much a specimen of original social thinking as a novel synthesis of variegated social philosophies—the positivism of Hume and Kant, the historical determinism of Hume, Kant, and Turgot, the development theory of Saint-Simon, borrowings from the current idealism, plus the medievalism of DeMaistre and a sort of social Catholic-

[144] A. Comte, *System of Positive Polity* (Paris: 1851), IV, 157.
[145] Comte, *op. cit.*, II, 183.

ism without the Church or God. Against the empiricist capitalism of his day, Comte was very bitter, though he recognized the possible benefits of the new industrialism. He called for a code of morals which would be much more efficacious than political measures, by providing a universal reproof for "a selfish use of riches possessed." This code of morals, however, was not to be such as in the medieval theocracy; rather it was to be positivistic, an ethic promulgated by the priesthood of a new sociocracy, an ethic with love as its principle, order its basis and progress its end.[146]

According to Comte, a society can no more be decomposed into individuals than a geometric surface can be resolved into lines, or a line into points. "The simplest association, that is, the family, sometimes reduced to its original couple, constitutes the real unit of society."[147] The family helps to bridge the gap between the natural egoism of the individual and the altruism that social life demands. However, the family is not society. Society is a functional interdependence of individuals and families that have common aims, the limits to which is humanity itself. The ethical code for the perfection of this familial society was the "religion of humanity" which Comte explains in *The System of Positive Polity*. Though its principle is love, and its epigram "Live for others," its likeness to Christian charity was only superficial. Comte denied a personal, transcendent God, and claimed that the theological basis of Christian ethics was a mistake. The supreme reality is humanity, "a relative absolute," the only one a positivist religion can know. All that is best in altruistic individuals shall live on forever in the relatively immortal life of humanity. While there is not objective immortality of the soul, there is a subjective immortality of all who live for others. There is no selfishness in seeking the immortality of helpful influence, as in Christianity. One's individual life may close with death, but his good works go on forever.

Compared with the rank individualism of the day, which paid lip-service to God and exalted self-interest, Comte's

[146] *Ibid.*, pp. 286, 343. [147] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

religion of humanity without God, but for mankind, was a challenging opposite. If positivism did not gain wider acceptance in his era, it was because it was at once behind and ahead of its time. Its basic familial concept was too narrow for the anti-individualistic people who were rapidly becoming class-conscious through the oppression of capitalism; its constitution of humanity as the ultimate end of the individual was too broad and general. What pragmatically-minded collectivists wanted was a doctrine which would accept the growing anti-capitalistic group, the proletariat, as the fundamental social principle and posit for it a more concrete, practical end. In Karl Marx's theory of the class struggle they found their answer.

Classism. Much has been written on the multiple aspects of the Marxian ideology, and it cannot be repeated here. What directly concerns us is the Marxian concept of class, for this represents a second stage in the attempted development of an organic concept of secular society. Class-consciousness is merely the inevitable reaction of a man who, having thrown over love of neighbor for God's sake, finds himself loving his fellow-men, if at all, for his own sake; then realizing that such selfishness is generally destructive of self, he seeks to remedy the anomaly, to widen the scope and relieve the loneliness of his ego by projecting it to a larger group, in this case, the class.

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, a new social group began to take shape and form. It was composed of an ever-increasing number of workers despoiled of their land and labor by the entrepreneurs of individualistic capitalism. Individualism as a theology of life, which had proved so appealing to all men dissatisfied with the Christian ethic, now lost its allure for those whom the more successful and powerful individualists had socially and economically excommunicated. A keen student of the times, Karl Marx (1818-1893) recognized the new milieu and formulated for it his doctrine of the class struggle. His statement of the theory is expressed in the opening paragraphs of the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) which he composed in conjunction with Fredrich Engels

The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. . . . In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. . . . Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—the bourgeoisie and proletariat.[148]

Anent the relation of the bourgeoisie to the individualistic spirit and its theological sanction, Marx and Engels are quite explicit:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment.' It has drowned the most heavenly ecstacies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philisthine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation.[149]

The capitalistic class, however, by its relations of production, of exchange, and property, inevitably breeds the proletarian class, which alone is the really revolutionary class. Law, morality, religion, are to the proletarian so many bourgeois prejudices, instruments of bourgeois self-interest. The Communists have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. The immediate end of the Communists is the formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, and conquest of political power by the proletariat.[150]

While Marx ideologically posited a classless society as the ultimate desideratum of social reconstruction,[151] it is nevertheless true to speak of class interest not only as a means of social reform but also its principle. The so-called "classless" society is one in which the interests of the proletarian class are completely satisfied. The morality of Marxism is a class morality, and human actions are judged good or bad according as they

[148] K. Marx & F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (International Publishers, New York: 1932), Sec. I.

[149] *Ibid.* [150] *Ibid.* [151] *Ibid.*

promote the interests of the proletariat.[152] With this in mind, let us proceed to the theological implications of the doctrine. Marx's emphasis on the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the fundamental divisions of society has, quite apparently, an economic criterion as its basis. Viewing the principles of society in terms of such a secular criterion, he definitely accepts what we have considered the fundamental tenet of the capitalistic spirit, i. e., the priority of economic rationalization to the hurt, and not seldom to the exclusion of moral, religious supernaturalization. In the preface to *The Critique of Political Economy*, Marx said,

> The aggregate of productive relationships constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis on which a juridical and political superstructure rises, and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of the material means of existence conditions the whole process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness.[153]

The religious world is, then, but the reflex of the real world, and can only vanish when the practical relations of everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations with regard to his fellowmen and to nature. In accordance with his principles, Marx says that for the capitalist society "Christianity with its *cultus* of abstract man, more especially in its bourgeois developments, Protestantism, Deism, etc., is the most fitting form of religion."[154] In the *Communist Manifesto* is a severe indictment of the "law of nature" of Puritantism and the classical school, addressed to the bourgeoisie:

> The selfish misconception that induces you to transform into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social forms springing from

[152] Cf. N. Lenin, *Religion*, pp. 47, 48. We deny all morality taken from superhuman or non-class conceptions. . . . We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat.

[153] K. Marx, Preface to "The Critique of Political Economy," in *A Handbook of Marxism* (London: 1935), pp. 371-372.

[154] K. Marx, *Capital* (New York: 1906), pp. 91, 92.

your present mode of production and form of property—historical relations that rise and disappear in the progress of production—this misconception you share with every ruling class that has preceded you.[155]

His animadversions to Protestantism, the religion of the England in and of which he wrote, are many.[156] Thus, he caustically refers to the British predestinarianism:

> Englishmen, always well up in the Bible, knew well enough that man, unless by elective grace a capitalist, a landlord, or sinecurist, is commanded to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow, but they did not know that he had to eat daily in his bread a certain quantity of human perspiration, mixed with the discharge of abscesses, cobwebs, dead black-beetles, and putrid German yeast, without counting alum, sand, and other agreeable mineral ingredients.[157]

Equally acrid are his observations on the "Christian colonial system," the price lists for Indian scalps drawn up by "those sober *virtuosi* of Protestantism, the Puritans of New England."[158] Marx also noted that Protestantism, by changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays, plays an important part in the genesis of capital.[159]

After reading Marx's condemnation of individualistic Protestant theology, upon which, for the most part, his animus to religion seems to be based, one might well wonder how familiar he was with the medieval ethic of Catholicism. He speaks of the medieval guilds as preventing masters from becoming capitalistic, and zealously repelling every encroachment by the capital of the merchants;[160] he refers to the social closeness of master and workman in the independent peasant proprietary in the country and the guild organization in the town.[161] Although Marx's concept of history forces him to accept the change as evolutionary progress, he is not too enthusiastic in saying that the economic structure of capitalistic society grew out of the economic structure of feudal society. "The dissolution of the

[155] *The Communist Manifesto.*
[156] Cf. *Capital,* p. 675, note 3; p. 793, note 2.
[157] *Ibid.,* pp. 274-275.
[158] *Ibid.,* pp. 824-826.
[159] *Ibid.,* p. 303, note 1.
[160] *Ibid.,* p. 394.
[161] *Ibid.,* pp. 809-810.

latter set free the elements of the former." [162] But we cannot expect the author of *Capital* to concede the economic structure of medievalism to have been inspired by the order of the Christian ethic of love. It was objected to him that while his economic structure theory might be tenable in times when material interests preponderate, it was not so for the Middle Ages, in which Catholicism reigned supreme. Marx replied:

> In the first place it strikes one as an odd thing for any one to suppose that these well-worn phrases about the Middle Ages and the ancient world are unknown to anyone else. This much, however, is clear, that the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, it is the mode in which they gained a livelihood that explains why here politics, and there Catholicism, played the chief part.[163]

Obviously, Marx's economic determinism blinded him to any appreciation of the medieval Catholicism in which the economic life of feudal society was orderly because of its ethic, and not its ethic orderly because of its economic life. Unfortunately his experience with British and continental Protestantism robbed him of a proper perspective of religion. As we have shown, the Calvinist-Puritan-classical school accommodated religion to the demands of the capitalistic spirit, and, in a sense, did only reflect the economic structure of society. Little wonder that such "economical" theology brought forth an economics that took the place of theology. Marx considers his theory precisely in this light. Of the primitive accumulation of capital which is the starting point of the capitalist mode of production, acquired by "the spoliation of the Church's property, the fraudulent alienation of the State domains, the robbery of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property, and its transformation into modern private property under circumstances of reckless terrorism," [164] Marx observes:

> This primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part as original sin in theology. . . . The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history of economic

[162] *Ibid.*, p. 786. [163] *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94, note 2. [164] *Ibid.*, p. 805.

original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this is by no means necessary. . . . And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work.[165]

Marx condemns the classicist dogmas consequent upon this original sin, but accepts the analogy for his own use. The Cain and Abel born soon after this "original sin" are the two classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The primitive accumulation of capital has as its genesis "the expropriation of the immediate producers, i. e., the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner."[166] The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless vandalism, and self-earned private property was supplanted by capitalistic private property.[167] Redemption is achieved when the "expropriators are expropriated"[168] by the formidable proletariat their system has called into being. Force is the means of effecting the transformation, and the beatitude, presumably, economic felicity. The radical opposition of this theory to the supernatural felicity aimed at in charity, which is the basis for an order in love of neighbor, is patent.

Around the theory of the class struggle, as justification for or consequences from it, are ranged the other ideological concepts of Marxian socialism—the Hegelian idealism and the materialism of Feuerbach, both of which can be traced through Cartesianism to the theological errors of Protestantism, the Darwinian law of survival of the fittest, French socialism, the surplus-value theory of Ricardo—and though the orthodoxy of these tenets is not unquestioned even by followers of Marx today, still the central classist dogma perdures. Lenin, the theologian of modern Marxism, preserves and even defines more sharply the classism of Marx. Apropos of "this most important and fundamental point," he says: "The state is the product and the manifestation of the *irreconcilability* of class antagon-

[165] *Ibid.*, pp. 784-785.
[166] *Ibid.*, p. 834.
[167] *Ibid.*, pp. 835-836.
[168] *Ibid.*, p. 837.

ism."[169] "The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent revolution."[170] True, he also retains the ideal of a classless society: "Only Communism makes the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is *no one* to be suppressed—'no one' in the sense of a *class*, in the sense of a systematic struggle against a definite section of the population."[171] We shall not attempt an evaluation of this "higher phase of communism," still happily futuristic. Our point here is that communism, in its first phase, is founded on economic self-interest, and it is that communism which we have to face today as an existent modern "ism" opposed to charity. Whether and when the perfect communist society is attainable, is highly problematical. Lenin himself conceded: "We leave the question of length of time, or the concrete forms of the withering away (of the state), quite open, because *no material is available* to enable us to answer these questions."[172]

Statism. Evident weaknesses in the class concept as the basis for the reconstruction of society, especially the failure of society to resolve itself into two mutually antagonistic groups, called forth yet another attempt to restore the organic structure of society so imperilled by individualism. This we call statism, or étatism, the philosophy of society which makes the state the principle and the ultimate end of man's activities. Though statism has an intellectual lineage stretching back through Hegel and Fichte to *The Prince* of Machiavelli, its practical expression is incorporated in contemporary Fascism. None can speak more authoritatively than Benito Mussolini on this subject, and upon his exposition of the doctrine of Fascism contributed to the *Enciclopedia Italiana* in 1932, we shall draw for our analysis of its tenets. Did time and space permit, other writers, such as Pareto, Rocco, and Spann, could be adduced and with great benefit. The latter writer especially dwells on the antithesis between individualism and universalism, so characteristic of totalitarian social theory. He teaches that the

[169] N. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (The United Communist Party of America; 1917), c. 1.

[170] *Ibid.* [171] *Ibid.*, c. 5. [172] *Ibid.*

heart of universalism is that it finds the original essence from which everything proceeds, not in the individual, but in society, the totality: Society itself is the true reality; the whole is primary and consequently the individual exists only as a component of the whole.[173]

Mussolini expresses the statist concept of Fascism very plainly:

> The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State . . . the Fascist State is itself conscious, and has itself a will and a personality—thus it may be called the 'ethic' State.[174]

With equal directness, Il Duce explains the relationship of Fascism to three essential problems dealt with in this article—the Christian ethic of love of neighbor, Marxism or Socialism, and individualism.

Regarding the first, Mussolini maintains that the Fascist State is not indifferent to the fact of religion in general, or to that particular and positive faith which is Italian Catholicism. The State professes no theology, but a morality, and in this state religion is considered as one of the deepest manifestations of the spirit of man; thus it is not only respected but defended and protected.[175] The state is a spiritual and moral fact in itself, and thus must be in its origins and development a manifestation of the spirit. It is not only a living reality of the present; it is also linked with the past and above all with the future, and thus transcends the brief limits of individual life.[176] This concept of the state gives a distinctively Fascist meaning to the theology of love of neighbor. The Fascist conceives of life as duty and struggle and conquest, lived for oneself,

[173] Cf. Landheer, "Othmar Spann's Social Theories," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXXIX, 2, 241-242.

[174] B. Mussolini, "The Political and Social Theories of Fascism," trans. from *Enciclopedia Italiana* (New York: International Conciliation, 1935), p. 13.

[175] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[176] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

but above all for others—those who are at hand and those who are far distant. . . . Thus the Fascist loves in actual fact his neighbor, but this 'neighbor' is not merely a vague and undefined concept, this love of one's neighbor puts no obstacle in the way of necessary educational severity, and still less to differentiation of status and to physical distance.[177]

As Mussolini points out, this conception of life makes Fascism the complete opposite of Marxism. First, Fascism rejects the Marxian economic concept of history, and believes, now and always, in holiness and heroism, "in actions influenced by no economic motive, direct or indirect."[178] Secondly, Fascism denies the class-war can be the preponderant force in the transformation of society. Furthermore, after refuting "these two fundamental concepts of Socialism," Mussolini repudiates the very conception of the materialist "economic happiness of Socialism and denies its possibility."[179]

Anent liberalism, political and economic, which for Mussolini is synonomous with individualism, "Fascism has taken up an attitude of complete opposition."[180] "The absurd conventional untruth of political equality dressed out in the garb of collective irresponsibility, and the myth of 'happiness' and indefinite progress," which Mussolini attributes to democracy and we to the capitalistic spirit, are likewise discounted.[181]

The self-characterization of Fascism as a "religious conception in which man is seen in his immanent relationship with a superior law and with an objective Will that transcends the particular individual and raises him to conscious membership of a spiritual society,"[182] its acceptance of Catholicism which it claims is more than "mere opportunism,"[183] its hierarchic syndicalism akin in concept to the medieval economy—all these make an evaluatory criticism of the doctrine in the light of the

[177] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[178] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.
[179] *Ibid.*
[180] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
[181] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[182] B. Mussolini, "The Doctrine of Fascism; Fundamental Ideas," *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*, edited by M. Oakeshott (Cambridge: 1939), p. 165.
[183] *Ibid.*

Catholic ethic rather difficult. The étatist concept is at least one—and decidedly important—point of departure. The social charity of a theology which refers all man's actions to God cannot well be reconciled with a system which "repudiates any universal embrace" and which requires its votaries to accept the state as "the true reality of the individual," and for which "everything is in the State, and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the State."[184] The State as ultimate end is nothing short of self-interest on a national scale, and thus opposed to charity.

Racism. In his *Enciclopedia Italiana* exposition of the doctrine of Fascism, Mussolini expressly excludes the race concept from his ideology. "Race; it is an emotion, not a reality; ninety-five per cent of it is emotion."[185] However this may be, a new sociological concept based on race, and often confused with Fascism, has captured the attention—and considerably more—of the contemporary world. The Nazi ideology is phrased by its greatest exponent, Hitler, thus: "All that is not race in this world is trash. All world historical events, however, are only the expression of the races' instinct of self-preservation in its good or in its evil meaning."[186] The well-springs of this racist ideology may be detected in the socio-biological doctrine of Althusius, German theorist of the seventeenth century, in Sombart,[187] Kant, Fichte,[188] Hegel, Spengler, and Spann, the universalist.[189] However, for the definite statement of the theory as it is in Nazism today, we can draw on no better source that the writings of its celebrated protagonist, Adolph Hitler.[190]

The whole philosophy of his racism may briefly be treated under four concepts which we shall explain singly: the con-

[184] *Ibid.*

[185] Cf. Oakeshott, *op. cit.*, p. 167, note.

[186] A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939), p. 406.

[187] Cf. *Der moderne Kapitalismus: Die Juden und das Wirtshaftsleben.*

[188] Cf. *Reden an die deutsche Nation.*

[189] Cf. *Der wahre Staat.*

[190] Alfred Rosenberg's *Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (1930) is a valuable source for the Nazi "theology," which, however, has not yet been translated into English.

ception of race itself, the folkish philosophy of life, the concept of society and the state, and lastly the notion of individuality and leadership.

The conception of race is founded on what Hitler calls the "iron logic of Nature,"[191] according to which nature wills to breed life as a whole towards a higher level.[192] With nature the highest race is that which is most pure of blood. Accordingly, "*there is only one most sacred human right, and this right is at the same time the most sacred obligation, namely: to see to it that the blood is preserved pure, so that by the preservation of the best human material a possibility is given for a more noble development of these human beings.*"[193] Once this standard is posited, the evident inequality of races has to be considered; some races are higher and others lower. The highest people are, according to Hitler, the Aryans, "the original bearers of human culture," "the actual founders of what we sum up with the word 'mankind.'"[194] On the other hand, the people without any true culture are the Jews.[195] Following upon the two root principles of racism, i. e., the natural principle of the distinction of races and the historical principle of the inequality of races, are two important conclusions, the rejection of the "pacifist-humanist" ideal and the importance of race-consciousness.[196] As for the first, an echo of humanitarianism and utopian socialism which Hitler abhors, he remarks: "Therefore, first fight, and then one may see what can be done. He who wants to live should fight, therefore, and he who does not want to battle in this world of eternal struggle does not deserve to be alive."[197] "The Jewish doctrine of Marxism rejects the aristocratic principle in nature; instead of the eternal privilege of force and strength, it places the mass of

[191] *Mein Kampf*, p. 312.
[192] *Ibid.*, p. 390.
[193] *Ibid.*, p. 606 (Italics by author).
[194] *Ibid.*, p. 397.
[195] *Ibid.*, p. 416 ff.
[196] Cf. M. Oakeshott, "Some Notes on the Doctrine of *Mein Kampf*," *op. cit.*, p. 197 ff.
[197] *Mein Kampf*, pp. 395, 397.

numbers and its deadweight." [198] Rosenberg, the theologian of Nazism, expresses the idea even more dramatically:

> History and vocation no longer consist in struggle of class against class, church dogma against dogma, but in struggle between blood and blood, race and race, people and people. . . . That history must be judged from the point of view of race is a truth that will soon be self-understood. . . .[199]

The folkish state's entire work of education and training has some day to find its culmination in branding, through instinct and reason, the race sense and race feeling into the hearts and brains of the youth with whom it is entrusted.[200]

The second concept, the "folkish" philosophy of life, grows out of the idea of race. The designation "folkish" is similar to the conception "religious," implying certain basic realizations,[201] which are formulated and put into action by the Party.[202]

> The 'folkish' view recognizes the importance of mankind in its racially innate elements. In principle, it sees in the state only a means to an end, and as its end, it considers the preservation of the racial existence of men. Thus it by no means believes in an equality of the races, but with their differences it also recognizes their superior and inferior values, and by this recognition it feels the obligation, in accordance with the Eternal will that dominates this universe, to promote the victory of the better and stronger, and to demand the submission of the worse and the weaker.[203]

Accordingly, the Nazis conceive of the state and society, with their first principle of racial unity, as means to the social existence of man.

> The State is not an assembly of commercial parties in a certain prescribed space for the fulfillment of economic tasks, but the organization of a community of physically and mentally equal human beings for the better possibility of the furtherance of their

[198] *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.
[199] A. Rosenberg, *Der Mythus.* Quoted by Oakeshott, *op. cit.*, p. 200.
[200] *Mein Kampf*, p. 636.
[201] *Ibid.*, p. 575.
[202] *Ibid.*, p. 582.
[203] *Ibid.*, pp. 579-580.

species as well as for the fulfillment of the goal of their existence assigned to them by Providence.[204]

Just as the folkish philosophy of life recognizes the disparity of races and stocks and assigns values to them, so also does it assign different values to individuals within the race.[205] The first consequence of this recognition of different individual values is the provision for the purest members of the race to breed apart from the rest; the obvious corollary of which is the prevention of reproduction by the unfit.[206] Secondly, individual personality must be developed and used for the state, leaders discovered. "The best State constitution and State form is that which, with the most natural certainty, brings the best heads of the national community to leading importance and to leading influence."[207] The means of doing this is the Party organization, or better, the German Army, "a school for the mutual understanding and adjustment of all Germans."[208] Thus the fourth essential concept of Nazism—the notion of individuality and leadership.

With this ideological structure of racism in mind, we can better appreciate the relation of Nazism to the Christian ethic of love of neighbor and the individualist principle of self-interest.

Regarding the first, we have, first of all, the statement of Hitler: "The National Socialist State declares itself for a positive Christianity."[209] Positive Christianity, according to the exegesis of Rosenberg, is opposed to the negative Christianity which includes Roman Catholicism and, in a lesser degree, Protestantism.[210] Had it not been for their conversion to historic Christianity, the Germans, the latter says, would have developed a new ethical system with honor as its basic principle.

[204] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
[205] *Ibid.*, pp. 661, 668.
[206] *Ibid.*, pp. 608, 611 ff.
[207] *Ibid.*, p. 669.
[208] *Ibid.*, p. 843.
[209] Quoted by N. Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church* (New York: 1939), p. 1.
[210] Cf. Oakeshott, *op. cit.*, p. 193, note 1.

"Unfortunately," they adopted the ideas of Christian love in the sense of "humility, mercy, subjection, and asceticism," a conception of universal love which is a "blow at the soul of Nordic Europe."[211] The Minister for Church Affairs, Dr. Kerrl, formulates the race theology thus:

> The Church must recognize the supremacy of the State; that ought not to be difficult, as the State expressly represents Positive Christianity. The will of our Father in heaven has been passed into our Blood; it works through the nation. Everything which National Socialism is now doing for the community, for the preservation of the nation, is the doing of the will of God. Our 'neighbour' is he who is indicated to us by Blood.[212]

Again Rosenberg states: "The German character-values are the eternal to which everything else must be related. . . . The racial soul of the people is the measure of all our thoughts, all the motions of our will, all our actions; it is the final norm of our values."[213] His doctrine is summed up in these words by German Catholic scholars who refuted the *Mythus*:

> The race-value is the only absolute, the supreme value, from which all other values derive their status; the concept 'God,' in particular, has only a basis in reality in so far as the 'eternal' race-soul is meant.[214]

Plainly, there is no place in this doctrine for the ethic of love of neighbor according to the Catholic ideal.

Apropos of the individualistic doctrine of self-interest, the basest egoism is attributed by Hitler to the Jews, such as may be considered representative of the capitalistic class, and more especially those of the Marxist persuasion.[215] After showing the Nazi self-preservation instinct of "egoism" to be a sublimated idealism,[216] he brands the Jewish instinct of self-preservation as "pure egoism on the part of the individuals,"[217] uncultured,

[211] Quoted by Micklem, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[212] Quoted *ibid.*, pp. 222-223.
[213] Rosenberg, quoted *ibid.*
[214] *Studien zum Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts.* Quoted by Micklem, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[215] Cf. *Mein Kampf*, p. 449 ff.
[216] *Ibid.*, pp. 407-11. [217] *Ibid.*, p. 416.

lacking the requisite idealism, parasitic, selfishly crass. Of the Jew, Hitler writes: "His life is really only of this world, and his spirit is as alien to true Christianity, for instance, as his nature was two thousand years ago to the Sublime Founder of the new doctrine."[218] The egoism of non-Semitic capitalism may be said to fall under a similar indictment of the Fuehrer, who credits even Manchester Liberalism with "a basic Jewish tendency."[219]

In summary, we may say, without prejudice to whatever good there may be in Nazism, that its racist ideology, while a reaction against the private self-interest of liberalism and the classist self-interest of Marxism, is yet permeated by a racist self-interest inimical to the Christian ethic of love which ordains everything, not to the self, the class, nor the race, but to God. In Nazism the self-interest principle is simply projected on a grander scale than heretofore.

* * *

Before concluding our survey of the social "isms" opposed to the Christian love of neighbor, we might, for the sake of completeness, mention a new form of self-interest ideology which is gaining recruits today. It comes as a reaction to individualism and to Fascism and Nazism especially. As if to free itself from the shackles of the individual, nation, and race, it parades under the banner of universal democracy, the new religion of humanity. Its concepts are still too ill-defined, its creed unformulated, and its protagonists of not sufficient prominence, but the not too distant future may bring it more to the fore. A recent volume, *The City of Man*,[220] endorsed by fifteen liberal signers, may be considered as an introduction to this new creed which, it seems, represents man's love of self without God on a scale even broader than the racist ideology. A few excerpts follow:

[218] *Ibid.*, pp. 422-23.

[219] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[220] *The City of Man: A Declaration on World Democracy* by the Committee of Fifteen (New York: 1940).

A new foundation, then, must be laid for a new democracy in the firm rock of conviction, deep below the moving sand of opinion. And the concept of a vital democracy must be disassociated from the notion of a disintegrated liberalism, which is a precursor of tyranny and a prey to it. There is, indeed, no liberty but one: the right, which is a duty, of making oneself and others free through absolute allegiance to the final goal of man. . . . Democracy, therefore, must be re-defined: no longer the conflicting concourse of uncontrolled individual impulses, but a harmony subordinated to a plan; no longer a dispersive atomism, but a purposive organism. . . . 'Thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.' These tenets, and the Golden Rule, and Paul's injunction, 'Be ye members one of another,' comprise the essential sociology and economics of democracy. . . . It is the plenitude of heart-service to a highest religion embodying the essence of all higher religions. . . . Democracy, in the catholicity of its language, interprets and justifies the separate creeds as its own vernaculars. . . . Democracy is nothing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism. . . .[221]

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(*Part III will appear in the next issue.*)

[221] *Ibid., passim.*

THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Part III

The End of the State: Happiness

THE reader of this series of articles is by now fully apprized of our aim—to demonstrate the proposition that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government. But he may wonder why an objective which can be so simply stated requires us to go to such great lengths in the way of theoretical analysis. He may even have felt that the elaborateness of our theoretical effort has carried us away from rather than toward our stated objective which, after all, is eminently a practical concern. Since the present article will be more theoretical than its predecessors, and will appear to take us still further afield, we feel obliged to explain why the ambit of our thought must encompass so much to reach the conclusion we have announced as our goal.

To those who are impatient of this undertaking because it is remote from the hurly-burly realities of the political upheaval which has unsettled the whole world, we can appeal only by repeating the perennial defense of philosophy whenever it has been charged with retreating from the scene of action. The work of the philosopher is thought, not action, and it is a work which some men must do so that the actions at which others labor can ultimately be guided or judged by reference to the truth. Action loses its brutality and becomes human only by regarding itself as an expression of right, not might. Once this distinction is admitted, once the notion of right is introduced, even in the most rudimentary way, the philosopher is called into collaboration with the man of action, and it is for him alone to decide how far it is necessary to go to establish in reason the rights his fellow-men would uphold by deeds. How far either must go is determined by the exigencies of his chosen

sphere—in action, to the risk of life itself; in thought, to the very edge of the truth that is knowable to man in this life.

There are no more difficult truths for man to know in the natural order than the existence of God and the subsistence of the human soul—and their inwardness is difficult to penetrate even with the light of faith—yet certainly action will be affected by their affirmation or denial, and any consideration of rights must reach to these ultimates for their foundation. In the domain of practical problems, which are never resolved except by action, the work of the philosopher is necessarily remote from the sort of judgments which derive from practical experience or which express the decision of prudence in the particular case. But however "abstract" and "theoretical" they may appear to be, the philosopher's judgments are essentially practical so long as they are not simply knowledge, but directions of action, albeit from afar. Herein lies the distinction between the speculative and the practical philosopher, on the one hand, and between the practical philosopher and the man of prudence, on the other.[113]

Impatience with speculatively-practical considerations is not the only source of dissent from what we are trying to do. There are some who think the proposition about Democracy does not need to be proved, or that the reasons for its truth are so obvious that it might almost be regarded as a self-evident principle rather than a conclusion. There are others who think it is neither self-evident nor capable of being proved, however much they would like to believe that it is true, for "reasons" difficult to state.[114] Curiously enough, both types of friendly criticism require us (though not for the same reason) to go deeply into traditional political theory, and beyond that into

[113] The paradox that some may find in the phrase "practical philosophy" is paralleled in the phrase "speculatively-practical" which names the highest level of practical thought—and also the most distant from action—beneath which the philosopher *qua* philosopher cannot go. Cf. our discussion of these matters in Part I, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, III, 3, pp. 413, 446-447, and fns. 32, 33, 34. Vd. also Maritain's discussion of *dirigere* and *cognoscere* on the several levels of practical thought, in *Science and Wisdom* (New York: 1940)., pp. 107 ff.; 222-224.

[114] Vd. Professor Charles O'Neil, "The Unity of the Moral Order," in *The New Scholasticism*, XV, 3, pp. 280-83.

the whole tradition of *philosophia perennis*: the one, because its supposition that our thesis needs little, if any, argument to support it rests upon ignorance of that tradition; the other, because its supposition that our thesis cannot be demonstrated rests upon what seems to us to be a misapprehension of some crucial points in traditional teaching. One type of critic, in short, does not know or underestimates the difficulties which the tradition puts in the way of this departure in political theory; whereas the other exaggerates difficulties into *insolubilia* or wrongly finds them where they do not really exist. That is why our undertaking has two responsibilities to discharge: first, the logical task of demonstrating a conclusion in terms of true principles; and second, the interpretative task of showing that the principles on which the demonstration rests are thoroughly compatible with the central truths in traditional theory, not only in the sphere of political doctrine narrowly conceived, but also in any part of philosophy and theology which has a bearing on the issue.

1. In this article, which concerns happiness as an end beyond the political common good—as the end of the state itself, in distinction from the well-being of the state (i. e., the political common good) as the end of political activity—we must face what is, perhaps, the most difficult problem in the practical order: the problem of a plurality of last ends, natural and supernatural, temporal and eternal. This will require us to go beyond politics into ethics, and beyond the whole of moral philosophy as a work of natural reason into the dogmas of faith and their elucidation by theology. Nothing less than an understanding of last ends can terminate the search for principles in the practical order. The common good, as we defined it in the preceding Part, is only an intermediate end and, therefore, insufficient by itself to guarantee the truth of conclusions in the sphere of politics, even though it is their proximate measure. We must, therefore, look beyond it to the end which it serves as means.

The problem which we are about to consider is closely related to the problem we dealt with in Part II. Parts II and

III taken together constitute our answer to objections which claim that the thesis about Democracy is not demonstrable. Once we have removed these objections, we shall be able to proceed in Parts IV and V to solve difficulties concerning the demonstration itself. It is important to note this distinction between demonstrability and demonstration, because in the first case we are concerned with showing the possibility of a moral hierarchy of political forms, whereas in the second we must establish the actual existence of what has been shown to be possible. The demonstration that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government, will be completed when we have proved the actual separation and cumulative combination of three distinct elements of political justice. The demonstrability of that thesis will be seen, we hope, as a result of completion in this part of discussions begun in Part II concerning the order of goods, and the disposition of means and ends. Upon an adequate account of means and ends, and upon a more elaborate analysis of the order of goods than is usually given, depends not only the truth, but the intelligibility, of the political theory we are trying to expound.[115]

The status of the common good as an ultimate end *secundum quid* (i.e., in the restricted sphere of activity which is specifically political) implies that the common good must also be regarded as an intermediate end which, as such, is then ordained as a means to an end which is ultimate *simpliciter*.[116] But this truth appears to be compatible with alternative possibilities: (1a) that the only end beyond the common good, which is ultimate *simpliciter*, is the eternal good of super-

[115] This has been our insistence from the very beginning. "The test of truth in any practical theory," we wrote, "is the validity of its account of means and ends. The truth of the theory of Democracy must be made evident in these terms" (Part I, *supra, loc. cit.*, p. 429). Cf. Part II, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, III, 4, pp. 590-91.

[116] We shall use the phrase "common good" in only one sense—to signify the good which is identical with the well-being of a political community. There is no difficulty about finding other words to name the various other goods which we have distinguished from the welfare of a state. Vd. Part II, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 599-607. A resolute avoidance of the ambiguities latent in the phrase "common good" is an indispensable condition of clarity in the further analysis of the order of goods.

natural beatitude, and (1b) that the notion of a strictly temporal, natural happiness, comprehends nothing but the common good, viewed as enjoyed by the individual members of a community *vs.* (2a) that, in addition to supernatural beatitude as an end beyond the common good, there is natural, temporal happiness, which is also an ultimate end *simpliciter*, and (2b) that such happiness is not identical with the common good, even in so far as the common good is individually enjoyed, but rather that the common good as so enjoyed is a constitutive part of individual happiness.

In the first alternative (the two points here being necessarily conjunctive), the common good is not only the last end *secundum quid* in the political order, but also in the temporal order without qualification; there is no higher or greater good in the natural, temporal life of man than the good of civil life, i.e., the common good as the good both of the whole (the community) and of the parts (its individual members).

In the second alternative (the two points being similarly conjoined), there is a natural and temporal good which is an end *simpliciter*, not *secundum quid*, for although the happiness here signified is an ultimate end only in the natural, temporal order, it is in no way a means to the perfect happiness which is eternal and supernatural beatitude, the two types of happiness being ends *simpliciter* in the radically distinct orders of time and eternity, and requiring for their achievement such radically distinct means as natural and supernatural causes. Furthermore, what is traditionally called " the good of civil life " cannot signify both the common good and also the end which the state itself serves as a means. If the phrase is intended to signify the ultimate temporal end, then it must be construed as referring to natural happiness in this life.[117]

[117] Two points should be observed here. (1) The phrase " good of civil life " is traditionally used with the same ambiguity as " common good," sometimes referring to the well-being or welfare of the state, and sometimes referring to the good life of individual men according as that is lived temporally under civil auspices. In the second signification, " the good of civil life " names happiness, just as the phrase " common good " names happiness when " common " is used to signify a perfection of human nature that is essentially the same for all men because they all have

These basic alternatives pose the problem we must solve. The dilemma cannot be escaped, for, in the absence of evidence that a third possibility is conceivable, we are faced with a perfect contradiction. The consequences for political theory of a choice between these alternatives should be immediately obvious. The theory of Democracy is tenable only if we can show that a true account of means and ends requires us to affirm natural happiness as the temporal last end, and to subordinate thereto the common good as a means. A hierarchy of political forms, unequal in justice, involves, as we have seen, several grades of common good as ends (*finis effectus*) of political activity. But this by itself is not sufficient as the condition prerequisite to proving that Democracy is the best form of government because it effectively establishes the highest grade of common good. It is also necessary to show that the several grades of common good are, as means, not equally efficient in the production of human happiness; in fact, there must be a perfect correlation between the grade of intrinsic goodness (i. e., justice) possessed by each type of common good (Royal, Republican, and Democratic) as an intermediate end, and the degree of extrinsic goodness (i. e., efficiency) it is able to exercise as a means to the ultimate end *simpliciter*. Now, if the ultimate end in question be supernatural and eternal beatitude, such a correlation is impossible, and there is no way of understanding the moral inequality of political forms; for every intermediate end (such as the state or the common good) must have, as a means to some more ultimate end, a degree of goodness which corresponds to its own grade of goodness as an end. It follows,

a common nature or essence. (2) When it is implied, as in the text above, that the common good is not the end of the state, a distinction already made must be remembered: that is, between two ways in which the state can be said to have an end—as a means, and as an agent. What we have called the ideal, as opposed to the existential, common good (*finis causa*, not *finis effectus*) can be the end of the state as an agent in the sphere of political activity; but when the state is regarded as a means, through which the primary political agents (human individuals) work for an end more ultimate than the common good, then that end obviously cannot be the common good itself, but is happiness. Vd. Part II, *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 619-21.

therefore, that unless there is natural, temporal happiness as an ultimate good which is more or less efficiently served by diverse forms of government according to the grade of common good they establish, the gradation of common goods becomes unintelligible even if we can show that such inequalities in political justice actually exist.[118] Hence the proof that there is a natural happiness which subordinates the common good in the temporal order, and the account of what such happiness is, are the main tasks that we must undertake in this Part in order to complete the analysis begun in Part II.[119]

[118] So long as its form of government is just, and thereby establishes, preserves, and promotes the common good, the State may cooperate with the Church (as an instrumental cause in the service of a principal cause) to the end of man's salvation. Political institutions by themselves (i. e., apart from their instrumental causality) cannot function as means to the supernatural end of eternal beatitude. Furthermore, it makes no difference to the efficiency of the State, functioning as a means through instrumental causality, whether it is more or less just, i. e., whether the grade of common good it exhibits is more or less perfect. It is generally understood that the Church exercises an attitude of indifference toward the several forms of good government, regarding each as equally acceptable. This is usually interpreted to mean that the several forms of good government are really all equally good on moral grounds, and differ *inter se* only through being more or less adapted to the conditions of a people living under certain historic circumstances, or as varying in the degree of efficiency with which they achieve the same common good. But another interpretation is possible, namely, that the Church's indifference arises from its viewing political institutions as instrumental means toward the supernatural end, in which case, of course, the several good forms of government are equally dispositive. This interpretation, moreover, accords with the analysis, given in Part II, of the moral inequality among states as more and less just, and requires the analysis we are about to make; for though states which are unequally just serve equally as instrumental means to the supernatural last end, which is eternal beatitude, they do not serve equally as among the principal means to the natural last end, which is temporal happiness.

[119] The points just emphasized were indicated in Part II: that the common good is not identical with happiness (*loc. cit.*, p. 605); that the common good is subordinated to happiness as means to end (*ibid.*, pp. 607-609, 619-20, and fns. 58 and 60); that temporal happiness is the end implied in the proof, from final causality, that the state is natural (*ibid.*, p. 610); that there is a diversity of last ends within the analogy of happiness according to the diversity of time and eternity, nature and supernature (*ibid.*, pp. 593, 634, and fn. 92); and that temporal happiness must be defined in a manner analogous to Boethius's conception of eternal happiness as the state of those made perfect by the possession of all good things (*ibid.*, pp. 626-28). But careful readers will remember that we explicitly said in Part II that "in this discussion, we shall assume that there is a happiness in the temporal order as well as in the eternal. The truth of that assumption, and the fuller

But it is not merely in order to complete the analysis begun in Part II, that we must devote ourselves to these tasks. There is the additional obligation of meeting that objection to the demonstrability of Democracy, which arises from supposing that the only last end *simpliciter* is eternal beatitude, that the last end in the temporal order is only an end *secundum quid*, i. e., an intermediate end, and that this intermediate end is the common good, which is the greatest good that men can enjoy in this life. Sometimes this supposition derives from what we hold to be a false interpretation of the traditional saying that there are only three goods: individual, common, and Divine.[120] Sometimes it is based on an erroneous conception of what the unity of the moral order requires so far as means and end are concerned—such notions, for instance, as that there can be

analysis of the plurality of common goods in relation to the unity of temporal happiness, belongs to Part III" (*ibid.*, p. 595). The respective problems of Parts II and III are so intimately related that we found it "impossible not to anticipate" (in Part II) "matters which will be more fully discussed later." Vd. *ibid.*, pp. 590-91.

[120] We have already shown that the ambiguity of such words as "individual" and "common" makes this tripartite classification of goods false if it be too simply understood. When "happiness" is understood as an existentially individual good which is essentially common, when the "individual good" is understood as an existentially individual good which is accidental and hence not common to all who share a common nature, when the "common good" is understood as a good which is existentially as well as essentially common, it will be seen that an adequate account of the order of goods involves more than three terms, because there is the Divine good (in which eternal beatitude consists) as well as temporal happiness. Cf. Part II *supra*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 606-607. The last point, of course, remains to be proved.

The consequences of an inadequate analysis are momentous. Accepting them, Father J. F. McCormick concludes that the profound error of totalitarianism can be avoided only by referring man to God. "Without this ultimate reference to God, it is not possible to rescue the individual man from total immersion in the community. On the plane of pure naturalism the community is the highest good, and man is necessarily subjected to the highest good" (*Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XV, p. 21). Cf. fns. 18 and 58 *supra*. With no intention of defending the hypothesis of "pure naturalism," we, nevertheless, hope to show, in the order of purely natural goods, however these are attained, that the well-being of the community is not the highest good, but rather the individual happiness of human persons in this life. And this will make intelligible the status of the common good as a *natural* means, for a natural means must have a *natural* end.

only one last end *simpliciter*, despite the radical diremption between man's life in time and eternity; or that the unity of the Christian life abolishes this diremption.[121] Whatever its source, we hold the supposition to be false, and in attempting to defend its opposite, we hope to be able, not merely to refute an error, but to reinterpret traditional doctrine on some of the extremely difficult points which are involved.

We shall proceed in the following order. In the immediately subsequent section (2), we shall try to prove *that* temporal happiness is; then (in 3) we shall try to show *what* natural happiness is, both in itself and by analogy with supernatural and eternal beatitude; and also what natural, temporal happiness *is not*, by distinction from the common good, on the one hand, and from contemplation, on the other. This completed, we must turn (in 4) to consider whether natural perfection can be *naturally* attained by a creature whose powers have fallen below the level of their natural aptitude and here, obviously, will arise all the questions concerning the cooperation of natural and supernatural means as working toward both natural and supernatural ends; then (in 5) we shall try to resolve the paradox that the state, which is a means to temporal happiness, seems nevertheless to subordinate the individual life to its own welfare by reason of the supposed priority

[121] Vd. the question put to us by Professor Charles O'Neil (*loc. cit.*), as challenging our thesis. We have already pointed out (vd. fn. 41a *supra*) that we think the analysis, begun in Part II and completed in this Part, completely answers Dr. O'Neil's question, and removes the difficulties he supposes stand in the way of a demonstration of Democracy. Let us say at once that a duality of last ends, temporal and eternal, does not mean that they are coordinate; on the contrary, as we shall show, eternal beatitude is the supreme human good and temporal happiness is at its best imperfect. But an imperfect last end *simpliciter* is never a means, even though it must be ordered to a perfect last end, as any inferior good is ordered to a superior. A good which is ordered as a means to an end is, of course, inferior to the good which is the end; but this relation of inferiority is not the same as the inferiority of an imperfect last end to a perfect last end. An intermediate end is always a means; but an imperfect last end, thought it is a subordinate and inferior good, is never a means. Failure to make such indispensable distinctions accounts for Dr. O'Neil's difficulties. Vd. our prior discussion of means and ends, in Part II, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 588-90. Cf. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom* (New York: 1940), pp. 179-80; 182-83; 211-17.

of the good of the whole over the good of a part; and we shall conclude (in 6) by showing the bearing of this analysis on the theory of Democracy.*

As the foregoing outline indicates, we cannot avoid theological problems because any discussion of natural happiness must be related to the central Christian dogma of man's fall. In the practical order, genuinely directive truth cannot be achieved in terms of a false hypothesis concerning the actual state of human nature. But though the hypothesis of uncorrupted nature must lead to false practical conclusions about what men can and should do to attain their end, it does not, however, falsify a purely theoretical analysis of *what man's natural end is*. To prevent misunderstanding on the part of impatient readers, let us at once make two points which should throw the whole discussion into clearer perspective. (1) The proof *that natural happiness is* and the definition of *what it is* can be undertaken without any reference to the dogma of man's fall, for the natural end must be understood in terms of the nature, even though the actual condition of the nature puts difficulties in the way of its accomplishing its end by the unaided exercise of natural powers, or the use of purely natural means. Hence, the difficult theological question about the indispensability of grace in relation to the natural, as well as to the supernatural, end does not arise until we come to Section 4 where the problem of how natural happiness can be achieved is discussed. (2) The theological difficulties which arise in this connection would be exactly the same if the common good, rather than happiness, were the ultimate good to be achieved in the temporal order. The actual condition of man's nature would present the same obstacles to his attaining by purely natural means, or unaided powers, the good which is due his nature, whether " the good of civil life " be interpreted as the community's welfare or the perfection of a human being in this life. The resolution of these theological difficulties (as

* Editor's Note: The whole of Part III is too long for publication in a single issue. The last three of the six sections indicated in the above outline of Part III, will be published in the next issue (April).

to means) may not be completely satisfactory, because no answers men can give, however free from contradiction, ever penetrate ultimate mysteries so that the truth is fully comprehensible to us. But the mystery of the cooperation of natural and supernatural causes working toward a natural end is the *same* whatever this natural end may be. Hence, the residue of mystery at the heart of our analysis is no argument against the conclusion that it is individual happiness rather than the social welfare which is the ultimate good in the temporal order.

2. The proposition to be proved, that there is a natural perfection of human life which can be properly called happiness in the temporal order, can be proved prior to a definition of what constitutes such happiness. What is to be proved is a good having certain formal properties: it is a good (a) proportionate to man's nature, (b) capable of realization in this life, (c) an end *simpliciter* and, therefore, not a means to any further end or greater good (to say which is not to deny that there is a greater good), and (d) an end which subordinates the common good. The last two points may appear redundant, but it is necessary to insist that the common good cannot satisfy the formal requirements of a last end in the temporal order.[122]

We shall proceed with the proof in three stages. (1) Since what is being proved is a natural end, we shall first consider arguments which depend entirely upon facts known to natural reason. (2) We shall then show that these arguments, and the conclusion they establish, are in no way incompatible with

[122] We shall use the word "happiness" without qualification usually to refer to the greatest natural and temporal human good just as we shall use the word "beatitude" to refer to the supernatural and eternal perfection of man. It will be necessary sometimes to use both of these words with distinguishing qualifications, as when we shall have to compare perfect and imperfect happiness, or natural and supernatural beatitude; but there will be no confusion so long as it is remembered that the phrase "perfect happiness" is synonymous with "beatitude" and that "imperfect happiness" signifies what is meant by the word "happiness" when that is used without any qualification. Any deviations from the usages indicated will be noted when they occur. Thus, whenever we speak of "the analogy of happiness" the context will make plain that "happiness" is being used to name what is common to perfect and imperfect happiness.

what Christian faith teaches concerning another last end, i. e., beatitude, which is superior to the happiness of this life. (3) Finally, we shall confirm our conclusion by explaining the subordination of the common good to happiness.

(1) The binding force of what seems to us to be adequate proof derives from a single fact—*the naturalness of the state* or political community. As we have already shown, following Aristotle, the state is not natural in the order of efficient or formal causality, but only in the order of material and final causality, and here primarily in the order of final causes.[123] But what is natural in the order of final causality may be natural either as an end, or as a means, or as both. What is natural as an end is a good which corresponds to some natural desire—its proportionate object. What is natural as a means is a good which is indispensable to the attainment of a natural end. Now the state, like the family and the village, corresponds to the desire of man's social nature to live with his fellows in permanent association. Hence association is itself an intrinsic good, an object of natural desire and, as such, an end. But this does not exhaust the nature or naturalness of any community, for, as Aristotle says, "every community is established with a view to some good."[124] One community is higher than another according as the good it aims at, the end it serves, is greater.[125] Now, the domestic community is that "association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants"; and the association of families to form a

[123] Vd. Part II, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 609-18. The Aristotelian analysis is to be found, of course, in *Politics*, I, 1, 2, and esp. at 1252^{b}30.

[124] *Politics*, I, 1, 1252^{a}.

[125] "If all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good" (*Politics*, I, 1, 1252^{a}4-5). Aristotle here suggests two principles of gradation among communities as higher and lower: (1) that the higher aim at the *same* good as the lower, but *in a greater degree*; and (2) that the higher aim at *a greater good*. The first of these principles does not specify communities as essentially distinct in type. If the state, for example, were merely more efficient than the family in serving the same end, it could not be regarded as a more perfect type of community than the family. It is a more perfect type of community because (according to the second principle) it serves a greater good (which is its specifying end).

village community "aims at something more than the supply of daily needs."[126] The state, or political community, has a higher aim than these, for "when several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life."[127] Thus we see two things: first, that no human association is natural merely as an end, but always also as a means to some good for which men voluntarily and deliberately associate themselves (in contrast to the purely instinctive gregariousness of brutes); and second, that the end which makes the state natural as an indispensable means is not life itself (i. e., subsistence and the satisfaction of animal needs), but a good life (i. e., a life perfected by the possession of goods appropriate to men, not brutes, according to the specific difference in their natures). If there were no distinction between *living* and *living well* (or *humanly*), there would simply be no need for the state over and above the family and village community, except perhaps as a more efficient means to the same end (i. e., subsistence and the objects of animal desire), in which case the state would not be specifically distinct

[126] *Politics*, I, 2, 1252^{b}12, 15. What is here being said is that the family is, according to the nature of man's economic insufficiency in a solitary condition, naturally indispensable as a means to his subsistence. The village community, strictly speaking, does not have a different end, but merely is a more efficient means to the same end, because of greater division of labor, etc. Vd. fn. 125 *supra*. Hence the family and the village are not specifically distinct, but differ only in degree.

[127] *Ibid.*, 1252^{b}27-30. This signifies that the state is not merely a more efficient means toward the end of subsistence, in which respect the village exceeds the family, but that it is also distinguished from the latter two by serving an end they cannot aim at—namely, *a good life*. Hence the distinguishing mark of the naturalness of the state is that it is, according to the nature of man, indispensable as a means toward the end of his leading a good life, i. e., a specifically human life. Whereas the village is merely more efficient than the family (serving the same good to a greater degree), the state, in addition to being still more efficient in serving that same good (because it is larger, can have a greater division of labor, etc.), is specifically distinct because it serves a greater good, one that neither of the inferior communities serves at all. Hence, although three communities can be distinguished, there is, strictly speaking, only one essential distinction in type—between family and village, on the one hand, and state, on the other.

from these other communities. And if there were no additional need for the state, it would not be necessary in the order of final causality, for it is only as a means to an end which family and village cannot serve that the state has its peculiar naturalness and special necessity. Now there is such a need because a rational animal can either merely live in a manner analogous to brute subsistence, or can also live well in a specifically human manner which exceeds the entire range of brute life. But what we mean by a good human life, a life made perfect by the possession of specifically human goods, by the satisfaction of man's natural desires, is happiness. Therefore, we must conclude that there is a purely natural happiness for man, constituted by goods proportionate to his specific nature, for if that were not so, then the state itself would not be natural, for it would have no necessity as a means to an end which distinguished it from less perfect natural communities. Since we cannot deny that the state is natural, and specifically distinct from family and village by reason of the natural end it serves, we cannot deny the existence of such an end, happiness in this life.

This proof is complete. Nothing need be added to establish the truth of its conclusion in the order of natural reason. As we shall subsequently see, the truths of faith concerning man's suspernatural destiny do not, and cannot, abolish this truth, though its significance may be profoundly altered. What the pagan Aristotle affirms—in the light of purely natural knowledge, and with nothing but natural goods in view—must be affirmed by any Christian thinker who agrees with Aristotle that the state is the perfect, natural community, for it would not be natural if it did not have a natural end, and it would not be perfect if this end were not the complete good of human life. What must be affirmed, as the end which naturally necessitates the state, is happiness, and happiness cannot be identified with the common good, for the common good is the well-being of the community itself (albeit a good commonly enjoyed by its individual members), whereas happiness is the well-being of a human life.[128] That Aristotle understood the

[128] Vd. Part II, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 599-607. The common good is primarily the

end of the state to be happiness is confirmed not only by the fact that the "good life" of which he speaks in the *Politics* is obviously what he uses "happiness" to name in the *Ethics*; but also by many clear passages in the *Politics* itself in which he explicitly speaks of happiness as the end of the state.[129] Nor is this interpretation of Aristotle's thought in any way altered by the oft-quoted and much misconstrued passages in which he says that the good of the whole is greater than the good of its parts; for these do not, and cannot mean, that the common good is greater than happiness, or that, in the purely natural

goodness of the political community as an end of natural desire; it, therefore, cannot be the end which the state serves as a means. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 619-21. But the state is not an end in itself; it is an intermediate end, an end *secundum quid*, and, therefore, it must be a means. But if it is natural as a means, it must serve a natural end. This fundamental truth, that means and ends must be in the same order, as causes are, does not violate another truth, that natural means or causes may be instrumentally elevated to the service of supernatural ends. When it functions as a principal, not as an instrumental, means, the state must have a natural, temporal end, for it functions principally as a natural and temporal means. That end, as we have shown, is happiness, an end *simpliciter*, not an intermediate end, not an end *secundum quid*.

[129] Vd. II, 5, 1264^{b}15-25, in which he criticizes Plato for depriving the guardians of happiness, and for supposing that the only end is the "happiness" or well-being of the state itself. The fact that he himself speaks in other places (III, 6, 1278^{b}25 and VII, 1, 1324^{a}5) of the happiness of the state, as well as the happiness of individuals, does not argue that they are the same existentially, but only that the word "happiness" is used as synonymous for "well-being" or "welfare," and the state, which has some being, has its own characteristic well-being and welfare, just as individual men do. Even when he says (as in VII, 1) that the happiness of individuals and of states is the same, he does not mean that they are existentially identical, but only that they are analogically the same, since each is a well-being, though not the goodness of the same sort of being. In the other passage (III, 6), where he says that happiness is the chief end of individuals and states, he can be interpreted to mean either that each sort of being (the community and the individual man) has its own appropriate perfection, or that both the state and its individuals work for the same end, i. e., the happiness of men. That the latter is his primary meaning is shown by his explicit statement that the state exists for happiness or the good life: "a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only; if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice" (III, 9, 1280^{a}30-35); "the state is the union of families and villages for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life" (*ibid.*, 1281^{a}). And finally he tells us that "the best form of government is one under which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily" (VII, 2, 1324^{a}23).

order and without any reference beyond it, the state is the ultimate good or end, and man is ordained to its service as a means.[130]

[130] The two capital texts which, as wrongly interpreted, make Aristotle to be, like Plato, an exponent of totalitarianism on philosophical grounds, are: *Ethics*, I, 2, 1094^b7-10: "Even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something more complete and greater, whether to attain or preserve"; and *Politics*, I, 2, 1253^a19-20: "The state is by nature clearly prior to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part." Cf. *ibid.*, III, 17, 1288^a27. Now, that these passages cannot be interpreted simply to mean that the common good is naturally a greater good than happiness follows from the incompatibility of such interpretation with the truth about the very nature of the state itself—as a means naturally ordained to the happiness of men. What is so ordained obviously cannot be a greater good than the end it serves. Moreover, on metaphysical grounds, as we have shown, the well-being or goodness of a substantial being (a man) is necessarily greater than the well-being of an accidental being (a state). Nor can this truth be evaded by those who would say that the state has metaphysical priority over its human members because it is related to them as form is to matter; for, as we have shown, the state is an accidental form (of organization) inhering in a plurality of associated substances, and substance always has more being than accident even though substance is *said* to be related to accident *as matter is to form*. Cf. fn. 58 and 60, *supra*. Not every sort of form is prior to its matter, but only substantial form to prime matter. Not every whole is prior to every part, in being or goodness, but only a substantial whole to its substantial parts. For Plato to make the error of treating the state as if it were a substantial organism, and its human members as organic parts, may be condonable, but there can be no excuse for Aristotle or Aristotelians, in view of their metaphysical understanding of substance and accident in being and unity.

How, then, shall these troublesome passages be interpreted? We suggest, in the first place, that the context of the passage in the *Ethics* reveals that Aristotle is simply saying that the happiness of many men is greater than the happiness of a single man; that, in short, he is using the word "state" here distributively to signify the multitude of individual men, each of whom is entitled to happiness. And, in the second place, we suggest that, since the state is an indispensable means to the happiness of its members, individual men must, in seeking that end for themselves—and everything naturally desires its own perfection— must seek it through the preservation of the state's common good as a necessary means. Certain paradoxes arise from these facts, as well as from the mixture of selfishness and altruism (love of one's fellow man) which enters into pursuit of happiness. We shall deal with these later in Section 5, *infra*; here let it be said that a paradox can be explained, but not a contradiction. Those who make the state the last end in the temporal order, or the common good the highest natural good, are involved in contradicting the very nature of the state as a means ordained to the happiness of individual men, that happiness being necessarily, through such ordination, a natural and temporal good itself. Vd. the position of Father McCormick (*loc. cit.*) and all others who so interpret the innumerable passages in St. Thomas where he speaks of the state as a whole and human beings as parts.

Before we turn now to a Christian interpretation of the conclusion which has been proved, let us observe one point of great significance for contemporary discussion. Aristotle's analysis of the naturalness and necessity of the state, which implies not only the reality of temporal happiness, but also the ordination of state to man as means to end, did not and could not appeal to the truths of the Christian religion. Even as a matter of natural knowledge, Aristotle did not understand God as the creator of man, nor did he ever assert unequivocally the self-subsistence of a separated soul. If his argument is quite sound without appealing to these truths, then the fact that Christian knowledge of man's relation to God, both in origin and in end, confirms the dignity of man as an end to be served by the state, cannot be interpreted as indicating truths essential to the argument itself. It is currently said, again and again, that the dignity of man cannot be affirmed apart from the truths of revealed religion, which show man to be created in God's image and to be destined to eternal salvation. These facts certainly increase man's dignity among earthly creatures, but they are not requisite for establishing that dignity, *if what is meant is his worth as an end which subordinates the state to his service.*[130a] That can be defended today, as it was argued by

[130a] Man's dignity—his inalienable worth as an end—is known as a natural truth flowing entirely from the fact that man, being rational, is a person (i. e., an individual substance of rational nature). Hence human nature has a mode of subsistence which differs in metaphysical type from the subsistence of every other corporeal nature. Individuals which are not persons lack the *dignity of end,* for they are but fragments of the species to which they belong and for whose perpetuation they are generated and generate in turn. Whether or not, as in the case of some brutes, such substances are gregarious and belong to the organized whole of a social group, any completely corporeal substance is a part of the unorganized whole which is the species. In contrast, an individual person is a subsistent whole, superior to the accidental whole which is a society, as well as rising above the species. The fact that man needs the state for biological as well as moral reasons, and the fact that man, being an animal as well as rational, is concerned with the perpetuation of his species, are not inconsistent with his status as a person—as a whole and an end—for man, unlike the angels, is a corporeal, not a spiritual, person. Vd. Fr. G. Phelan, "Person and Liberty," in the *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,* XVI, pp. 53-69, esp. pp. 59-65. In short, it is the rationality of a rational animal which, in conferring the lowest degree of personality on man, also constitutes the only individual and corporeal substance that has the dignity of an end.

Aristotle, entirely in terms of the nature of the state as flowing from man's nature as a rational animal. Natural reason, in short, suffices to refute the error of totalitarianism, though revealed religion augments the refutation by what faith teaches concerning the significance of man's rationality.[131]

(2) Aristotle affirms only one last end *simpliciter*—happiness. The Christian affirms two, one an object of natural knowledge and intention (happiness), the other an object of supernatural faith and hope (beatitude). It may be objected

[131] One cause of misunderstanding about this matter is that man's rationality is at once a premise for two independent conclusions; on the one hand, that he has a self-subsistent soul; on the other, that the state is necessary as a means to provide the conditions of a good *human* life, as opposed to a merely *animal* life. (A rational soul is incorruptible; hence from the fact of rationality we can argue to immortality. But a rational soul also constitutes a corporeal person; hence from the same fact of rationality, we can also argue to man's dignity as an end, subordinating the state as a means. Vd. fn. 130a *supra*.) Now the fact that two conclusions follow necessarily from the same premise does not permit us to say, in sound logic, that one of these conclusions follows necessarily from the other. Yet that is precisely what is said by those who make man's immortality, and the destiny it implies, an indispensable premise from which to argue to man's dignity as an end to be served by the state. All of man's *natural* rights flow from his *nature* as a rational animal. They do not depend on his having an immortal soul except in so far as self-subsistence of soul is implicated in a rational nature. It is true, however, to say that no one can consistently deny man's immortality and at the same time claim to demonstrate man's dignity or natural rights, because if two conclusions are implied by the same premise, the denial of either conclusion requires the denial of the common premise on which the other conclusion depends for its proof. (To be logically exact, we must add the qualification that the additional premises, differing in each case, be unquestioned. Thus, let P stand for a major premise which is common to two syllogisms; p1 for p2 for the different minor premises with which it is conjoined in these two syllogisms; and C1 and C2 for the two conclusions respectively. Then, on the condition that p1 and p2 are not questioned, the denial of C2 requires the denial of P, and this removes the proposition which, as major premise along with p1 as minor premise, is indispensable for the proof of C1. The proposition about man's rational nature is P, the common major premise; C2 is the conclusion that man's soul is self-subsistent; and C1 the conclusion that man is an end to be served by the state. Now, on the condition indicated, the denial of C2 requires the denial of P, indispensable to the proof of C1.)

The point we have just made belongs in the order of knowledge, not of action. We have said only that man's dignity can be *known* apart from revealed religion, not that it can be successfully defended in practice (as opposed to argument) without the supernatural aid which nature needs to achieve even the good which befits it. We shall return to this matter in Section 4 *infra*.

at once that this cannot be so because *two* last ends *simpliciter* are impossible. The objection arises from a failure to distinguish two ways in which goods can be ordered to one another: as means to end, and as inferior to superior. While it is true that every good which is a means is inferior to the good which is its end, it is not true that every inferior good is ordered as a means to the good which is its superior. Thus, for example, the habit of science is inferior in the goodness which belongs to virtue, to the habit of justice, the one being a secondary, the other a cardinal virtue; but science is not ordained as a means to justice. Similarly the happiness which belongs to this life, and which is called by St. Thomas "imperfect happiness," is inferior as happiness to beatitude, or perfect happiness; but this does not make the one a means to the other. Now what is good entirely as end, and nowise as means, must be regarded as an end *simpliciter*; it cannot be an intermediate end, or end *secundum quid*. Objection to the notion of two last ends *simpliciter* arises from the supposition that every inferior good must somehow be a means to some superior good. That supposition being clearly false, the objection is removed.[131a] We are not saying that it is easy to understand the relation which obtains between an inferior and a superior last end (*simpliciter*), especially with concern for the unity of man's moral life. But that is a problem we shall deal with later. Here we wish only to show that Christianity in proclaiming man's supreme end to be beatitude does not, and cannot, deny happiness as the analogous good of man's natural life on earth—a

[131a] Vd. *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 1, a. 5, where St. Thomas says, *per contra,* that "it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one another." This *impossibility* certainly excludes two *natural* last ends, for they could not be ordained to one another *either* as means to end *or* as inferior to superior good. But there is nothing at all impossible about the duality of a natural and a supernatural last end, for though the former cannot be directed to the latter as a means, it is subordinated to the latter as an inferior. Moreover, the motions by which man tends simultaneously toward these two last ends are accomplished by natural and supernatural acts. The will cannot tend *naturally* to more than one last end, but it can be activated by supernatural, as well as natural, tendency. As rectified by the natural virtues, the will tends toward an end which is other than the end for ordination to which it must be elevated by charity and the infused virtues. Vd. fn. 136 *infra.*

last end simpliciter, though subordinated to beatitude as imperfect to perfect in the same analogous genus.[132] For the sake of brevity, we shall merely indicate the relevant evidence under the following four headings.

(a) *Church and State.* Church and State differ in two ways that are related: in mode of origin and in end. The State is

[132] Much of the difficulty about means and ends is due to the inadequacy or imprecision of the vocabulary we use to make the distinctions. As a result we do not make enough distinctions or make them clearly enough. Ignoring goods which are mere means, let us consider goods which are entirely ends or both means and ends. Now here there are two principles of distinction, which are independent of one another. (1) The distinction between end *secundum quid* and end *simpliciter*, according as the end is also a means to some further end, or entirely an end. (2) The distinction between a superior and an inferior end, whether it be *secundum quid* or *simpliciter*. Now the trouble is that such words as "intermediate" and "subordinate" are used as if they were synonymous. Yet an end might be subordinate in the sense of being inferior, but not be intermediate because it is an end *simpliciter* rather than *secundum quid*. Maritain, for example, seems to use these words interchangeably; and sometimes speaks of an "infravalent end" though it is not easy to tell when he means, by this phrase, an intermediate end, such as the common good, or a subordinate last end, such as natural happiness. The difficulty is complicated by the fact that all intermediate ends are subordinate (because means are inferior as goods to their ends); whereas subordinate ends need not be intermediate, as in the case of happiness. Furthermore, the phrase "secundum quid" is sometimes interpreted to mean "in the temporal order"—in which case, the happiness which is the last end *simpliciter* in the temporal order should also be called a last end *secundum quid*; but this would violate the distinction between *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* as signifying an end which is also a means, and an end which is not. We suggest, therefore, that this confusing vocabulary be renovated to conform to the basic distinctions. The only words we really need are: "intermediate" and "final," "imperfect" and "perfect." Ends are either intermediate or final, and either sort of end may be imperfect or perfect (imperfect and perfect virtues, as intermediate ends; imperfect and perfect happiness, as final ends). If in certain cases synonyms cannot be avoided, then let it be understood that "*secundum quid*" signifies *intermediacy*, that "*simpliciter*" signifies *finality*, that "subordinate" or "infravalent" means *inferior*, though not necessarily as a means is inferior to an end, for it can signify simply the relation of the *imperfect* to the *perfect* in the same analogous genus. The phrase "last end" is also ambiguous because it can be used to name either an end which is last *secundum quid* or *simpliciter*, but if it is used without qualification it should be interpreted to mean a genuinely final end. The opposition of "absolutely" and "relatively," in St. Thomas's reference to beatitude as the last end absolutely and to temporal happiness as the last end relatively, imports nothing new, but in this case "absolutely" must not be regarded as a synonym for "*simpliciter*," nor "relatively" for "*secundum quid*."

naturally generated and serves a natural end, whereas the Church has a supernatural foundation and serves a supernatural end. These institutions or associations are specified by their ends, just as the natural virtues are specifically divided against the supernatural virtues in terms of end. Now if a natural end were to be denied, the State would have no end to serve as a principal means; it could function only as an instrumental means, entirely subalternated to the Church, in the work of saving souls. And the common good cannot be the natural end of the State, because even if we think of the common good as the ideal perfection toward which the State itself tends, the State as perfect is still a means, and must serve an end beyond itself—beyond its own well-being—and this is the happiness of men, the welfare of individuals in this life. Nothing else is both *final* and *natural* as an end.[133]

(b) *Natural and supernatural virtues.* Like Church and State in the sphere of institutions, natural and supernatural

[133] Cf. Pope Leo XIII, in *Immortale Dei*: "The Almighty, therefore, has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers, the one being set over divine, the other over human, things. . . . One of the two has for its proximate and chief object the well-being of this mortal life; the other the everlasting joys of salvation." And Pope Pius XII, in *Summi Pontificatus*: "As our great predecessor, Leo XIII, wisely taught in the Encyclical *Immortale Dei*, it was the Creator's will that civil sovereignty . . . should facilitate the attainment in the temporal order, by individuals, of physical, intellectual, and moral perfection; and should aid them to reach their supernatural end." Note here the distinction between the State functioning as principal means toward the natural end, and as instrumental means, *assisting* toward the supernatural end. In the next paragraph, Pope Pius speaks of the "common good" not as the prosperity of the State itself, but as "the harmonious development and the natural perfection of man. It is for this perfection that society is designed by the Creator as a means." Though "common good" is here used in one of the senses we have relinquished (vd. Part II, *supra*, at pp. 599-604), the analytical intention of the passage quoted is not at variance.

Cf. Maritain, *The Things That are not Caesar's* (New York: 1931), pp. 5, 125; *True Humanism* (New York: 1938), pp. 90-95, 169-173; *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York; 1940), pp. 225-28. Throughout all these passages in which Maritain clearly distinguishes between the temporal and the eternal ends, respectively the ends of State and Church, he does not distinguish clearly enough between that meaning of the phrase "common good" in which it names the intermediate end (*bonum communitatis*) that is *identical with* the well-being of the State itself (and as such not the *end of* the State) and the meaning in which it is synonymous with "happiness"—the *totum bene vivere* which is possible to men on earth.

virtues are divided, in the sphere of habits, according as they function, respectively, as principal means to natural and supernatural ends. Here, too, there is a difference in origin which corresponds to the difference in end: one type of virtue can be naturally acquired, the other is supernaturally infused. We need not consider here whether perfect possession of the natural virtues is within the competence of fallen man without the assistance of grace; or whether, as subalternated by the infused virtues, the acquired virtues function, in instrumental causality, as means to an end beyond their natural scope. The only point is that the possibility of natural virtue implies the possibility of a natural end—an end which is just as proportionate to man's nature as these virtues are as means. Moreover, it follows that to whatever extent the natural virtues do exist, and under whatever conditions they are acquired, the natural end to which they are ordained must be realized. Now this end is not the common good, for only one of the virtues regards the commonweal directly.[134] Even though all the acquired virtues are also called *social* virtues,[135] this does not mean that the commonweal is their ultimate end (except when they are considered under the aspect of justice), but rather that they are acquired and exercised in the course of the social life that is connatural to man. The ultimate end of the cardinal virtues, including justice, is a whole life lived according to virtue, and this as we shall see is natural happiness on earth.[136]

[134] "Legal justice alone regards the commonweal directly; but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the commonweal" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 5 ad 4).

[135] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 5.

[136] "Man is perfected by virtue for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness. Now man's happiness is twofold. One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is happiness surpassing man's nature. . . . Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end by means of his natural principles, albeit not without the Divine assistance" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 1). This central truth is confirmed by other passages in which the distinction between acquired and infused virtues is further clarified: vd. *ibid.*, q. 51, a. 4; q. 63, aa. 2, 3, 4. Nor is this point altered in its essential signification by the discussion of the acquired virtues in relation to charity (vd. *ibid.*, q. 65, aa. 1, 2) or in relation to the need for grace (vd. *ibid.*, q. 109, a. 2); on the contrary,

(c) *Divine and natural law.* Law is an ordination of reason which directs man to his end. Hence an essential division in types of law must be according to a difference in end. Now, as St. Thomas points out, the need for divine law, over and above both natural and human law, is that the latter is not competent to direct man to a supernatural end; wherefore it follows from the existence of natural law, and of positive law as its human derivative, that there is a last end, other than the supernatural end, toward which men are directed.[137] Now this end may either be the common good or happiness according as we consider positive law or natural law; for the former is entirely a matter of political institution and, therefore, is directed toward the common good as its proximate end; whereas the latter directs man to seek the end which is appointed by his natural appetites, and this is happiness, as constituted by the whole of natural goods, including, of course, the common good as the object of man's natural desire for social life. Moreover, the common good is itself ordained as a means to happiness. Hence the ultimate end toward which law directs is always happiness, though positive law directs men *primarily* to the common good.[138]

the difference in end which divides natural and supernatural virtues is confirmed in the discussion of the light of reason and the light of grace as related, respectively, to these two kinds of virtue (vd. *ibid.*, q. 110, a. 3). Cf. *De Virt. Card*, q. 1, a. 2.

[137] "If man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculties, there would be no need for man to have any further direction on the part of his reason, besides the natural law and the human law which is derived from it" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 4). Cf. *ibid.*, q. 91, a. 5, where an earthly and a heavenly good are contrasted.

[138] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 2: "The first principle in practical matters, which are the object of practical reason, is the last end; and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness. Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relation to happiness." The subsequent discussion, in this article, of happiness and the common good is obscure, first, because St. Thomas fails to distinguish the proximate end of positive law from its ultimate end, which is the end declared by natural law; and secondly, because St. Thomas fails to clarify Aristotle's statement that law concerns both happiness and the good of the body politic. But when later he discusses natural law by itself (*ibid.*, q. 94, a. 2), St. Thomas does make clear that the end toward which the natural law directs men is the *whole* natural good, including each partial good that is the object of each natural appetite, and thus including the common good which corresponds to man's desire for social life.

(d) *Imperfect and perfect happiness.* In addition to the foregoing contexts, in which the distinction between a natural and a supernatural last end is implicated in other basic distinctions, there is an explicit discussion of this distinction itself in St. Thomas's theory of happiness. We cite this fact, not as an argument from authority, but as evidencing the Christian incorporation of the natural truth about man's happiness in this life, in its larger doctrine concerning the ends of man, both temporal and eternal. We will not here examine all the texts in which St. Thomas adverts to this distinction, because we shall consider them later in trying to define *what* natural happiness is.[139] Whether Aristotle and St. Thomas agree in their conception of the happiness which Aristotle regarded as natural and St. Thomas calls "imperfect," whether or not there are several apparently conflicting or at least competing definitions of what this happiness is, makes no difference here, for our only contention here is that happiness is an analogous notion which includes at least two goods that are ultimate ends, proportionate respectively to the natural and supernatural potentialities of human life.[140]

(3) We have already shown in Part II how necessary it is to cure the phrase "common good" of its radical ambiguities. Our present problem re-emphasizes the need. Despite the fact that the welfare of a community and the welfare of a man cannot be identical goods; despite the fact that the causes of well-being in a community and the causes of well-being in a man are not the same; despite the fact that the state as a good is an intermediate end and hence a means, whereas the goodness of a human life is a final end and not a means; despite these facts, inveterate habits of imprecise speech permit many to speak of

[139] These texts occur principally in *Summa Theol.*, I-II, qq. 3, 4, and 5; and in *III Contra Gent.*, 25, 34-48, 63.

[140] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4: "Happiness signifies some final perfection; hence, according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happines." Cf. also *ibid.*, II-II, q. 186, a. 3 ad 4: "Happiness is twofold. One is perfect, to which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in respect of which some are said to be happy in this life."

the "common good" or the "good of civil life" as the last end in the temporal order without distinguishing between the welfare of the state and individual happiness. These phrases can, of course, be used to name happiness in this life, because it is a good that is *common* to all men, a good proportionate to their specific nature; and because it is a good that is achieved only in the course of *civil life*, under the auspices of a civil community. But if they are thus used, then to avoid the peril of self-contradiction they must not also be used *without distinction* to name the welfare of the community itself, for then what is named is both an intermediate and a final end, which is impossible. It is precisely this quite avoidable confusion which has led many to regard the supreme good of temporal life as if it were a last end only *secundum quid* and hence, as intermediate end, also a means. But if this were the case, then there would be no natural or temporal happiness, for happiness, albeit imperfect, can never be a means to any further end. In view of all this, it seems desirable to employ the names "common good" and "happiness" with clearly distinct significations—the one to signify the goodness proper to a community as such (*bonum communitatis*), the other to signify the goodness of a human life (*totum bene vivere*). Then there can be no question that when we speak of the common good, we are considering an intermediate end which is a means to happiness. And when we speak of happiness it will be clear that we are referring to a final end which is none the less an end *simpliciter* because it is both temporal and imperfect. Unless these things are absolutely clear, there was no point in having proved that temporal happiness exists, for no one in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas has ever denied the existence of a temporal common good, though many, in affirming the latter as the natural end, have supposed they were acknowledging a supreme temporal good that is not only subordinate to, but also ordained as a means to, beatitude.[141]

[141] Cf. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom* (New York: 1940), pp. 179-82; and *Scholasticism and Politics* (New York: 1940), pp. 225-228.

To confirm the rightness of this distinction, we need only remember the following points: (a) that a good state, sustained by the institutions of good government, is only one condition of the life of virtue; the other, and more proximate, cause is the possession of virtue itself; (b) that the life of virtue, which is usually identified with happiness, is a life led by individual men, just as virtues are habits possessed by them, and that the community as such, not being a living organism, neither has virtues nor leads a life of virtue, in the primary and proper signification of these terms;[142] (c) that the "good of civil life" must, therefore, be construed as referring to the goodness of the life men can lead in civil society, not to the goodness of the state's own "life," nor to the goodness of a civilization or a culture as such; (d) that enjoyment of the common good is only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of happiness, for not all the members of a good society in fact possess virtue, and lacking it they cannot be happy; hence enjoyment of the common good leaves much to be desired even in this life, which could not be the case if the common good were the last end in the temporal order; (e) that there are supra-political aspects of human life which are indispensable to its perfection, even though such things as speculative and artistic activity may be politically supported and socially exercised;[143] and (f) that St. Thomas affirms the ordination of the common good to happiness when he shows how all temporal means are ordered to "the service of those who contemplate the truth."[144]

[142] Both life and virtue are said of the state by attributive analogy, as when we speak of the justice of the state, or of its agency. Cf. Part II, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 620 ff. and esp. fn. 73.

[143] Vd. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics,* pp. 75-76. Cf. *Freedom in the Modern World* (New York: 1936), p. 44.

[144] "Perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which all the regulations of civil life are directed" (*III Contra Gent.,* 37). Or, as Maritain puts it, "to what end is the whole government of civil life, if not to assure the exterior peace necessary to contemplation?" (*Art and*

This last point turns our attention to the problem we must now consider: What is happiness? Is it adequately defined as contemplation or contemplative activity; or is it a whole life lived in accordance with perfect virtue and supported by a sufficiency of the goods of fortune? How that question is answered does not alter the *truth* of what has so far been proved (that happiness is), but it does profoundly affect its *significance* for political theory. If temporal happiness is *nothing but* contemplation, then political institutions are never a principal, but only an instrumental, cause of happiness in this life, just as the State and the natural virtues function only instrumentally by subalternation to the Church and the supernatural virtues in the work of salvation. And if this be so, then the several good forms of government (however unequal they may be in their intrinsic justice) are all equally good as means to man's last end, whether that be temporal happiness or eternal beatitude. We have already pointed out why the theory of Democracy is not tenable if temporal happiness be denied.[145] We must now add that it is not tenable if temporal happiness be *identified with* contemplation. That identification can be denied without denying the paramount place of *knowing the truth* in the order of goods which men can possess in this life.

Scholasticism (New York: 1930), p. 80). To what end is that unity of peace which is the common good, if it be not happiness?

It does not make any difference to the significance of this point whether we agree that temporal happiness consists in contemplation or whether, as we shall show, the purely natural end of man in this life must be otherwise defined. The point remains that to this end all other temporal goods are somehow ordered as means, among them the common good, the exterior peace which it is the work of just government and prudent civil regulations to provide. Cf. our prior discussion (fn. 87, *supra*) of the distinction between the social, or exterior, peace (which is directly the work of justice) and the human, or interior, peace (which is directly the work of the virtues, and especially charity). Vd. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 4 ad 1.

Moreover, the statement that "man is not ordained to the body politic according to all that he is and has" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 21, a. 4 ad 3), is subject to two interpretations. The one given by St. Thomas in that passage, namely, that beyond the state man must be referred to God as his prime ruler; the other, which follows from the recognition of a temporal, as well as an eternal, last end, namely, that it is to natural happiness, not to the common good, that all human actions must be ultimately referred, in so far as they function *principally* as *natural* means.

[145] Vd. Section I *supra*, at p. 126.

The problem is a difficult one. It requires us to examine the various meanings of "happiness" in traditional discussion, not merely for the sake of understanding Aristotle and St. Thomas, but in order to show the relation of several distinct notions within the analogical concept of happiness.

3. An analogical concept cannot be expressed in a definition. We cannot define what is common to natural and supernatural happiness. But we can, nevertheless, state the formal properties or signs of happiness. Being a last end, happiness must satisfy every desire. It must be that which, when possessed, leaves nothing to be desired. If we understand what this means, we realize that happiness is not *a* good, but *the* good. The phrase "*a* good" can be used for any type of partial good, the highest as well as the lowest in the order of such partial goods. In sharp contrast, "*the* good" signifies the whole of goods, that whole which includes every type of partial good, the types being enumerated according as they are distinct specifying objects of diverse desires, and ordered according to the grades of potentiality in which these diverse desires are founded. Thus, wealth is a (type of) good, and health, and knowledge, and virtue, and a good society. None of these by itself can constitute happiness, for its possession leaves much else to be desired. But if the various partial goods be exhaustively enumerated, and if they be rightly ordered *inter se*, then taken together they can be said to constitute happiness, for the possession of this ordered aggregate of goods would necessarily satisfy every desire. Now if happiness is the whole of goods, thus constituted by an ordered variety of parts (i.e., partial goods), it cannot also be one of the parts (i.e., one type of good among others in the order of goods). Hence when we speak of happiness as "the highest good" or "the greatest good" we must be careful not to confuse what is the whole of goods with what may be the most desirable partial good by comparison with other types of partial good which are less worthy. Happiness, in short, is not *a* good among others, but *the* good which includes all others.[146]

[146] For a fuller explication of these points, vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," in *The*

So far, it may be said, we have been talking of temporal happiness, for we have mentioned only temporal goods. But just as in the apprehension of being we must proceed from that analogical mode of being which is most knowable to us, so, too, in regard to the good we must proceed from that analogical mode of happiness which falls within our present experience. This procedure is fruitful only if it enables us to grasp, however indistinctly, what is common to being or the good in all its modes. Now the conception of happiness as the whole of goods does enable us to understand the analogy of temporal and eternal happiness. This conception is best expressed in the formula of Boethius, which St. Thomas quotes with approval: that happiness consists in a life made perfect by the possession in aggregate of all good things.[147] But life in time

Review of Politics, III, 3, pp. 354-86. Cf. Part II, *supra, loc. cit.,* pp. 626-27; also pp. 595 ff. and fns. 43, 44.

This conception of happiness as the whole of goods entails a distinction between constitutive and functional means. Since a whole cannot be possessed except through possession of the parts, the partial goods which constitute the whole of goods are means to its possession, and from this relation to the whole they are called "constitutive means." This relation of means to end is in the order of material causality. But means may also be related to ends in the order of efficient causality, and when they operate in this way, we speak of them as functional or, productive means. Furthermore, among functional means we must distinguish between those partial goods which are productive of other partial goods, and those which are productive of happiness itself. One and the same good may, of course, be in different relations both a constitutive means (constitutive of happiness) and a functional means, and as a functional means, it may either serve another partial good as end, or happiness itself. Vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.,* pp. 373-76.

[147] Vd. *III Contra Gent.,* 63. Cf. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 5, a. 8 ad 3: "This definition of happiness given by some—"*Happy is the man who has all he desires,* or, *whose every wish is fulfilled*—is a good and adequate definition, if it be understood in a certain way; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand simply all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires is happy, since nothing satisfies all of man's natural desires except the perfect good which is happiness. But if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of reason, thus it does not belong to happiness to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally. . . . And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added—so as to include happiness—that he *desire nothing amiss*; although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that *happy is he who has all he desires.*"

is only analogically the same as life in eternity. The one consists primarily in the transitive activity of a composite substance; the other is entirely the immanent activity of the soul, in which, of course, the resurrected body may participate. In time, the aggregate of all good things can be possessed only successively, accumulated during the course of a whole life; hence just as temporal life does not exist in any moment, but is a process in becoming, so the perfection of this life, which is temporal happiness, cannot truly be said to *be* at any moment, but only to *become*; so that, as Solon wisely remarked, a man's happiness in this life cannot be judged until he is dead, and there is a finished whole to examine. But in eternity, all good things can be possessed simultaneously and in no other way, for where there is no time, there is no motion, no process of becoming. Hence, although happiness is a whole of goods in both time and eternity, that whole differs in the two cases as radically as do the modes of life which can occur in these two orders: in time, only a finite whole is possible, whereas something like an infinite whole can exist in eternity; in time, a finite whole can be constituted only by a complex diversity of ordered parts, whereas in eternity, a quasi-infinite whole can be constituted as a simple unity, in which a diversity of distinctions is present only formally. In short, man's natural happiness is in every respect proportionate to his nature: it cannot be accomplished without work, nor can it be enjoyed in perfect rest; it is successively realized as is his life itself, nor is it finished until his life is done; it is a finite whole complexly constituted by diverse partial goods, as man is by nature a finite being, complexly constituted by many faculties, each the source of a diverse natural desire. But in the beatific vision man is supernaturally united to God, and the perfection which he thus enjoys is proportionate to the object in which beatitude consists: it derives its quasi-infinite character as a whole of goods from its truly infinite object; it is a simple whole, for in the vision of God, the blessed enjoy all good things in an eminent unity; every "natural" desire is satisfied by the knowledge and love of God which beatitude confers, and in the immanent activity of such

knowledge and love, the blessed are at once completely alive and completely at rest.[148]

[148] One other difference between natural and supernatural happiness must be mentioned. In both cases, happiness exists *subjectively* in the perfection of man's being, a goodness convertible with the actualization of his potentialities. But beautitude also consists *objectively* in the Divine being and goodness. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 8; q. 3, a. 8; q. 16, a. 3. It is in this sense that we speak of God as man's last end, rather than the beatific vision itself, which is the acquisition of the end. In contrast, the objective constitution of temporal happiness does not consist in a single object the attainment of which satisfies every natural desire; it consists of some objects which are extrinsic and entirely useful goods, such as the forms of wealth, of some which are intrinsic and useful, such as health; and of some which are intrinsic and enjoyable, such as virtue and knowledge. Here happiness, which is the whole of these goods, whether objectively as desired, or subjectively as attained, is greater than any of them; whereas beatitude is necessarily inferior to the goodness of God from which it flows. Cf. *A Dialectic of Morals*, pp. 82-84. When it is said that God is man's last end objectively, in common with all other creatures, it must be understood that only man, of all corporeal creatures, attains this last end *subjectively*, which attainment, says St. Thomas, is properly called happiness. Furthermore, this attainment occurs only in beatitude, not in the happiness of this life. The natural knowledge which man can have of God in this life is a partial good and does not constitute temporal happiness. God is not the temporal last end *objectively*, in the attainment of which natural happiness *subjectively* consists. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 5 ad 3. We shall return to this point subsequently when we compare what is truly natural happiness with what is a temporal participation of supernatural happiness, i. e., namely the supernatural contemplation of God which, though it may occur in this life, occurs only through the agency of theological and infused virtues. Strictly speaking, God is never an object of desire, natural or elicit, but always an object of love. The ultimate object of desire is an immanent perfection. But God is a transcendant good. To speak of "the desire for God" is as improper as to speak of "the love of the beatific vision." We do not love the beatific vision; we love God. We do not desire God, we desire to know Him in the vision that is promised the blessed. This clarification is necessary to make precise what is meant by the loose statement that God is man's last end. If a last end is an ultimate object of desire, an attainable immanent perfection, then God is not man's last end. Happiness, natural and supernatural, are man's last ends. When it is said that all creatures tend toward God as their end, as toward the final cause of the universe, nothing more is meant than that the ultimate (immanent) perfection toward which each thing tends according to its nature is a participated or created good—participating to some degree in the uncreated goodness of God, just as the being of each creature participates in some degree in the uncreated being of the first efficient cause. "Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and immanent in him; but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite" (Summa Theol. I-II, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3). Man can love the uncreated and infinite good (as a transcendant object); but man cannot desire anything but an intrinsic and immanent good, which must, therefore, be a

Thus we see that between happiness and beatitude there obtains a perfect analogy of proportionality, for each is a perfection proportionate to the nature perfected, according to the radically diverse conditions of life in time and eternity, and according to potentialities or natural desires naturally realized or supernaturally fulfilled.[149] Moreover, we see why natural happiness at its best, in its most complete realization, is imperfect by comparison with its supernatural analogue. The most complete finite whole is less than the infinite. The happiness

created good, and a finite perfection. Even the beatific vision, which consists in the knowledge and love of what is *objectively infinite*, is *subjectively a finite perfection*, because a finite creature cannot be infinitely perfected without ceasing to be a creature and becoming God. That is why it is always better for the creature to love God than to know Him, as St. Thomas says (*Summa Theol.* I. q. 82, a. 3); the goodness of love is measured by its object, but the goodness of knowledge is measured by what is known of the object. Though we can know an infinite object, insofar as we can know God, we cannot have infinite knowledge, either naturally or supernaturally. Vd. *Summa Theol.* I, q. 12; also q. 86, a. 20.

In sharp contrast to both knowledge and love, desire always has a finite object; for the good to which it is directed is an immanent perfection, which being a created good, the perfection of a finite creature, is always a finite object, whether that be supernatural or natural happiness. If we compare supernatural to natural happiness as an infinite to a finite whole of goods, that must be understood only as signifying that beatitude consists in the knowledge and love of an infinite object, not that it is an infinite perfection. In short, desire is always of the finite good, and this applies to the will as a faculty of elicit desire, as well as to natural desire, though we must remember, of course, that the will is also a faculty of love and may thus have an infinite object. Failure to realize this results from the confusion of love and desire, and the confusion of the good in general with the infinite good. When the will is regarded as a faculty tending toward an attainable end, whether naturally or supernaturally, its object is a finite good—either the natural happiness which is known to reason, or the supernatural beatitude which is known to faith. It is absolutely false, therefore, to argue against natural happiness (as an immanent perfection, an object of desire) by saying that the will is an infinite faculty, a faculty ordained in every way to an infinite object. The fallacy of this argument is paralleled in a similarly erroneous argument from a false supposition about the intellect as an infinite power. Vd. fn. 149a *infra*.

[149] The analogy of happiness here considered is only part of the larger analogy which St. Thomas discusses, for here we are concerned only with a proportionality arising from man's different modes of being—*happiness*: *man on earth* : : *happiness*: *man in heaven*. But St. Thomas also considers the happiness of beings other than man, and therefore extends the proportionality to include—*happiness*: *God* : : *happiness* : *angels* : : *happiness* : *man in this life* : : *happiness* : *man hereafter*. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 2 and 4.

of work can never quiet all desires simultaneously as does the happiness of rest. And even if temporal happiness satisfy every natural desire which can be requited in this life, it cannot be said to leave nothing more to be desired, for man, by reason of his spiritual nature (his incorporeal intellect and will), *transcendentally* tends toward what he cannot naturally achieve—a greater knowledge of *the* Truth, a more perfect union with *the* Good. There is nothing paradoxial about *imperfect* happiness being *the perfect good* in the temporal order, yet *not complete enough*, because of the limitations peculiar to that order and the weakness of man's natural operations therein. The paradox is avoided by qualifying temporal happiness by reference to the inescapable defects of temporality itself. The analogical concept of happiness is not violated, if we say that natural happiness leaves nothing to be desired *which can be naturally achieved in this life*. To insist upon more is to posit a happiness that either exceeds the bounds of time or transcends the efficacy of nature. To ask for less is to accept some partial good as a substitute for happiness.[149a]

[149a] To ask for more is to ask for an end that is *not natural*; to ask for less is to ask for a natural good that is *not the end*. Even though natural happiness is not the highest perfection of which man is capable, it is the complete or perfect temporal good because it leaves nothing to be desired which can be naturally achieved in this life. In this sense, natural happiness satisfies every natural desire. To understand this point, it is necessary to distinguish two radically distinct meanings of "natural desire" according to the distinction between effective and obediential potentiality. Effective potentiality is one which tends actively toward a perfection attainable by natural operations, the potency not only tending toward a certain act as its due end, but also being the principle of the operations by which that end is reached. Obediential potentiality tends passively toward a fulfillment because here the potency is not a principle of operation: it is entirely subject to being operated upon by causes *transcending* the nature in which the obediential potentiality exists. One must speak, therefore, of *active* and *passive* natural desires; or, if one regards the causes by which the desire is fulfilled, one must speak of *natural* and *transcendental* desire—both of which are generically natural only in the sense that nature includes both sorts of potentialities. Now man has only a passive natural desire, that is, a transcendental desire, for such knowledge of God as exceeds the limitations of natural operation. He does not have an active natural desire for the beatific vision, or even for the knowledge of God which man receives through faith. He can actively desire only what he can actively acquire. (And if one passes from the consideration of natural desire to elicit desire, one must observe the distinction between willing and wishing: we can

There is no difficulty about the analogical genus of happiness or in seeing how it comprehends as proportional analogues the natural and supernatural modes of human perfection. The only difficulty arises with respect to the natural mode itself, for this, as a species of happiness, can be defined, and the ques-

will, i. e., rationally desire, only such goods as we *know* to be actually attainable by our own operations; if we *know* other goods to be *possible*, we can wish for them, but we cannot will them. Thus, without grace, man can wish for the beatific vision if he is able to conceive its possibility, but such wishing is ineffectual; an effectual elicit desire for the beatific vision is impossible without grace, for it belongs to the supernatural virtue of hope.) In short, the object of active natural desire, and of an elicit rational desire that is naturally founded and naturally developed, never exceeds the scope of purely natural operations: no good which is not thus attainable is an object of such natural (as opposed to transcendental) desire, or of the will as naturally (not supernaturally) activated. Hence the only knowledge of God which is an object of such natural or rational desire is either the sort of knowledge which men can attain without faith or grace in this life, or hypothetically, the sort of knowledge which the separated intellect would naturally achieve by its special mode of operation in a separated condition, if it ever existed in such a condition apart from supervening supernatural status. The latter sort of knowledge constitutes the hypothetical condition called "natural beatitude." The former sort is one of the partial goods which belongs to natural happiness in this life, albeit the highest because it is natural wisdom.

As a result of confusing these two radically distinct meanings of "natural desire," the perfection, in fact, the very existence, of temporal happiness has been denied by those who claim that man has natural desires which such happiness does not satisfy because the whole of naturally attainable goods does not include the greater knowledge of God for which man has an obediential potentiality. The error of such argument should be immediately obvious. Nor can its central fallacy be hidden by loose talk about the human intellect being a naturally infinite faculty, and so the root of a natural desire for an infinite object, *the infinite Truth which is God.* Anyone who will read what St. Thomas says about our knowledge of the infinite will see the very special sense in which our intellect is called "infinite." Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 2, and esp. ad 4. Nor is our intellect infinite even in obediential potentiality, if by "infinite" is meant the capacity for knowing adequately an actually infinite object, or even *all* intelligible things. Only God is able to comprehend God. Not even in the beatific vision does man know *all* intelligible things. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 12, aa. 4, 7, 8, 12, 13. When it is said, therefore, that man naturally desires to understand the cause whose effects he knows (vd. *ibid.*, a. 1), this cannot mean "adequately understand" or "comprehend" the transcendental cause of being. It can mean only that man has an active natural desire for such knowledge of God as he can actively acquire (discursive, remote, negative, analogical), and a transcendental desire for such knowledge of God as God Himself transcendentally causes some men to receive in fulfillment of their obediential potentiality—neither of which can be adequate because man's intellect, like his essence, is finite.

tion is how it shall be defined. To define it as consisting in, or identical with, the contemplation of God which can be enjoyed in this life through the light of grace and the virtues and gifts it confers, is to violate the *naturalness*, though not the *temporality*, of imperfect happiness. To define it as consisting in, or identical with, that exercise of the natural speculative virtues, and especially wisdom, through which man is able to consider the truths he has naturally learned, is to violate the very notion of happiness as the possession in aggregate of all good things—the whole of goods which leaves nothing to be desired (that can be naturally achieved in this life). Both definitions are false, though in opposite ways—the former positing a happiness that transcends the efficacy of nature, the latter accepting a partial good (albeit the highest among all partial goods) as a substitute for happiness. To say that they are false does not mean that supernatural contemplation is not the highest good which men can enjoy in this life, a higher good than natural happiness itself of which it cannot be an integral part; nor does it mean that the exercise of the natural speculative virtues is not the highest good among all the partial goods which constitute natural happiness. These things being true, the falsity of these definitions remains, because they simply do not define the object in question. They either add what cannot be included or omit what must be comprehended.

In rejecting these definitions, we realize that we shall appear to be gainsaying the authority of St. Thomas, in the one case, and of Aristotle, in the other. But we hope to show that that only *appears* to be so; that, in fact, we reject the definition of happiness which Aristotle gives in Book X of the *Ethics* only for the sake of embracing the definition he gives in Book I, with which, by the way, the opinion of Book X can be reconciled if it is properly construed; and that we do not reject the definition of St. Thomas as positing an imperfect and temporal participation in supernatural beatitude, but only as the definition of the natural analogue of beatitude, which not only is imperfect as happiness, which not only occurs in this life, but which is also an end attainable entirely by natural principles.

Before we undertake the textual commentary that is required to support these statements, let us first attempt to demonstrate the truth of our central contention—that the definition of natural happiness in this life is *activity in accordance with perfect virtue in a complete life attended by a sufficiency of the goods of fortune*.[150]

The truth of this definition can be tested in two ways: first, by applying the formal criteria which derive from the analogical notion of happiness; and then by measuring its conformity to the special conditions of natural, temporal life. By these same criteria and conditions, it can be shown that the other definitions are false, i. e., that they do not rightly say what natural happiness is.

Formally, as we have seen, *happiness is all good things*, the complete good or perfection of a human life, here or hereafter. Because it is the whole of goods (whether these goods be possessed in their actual diversity and successively, or in an eminent unity and simultaneously), happiness leaves nothing to be desired.[151] Now, in order to show that the definition proposed meets these formal criteria, it is only necessary to enumerate the variety of partial goods which can be possessed in this life, and to show that virtue and good fortune are the causes whereby a complete life can become enriched by their possession, so that when it is done it can be reviewed and judged as having left nothing to be desired.[152] The Aristotelian

[150] Happiness is an "activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, then in accordance with the most complete virtue. But we must add 'in a complete life.' For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day. And so, too, one day or a short time does not suffice for happiness" (*Ethics*, I, 7, 1098^a-15-18). "He is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period, but throughout a whole life" (*ibid.*, I, 10, 1101^a15). "Happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue" (*ibid.*, I, 13, 1102^a5).

[151] Happiness is that which makes life "lacking in nothing. . . . It is of all things most desirable without its being counted as one good thing among others; for if it were so counted, it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable" (*Ethics*, I, 7, 1097^b15-20). Natural happiness meets this formal requirement if no *type of naturally attainable* good is omitted from its constitution. Vd. fn. 149[a] *supra*.

[152] Vd. *Ethics*, I, 8, 1099^b; 9, 1100^a10-15.

enumeration of all the partial goods under three heads (external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul) must be analytically expanded so that every distinct type of good is specifically mentioned; there are then these goods which man can either use or enjoy in this life: wealth (all physical external goods), health and sensual pleasure (goods of the body), social goods (such as a good society, friends, honor), virtues and virtuous activity (goods of the soul).[153] Since happiness is the whole of these goods, each type of partial good is a constitutive means to happiness as the end. No constitutive means can be lacking, for the whole does not come into being unless all the parts which constitute it are accumulated. But not all of these goods need be mentioned in the definition of happiness, for happiness as something which becomes is defined in terms of its causes, and of these the chief cause is " activity in accordance with perfect virtue." To possess all good things, a man must not only rightly judge between real and apparent goods according to the measure of natural desire; he must not only rightly enumerate the various types of real good, but he must also rightly order them one to another so that all can be possessed.[154] Now the moral virtues and prudence, grouped together as the cardinal virtues, are habits of right desire for the end, accompanied by a right choice of the means thereto; hence a man of good moral character (i. e., having the cardinal virtues), as he exercises his virtues in action with respect to every type of partial good, is one who is *becoming happy*, for all good things are obtainable in the course of a complete life if they are rightly desired and the means are rightly chosen. Such a man will not desire more external goods than are necessary; he will seek both wealth and health as conditions of good activity; he will forego pleasures that interfere with the acquisition of greater goods, and suffer pains for their attainment; he will love his fellow men according to the virtue in them which makes them

[153] Vd. *Ethics*, I, 8. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 6. For a commentary on these two enumerations of the partial goods, see " A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, III, 3, pp. 367-9.

[154] Cf. " A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, III, 2, pp. 204-24; III, 3, pp. 358-60, 378-80.

truly friends, and will be similarly loved by them; he will seek the good of others, harming no one, and thus he will support the common good; and, above all, he will regard as most worthy the goods of his intellect which are perfections of the highest part of his nature. The man of virtue thus possesses in himself the active principle (i. e., the principle of activity) whereby to become happy, for he so desires and so chooses among every type of partial good that he can possess them all, each in due proportion and ordination to the rest. But temporal happiness does not exist at a moment; it is not a simultaneous but a successive whole; the order of its constitutive parts must be disposed throughout a whole life; happiness, in short, is not achieved by a single act, but by continuous activity from day to day. Again we see the role of virtue as a cause, for the virtues are stable habits which may take years to form, but which then function as the enduring source of good activity in the pursuit of happiness throughout a whole life.[154a] Though necessary, good habits are, however, not enough. Good fortune is also necessary. Forces beyond the control of each individual man affect his possession of external goods, determine his health and his span of life, and even determine whether he shall live under the beneficent auspices of a good society in a period of peace, during cultural as well as material prosperity. Not that these goods do not come within the causality of virtue, but it cannot be said that they are entirely at virtue's command. There is an aspect of each of them which falls under the aegis of what the Greeks called fortune, which Christians understand to be the providence of God. Hence in defining happiness as activity in accordance with perfect virtue in a complete life, we must take account of that aspect of the

[154a] To speak strictly, we should refer to happiness, not as the perfection of a man, but as the perfection of a human life. The perfection of a man *as such* consists in the virtues. According as man, the agent, is perfected by virtue, so is his life perfected by the consequence of virtue in operation—happiness. Also, in strict speech, we should use the word "well-*being*" to name man's perfection in *being* by the possession of virtue, whereas the word "wel*fare*" should be used to signify happiness as the perfection of a life in the process of *becoming*. If we understand the causal relationship between virtue and happiness, we can appreciate this distinction between human well-being and human welfare. Cf. fn. 170, *infra*.

goods being sought which lie beyond virtue's power, by adding the qualification "attended by a sufficiency of the goods of fortune."[155] This definition has now been shown to be true as measured by the formal signification of happiness: *that whole of goods which leaves nothing to be desired.*

Before we complete the test of this definition by seeing if it conforms to purely natural conditions, one important discovery should be noted. The foregoing analysis reveals that "perfect virtue" means not every virtue, but only such virtue as is the productive cause of happiness itself. Any virtue, since it is a good habit (a good of the soul) and hence among the partial goods man naturally seeks, is a constitutive means or part of happiness. But not every virtue is a functional means directly productive of the least end itself.[156] Since the last end, or happiness, is a whole of goods which can be constituted only by every type of good in the right order and proportion, those virtues alone which order and proportion desires (and the choices which fulfill them) are the productive cause of becoming happy. The cause must be equal to the effect. The effect being a whole of rightly ordered *desirables*, the cause must be a unity of rightly ordered *desires*. Hence the cardinal virtues, and only they, are means productive of happiness; moreover, the requisite unity of all right desires requires the connection of the four cardinal virtues. What is meant by "perfect virtue," then, in the definition of happiness is, first, the virtues which regulate man's desires for, and choices among, partial goods; and, second, the condition indispensable to the unified functioning of these virtues—their interconnection. Each cardinal virtue is a perfect virtue, but none exists in a perfect mode (in the status of *habit* as opposed to mere *disposition*), nor can it function perfectly, apart from the coexistence of the other three.[157]

[155] Note that St. Thomas says: man is "directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, *albeit not without the Divine assistance*" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 1). The italicized clause states the Christian transformation of the factor of fortune.

[156] On the distinction between constitutive and productive means, vd. fn. 146, *supra.*

[157] Aristotle explicitly recognized one of these two notes in the meaning of *per-*

Now let us ask whether the definition we have been considering describes the sort of happiness which can be attained in this life by purely natural means. That it is a perfection appropriate to the conditions of man's temporal existence is at once evident. And the requisite means also appear to be purely natural, for they are acquired virtues, which are habits formed through the exercise of man's natural powers. But it may be objected that fallen man cannot, without the aid of grace, exercise his natural powers in such wise as to acquire the perfect virtues perfectly, i. e., in the state of *habits* through connection with one another.[158] We shall return to the problem this objec-

fect virtue. Vd. *Ethics,* VI, 13, where he insists upon the connection of the moral virtues and prudence " for the one determines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end " (1145^b5). It might even be said that in thus arguing for the unity of the cardinal virtues as prerequisite to their functioning as true virtues rather than as dispositions, he also implicitly recognized that the cardinal virtues, rather than the intellectual virtues (excluding prudence, of course) are perfect as virtues because they, and they alone, are productive of the end. But there can be no question that St. Thomas makes this point explicitly. Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 61, a. 1: " When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of appetite, for such-like virtues not only confer the faculty of doing well, but also cause good deeds to be done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of appetite, because it merely confers an aptitude for doing well, but does not cause the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect; and so those virtues which imply rectitude of appetite are called principal or cardinal virtues. Such are the moral virtues and prudence alone of the intellectual virtues." Cf. *ibid.,* q. 66, a. 3, in which the cardinal virtures are said to be more excellent than the intellectual virtues, *as virtues,* though not *as habits,* and this arises from considering a habit in relation to the end of life, and not simply in itself as the perfection of a power. The cardinal virtues make a man good simply, and through causing him to perform good deeds, make his whole life good, enabling him to attain happiness; whereas the intellectual virtues make a man good only in a certain respect. Vd. *ibid.,* q. 56, a. 3: " And since virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise, these latter habits (the cardinal virtues) are called virtues simply." On the other point, i. e., the mode of the virtues as connected and disconnected, St. Thomas is, of course, clearer than Aristotle. Vd. *ibid.,* q. 65, a. 1, where the perfect virtues (i. e., the cardinal virtues) are described as existing under two conditions: disconnected or imperfectly, connected or perfectly. As a thing is, so does it function. Hence only the perfect virtues, having the status of perfection through interconnection, function perfectly, i. as adequate productive means to the end of life which is happiness.

[158] Vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

tion raises (in Section 4 *infra*), but here it is enough to note what St. Thomas says concerning the efficacy of nature without Grace: "It is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man; and when they are thus acquired, they can be without charity, *even in so far as they were in many of the Gentiles.*" [159] Postponing further consideration of the question whether, without charity, the acquired virtues have the perfect status of true habits or the imperfect status of dispositions, we can conclude that the definition given describes a genuinely natural happiness—" a connatural end to which man is directed by means of his natural principles, albeit not without the divine assistance." [160] Even if we decide subsequently that the means themselves (i.e., the natural virtues) cannot be acquired perfectly by purely natural operations (i.e., without the assistance of grace), it will remain true that the end we have defined is connatural, for it is an end proportionate to natural virtues, however they are acquired by man in a fallen state. The truth of this conclusion consists entirely in seeing the commensuration of the end to the means: the natural virtues can have no other commensurate end than the sort of happiness we have defined, and that in turn can require no other productive means than the sort of virtues which perfect man's composite nature.

This is the truth which Aristotle expounded in Book I of the *Ethics*.[161] It needs no further explication, but it is neces-

[159] *Ibid.*, q. 65, a. 2. Italics ours.

[160] *Ibid.*, 62, 1. This happiness is called connatural because it is "proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles" (*ibid.*). Cf. fn. 136 *supra*.

[161] The truth of this definition of happiness can be understood theoretically, and as so understood it is not altered by the aetiological problems which arise from the fact of man's fallen nature. But when this same truth is apprehended practically as direction to seek the end defined, then it becomes necessary to consider the unavailability of purely natural means in the absence of grace. The truths of natural ethics thus become transformed when they are used by what Maritain calls moral philosophy adequately considered—an ethical doctrine subalternated by theology. Vd. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 161-67, 174-209. "Aristotle's ethics prepares the materials of an adequate moral science (moral theology and moral philosophy adequately considered), which adequate moral science tells me how I ought to act

sary to show that what is said about happiness in Book X cannot be accepted as a definition, though the remarks there made can be construed in a manner consistent with the true definition given in Book I.

In order to refute its falsity, let us express what is said in Book X as a definition of happiness (for unless it be regarded as a definition, what is there said is not false). Suppose, then, we interpret Book X as saying that *happiness is contemplative*

to become a good man. If I turn Aristotle's ethics into an independent moral philosophy by which I seek to direct my life; and if I expect it to tell me . . . how I ought to act *to become a good man* and direct my life perfectly, I will be led astray by the omissions it makes in regard to the supernatural order and the existential truth of my life" (*ibid.*, p. 226). Natural ethics is, however, adequate theoretically (i. e., as speculatively-practical knowledge of *what* the natural end and means are) insofar as the truth about the existence and constitution of the natural last end can be inductively established by reason in terms of purely natural evidence. If this were not so, there would be no science of natural ethics at all, for without a natural last end as a first principle, no further scientific reasoning would be possible about the order of partial goods, the rôle of the virtues, etc. Aristotle's *Ethics* would not only be practically inadequate, in the way Maritain so rightly points out, but it would have no foundation whatsoever. Apart from faith and dogma, there would be only opinion, not knowledge, in the sphere of morals.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that natural ethics is limited even as theoretical knowledge about the good for man, because it must proceed in terms of man's natural, not his transcendental, desires, in order to be a *practical* science, albeit inadequate practically in terms of man's fallen nature. The objects of transcendental desire cannot be attained by natural means. Furthermore, that such objects *exist* and *what* they are, cannot be naturally known. Although natural reason can prove the existence of a supernatural first cause and reach an analogical or negative understanding of its essence, natural reason cannot prove the existence or determine the character of a supernatural last end—for this is not God, the transcendant final cause, but the beatific vision, an immanent but supernatural perfection of human nature. Vd. fn. 148 *supra. That* there is such an end, and *what* it is, are entirely dogmatic truths which faith knows through revelation. In this sense, therefore, natural ethics is inadequate, even theoretically, in a way in which natural theology is not. The Treatise on the Last End (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, qq. 1-5) is misunderstood if it is regarded as expounding knowledge of the same sort as set forth in the Treatise on God (*Summa Theol.*, I, qq. 1-11). The major truths which the latter enunciates are truths of reason as well as known by faith, whereas the primary truths about the supernatural last end are not knowable by reason at all. The supposition that they are arises from the fatal error of confusing the two senses of "natural desire"—related to the distinction between effective and obediental potentiality. Vd. fn. 149a *supra.*

activity.[162] To regard this as a definition requires us to treat contemplative activity as identical with the whole of happiness, not merely as a part thereof, albeit the most worthy. We must also understand precisely what is meant by "contemplative activity." Aristotle tells us that he does not mean the search for truth, but rather the consideration of truth already known.[163] We know, furthermore, simply from the fact that Aristotle was not a Christian—a fact which, unfortunately, St. Thomas sometimes seems to forget—that Aristotle does not mean by contemplation that cooperation of intellect and will in which the knower is united to the object of contemplation through love as well as apprehension. On the contrary, we know from Aristotle's explicit statement that he means nothing more than the actual exercise of the virtue of philosophic or speculative wisdom, through which exercise a man can consider the philosophical truths he has previously acquired by research.[164] From this we also know that God is not the only object of contemplation. If Aristotle's own *Metaphysics* is a book of philosophic

[162] "The activity of the most divine element in us, in accordance with its proper virtue, will be perfect happiness. This activity is contemplative" (X, 7, $1177^{a}16$-17). "The activity of God which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative; and of human activities, therefore, that which is most akin to this must most be of the nature of happiness. This is indicated, too, by the fact that the other animals have no share in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity. For while the whole life of the gods is bliss, and that of men too in so far as some likeness of such activity belongs to them, none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly happy, not as a mere concomitant, but in virtue of the contemplation. Happiness, therefore, must be some form of contemplation" (*ibid.*, 8, $1178^{b}21$-31).

[163] *Ibid.*, 7, $1177^{a}28$. Cf. St. Thomas: "Since then as Aristotle himself shows (*Ethics*, X, 7) man's ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life" (*III Contra Gent.*, 48). St. Thomas elsewhere interprets Aristotle as meaning by contemplation the knowledge of truth, not the search for it: *In Ethica*, X, 7, Lect. 10, 2092.

[164] "The activity of philosophic wisdom" is synonymous with "contemplation" or "contemplative activity." Vd. *Ethics*, 7, $1177^{a}24$. Cf. St. Thomas's comment on the difference between the wisdom of a Christian and of a non-Christian philosopher, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 7. Cf. Maritain, *Three Reformers* (New York: 1932), note 67, p. 230.

wisdom, then the happy man is one who spends his hours considering a great variety of truths—about contradiction, matter and form, substance and accident, the one and the many, as well, of course, as truths about God. According to Aristotle, it is not God or *the* Truth which is the object of contemplation, but truths; and even if it be said that Aristotle would place the truths about God foremost, as the most worthy of contemplation, we must remember that the best knowledge of God which men can attain by purely natural reason, unaided by faith, is not only radically inadequate, but also likely to be profoundly erroneous—as Aristotle's *Metaphysics* reveals. Even if Aristotle's happy man contemplated God (i. e., considered the truths he knew about the supra-sensible one who was purely actual), he would not be considering a divine Creator, a divine Provider, or a divine Savior. Such are the limitations of natural knowledge, either accidentally or essentially. The quiddity of a corporeal substance, not the divine essence and existence, is the proportionate, the connatural, object of the human intellect. If God were its proportionate object, man's intellect would be truly an infinite power, i. e. capable of *actually* infinite knowledge.

Taking this definition as having only the significance with which Aristotle, not St. Thomas, might have proposed it, we can give many reasons why it is preposterously false. In the first place, contemplative activity is neither by itself *all good things*, nor is it a whole *constituted* by every type of partial good in a right order; therefore, it cannot be happiness. In the second place, contemplative activity, even when most fully enjoyed, leaves much to be desired, since a man can have knowledge (even philosophic wisdom) and lack the moral virtues and prudence, suffer ill-health, be deprived of friends, be enslaved by a tyrant, etc.; therefore, it cannot be happiness. In the third place, happiness as the natural end of man must be connatural to him, which means that, despite all the inequality of individual differences in intelligence and talent, the attainment of happiness must be open to all men because they are all equal in their specific human nature; but few men have

either the talent or interest to become philosophers, few have sufficient intellectual power to learn much philosophic wisdom, and few have the leisure to acquire what wisdom is within their power to learn; therefore, contemplative activity cannot be happiness.[165] In the fourth place, if contemplative activity is happiness, then the natural means commensurate with the end as thus defined must be the intellectual virtues, especially wisdom, and happiness would be defined as activity in accordance with such virtue; but then the intellectual virtues must be the cardinal or perfect virtues, and the moral virtues with prudence must be secondary and imperfect virtues; but the intellectual virtues cannot be perfect virtues for they confer only an aptitude for good activity, but not the stable disposition to do good deeds; nor do they make a man good simply, but only in a certain respect; hence if we affirm that the moral virtues and prudence are the cardinal or perfect virtues, and if we retain the notion that happiness is activity in accordance with perfect virtue, we must deny that happiness is contemplative activity, for neither wisdom nor any other speculative habit is perfect virtue, though they be more excellent as habits regarded simply as perfections of man's highest power. In the fifth place, if the habit of wisdom can exist apart from the cardinal virtues, so can activity in accordance with that habit;

[165] Vd. *III Contra Gent.*, 39, wherein St. Thomas proves that happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God acquired by demonstration, in the course of which he says: "Now happiness is the end of the human species; since all men naturally desire it. Therefore happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to some whereby they are debarred from it. Few, however, attain to the possession of the aforesaid knowledge of God by way of demonstration. . . . Therefore, this knowledge is not essentially man's happiness." And he goes on to argue that happiness should exclude unhappiness; but the possession of such demonstrative knowledge of God, in which philosophic wisdom consists, does not exclude many elements of human unhappiness. Cf. *ibid.*, Ch. 44, in which St. Thomas seems to take back his objections to philosophic wisdom as the source of the ultimate happiness man is able to obtain in this life. Vd. also *ibid.*, Ch. 25, in which St. Thomas interprets *Ethics*, X, 7, as confirming *Matthew*, v. 8: "Blessed are the clean of heart for they shall see God." Vd. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2 ad 2.

Maritain condemns the typically Greek error of making happiness available only to a chosen few (a leisure class), and of sharply dividing mankind into *homo sapiens* and *homo faber*: vd. *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 172 ff.

in which case, since the virtue of wisdom does not depend on the cardinal virtues, a man could be happy (i. e., enjoy contemplative activity) without having the cardinal virtues; but this is contrary to the very meaning of cardinal virtue as indispensable for a good human life; hence, happiness cannot consist in contemplative activity. We can also argue conversely from the fact that a man can have the cardinal virtues, and lack science or wisdom.[166] In the sixth place, and finally, the active life is connatural to man, and man's natural life on earth is ordained to work, not rest. Even in the sphere of speculative matters, man must be primarily engaged in the work of seeking the truth; nor, because of the uncertainty and inadequacy of his natural knowledge, can he ever desist from such labors to rest in the contemplation of a settled truth.[167] Hence, to propose a definition of natural happiness which makes man's earthly bliss the enjoyment of rest through immanent activity, violates the conditions of man's terrestial life. Furthermore, such happiness could be enjoyed in a single moment and would not be the quality of a whole life, never fully in being, always becoming. For all these reasons, it is necessary to conclude that man's natural happiness in this life does not consist in contemplation.

It remains necessary, however, to explain the apparent deviation of Book X from Book I of Aristotle's *Ethics*, with regard to happiness. There seem to be three possibilities. The first is simply that Aristotle fell into error by changing the meaning of "perfect virtue" and by confusing "the highest good" with "the whole of goods." For if by "perfect virtue" is meant the most excellent of all human habits, *qua* perfection of power, then wisdom is the highest or most perfect virtue; in which case, following the definition given in Book I (activity in accordance with perfect virtue), Aristotle slipped unwittingly into the false conclusion that happiness must be contemplative activity, for such activity flows from wisdom, the perfect

[166] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 58, aa. 4 and 5.

[167] Vd. fn. 163, *supra*. Cf. *III Contra Gent.*, 47, 48, which argue that there is no rest in this life.

virtue.[168] And if he permitted himself to use the phrase "the highest good" ambiguously, sometimes to mean the most excellent among all partial goods, and sometimes the whole of all good things, to which nothing can be added, Aristotle may have passed unconsciously from thinking of happiness as the highest good in the second of these two senses, which is the only right sense, to conceiving it in terms of the first of these two senses, which allows happiness to become identified with contemplation, for such activity is certainly the most worthy type of partial good.[169] But though contemplation, or even the activity of speculative work, may be *an* end in the order of partial goods, because it is the highest among them, it is not *the* end of human life, for that is constituted by the whole order of partial goods, and achieved only through the cardinal virtues as productive means.[170]

The second explanation is the most likely. It consists in

[168] There is some evidence that he did precisely this. "If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be the best thing in us" (*Ethics,* X, 7, 1177[a]11). In one place, St. Thomas seems to follow him in this error (vd. *III Contra Gent.,* 44), although elsewhere St. Thomas clearly asserts that, though wisdom is the highest of the intellectual virtues (vd. *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 66, a. 5), nevertheless, the moral or cardinal virtues are better as virtues, more perfectly virtues in relation to the end of human life, than are the speculative virtues (vd. *ibid.,* q. 66, a. 3; q. 66, a. 1; q. 57, a. 1; q. 56, a. 3).

[169] Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.,* III, 3, 381-83, for an analysis of this error. The substitution of means for ends is a major fallacy in moral thinking. So is the substitution of a partial good for the whole of goods. In fact, it is the *same* error in its paramount form, which is obvious as soon as we remember that every partial good is a *constitutive means to the end* as the whole of goods. This is the error of *Ethics* X on one interpretation of what is there being said. Those who conceive their last end as wealth or honor commit this fallacy—converting a means into an end, a partial good into the whole. But to conceive happiness as consisting in contemplation is *formally* the same error. *Materially,* it is not as egregious, because speculative activity is the highest *part* in the order of goods constituting happiness as the *whole,* whereas wealth and honor are distinctly inferior goods.

[170] Contemplative or speculative activity is *an* end which the intellectual virtues serve directly as productive means, and which the cardinal virtues may also serve indirectly. Vd. fn. 144, *supra.* But when *the* end of human life is properly conceived as the possession of all good things, then *only* the cardinal virtues function directly as productive means. The cardinal virtues perfect a man *simply,* as the happiness they produce perfects a *whole* human life.

showing that there is only an *apparent* inconsistency between Book I and Book X. Aristotle's intention in Book X was merely to discuss *one part* of happiness which had not yet been treated, namely, contemplative or speculative activity. The fact that this is the highest part of happiness does not mean that it alone constitutes happiness, though there is reason for saying that a man who is able to enjoy more of such activity is comparatively happier than those who can enjoy less. (Strictly, of course, if such activity is a constitutive part of happiness, it must belong to *every* happy life in some degree proportionate to individual differences in talent and fortune.) Though Aristotle may *appear* in Book X to be identifying happiness with contemplation, that is only a manner of speaking, for he explicitly tries to relate his discussion of contemplation to the definition of happiness given in Book I.[171] Furthermore, he concedes that contemplation by itself is not enough for a good life. Because we are men, he tells us, we "also need external prosperity, for our nature is not self-sufficient for the purpose of contemplation; hence our body must be healthy and must have food and other necessaries"; [172] and he goes on to mention the acts of the moral virtues as also constitutive of happiness.[172] Though the enumeration is not complete, it can, nevertheless, be taken as indicating that Aristotle has not departed from the conception of happiness which, as defined in Book I, consists in the possession of all good things in a complete life—by means of virtue, and with the aid of fortune. But this interpretation of Book X requires us, of course, flatly to reject the *identification* of happiness with contemplation.[174]

[171] Vd. *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177^{a}18, where he says: "Now this would seem to be in agreement with what we said before."

[172] Vd. *ibid.*, 8, 1178^{b}33-1179^{a}.

[173] "Solon, too, was describing well the happy man when he described him as moderately furnished with externals, and as having done noble deeds and lived temperately, for one can with but moderate possessions do what one ought" (*Ethics*, X, 8, 1179^{a}10-12).

[174] In other words, the "definition" of happiness in Book X can be reconciled with the correct definition given in Book I only on the condition that it be properly subordinated thereto. And this can be done only by seeing that it is not, strictly, a definition of happiness at all, but merely a statement of what is the

The first explanation can be subordinated to the second;[175] but there are some obstacles to accepting the second as completely right, and these lead to a third explanation. In Book I, Aristotle distinguishes between the active and the contemplative life, and promises to return later to a fuller discussion of this distinction.[176] He does so in Book X, and there he says that a life led in accordance with the active (i.e., the moral

highest good in the order of partial goods. Cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, III 3, fn. 47.

There are many passages in the *Summa Theologica* which seem to confirm this interpretation of *Ethics*, X, 7, 8. If we assume that St. Thomas meant by contemplation what Aristotle meant—which we hope to show is not the case—then we will find that he adds the same qualifications, namely, that imperfect happiness in this life involves contemplation (i.e., speculative activity), but that it also requires bodily goods (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 6), external goods (*ibid.*, q. 4, a. 7), friends and fellowship (*ibid.*, q. 4, a. 8). Moreover, he says explicitly that happiness in this life does not consist entirely in contemplation, as it does hereafter (*ibid.*, q. 3, a. 5); and elsewhere he supports this by saying that happiness in this life "consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical" (*ibid.*, q. 4, a. 5); not only is prudence, then, indispensable for happiness, but also the moral virtues, for, as he points out, "recititude of will is necessary for happiness, both antecedently and concomitantly" (*ibid.*, q. 4, a. 4). All of these texts support the definition of happiness given in *Ethics*, I, 7, 10, 13; and this is confirmed by the fact that he says that imperfect and perfect happiness cannot be of the same species (*ibid.*, q. 5, a. 5 ad 3), and since the specifying object of the latter operation is God, it cannot be the same in the case of the operations which generate happiness in this life; moreover, he agrees that happiness must satisfy every natural desire (*ibid.*, q. 5, a. 8 ad 3), which is not the case with contemplative activity in this life. Finally, in *III Contra Gent.*, 63, he enumerates the various goods which constitute happiness in this life and thereby satisfy every natural desire that can be requited by natural means: *viz*: to know the truth, to exercise virtue in the occupations of active and civic life, to have honor and friendship, wealth and pleasure. He concludes by agreeing with Boethius that "happiness is a state of life made perfect by the accumulation of all goods," and adds that of all the goods which can be enjoyed in this life knowing the truth is the most desirable, wherefore "the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of the final beatitude placed man's ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life." This last statement need not be construed as contradicting the major portion of the preceding text, any more than *Ethics*, X, need be read as contradicting *Ethics*, I. But it is necessary to read the words "placed man's *ultimate* happiness in contemplation" so that "ultimate" signifies merely the highest part of happiness, and not the whole of it.

[175] By properly interpreting "the highest good" and by understanding the two ways in which one type of virtue can be said to be better than another.

[176] *Ethics*, I, 5.

or social) virtues is happy *in a secondary degree.*[177] Yet it is precisely such a life that is being described in Book I as the happy life for man, *without qualification.*[178] And although, in Book X, he calls this active, social life a happy one in a secondary degree, he also admits that the contemplative life is "too high for man, for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue" (i. e., the social virtues).[179] This suggests that Aristotle, in Book X, is going entirely beyond the conception of natural happiness as that is developed in Book I—for a happiness which is not connatural to man as a composite substance, which is not proportionate to his human powers but can belong to him only "in so far as something divine is present in him," is not, strictly speaking, an end commensurate with natural principles. *If this be so, there is no inconsistency between the two accounts, but neither can they be reconciled as if both were treating of the same mode of happiness.* By some almost miraculous anticipation, Aristotle may here be thinking—vaguely and remotely, of course—of the supernatural participation, in this life, of eternal beatitude, occurring in the supernatural contemplation that is open to all who through God's grace (i. e., the divine element in man) have faith, charity, and the gift of wisdom. Whether or not this is the truth about Aristotle, it seems evident that St. Thomas read Book X of the *Ethics* as if Aristotle were anticipating a distinctively Christian truth. To complete our discussion of traditional doctrines, in so far as they bear on the true definition of natural happiness, let us now consider St. Thomas's account of imperfect happiness.

St. Thomas uses the words "imperfect" and "perfect" to distinguish between the happiness which can be enjoyed in this

[177] *Ibid.*, X, 8, $1178^{a}8$.

[178] *Ibid.*, I, 7. Especially to be noted is the fact that he there says the happy life is the social life, not the solitary life—*the life of a citizen* (vd. $1097^{b}10$).

[179] *Ibid.*, X, 7, $1177^{b}26$-29. Vd. St. Thomas's commentary on this passage, *In Ethic.*, X, 7, Lect. 11, 2105.

life and the ultimate beatitude which is possible only hereafter. The problem of interpreting St. Thomas, in himself and in relation to Aristotle, turns on one question: Is what St. Thomas calls " imperfect happiness " a purely natural perfection of man, or is it a supernatural participation of the divine good, *imperfect because occurring in this life*. The issue is not about the *temporality* of imperfect happiness, but about its *naturalness*. The issue is complicated by the fact that St. Thomas obviously wishes to think that, in treating of imperfect happiness, he is following Aristotle.[180] But if Aristotle was considering purely natural happiness—which is the only mode of happiness that was strictly within his competence as a philosopher and as a pagan—then St. Thomas's discussion of imperfect happiness must be subject to the same criticisms and interpretations we have already applied to Aristotle. If imperfect happiness is natural, then it cannot be defined as consisting in, as identified with, contemplation, i.e., natural knowledge of any sort, even wisdom. We need not reexamine the various texts of St. Thomas to show that the same difficulties apply to his *apparent* identification of natural happiness with contemplation, as apply to the philosopher's opinions in *Ethics*, X, 7, 8, unless the *apparent* inconsistencies be removed by reconciling the later discussion with the true definition of natural happiness given in Book I.[181]

[180] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 3, a. 6, where after saying that " the consideration of what can be known by the speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness," St. Thomas says: " In his book on Ethics, the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness such as can be had in this life " (ad 1). Cf. *III Contra Gent.*, 44, where he says: " Clearly the opinion of Aristotle was that the ultimate happiness which man is able to obtain in this life is that knowledge of divine things which can be acquired through the speculative sciences." Vd. also *ibid.*, 48: " Happiness in its most perfect form is not possible to man, yet he has a certain participation thereof, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle's opinion about happiness." He then goes on to say, citing *Ethics*, I, 10, that such happiness consists in deeds of virtue, and " those who in this life attain to such perfection are happy *as men*, not thus attaining to happiness simply, but in a human way." *Deeds of virtue are not contemplation.* The virtues here referred to are the cardinal virtues. Yet St. Thomas, in the same chapter, also says that, according to Aristotle (citing *Ethics*, X, 7), man's happiness in this life consists in the speculation whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth.

[181] Vd. fn. 174 *supra*, wherein it will be seen that the same interpretation can be made of the Thomistic texts, as in the case of Aristotle.

But there is another possibility, as we have already suggested, namely, that for St. Thomas—whether or not this can be said of Aristotle—the imperfect happiness which is identified with contemplation is not natural but supernatural; that, in short, the contemplation being considered is not an activity in accordance with the natural speculative virtues, but rather what is truly the contemplation of God in this life, achieved through the *gift* of wisdom, and consisting in union through love as well as through knowledge. Such contemplation is, of course, impossible without grace, without faith and charity, without the infused moral virtues.[182] Such happiness must be called supernatural, even though it occurs in this life, because it is operation flowing from supernatural, not natural, virtues.[183]

Despite the fact that St. Thomas wishes his own discussion to appear to be in conformity with Aristotle, despite the fact that in certain places he explicitly says that imperfect happiness is natural,[184] there is much evidence to the contrary—evidence which shows that, in addition to the imperfect happiness which is natural, there is also an imperfect participation (in this life, but through supernatural causes) of supernatural and eternal beatitude; and that it is of this that St. Thomas mainly speaks. It should be noted at once that, strictly speaking, there are not *two* imperfect happinesses. What is truly natural happiness is the *analogue* of, not a *participation* in, eternal beatitude; whereas supernatural contemplation in this life is an imperfect participation in beatitude. Both can be called *imperfect*, but not for the same reason: the one be-

[182] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 4, a. 8; q. 8, a. 9. In regard to the distinction between *natural* wisdom and *Christian* wisdom, vd. *ibid.*, q. 19, a. 7. Cf. fn. 164 *supra*.

[183] Even if the natural virtues cannot be acquired *perfectly* without grace, the sort of operation which flows from them, however they are acquired, can rightly be regarded as natural happiness; but the sort of operation which is directly in accordance with the supernatural virtues, and the consequent gifts, cannot be regarded as natural, even if it occurs in this life, and even if it may also involve the natural virtues as instrumental causes.

[184] "Imperfect happiness, which can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as the virtues in whose operations it consists" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 5).

cause, though a true analogue of beatitude, it is limited by the defects of temporality and motion; the other because, though a participation of beatitude, it is limited by man's corporeal defects.[185] But, strictly speaking, both cannot be called happiness, for only natural happiness (as truly defined by the philosopher) and supernatural beatitude (as analogically understood by the theologian) are genuinely modes falling within the analogy of happiness, conforming to the notion of happiness as the possession of all good things. Supernatural contemplation is rather the beginning in this life, a first taste as it were, of eternal bliss; but as it occurs under the limitations of this life it is neither the finite (natural) whole of goods, nor the infinite (supernatural) whole of goods.

Let us briefly review the evidences which support this interpretation of St. Thomas's teaching. In the first place, St. Thomas explicitly speaks of the "imperfect happiness" which *is* contemplation as being an imperfect participation in this life of the beatific vision; in one sense, they have the same object, i. e., God, though they differ in not being the same kind of knowledge of that object.[186] In the second place, in treating of intellectual habits, he justifies calling them virtues, because the acts of these virtues, especially of wisdom, is a "kind of beginning of the perfect bliss which consists in the contemplation of the truth"[187]—i. e., the knowledge which occurs through vision; and if this can be said of the acts of natural wisdom, how much more so can it be said of the activity of contemplation which can occur in this life through the supernatural gift of wisdom that accompanies faith and charity; the activity of natural wisdom is only the beginning of that beginning. In the third place, in distinguishing between the active and the contemplative modes of life, and in regarding the latter as superior, St. Thomas praises the contemplative life as being more of a participation here of the perfect happiness hereafter.[188] But

[185] Vd. St. Thomas's discussion of rapture in the case of St. Paul, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 175. Rapture is the limit of contemplation in this life—the nearest approximation to the vision whereby God is seen in His essence.

[186] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 3 ad 2. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 5, a. 5 ad 3.

[187] Vd. *ibid.*, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2.

[188] Vd. *ibid.*, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4.

if now, finally, we study St. Thomas's doctrine concerning the active and the contemplative modes of life, we find that both require charity as their principal productive cause, and hence that neither can be regarded as natural.[189] The division into the active and contemplative applies, strictly, only to the life of a Christian, and the perfection of the Christian life requires charity.[190] Furthermore, St. Thomas explicitly tells us that the contemplative life consists not in the consideration of any truths, but only in the contemplation of God. This contemplation, he says, " will be perfect in the life to come when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy; whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us only imperfectly, namely, *through a glass* and *darkly* (I Cor. xiii, 12); hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude which begins now and will be continued in the life to come."[191] The language here plainly makes the point on which we are insisting, namely, that what is truly contemplation in this life (flowing from supernatural causes) is not happiness as the natural analogue of beatitude, but rather an imperfect participation of that beatitude—" a certain inchoate beatitude which begins now and will be continued in the life to come."

Two important conclusions follow from this analysis. The first concerns the various meanings of happiness. The second concerns the character of natural happiness in this life.

(1) There are four distinct perfections of human life, which the word " happiness " has been used to name. The fourfold division is made by the opposition between time and eternity,

[189] Vd. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 182, a. 2. Cf. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, Ch. VII: " Action and Contemplation."

[190] Vd. *ibid.*, q. 184, a. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 184, a. 2 ad 3; q. 184, a. 3.

[191] Vd. *ibid.*, q. 184, a. 4. Yet in this very passage St. Thomas goes on to say: " wherefore the Philosopher (*Ethics*, X, 7) places man's ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good." Cf. *ibid.*, q. 182, a. 1, where St. Thomas also tries to make it appear that Aristotle's arguments for the superiority of the contemplative life can be cited as supporting his own point, though he must know that Aristotle cannot be considering the modes of Christian life which have their root in charity; and also that Aristotle nowhere specifies the activity of contemplation as having God alone for its object.

and by the opposition between natural and supernatural causes. In time, there is a natural and a supernatural perfection of human life. In eternity, there is also a natural and supernatural perfection of the life of the soul. Of these four, we have not discussed what has been called "natural beatitude"—namely, the knowledge which is possible for a separated soul to have, operating *naturally* according to that mode of operation which it can have in separation from the body;[192] nor need we consider it, for it is both hypothetical and without bearing on our problem. With respect to the remaining three, there is no likelihood of confusing the eternal, on the one hand, with the temporal, on the other. The only difficulty arises with regard to the two temporal significations of "happiness." Here disastrous confusions result from using that ambiguous phrase "imperfect happiness" to refer, *without distinction*, to the good natural life and to the good Christian life (whether active or contemplative).[193] Clarity can be achieved only by distinguishing between what is, in time and this life, a truly analogical mode of happiness and an imperfect participation of eternal beatitude. By the formal criteria which derive from the analogical notion of happiness, supernatural contemplation in this life is not a mode or species of happiness. It is a kind of rest enjoyed in time—imperfect as rest, and supernaturally elevating man above the vicissitudes of temporality and becoming. If, however, the word "happiness" be used to name this sort of rest which a Christian can enjoy, then such happiness can be said to consist in contemplation, most fully experienced in the contemplative mode of Christian life, but also present in the active mode of Christian life. But if we use the word "happiness" more strictly to name the natural per-

[192] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 89, aa. 1, 2, 3; cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 12, aa. 12, 13.

[193] The confusion is increased by the ambiguity of the word "contemplation" as Aristotle uses it to mean the activity of the natural speculative virtues (whether seeking or considering natural truths), and as St. Thomas uses it to mean the supernatural knowledge and love of God which follows upon grace. The confusion becomes almost incurable unless we observe the apparent inconsistency between the two accounts of natural happiness in Aristotle's *Ethics*, and reconcile them in favor of the truth of the definition given in Book I.

fection of human life—as naturally achieved as are the natural virtues which are its principal cause—then temporal happiness does not consist in contemplation (not even in the consideration of the truths knowable by natural wisdom), but rather in the possession of all good things; and this requires us to define such happiness as activity in accordance with complete virtue, in a complete life, attended by a sufficiency of the goods for fortune.[194]

(2) In the natural dimension of human life, there is no significance to a distiction between active and contemplative. This distinction corresponds to the two directions of charity—love of one's neighbor and love of God—and, therefore, applies properly only to the supernatural dimension of a Christian life on earth.[195] The life that is connatural to man is both active and social. This does not mean that speculative activity has no place in man's natural life; but it means that it is transitive,

[194] Wherever it is necessary to avoid confusing the two temporal significations of the word "happiness," we shall speak of "natural happiness in this life" in contradistinction from "Christian happiness in this life." Nor should the making of this distinction lead anyone to suppose that the one excludes the other. A Christian can enjoy both, just as he can enjoy inchoate beatitude in this life (mere contemplation) and perfect beatitude hereafter (the fullness of vision). On the contrary, we shall subsequently show that only a Christian can fully enjoy natural happiness in this life, for without grace the diminished efficacy of fallen nature for acquiring virtue can accomplish only some degree of approximation to the perfection of natural happiness in this life. Vd. Section 4 *infra*.

[195] Vd. fn. 189 *supra*. Maritain (*loc. cit.*) makes clear the sense in which the Greek distinction between action and contemplation (between work and rest) is false (vd. pp. 170-72); and then shows how Christianity transfigured the truth that the Greek distinction contained (p. 173 ff.). Christian contemplation is open to all men, not only to the learned and the wise. It can occur in any sort of human activity which is motivated by charity and which, therefore, both springs from and has its root in the immanent activity of knowing and loving God. The Christian distinction between active and contemplative lives is not one which places rest only in purely speculative activity: the rest of supernatural contemplation can occur in the active life as well as in the life which is withdrawn from the affairs of this world and hence is called "contemplative." For what is meant here by supernatural contemplation is the mystical life to which "all souls are called, if not in a proximate manner, at least in a remote manner," as the result of the "normal blossoming of grace's virtues and gifts" (p. 185): *in a proximate manner*, through the operations of the contemplative (or solitary) life; *in a remote manner*, through the operations of the active (or social) life.

not immanent, activity—the activity of work, rather than rest. It means, furthermore, that man's natural intellectual life is lived socially; consisting in work done by cooperation and interchange with his fellows; it does not require nor can it long flourish in solitude.

When we say that man's connatural life is active and social, we are likely to be misled if we understand the word "active" in opposition to "contemplative"—for that would re-import the distinction which is not at all appropriate to man's natural mode of life. To be perfectly clear here, we should say that the life connatural to man is a life of *work*, not *rest*; and whether the work a man does is primarily speculative, or primarily practical, labor, it is the sort of transitive activity which requires the cooperation of his fellow men. Human work is both rational and social, and these two factors interpenetrate each other to give full meaning to the *discursive* quality of human life. It is for this reason that St. Thomas says that all the natural virtues—both moral and intellectual—are *social* virtues.[196]

This point has great significance for the character of natural happiness. Not only must we deny that there are two grades or degrees of natural happiness (active and contemplative), but we must see that natural happiness is specifically the good of civil life—the natural perfection of a human life as lived, not

[196] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 5: "Since man is by nature a social animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called *social* virtues, since it is by reason of them that man behaves well in the conduct of human affairs." It must be stressed that St. Thomas is not speaking here only of the moral virtues, but of all the natural virtues. Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 181, a. 4, ad 3, and q. 182, a. 4, ad 1, which show that even in the supernatural dimension, the active life is connatural to man, not the contemplative. And the active life is always a social life, not a solitary one: vd. *ibid.*, q. 181, a. 1 and q. 188, a. 8. This suggests that, apart from grace, the natural life for man is entirely one of work in society, for if this were not so, it would not be true that the common form of supernatural contemplation, when grace supervened, would be that of the active and social life, rather than that of the contemplative and solitary. Cf. fn. 196 *supra*; and Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, p. 187; *Three Reformers*, pp. 120-123: "The solitary life is not human; it is above or beneath man." Vd. also Note 67 (p. 230): "Social life has the solitary life not for its specific end but for its higher limit."

only under temporal, but also under social, conditions. The *vita civilis* is the natural occupation of a *homo politicus* or, what is strictly synonymous, a *homo virtutum acquisitarum*;[197] and the perfection of such a life by the possession of all temporal goods is the end naturally commensurate to the operation of the acquired virtues. To make this point explicit, and without changing its essential significance at all, the definition of natural happiness might be stated thus: *work in accordance with the social virtues, in a complete life, lived politically, enriched by the fruits of the common good, as well as supplied sufficiently with the goods of fortune.*[198]

[197] Cf. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, p. 182.

[198] Let us repeat that the social life is to the solitary, the life of work is to the life of rest, as the human is to the divine life of man. If we keep this in mind, we shall understand why social (i. e., the human) happiness for man must be sustained by the common good, enriched by its fruits flowing back into his individual life. (Cf. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, Ch. III, esp. p. 72). Similarly, we shall understand how man's solitary (i. e., divine) happiness is created by an overflow from the superabundance of the divine good.

But most important of all is the fact that a right understanding of human happiness as essentially social prevents anyone from supposing that there can be a conflict between *individual* happiness (which is social precisely because it is *individual*) and the common good on which it depends. There is no need to call this natural happiness personal, as opposed to individual, in order to make sure that it will not be conceived as something which can be pursued only at the expense of the common good. (Cf. Maritain, *loc. cit.* above). On the contrary, this natural social happiness must be spoken of, and understood, as individual because it is a perfection of the life of the composite substance of man, not of his soul. It is not the human soul which is naturally social, but man the substance composite of matter and form. And just as the material principle in this composition is the source of man's need for social life (the rational principle being the source of his peculiar administration of that need), so the same material principle is the source of his individuality. Considering the rational principle by itself as the seat of man's personality, the word "personal" should be used to name man's spiritual happiness. In contradistinction to man's *individual* happiness (which is social), man's *personal* (or spiritual) happiness is solitary and divine—the happiness of man with God, here or hereafter, not with his fellow men in the political community.

This is not to deny the community of saints—for each of the blessed is united with all in rejoicing over God's presence. Though this enjoyment of spiritual fellowship is not of the essence of beatitude, it is nevertheless a consequence which, as St. Thomas says, "conduces to the fullness of happiness" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 4, a. 8). The point here being made is that man's individual (*i. e.*, natural) happiness is *essentially* social, whereas man's personal or spiritual

Once more, and for the last time, it is necessary to answer those who will cite the authority of Aristotle against this conclusion. The fact that Aristotle appears to distinguish between two grades of happiness, that of the active and that of the contemplative life, must be interpreted as we have previously interpreted Aristotle's remarks about contemplation: *either* as error on Aristotle's part, for no such distinction can be made in the natural order;[198a] *or* as a vague anticipation of a truth appropriate to the supernatural dimension of Christian life. If we dismiss these texts,[199] therefore, as having no relevant authority, we will find that the remainder of Aristotle's discussion supports the conclusions we have reached. The happy life is the life of a citizen, for that is what man is born to be.[200] What is said in the *Ethics* on this subject is both confirmed and amplified by what is said in the *Politics*. "The best life," he there tells us, "is the life of virtue, when virtue has external goods enough for the performance of good actions."[201] Moreover, "that form of government is best under which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily."[202] And then

(i.e., supernatural) happiness is essentially through union with God, and only *accidentally* through union with his fellows.

We shall return to a consideration of the problem of happiness in relation to a false individualism, in Section 5 *infra*.

[198a] In order to avoid the error here indicated, the Aristotelian distinction must be understood entirely as a division between two modes of reason's *work*, theoretic and practical, not as a distinction between two grades of *rest*—the active and the contemplative enjoyment of God. There is, first of all, the distinction between work and rest, between transitive and immanent activity in this life, but this distinction can be given *practical* significance only by a Christian, because a life of rest (centered in immanent activity) is impossible to sustain without supernatural causes. Then, subsequently, there is the Christian distinction, in the sphere of rest, between the active and the contemplative modes of life; and, in the sphere of human work, there is the thoroughly natural distinction between the dimensions of theoretic and practical activity. It is this last, and this alone, which Aristotle is competent to make in terms of natural knowledge. A crucial text in Book I seems to show that Aristotle was concerned with the distinction between practical and theoretic modes of activity in accordance with the rational part of man's nature. Vd. 1098[a]3-6. The apparently disparate passages in Book X, speaking of "active" and "contemplative," should be interpreted accordingly; or else they must be rejected as untenable on purely natural grounds.

[199] *Ethics*, I, 4; X, 8.

[200] Vd. *Ethics*, I, 7, 1097[b]8-12.

[201] *Politics*, VII, 1, 1324[a].

[202] *Politics*, VII, 2, 1324[a]23-25.

raising the question whether the "best life" is active or contemplative, Aristotle does not oppose them as exclusive; but while insisting that "the active life will be the best," makes clear that "activity" here is intended to include both the practical activities which constitute the *work* of statesmen and the speculative activities which constitute the *work* of philosophers.[203]

This concludes our discussion of what natural happiness is. If natural happiness were not as we have defined it, then there would be no end commensurate to the natural (i.e., the social) virtues; and, like the natural virtues, the State would have no temporal end beyond itself to serve, proportionate to its natural efficacy as a principal cause. Herein lies the great significance for political theory of a true conception of natural happiness in this life. The State, we say, must sustain human life, it must respect human liberty, and it must help man in the pursuit of happiness. But there are several happinesses men can pursue—two in this life, and one hereafter. And of these, the State is competent to help men achieve only one—natural happiness in this life—competent, that is, to work for this end as a *principal* cause. The State may also serve as an *instrumental* cause subalternated by the work of the Church in helping men toward Christian happiness in this life, and beatitude hereafter.

If temporal happiness did not exist, the State would have neither naturalness nor necessity. If the only temporal happiness there were consisted in the joy, the peace and rest, of contemplation (perforce supernatural), the State would have no work to do as a principal cause. But these things not being so, the State has a natural mission to perform, and a principal work to do. It remains only to show that it performs this mission and does this work well, in proportion as it is intrinsically better as a State, according as its form of government is more or less just. The supremacy of Democracy is not merely that it effects the greatest common good, but more ultimately that, through this common good, it distributes to all men the help they need in the pursuit of natural happiness.

[203] Politics, VII, 3, 1325b15-30.

Before we draw these political implications from our analysis of happiness, it is necessary to consider certain theological questions which arise from the fact of man's fallen nature. We must ask whether the State can do anything, in the sphere of natural happiness and as a principal cause, without the help of the Church. We must try to understand how the unity of Christian life is able to embrace several last ends, not only temporal and eternal, but also natural and supernatural in this world of change. Whatever solution is possible must flow from the truth that grace elevates, it does not destroy, nature; that, healing fallen nature, grace helps it to achieve what is its due.

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(Part III will be completed in the next issue, with the publication of Sections 4, 5, and 6.)

BOOK REVIEWS

Thomistic Psychology. By Robert Edward Brennan, O.P. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941. Pp. xxvi + 401, with index. $3.00.

This book is a comprehensive study of the mind of man in terms of the teaching of Thomas Aquinas in its relationship to the experimental data of modern physiology and psychology. It is not Father Brennan's first effort in this direction. In 1937 he published a textbook that was " an interpretation of the science of mind based on Thomas Aquinas." In the earlier work the greater part of the author's attention was devoted to theories and conclusions which are to be found in any of our standard modern psychology textbooks. He added, however, several sections on the psychology of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas for the purpose of fitting the data into a general frame such as these two authors afford.

In the present volume he has reversed his procedure. The first section is a summary of Aristotle's " Treatise on the Soul," " Treatise on Sense and the Object of Sense," and " Treatise on Memory and Recollection." The second section, and major portion of the book is an exposition of the Psychology of Aquinas with frequent references to the relationship between the general principles set forth by the Angelic Doctor and scientific investigation. In each instance the author takes special pains to show that there is no contradiction between these principles and scientific facts. At the end of the book there is a brief epilogue concerning modern psychology and the Thomistic synthesis. Here, the major principles of the contemporary schools of psychology are reviewed and evaluated. Throughout, Father Brennan maintains that these schools are based on the fallacy of materialism, since they ignore man as " a besouled organism . . . a creature composed of matter and spirit." In his final evaluation of modern scientific psychology he says, " the first mistake is in the point of view that the sole subject matter of scientific psychology is either consciousness and its phenomena or behavior and its phenomena. . . . The second mistake is in the investigator's complete abandonment of philosophic criteria for his work. Out of this abandonment comes the loss of the precious concept of soul. . . . Without a soul, psychology is like a temple without a diety." Father Brennan admits that scientific psychology has profited by its separation from the field of philosophy. It is quite likely that the author would also admit that such a discipline is a life's work in itself for any investigator: still, in presenting the final results of the study of the human mind he would insist that the experimental data is but one part of a whole, the structure of which is the psychology of Thomas Aquinas alone.

There are several criticisms which I should like to make as they appear

in chronological order. First, both in his chapters on Aristotle and Aquinas, Father Brennan makes the sharp distinction between reproductive and creative imagination. The concept of a creative imagination is neither Aristotelian nor Thomistic. It is part of our late 18th century heritage and perhaps an unfortunate one. Secondly, in so far as he has pointed out so many relationships between Aquinas' description of the sensitive knowledge of man and our present day knowledge of the nervous system, he might have discussed the possible relationship of the Thomistic concept of "common sense" to the function of the association areas of the cortex. Thirdly, there is experimental data which might lead one to conclude that animal and human reasoning differ in degree only, which, if true, would invalidate the Aristotelian and Thomistic dichotomy between the rational and non-rational animal. Father Brennan in nowise glides past this problem. He refers to the problem solving of Köhler's apes and cites an example of what Aquinas called "animal prudence," a capacity distinct from human reasoning; still, the author's solution to the problem is by no means complete. A number of difficulties lie in the way which he can take up at some future time.

Despite these criticisms it is surprising that Thomists have taken so long to write a book such as this, but now that it does exist they should be grateful.

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Between Science and Philosophy. By PHILIPP FRANK. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. 238, with index. $2.75.

The author is a physicist, once professor of physics at Prague, now Visiting Lecturer at Harvard University. His name is known to philosophers as one of the founders of the so-called Vienna Circle and as a staunch advocate of "Logical Empirism." His book, a collection of essays dating from 1908 to 1938, deals mostly with problems concerning the philosophy of science. They deserve the attention of the philosopher because the spirit of this particular interpretation of science, and of philosophy, is scarcely stated as clearly elsewhere. It is not because of the importance of Dr. Frank's personal viewpoint, but because of the fundamental importance of the ideas he shares with quite a few well-known students of the theory or philosophy of science that this reviewer feels the work merits extensive analysis.

The title is as misleading as it is obscure. "Between" might refer either to relations obtaining between the two fields of science and of philosophy, or to a field located, as it were, between two well defined boundaries. Neither meaning applies to Dr. Frank's view. Philosophy, that is metaphysics, deals, according to the author and his fellows, with "meaningless

propositions" and has no right to be considered as science. Between a non-existent something and any other thing there can be no relations, nor can there be a field bordering on both. If, however, the title should refer to certain differences of opinion between science and philosophy, or scientists and philosophers, the question is decided beforehand. Philosophy loses, because it has no right to exist. The late Professor M. Schlick, of the University of Vienna, repeatedly emphasized that the task of the philosopher is to reveal the problems of philosophy either as pertaining to some special science and to deliver them to this science for solution, or to reveal them as pseudo-problems and thus to eliminate them altogether. The task of the philosopher, Schlick said, was to prove that his own work had no meaning.

Schlick, however, apparently never conceived of this statement as philosophical, nor does Dr. Frank pretend to make certain preliminary suppositions which, according to his own definition, rank as philosophical. Dr. Frank speaks in several places of the necessity of adopting his viewpoint in order to bring about a perfect unity of science. By this he means that all empirical knowledge has to be stated in a uniform language and that the boundaries between physics and biology, biology and psychology, natural and social sciences, thus will be made to disappear. Such a program is possible only if it is previously assumed that reality is uniform throughout. Now, the term reality does not occur in the language of Logical Empirism. The only thing we are allowed to speak of are perceptions. Whether these perceptions refer to any kind of reality, material or ideal, is not a question to be discussed by the scientist, since this question cannot be answered by the only means recognized as valid, namely experiential verification. To express the state of things correctly (that is in the language adopted by Dr. Frank) we would have to assume beforehand that all perceptions are essentially of one kind and permit the application of the same type of language.

It makes no difference, however, whether we adopt the expressions of ontology or the rules of "syntax" as developed by Carnap. In both cases a preliminary investigation becomes necessary to prove that the notion of the "unity of science" is legitimate. With Dr. Frank and the other followers of Logical Empirism, there is no question about the legitimacy of this notion. In this regard they are fully in accord with the most cherished beliefs of the nineteenth century or with what Dr. Frank loves to call "school philosophy." By this term he refers to a philosophy moving between the alternatives of idealism, mostly of the Kantian kind, and materialism. Although Dr. Frank expressly denies any intention of siding with materialism, he shares views of this philosophy in that he is convinced that a system of terms can be constructed suitable as well to physics as to any other discipline dealing with observable facts, that is, he believes in a thoroughgoing uniformity of facts of any kind whatsoever. Perhaps

he will contend that this statement is not one of philosophy and therefore "meaningful," since it may be tested by experience. He would, however, be very much at a loss, so this reviewer feels, if he were called upon to produce any factual verification. The attempts to build up a psychology which would be in line with physics is hopeless. Such an enterprise can be considered as possible only by someone who has fallen prey to the typical vicious circle underlying most of the reasonings on unified science. First it is assumed that the methods of science, that is physics, are the only ones allowing for true experiential verification. When it becomes manifest that there are certain data which escape any approach of this kind, these data are eliminated as lacking the scientific character. Thus, psychology is reduced to an assembly of data which lend themselves more or less to a treatment moulded on the ideal of physics. But the elimination rests on the assumption which in truth has still to be proved, that there are no other methods, permissible and reliable, outside of those fashioned according to the pattern of physics.

Dr. Frank has some curious ideas on the history of philosophy. He speaks of an animistic world view as having dominated medieval philosophy. He apparently believes that the categories by which Scholasticism conceived the universe were formed by applying terms derived from inner experience to the physical world. He seems to ignore the fundamental role played by the notion of strata of being and of analogy. He once refers to Maritain's remarks on the philosophy of the Vienna circle, but he has, it seems, no primary knowledge either of Maritain's ideas or of Scholasticism. This is not amazing, since his notions on what he calls the school philosophy are equally inaccurate. Had he a more precise idea of what Scholastic ontology really is, he might have considered it worth while to inquire into the legitimacy of his—and, of course, his companions'—notion of unified science. He might, at least, have discovered that this notion is not so simple and so inescapable as he evidently believes.

We can agree with the author in many points, as long as he is dealing with physics. It is quite permissible to consider the statements of the physicist as mere formulations of factual observations. A "law" of physics may be defined—these are not the author's words—as the actually most convenient way of summarizing the greatest possible number of phenomena, taken in their quantitative aspect, by one formula. One may also side with the author when he emphasizes that physics as such is independent of metaphysics and that the former's discoveries or theories have no bearing on ontology. The reason indeed is not what Dr. Frank thinks; it is not that philosophical statements are "meaningless" and, therefore, without any importance to physics; it is rather that physics does not attain the level where questions of ontology arise. We should be grateful to Dr. Frank for pointing out forcibly that the notions proposed occasionally by philosophers, but more frequently by philosophizing physicists, regard-

ing indetermination and freedom are utterly void. It is preposterous to attempt any justification of human freedom by reference to the indeterminancy principle of Heisenberg.

Another premise, taken for granted and accordingly not inquired into, states the superiority of " simple " propositions, but why must a simple proposition be preferred in any case to the less simple proposition. It cannot, of course, be denied that the human mind longs for simplicity, at least in a certain degree. It is also true that simplicity is a category of importance in mathematics. Many modern thinkers quote approvingly " Occam's razor." They usually forget that the proposition warning against an undue multiplication of principles is limited—even with Occam himself —by another which asserts that principles are not to be dismissed arbitrarily (*principia praeter necessitatem non esse temere minuenda*).

Experiential verification, which alone makes a proposition meaningful, refers, we are told, to perceptions. Here, however, the statements of the author definitely lack the desirable clarity. He does not distinguish between perception as a mental state and the percept as that which is " presented " or " intended " by this state. His admiration for the Austrian physicist and philosopher, E. Mach, makes him overlook the same lack of clarity in this thinker's statements. The distinction between the thing perceived and the perceiving mental state, however, is a primary fact. To ignore it amounts to an arbitrary simplification and, therefore, a falsification of factual evidence. This neglect of obvious facts is the more remarkable as Dr. Frank taught for many years at a university where the name of Franz Brentano was held in high esteem. The identification of " school philosophy " with Neo- Kantianism or, eventally with crude materialism, is due to the same neglect. Dr. Frank ought to be aware of the existence at his time of other schools of philosophy, in Germany. Among these schools those going back to Brentano deserve particular mention.

Like the other members of the Vienna circle, like the various positivists and pragmatists, Dr. Frank is a thorough nominalist. He does not, however, care to justify this viewpoint; he takes it for granted. He approves, of course, of the operationistic interpretation of concepts as proposed by Professor P. W. Bridgman, of pragmatism, at least in regards to its fundamental attitude, of behaviorism in psychology and of all similar schools.

It is obvious to anyone reading this book with a somewhat critical eye that this partisanship has nothing to do with the notions on the nature of physical theories. A relation with these other fields of study becomes visible only if the primary proposition of the essential uniformity of knowledge and its objects is previously granted. Besides these general and basic objections, there are many other criticisms or questions which come to the mind of the reader. It is not feasible to take up all the points which may be questioned. Some few instances must do here by way of illustration.

Dr. Frank remarks (p. 65) that physicists are the more dominated in

their thinking by "the traditions of school philosophy" the less they are used to thinking about philosophical questions. This is true, but it applies to the non-school philosophy in the same degree. A school which *a priori* declares that all philosophical problems are meaningless, cannot be considered as "used to thinking about philosophical questions." These questions are eliminated and not thought of at all. Back of the position taken by the logical empiricists is a definite philosophy, as this reviewer has tried to show; but this philosophy is not thought of, it is taken for granted. So also it is taken for granted that "inventing a procedure which, with the help of a skillfully chosen system of symbols, is capable of bringing order into our experiences" is a matter of course and does not entail any further problem. But it is not meaningless to ask how much an invention becomes possible or why "imagination" is capable of creating a framework wherein to comprise the data of experience. Dr. Frank's notion becomes understandable when one reads that "in practice we encounter only experiences, never an object." This too is statement not of "experience" but of metaphysics. Experience tells us of objects; the human mind distinguishes between its experience and the object to which the experience refers. If the testimony of common sense is to be rejected, reasons must be given for this; else such a statement is no more than an arbitrary decree without any justification.

The answer to this objection, as given by logical empirism, declares that the question whether the real world, apart from perceptions, exists can neither be answered nor even expressed because it cannot be "expressed through constituted concepts" (p. 89). This, of course, is but another way of formulating the fundamental axiom of the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements because they escape experiential verification. The testimony of common sense which, after all, expresses a verification common to everyone (unless his ideas be fettered by some idealistic philosophy), is disregarded. In this direction the Vienna school is a true follower of Kant, whose ironical comments on common sense could find a place also in a treatise by one professing the creed of Carnap, Frank, Wittgenstein, etc.

Already in his first article, of 1908, Dr. Frank gave an interpretation of causality which is based on notions altogether different from those contained, e. g., in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. The only interpretation the author knows, besides his own, is more or less Kantian. His views have not developed; twenty-one years later he had not changed his previous standpoint. One passage deserves quotation. "If the symbols conform to the experiences in a very detailed manner, we speak of causal laws; if the correspondence is of a broader sort we call them statistical" (p. 99). Dr. Frank apparently assumes that the degree of correspondence depends only on the progress of methods. This leaves unanswered the question whether or not there are reasons, depending on the material investigated, for the greater or lesser correspondence. This question, to Dr. Frank, is

meaningless, since it cannot be tested by experience, or so he says. But experience to him means measurement. Were there data which escape measurement, the question would become of primary importance. This problem again does not exist for such a mentality. "Only the formula for the connection between electric charge and inertia (and of course similar data) is a statement about the observable world" (p. 157). It is well to note the particular sense of "observable." Only what the physicist observes with his methods and what may be observed by anyone capable of handling the appropriate method is recognized. There is not the slightest attempt at any justification for restricting in this manner the field of experience. The fact of inner experience, for instance, is disregarded.

The indeterminacy principle of Heisenberg is well know. According to Dr. Frank it has to be stated thus: "One has no right to speak of particles the positions and velocities of which are present but cannot be accurately observed (p. 159). One can only speak of "experimental arrangements in the description of which the expressions 'position of a particle' and 'velocity of a particle' can never be employed simultaneously. If . . . the expression 'position . . .' can be used, then in the description of the same arrangement the expression 'velocity . . .' cannot be used." By this "complementary description" the danger of metaphysical conception is avoided.

As has been pointed out before, one has to agree with Dr. Frank that the principle of Heisenberg is, as such, metaphysically irrelevant. To make it an argument in favor of free will, is a thorough misunderstanding of the facts. If, however, Dr. Frank pretends that "free will is no expression from the psychology of daily life but rather a metaphysical or theological expression," he evidently is prejudiced. A little more knowledge of facts would have shown him that this is not the case. Freedom and coercion are primarily facts of daily, pre-philosophical experience. The statements: I shall do what I want, or: I cannot do what I want, are expressions of common experiences. The whole discussion on the problem of freedom shows an amazing ignorance of facts. The suggestions on how to build up a "scientific" psychology (p. 171) are utterly preposterous and can originate only in minds that know nothing of the empirical data regarding mental life.

The Aesopian fox found a meager consolation, when he could not reach the grapes, by telling himself that they were sour. More ingenuous, another fox in the same predicament proclaimed: Whether grapes are either sweet or sour cannot be tested by experiment. By tasting we ascertain the fruit-nature. The statement that there are grapes is, therefore, meaningless. Unfortunately, this fox forgot to consider that there could be other beings, taller than he is, and therefore capable of tasting the grapes.

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BRIEF NOTICES

God and Philosophy. By Etienne Gilson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. Pp. xviii + 147, with index. $2.00.

This book, though short, is extremely important for anyone wishing to understand Prof. Gilson's contribution to philosophical method. In the preface to the work he explains what he is trying to do in his teaching and writing, viz. to extract from the history of past philosophies "the essential data that enter into the correct formulation of a philosophical problem, and of determining, in the light of such data, its correct solution." This is not simply history of philosophy, but philosophy in the light of its history, philosophy using the histories of philosophies as a handmaid. In the four lectures of the present work, Gilson confines himself to the metaphysical problem of God, and the particular aspect of that problem chosen for emphasis is "the relation which obtains between our notion of God and the demonstration of his existence."

Living Religions and a World Faith. By William E. Hocking. New York: Macmillan, 1940. Pp. 291. $2.50.

This volume has one end in view—a prognosis of the future relationships between world religions. As an executive of the Protestant foreign missions, Dr. Hocking has had ample opportunity to enjoy actual contact with many of the Asiatic religions, and brings the results of his deep study to the production of this book. He treats, in order, his own concept of religion and its relationship to the many Christian religions; the characteristics of oriental religions, methods in attaining a world faith and, finally, a survey of the present religious situation and a forecast for the future world faith. It is unfortunate that a man of Dr. Hocking's ability is unable to realize that a living religion and a world faith is already in existence, has been in existence for two thousand years, and, if Christ's promises are at all to be trusted, will exist till the end of time.

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, December 30 and 31, 1940. The Problem of Liberty. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America.

The papers read at the American Catholic Philosophical Meeting of last year attack the problem of liberty from many aspects. The titles of the papers are as follows: "Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," by A. C. Pegis; "The Metaphysics of Human Liberty in Duns Scotus," by Bernard Vogt; "The Influence of Immanuel Kant's concept of Liberty," by Joseph B. McAllister; "Person and Liberty," by

Gerald B. Phelan; "Intelligence and Liberty," by Gerard Smith; "Liberty and Authority," by Yves R. Simon; "The Purpose of Liberty," by Geoffrey O'Connell; "The Limitations of Liberty," by John McCann. To be noted also is the paper read in the panel discussion by Bernard Muller-Thym on "The *To Be* Which Signifies the Truth of Propositions."

The Emancipation of a Freethinker. By Herbert E. Cory. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941. Pp. xx + 313, with index. $3.00.

Within a slight framework of biographical detail, Dr. Cory gives us here the workings of his mind toward the Catholic Faith. His intellectual background is amazingly broad. After graduating from Brown, he received his doctorate at Harvard, taught English literature for nine years at the University of California, became something of a Marxist. During the war he settled in Baltimore and for four years specialized in biology at Johns Hopkins. His training there led him finally to see the validity of the proofs for the existence of God. Thereafter his progress towards the Church was rapid. As he sketches this background, Dr. Cory presents to the reader the answers he found in the faith to the problems that faced him along the way. Hence we find an exposition of the Church's social teaching, of her attitude towards the problem of evil, of the nature of faith, of the nature of beauty. There is also in broadest outline a history of the Church in her greatest crises, and an explanation of some important dogmas. This book is, then, a treasury of apologetic material colored by the splendid literary and scientific culture of its author.

The Concept of Sacred Theology. By Joseph C. Fenton. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941. Pp. xi + 276, with index. $3.00.

In his latest work Dr. Fenton offers to all who are interested in theology an exposition and defense of its scientific character. He does more; for included in the book are an exposition of the *loci theologici* and a brief history of theological writings. Basing his work on the latest researches in the field, Dr. Fenton, with utmost clarity, presents a well-rounded view of theological science. His work is especially welcome now when so many are completely ignorant of what theology has to offer in the way of sane thinking and sound moral principles.

Landmarks in Philosophy. By Irwin Edman and H. W. Schneider. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941. Pp. x + 1008, with index. $3.00.

This is a selection of continuous texts from some of the outstanding philosophers of Western culture. The following are included: Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James and Bergson. In their Introduction the authors say: "We have, for example, omitted Spinoza because it seems impossible to present in brief compass in his own words the whole

character of his central themes, problems and solutions." Presumably they think that they have succeeded in presenting the "whole character of his central themes, problems and solutions," of the other authors in the volume. This is, of course, not so. They have presented an excellent selection of texts from these philosophers dealing with one or another important philosophical problem. In the hands of a skillful professor this work would make an excellent introduction into the methods of philosophical thinking. The index is especially valuable for collating the opinions of the philosophers on any one question. Unfortunately, the selection from St. Thomas is taken from Rickaby's translation of the *Summa Contra Gentiles;* consequently the central portion of the text, the proof of God's existence, is expressed in a general syllogism with no attempt to give the fundamental reasons contained in its premises.

Les Parents et l'Enfant. Deuxième Congrès annuel, 18-21 juin 1941. Ottawa: Les Editions du Lévrier.

The following papers are contained in this report: "La Philosophie des Relations Familiales," by Louis-Marie Régis, O.P.; "L'Education des Parents," by Irénée Lussier; "Parents and Heredity," by Peter Sandiford; "Les Parents et la Formation de la Conscience Morale," Noël Mailloux, O.P.; "Parental Acceptance and Rejection and their Influence on the Child's Behavior," by Charles M. Diserens; "La Famille et L'École dans L'Éducation de la Personalité," by Jean-Charles Miller; "The Identification, Description and Development of the Intellectually Gifted," by Florence S. Dunlop.

A Catholic Dictionary. Edited by Donald Attwater. New York: Macmillan, 1941. Pp. xvi 576. $1.98.

This is a reissue of a book originally published under the title *The Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary.* Because of a conflict of titles, the publisher has changed the title of this valuable work and offers it to the public at an extremely reasonable price.

Summa Cosmologiae seu Philosophia Naturalis Generalis. By Frederick Saintonge, S. J. Montreal: Imprimerie du Messager, 1941.

Professors of Cosmology will welcome this new textbook by Fr. Saintonge. It is very simple, clearly written and well presented. Each thesis is presented in traditional Scholastic style, but there are several additional features. Carefully constructed nominal definitions are given of all the necessary concepts at the head of each thesis. The objections are well chosen and quite modern. Best of all, a short bibliography is appended, giving the capital texts in Aristotle and St. Thomas, page references to other manuals, and a list of periodical literature dealing with the question discussed. This last feature makes the book especially valuable.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Blakney, R. B. *Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1941. Pp. xxviii + 333, with Introduction and Notes. $3.00.

Cargill, A. *Intellectual America.* New York: Macmillan, 1941. Pp. xxi + 777, with index. $5.00.

Gondin, W. R. *Prefaces to Inquiry.* New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. Pp. 260, with index. $2.00.

Greene, E. B. *Religion and the State in America.* New York: New York University Press, 1941. Pp. 172, with index. $4.00.

Lowinger, A. *The Methodology of Pierre Duhem.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 184, with index. $2.25.

Meehan, F. X. *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas.* Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1940. Pp. xxii + 424, with index.

Robinson, R. *Plato's Earlier Dialectic.* Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1941. Pp. viii + 239, with index. $3.00.

Shields, L. W. *The History and Meaning of the Term Social Justice.* Notre Dame, Indiana: 1941. Pp. 81.

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THE MILITANT CHRISTIAN VIRTUES

I. THE SENTIMENTAL REVOLT AGAINST HARSHNESS

PRINCIPLES and programs of many religious organizations in the United States are concerned with the attitudes of their communicants toward our enemies during the war and in post-bellum peace negotiations. In these church pronouncements there is a manifest gentleness that approaches spiritual and religious flabbiness. This is a carry-over from the prewar pacifistic activities, which are now necessarily quiescent but which did much to create among religionists the hopeful but spiritless quietism that left our nation unprepared to defend itself against the Axis powers. This current idealism about the gentle attitudes which Christians must take toward their savage enemies during and after the war is only a partial and disparate application of Christian principles to practical life. It pushes out of the picture basic and stern Christian virtues, and it leaves citizens and nations without the help of those vigorous and militant qualities demanded for an organized society in peace and war. Christianity itself is done no great service if, in the popular mind, it is identified exclusively with sentimental idealism to the neglect of the stern

and rational realities of life. Christianity is done no service anywhere if persons with normal and God-given instincts of anger and indignation are made to feel that there is no place within the fold for them. There is need to open up to all a view of real and more complete Christianity as presented in the Catholic Church by the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas.

The definite indictment which can be brought against incomplete and sentimental Christianity is that, in order to create horror for criminal hatred and barbaric vengeance in war and at the peace table, it has exiled from life Christian obligations like holy anger and vindictive justice. Furthermore such partial Christianity has so overemphasized the gentle virtues of meekness, forgiveness, and mercy as to have fallen into vicious extremes of flabbiness against which these very gentle qualities are supposed to protect individuals and nations. In order to protect society against relying on brute power, it has attempted to lead Christians into a grovelling and supine inertia that is an apostasy from reason. There is no intention of questioning the fine and humanitarian spirit that lies behind the efforts of pacifistic and unaggressive Christian leaders. They are rather the victims of two tendencies characteristic of partial Christianity for four centuries. One tendency is that of whittling down the content of Christian teaching and discipline to the proportions of human convenience, through a disregard of the rights of God and the ultimate needs of human nature. This is an apostasy from divine Intelligence. The other tendency is that of failing to adhere to first principles despite the temporary discomfort they may occasion and the consistency of conduct they may demand. This is an apostasy from human intelligence. Both of these tendencies are evident in the contemporary life of partial Christianity.

The apostasy from divine Intelligence began with the neglect of some of the teachings of divine Revelation, and was consummated in the open repudiation of these teachings. The Sacraments offer a striking example. First some of them were ignored, like Matrimony, Penance, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction; then they were dropped entirely. Now Baptism is

the only remnant of sacramental life on which partial Christianity can present any semblance of loyalty and united action. The divine commandments suffered in a similar manner. Of the Ten Commandments, some were ignored, under the pressure of economic change and consequent moral dissolution. The first three commandments are practically ignored by about seventy-five millions of partial Christians in the United States today. From neglect of these commandments our partial Christians pass on to the open repudiation of them and to the neglect of the others. A similar process of deterioration has taken place and is taking place in regard to the virtues of Christian living. Power politics found it convenient, with the help of Nietzsche, to scrap all the gentle Christian virtues and to make political capital of their opposite vices of hatred, revenge, and savage cruelty. Totalitarian ideology finds it convenient to repudiate Christianity in its entirety and to adopt controllable and kaleidoscopic paganism. Sentimentally partial Christianity finds it convenient for its pacifistic and selfish purposes to neglect the sterner Christian qualities of vindictive justice, punishment, courage, military prudence, and righteous anger. Already these dynamic qualities have been repudiated by some recognized Christian leaders. There is danger that they will be lost in the general apostasy from divine Intelligence.

The apostasy from human reason is seen in the manifold paradoxes into which truncated and disparate Christianity falls in adopting a pragmatic and sentimental policy of coasting into a chronic procrastination. These paradoxes of procrastination are not far removed from mental, moral, and social anarchy. Several favorite attitudes and policies of partial Christianity reveal this. In religious life the affair of baptism and the matter of selecting a church or creed are evaded by parents, turned over to children themselves, and postponed until the youngster is supposed to be capable of deciding. In the field of education the theory of self-activity is sovereign. Pedagogues hesitate to teach with authority because of fear of indoctrination. The reaching of conclusions is postponed until immature

minds have completed their discussions and forums. Then the pedagogue must concur rather than demur. In social life at home, and elsewhere, the religious attitude which has negated the facts of the last judgment and the punishments of Hell finds reflection in the theory that authority, parental and political, must rule all by love rather than by fear of punishment. Inexperienced, amateur individuals usurp parental authority in the home, religious authority in the church, pedagogical authority in the school, and political authority in the state. This makes the individual sovereign everywhere and launches anarchy. This procrastinates the fulfillment of duty and passes the responsibility from one refuge to another. This creates the concatenation of paradoxes that always results from the abdication of rational principles and the sovereignty of sentiment. One must avoid punishment and govern only through love, but society has only punishments to offer as sanctions for laws. One must avoid indoctrination and yet teach the accumulated experiences of the past to the young. One must guard group interests and yet turn sovereignty over to individuals. One must preserve liberty and yet surrender the control necessary for the preservation of freedom. One must cultivate through religion the qualities that make for sound social living, and yet one must avoid the control that keeps many virtues from becoming vices. Partial Christianity with its apostasy from reason and its subsequent procrastination, anarchy, and paradox could not escape its present condition. Its historical antecedents have maneuvered it into its sentimental lack of sympathy for righteous anger, vindictive justice, and other stern virtues of Christianity, into its prewar pacifism and into its postwar program of softness. It is interesting to note the nonintellectual use made of Christ's teachings and life in overemphasizing some gentle virtues and in neglecting sterner qualities.

II. Paradoxes of Christianity

Frequent reference, in pacifistic and inferiority Christianity, is made to the meekness and mercy of Christ and to the

obligations of Christian men and nations to be gentle and nonresistant. In fact these well-intentioned persons make gentleness and mercy synonymous with nonresistance. They also make nonresistance and nonpunishment mandatory for every one and take away from all persons, public and private, the duty and the right of demanding justice. There is in this a sad confusion of the respective force of precept and counsel, a misunderstanding of the nature and functions of justice, a failure to see the full picture of Christ's life and a convenient neglect of some of His harsher words. About the meaning of meekness and mercy and about the difference between counsel and precept we shall ask Aquinas to speak later. Attention is directed now to the partial understanding of Christ's life and words presented by partial Christianity.

No time need be lost in proclaiming the mercy, the humility, the meekness, the charity, the patience, and all the other gentle and submissive virtues of the Master. But with equal readiness one must also proclaim that Christ was always just and also stern and rigourous when conditions demanded Him to be so. He violated none in the hierarchy and interlocked scale of virtues in order to be gentle. Negatively and positively He was stern. In a negative way Christ was stern in the punishments He failed to arrest and in the corrections He did not withhold when charity, justice, and truth demanded severity. Christ possessed all the virtues.[1] His most perfect grace perfected all the powers of His soul and all the acts of these faculties. He had the fine emotions of the nature He assumed, under perfect control and perfectly sublimated.[2] He was subject to sensile pain [3] and also experienced sorrow and grief,[4] that issued from His knowledge of the perils that beset Himself and His neighbors.[5] But as much as Jesus grieved over the distressful punishments that would befall those whom He loved, His virtue

[1] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 7, a. 2. For the benefit of those who wish to make an extended study of these virtues in the works of St. Thomas, copious references will be given throughout this study.

[2] *Ibid.*, q. 15, a. 4.

[3] *Ibid.*, a. 5, ad 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, a. 6.

[5] *Loc. cit.*

demanded that justice take its course. He wept over the city of Jerusalem and lamented its coming destruction, but He did not prevent this calamity. He grieved over the treachery of Judas, but His virtues forbade the arresting of the just fate of the traitor. Jesus sorrowed in the garden over His coming crucifixion and death and over the punishment His murderers would bring on themselves, but He did not stop the divine tragedy by permitting the truthfulness of the prophecies to be gainsaid or the justice of God to be thwarted. Jesus found no pleasure in the denial by Peter, but He did not prevent Peter's denial and subsequent embarrassment. Positively, the conduct of Christ bristled with incidents which showed, side by side with His humility and meekness, His agressive interest in charity, justice, and truth. Parabolic though he may be, Dives is an impressive indication of the devotion of Christ to drastic and punitive action. The cursed and blighted fig tree is also an indication of Christ's ire in the name of justice. That love of neighbor may demand aggressive action against enemies of human welfare is shown in the habitual aggressiveness of Jesus against the Scribes and Pharisees because they blockaded the boulevards between men and God. Actions speak more loudly than words when Christ chases the moneylenders out of the Temple. Gentleness is in the background while vigorous action in the name of justice and charity take the center of the stage. Jesus was capable of and manifested righteous, zealous, and intelligent anger.[6]

The sorrow which is caused by the knowledge of an injury done to oneself or to others is followed naturally and honorably by a desire to right and avenge the wrong. Anger is therefore a combination of sorrow and the desire for vindication. This combination existed in Christ in a perfect degree and under the perfect control of reason and justice. St. Thomas calls this type of anger with its concomitant and laudable desire for just vindication *ira per zelum*[7] (anger inspired by zeal), and calls attention to the fact that in Christ such anger never impeded

[6] *Ibid.*, q. 15, a. 9; *III Sent.*, d. XV, q. 2, quaes. 2.
[7] *Loc. cit.*

understanding.[8] The divine as well as the human dignity of the Savior would not be demeaned by His voluntary and reasonable anger.[9] The righteous indignation of Christ when He beheld the profanation of the Temple by cattle dealers and money-changers showed itself in vigorous action. He drove out the men with lashes, He drove out the cattle and birds, He poured out the money and He overturned the tables and stalls. He was angry because justice and religion had been violated and for their restoration as well as for the punishment of the culprits Christ took vigorous action.[10] This is a phase of the character and the conduct of Jesus which partial Christianity is wont to conceal when it campaigns for quietistic pacifism.

The possibility of remaining a devout Christian even while seeking aggressive vindication of justice is founded on the words of Jesus. The Master surrendered and abdicated none of the gentler virtues when He poured vitriolic denunciation on the Scribes and Pharisees. It was essential for the triumph of truth, for the salvation and happiness of the people, for the sake of obedience to the Man God and for the vindication of justice that these false leaders be exposed in all their raw viciousness. And Jesus spoke with a plainness and force that must embarrass the sentimental and delicate partial Christians of this day who have a smug disdain for what they characterize as "name calling," even in the interests of justice and truth. In His denunciation of them Christ was not as concerned about excusing, condoning, and glossing over their crimes as some of His halfway followers in the United States are concerned in softening their words and their characterizations of the ugly rottenness of the ideology and the conduct of Axis paganism. Jesus called them, among other things, "brood of vipers,"[11] "an adulterous generation,"[12] "whited sepulchres,"[13] "hypocrites,"[14] "blind guides."[15] The divine Preacher denounced them while they were present and while they were absent, and

[8] *Ibid.*, quaes. 3, sol. 2, ad 3.
[9] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2.
[10] *In Joann.*, ii, 2.
[11] *Matt.*, iii, 7.
[12] *Ibid.*, xii, 39.
[13] *Ibid.*, xxiii, 27.
[14] *Ibid.*, xv, 8.
[15] *Ibid.*, xxiii, 24.

actively spread a contempt for the vices they lived and the havoc they wrought. His caustic condemnation of these enemies of human happiness, temporal and eternal, could be imitated with dignity and with service to truth and justice by contemporary semi-Christian preachers before whose pulpits and on whose horizon stands an army of satanic successors of the diabolical Scribes and Pharisees. Christ's vigorous preaching might be censored by some broadcasting companies and their editorial boards today, but He was the paradigm of the preacher who St. Thomas says ought to be a " soldier," a *titurator*,[16] and a trumpet who calls all to a spiritual warfare.[17] It is clear that ultra-pacifistic Christian leaders are disturbed by the belligerent denunciatory and punitive utterances of Christ. This pacifistic passion is not satisfied with trying to submerge the irate utterances of Christ; it attempts to interpret the Christian philosophy of meekness and forgiveness more abasingly than Christ Himself intended. Take as an example of this tendency the distorted meaning read into the passages: " You have heard that it hath been said: An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say not to resist evil: but if anyone strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other." [18] This has been used often as the charter of universal nonresistance and supine pacifism, very contrary to the true Christian meaning disclosed by the Angelic Doctor.[19] The meaning of this is that one is not allowed to repel injury by taking revenge (*ulciscendo*) or with the purpose of cruelty. But the question is asked by St. Thomas whether nonresistance to evil is a matter of precept or counsel and the following answer is given:

Injury can be private and particular, or public; if public, it should be fought against at the command of the ruler. Augustine remarks further that the courage which defends one's homeland, or the oppressed, against the oppressor, or one's friends against robbers, is in full accord with justice. Hence, the precept is for the ruled as well as for the rulers. If the injury should be private, it may be

[16] *In I Cor.*, ix, lect. 1.
[17] *In Is.*, lviii.
[18] *Matt.*, v, 38, 39.
[19] *In Matt.*, v, 9.

repelled in three ways; it may be impeded . . . or it may be forestalled by discussion. These failing, when necessary, that is, when there is no way of avoiding conflict, injury may be fought against either without arms (in which circumstances clerics might participate) or by attacking the oppressor, but always with the proper moderation. To refrain from the use of arms in resisting evil is of precept for clerics, but of counsel for layfolk. Of course, to fight with the intention of exacting revenge is forbidden by precept to all.[20]

It would seem from this that under certain circumstances nonresistance would be criminal and that in all but a comparatively few cases it is more or less optional. This is a little bit different from the interpretation usually placed on the words by quietistic Christians. The same distortion of Christ's words and the same confusion of precept with counsel are found in the interpretations of similar passages. These facts make necessary the heeding of certain warnings in building up a nonresistant Christianity that neither does justice to Christ's teachings, nor makes intelligible traditional Catholic teaching, nor fully explains the duties of Christian citizenship in contemporary political society and especially in American democracy at war for peace. These warnings, which will be explained, are: 1) Counsels must not be confused with precepts; 2) virtues must not be abused and isolated one from another; 3) the freedom and rights of individuals must not be confused with the freedom and rights of the state; 4) utopian idealism must give place to sound realism in moral and political life.

III. Intelligent Warnings

Counsels and precepts differ in the extent of their respective obligating power. To observe the counsels is more difficult than to observe the precepts or commandments especially in regard to external actions,[21] because counsels are instruments for attaining the higher or contemplative life.[22] The counsels reenforce the commandments and they protect the keeping of

[20] *Loc. cit.* [21] *Quaes. Quod.*, IV, a. 24, ad 9. [22] *Ibid.*, ad 5.

the precepts.[23] But the counsels do not obligate as many Christians as do the precepts which fall upon all.[24] The keeping of the commandments is essential for salvation while the observance of the counsels is essential only for a higher spiritual life.[25] In regard to counsels it is commanded that the soul be kept in readiness for them,[26] though under certain unusual conditions a counsel of Christ may become a precept for some. Thus resistance with arms to an invading enemy in the home *may* be refrained from by the laity; they may practice the counsel of nonresistance if the safety of no one else is involved. But a cleric must practice nonuse of arms.[26a] A counsel, as opposed to a precept, is an amicable persuasion.[27] A counsel never obligates unless by some circumstance it passes over into the realm of precept.[28] A perpetually celibate life is counselled by Christ; it is not a matter of obligation unless one in the priesthood or with a solemn perpetual vow of chastity should adopt the counsel and make it preceptive.[29] A parallel situation is found in the case of meekness, mercy, gentleness, and other submissive Christian virtues. There are heroic degrees of these virtues which must be practiced by some exceptional souls called to and obligated to achieve high perfection and union with God by charity. Others, the majority of men, have no such call to an heroically perfect life and no corresponding obligation to live the counsels. There are grades of perfection [30] and the perfection of life consists essentially in precepts and accidentally in counsels.[31] The inequality of the perfection of charity is referred to by Aquinas when he says that the perfection of charity on the part of the one loving is threefold: in act, in

[23] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 189, a. 1, ad 5.
[24] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad 4.
[25] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 43, a. 7, ad 4.
[26] *De Virt.*, q. 3, a. 2; *III Cont. Gent.*, 130; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 108, a.3.
[26a] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 40, a. 3.
[27] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 17, a. 3, ad 2.
[28] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 124, a. 3, ad 1; *IV Sent.*, d. XIX, q. 2, a. 2, quaes. 1.
[29] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad 1.
[30] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 3; q. 186, a. 2.
[31] *De Regimine Principum*, 6.

seeking, in habit. The first is found in the blessed, the second in perfect wayfarers, the third—to which all are bound—is found in those having charity.[32] An unfair procedure not sanctioned by complete Christianity is the bigotry and intolerance of men who crusade for counsels by trying to change them into commandments and to make them obligatory for all. They try to dragoon into a life of heroic perfection persons whom neither nature nor grace has fitted for such a life. Heroic submission, meekness, and gentleness are not binding on all men. Some have neither the ability nor the right to practice them; justice and charity often make aggressiveness and vindication mandatory. Though a preacher should aim at the betterment of all, he must remember that while all are obliged to tend to the perfection of charity, not all are obliged to have it in that heroic degree.[33]

The abuse of virtues and their dislocation are chargeable to many who, innocently or otherwise, insist on drafting Christ into the service of pacifism and in Christian condonation and encouragement of injustice. It is possible to be too generous and turn charity into a vice. It is possible to be too meek and turn abasement into a crime against justice. It is possible to isolate love of enemies from prudence and thus turn charity into a criminal mockery of truth. During the tensions created by war it is imperative that the real nature of virtue be respected and that the consolidation of virtues be maintained. This means that the mediety and rationality of real virtue must be protected against extremes and emotion and that unity must be preserved against dislocation.

Virtue must stand midway between extremes and it must be rational. In moral virtues, like the meekness and gentleness to which special reference is made here, it is essential that a golden mean be held.[34] This is particularly true where the departure from the golden mean is so subtle and gradual that the virtuous subject is unaware of the transition. Many of our

[32] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 8; q. 184, a. 2.
[33] *III Sent.*, d. XXIX, a. 8, quaes. 2.
[34] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3; *III Sent.*, d. XXIX, q. 1, a. 1.

hypersympathetic peacemakers would resent the insinuation that sentiment and emotion have made their virtues fictitious and false.[35] They fail to realize that control is necessary to keep virtue within moderation and that fear of ruining a virtue through the development of an erosive vice is necessary.[36] A defective virtue is likely to become, very rapidly, a vice,[37] and constant vigilance must be exercised to keep to the middle course or the formal element of a moral virtue.[38] Not the least of the difficulties of virtuous living is that of preserving from deteriorating, through excess, virtues already acquired.[39] One test that can be used to test the genuineness of a virtue is to see whether it really makes the possessor of the quality good,[40] and whether at the same time it is not defeating other virtues,[41] but is strengthening genuinely good inclinations of human nature.[42]

The controls which keep virtue from going to extremes are found in the rational and not in the emotional nature of man. Emotion is too unsteady a guide to be entrusted with the direction of virtue and the appetency from which it springs is too unpredictable.[43] Whether a virtuous act be so called because it springs from a virtue or prepares the way for a virtuous habit,[44] it is inextricably involved with cold, calculating intelligence in its genesis and in its endurance. Intellect and will must be sovereign if virtue is to remain virtuous. Right choice is paramount,[45] and right reason is basic in virtue.[46] The virtue remains a virtue only so long as it retains its relation with reason.[47] In fact the distinction and classification of the virtues rests on the correlation between the faculties

[35] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2.
[36] *Ibid.*, q. 123, a. 4, ad 2.
[37] *Ibid.*, q. 107, a. 2.
[38] *IV Sent.*, d. XV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. 1.
[39] *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 13, ad 1; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 4.
[40] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 4; *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 2.
[41] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 7.
[42] *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 2.
[43] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 59, a. 1.
[44] *II Sent.*, d. XLIV, q. 2, a. 16.
[45] *IV Sent.*, d. XIV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. 2.
[46] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 149, a. 2.
[47] *II Sent.*, d. XXVII, a. 2, ad 1.

of the soul and reason,[48] and reason becomes the taproot of all the virtues.[49] Apostasy from reason is incompatible with virtuous living,[50] and volition and election radicated in intelligence are supreme.[51] The very definitions of a moral virtue indicate these facts: "A moral virtue is only a certain participation of right reason in the appetite," [52] and "A moral virtue is a certain disposition or form sealed and impressed on the appetite by reason." [53] Control by cool reason is particularly necessary during the stress of war if virtues are to remain such. "The seal of reason on the lower powers formally perfects the moral virtues," [54] and "The habits of the moral virtues are caused in the appetitive powers in that they are moved by reason." [55]

While intelligence must exercise power in the control of virtue,[56] special phases of rational life have priority in preserving the golden mean. "The end of any moral virtue is the attainment in its proper material of a mean determined according to the right reason of prudence." [57] Prudence is the wellspring of intelligence in which all the moral virtues share.[58] Discretion likewise is necessary to prevent sensile emotion from taking charge of and degrading a virtue. Discretion belongs to prudence; it is the cause, guardian, and moderator of the virtues.[59]

The degradation of virtues, especially of the gentle virtues, is affected not only by apostasy from reason but also by dislocation and amputation. The virtues, moral and intellectual, are interlocked. The psychological unity of human personality, with a variety of faculties resident in the one soul indicates this fact. This consolidation of the virtues is discovered in more objective analysis. The object of one virtue frequently becomes the terminal of another,[60] and frequently one virtue will ema-

[48] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 5.
[49] *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.
[50] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 1.
[51] *II Sent.*, d. XXIV, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3.
[52] *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 12, ad 16.
[53] *Ibid.*, a. 9.
[54] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 24, a. 4, ad 8.
[55] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 51, a. 2.
[56] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 6.
[57] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 66, a. 3, ad 3.
[58] *III Sent.*, d. XXVI, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.
[59] *III Sent.*, d. XXIII, q. 2, a. 5.
[60] *In I Tim.*, lect. 2.

nate from another either as a cause or a predisposition.[61] This means, concretely, that real mercy is displaced by the vice of softness unless justice and prudence are in control. It means too that patriotism is affected by religion and that love of country may disintegrate into jingoistic hatred unless charity is operative. It means also that prudence is likely to be debilitated into cunning under pressure of lust and greed. The moral virtues are so connected that they must stand or fall together.[62] This interlocking of the virtues is disclosed further by the fact that often one virtue will regulate many grades of emotion,[63] and that many forms of vice may ensue upon the collapse of one virtue.[64] There is an arresting fact, however, from the viewpoint of the solidarity and subsidiarism of the virtues. Despite inequalities of virtues in the same person,[65] they march to progressive perfection or dissolution together. All the virtues in the same person are equal by proportion because they have equal increase.[66] Neither the virtues of war nor the moral qualities of peace are safe when isolated from supporting virtues and they are slaves of vicious sentiment when they desert reason.

Public leaders looking toward the peace chamber must keep in mind the differences between the rights and duties of an individual as such and the rights and duties of a nation responsible for the protection of its people and responsible for orderly relations with other single units in the family of nations. It is conceivable that while an individual may have the right, and in some cases the duty, to practice heroically the virtues of the counsels where he alone is concerned with the consequences, a nation would have no such right either in regard to its own people or other nations. Surrender of the right of punishing criminals and abdication of the duty of punishing gangster nations might violate both distributive justice and commutative justice. Such right the state does not possess, and yet

[61] *II Sent.*, d. XLIV, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6.
[62] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 1; *De Virt.*, q. 5, a. 2, 3.
[63] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 4.
[64] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 92, a. 1.
[65] *De Virt.*, q. 5, a. 3.
[66] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 66, a. 1, ad 1.

overkind persons will bring American Beauty roses to criminals in the death cell and are deeply worried that the war will produce, in our people, harsh feelings toward the Nazis, Fascists, and Japanese. Such mollifiers are dangerous diplomats to have at a peace table where fear of punishment may be the only sanction available for creating submission to international law. One set of virtues may come to the foreground when a man is acting as an independent individual, another set must be stressed when he is meeting the responsibilities of parental authority, and still another set of virtues assumes importance when he is acting in the capacity of a citizen.[67] In a parallel way public authority may have to vary the virtues in relation to the events with which it must deal. Turning the other cheek after an assault may be optional, as a counsel, to the average lay person. It would be forbidden to public authority where such submission would damage the commonweal of its own people and of society at large.[68] In this light one can understand the statement of St. Thomas: "A prince should rule his subjects with mercy, his captives with rigid justice." [69] Political authority is obligated to a new set of virtues on the assumption of office,[70] and among these is the obligation of coercing to sound citizenship those who are inclined to crime.[71]

A fourth danger to complete international thinking against which warning must be issued is that of overoptimistic idealism. Kindly and gentle persons are likely to believe that all others are like themselves. Their virtues are so Pollyannish and utopian that they become a vicious menace to public weal. They have urgent need of a realistic point of view which commands a vision of real facts, means, ends, and circumstances. Individuals and nations have tendencies to crime as well as to virtue. Not all individuals and not all nations can be won by love; many can be controlled by fear of reprisal. Christian nations must be astute in dealing with governments that are conducted on standards of pagan trickery and force. It is real-

[67] *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 10; *Q. D. de Malo.*, q. 4, a. 1.
[68] *In Matt.*, vi.
[69] *In Ps.*, ii, xxxii.
[70] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 11, ad 1.
[71] *In Rom.*, v, lect. 6.

ism to recognize that Christian virtues are under a handicap when in competition with qualities adopted by pagans as virtuous strength and repudiated by the followers of Christ as vicious weakness. One of the reasons for the tardiness of the coming supremacy of the United Nations is that their diplomats have been dealing with low pagan power politics from the level of Christian idealistic presumptions, and have failed to see many traps into which they have been lured. These Christian diplomats have failed to realize, until too late, that trust can be carried too far, that justified suspicion can be a virtue,[72] and that doubt is not always rash and vicious. Appeasement, mercy, generosity, meekness are poor weapons for Christian nations to use when dealing with demoniac power governments that have only contempt for them. To the foreground, now and at the peace table, must come a galaxy of sturdy and tough Christian virtues. An understanding of some of them, in the thought of Aquinas, is timely, because these forms of honorable and virtuous hardness are repudiated with disdain by the satin-hearted borderline cowards of this day. Vindictive justice, just anger, righteous indignation, and virtuous disdain ought to be restored to an honorable place in American attitudes. In order to forestall an obvious objection, it should be noted here that, not superior sanctity, but rather the integrity of right reason, is required for the just judgment which is essential to righteous punishment.[73]

IV. The Militant Virtues

Vindictive justice brackets together a corps of firm and tough-souled qualities and unites them with charity. Justice, in a way, spreads itself over all the moral virtues,[74] but in its stricter sense it looks to the payment of debts,[75] and vindication is one of its subjective parts.[75a] Vindictive justice has respect to an offense that has been committed, which has upset rational order

[72] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 60, a. 3.
[73] *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 5.
[74] *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 6.
[75] *Ibid.*, a. 11.
[75a] *III Sent.*, d. XXXIII, q. 3, a. 4, quaes. 1.

and for which reason and order demand reparation.[76] In no other disorder is apostasy from reason so far-reaching and vicious as in that caused by violations of justice.[77] The cunning of smart men and the power of the mighty are weapons with which the structure of orderly justice is wrecked.[78] In its eternal perspective this sabotaged justice is adjusted by God in the endless punishments of the next world.[79] The truth and the goodness of the Deity demand the restoration of order through the vindications of justice.[80] Here on earth wise, just, and beneficent government is disclosed by the concern of earthly rulers for order established and protected by the vindication of justice.[81]

The ordinary implement of vindictive justice is punishment, either medicinal or obliterating.[82] Punishments should have in mind both the restoration of the just order disrupted by sin and the correction of the sinner.[83] Medicinal punishment with this double intention should be distasteful to the culprit: it is of the nature of punishment to be against the will.[84] Given this condition, the action of the just punitive agent is good even though the culprit be indignant.[85] This principle might be kept in mind at the peace table by the delegates of the victorious United Nations in their negotiations. They will be there, not to barter, but to pass just and punitive sentence on the guilty instigators of total war. The vindication of justice and the future and peaceful health of society demand distasteful medicine [86] for the Axis governments and even for the civilian populations who have made them possible. Satisfaction must be demanded in the name of charity, justice, and order, which have been violated and which must be restored.[87] Correction is a function of charity,[88] and in its coactive phase it is an

[76] *IV Sent.*, d. XV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. 2.
[77] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 55, a. 8.
[78] *In Job*, vii, lect. 1.
[79] *IV Sent.*, d. XLVI, q.1, a. 1, quaes. 2.
[80] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 21, a. 2.
[81] *Ibid.*, a. 1.
[82] *De Anima*, a. 21, ad 20.
[83] *III Cont. Gent.*, 144.
[84] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 64, a. 3.
[85] *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 1, a. 4, ad 9.
[86] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 87, a. 7.
[87] *IV Sent.*, d. XV, q. 1, a. 1, quaes. 1.
[88] *IV Sent.*, d. XIX, q. 2, a. 1.

inescapable duty of justice,[89] all the more difficult when the culprit is proud and stubborn.[90] In such a situation severity, another virtue, will reenforce the demands of vindictive justice. Severity will give that firmness which sentimental sympathy might abdicate but which right reason demands.[91]

The desire for vindication, in itself, is a natural urge of human nature. It is more natural to demand reparation for injuries done us than not to demand such atonement.[92] Vindication, therefore, strengthening a natural impulse, becomes a special virtue,[93] and is reenforced by the noble virtues of courage, just anger, and charity.[94] Vindication remains a virtue as long as it keeps the golden mean between cruelty and savagery, at the one extreme, and unjust pardon at the other.[95] It remains a necessary virtue when reparation is demanded not merely for the purpose of inflicting evil on culprits but to reform them, to restrain their lawless impulses and to guarantee the peace of others.[96] Such vindication to be effective and rational will deprive culprits, individual and national, of those values which they prize most highly.[97] Vindication is a quality that cannot be scrapped in international relations or in national autonomy. The tendency to go soft on this phase of justice is too widespread even though it is explicable. In the religious field, the neglect or denial of eternal punishment on sentimental grounds has created a habit of mind that asserts itself in sentimental softness everywhere. In the ethical and juridical field, the eradication of objective norms of right and wrong and the annihilation of responsibility and culpability have anathematized vindictive justice and punishment. It is to be hoped that the contagion will be arrested by war and that at the peace conference vindictive justice will be restored to its honorable place in the hierarchy of fine moral qualities.

Two virtues that may be coupled and which need emphasis in

[89] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 33, a. 1.
[90] *IV Sent.*, d. XIX, q. 2, a. 3, quaes. 3.
[91] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1.
[92] *Ibid.*, q. 157, a. 2, ad 2.
[93] *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 2.
[94] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 105, a. 2.
[95] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3.
[96] *Ibid.*, a. 1; *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 12, a. 1.
[97] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 108, a. 3.

any attempt to strengthen rational living are just anger and righteous indignation. These sturdy qualities have lost caste under the deluge of sentimentalism engulfing us today. One kind of anger must be suppressed; it is vicious anger that has escaped the control of reason [98] and which results in reprehensible hatred.[99] To this kind of anger is opposed the virtue of meekness.[100] There is another kind of anger which is honorable, anger inspired by zeal (*ira per zelum*),[101] and which counteracts the vice of cowardly and unjust pardon.[102] It is this just anger, with which righteous indignation is associated, which needs exaltation and defense today.

Just anger is correlative with vindictive justice [103] and an angry deed has a threefold relation. Directly and essentially it seeks redress; antecedently it is a manifestation of grief; consequently it involves delight over the punishment merited and inflicted.[104] In all of these relations anger remains just if it remains under the control of reason.[105] Reason is usually operative at least in making known the injury that should be avenged, though frequently reason loses control when vindication is begun.[106] One reason for this is that the physical reverberations of anger often impair the correct use of reason.[107] It is interesting to recall some of the explanations of the interplay of anger with other emotions and virtues given by St. Thomas. These reflections are important in view of the contemporary eclipse of just anger today.

Three important elements or causes of just anger are sadness, daring, and hope.[108] This is why just anger is not usually manifested toward persons in dominating position; [109] one or more of those elements is missing. Grief may be present but

[98] *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 12, a. 1.
[99] *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 3, ad 3.
[100] *In Ps.* xxxvi.
[101] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 158, a. 1.
[102] *Ibid.*, a. 8; *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 12, a. 5, ad 3.
[103] *III Sent.*, d. XV, q. 2, a. 2.
[104] *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7.
[105] *Ibid.*, q. 12, a. 1, ad 2.
[106] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 46, a. 4, ad 3.
[107] *Ibid.*, q. 48, a. 3, ad 1.
[108] *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 12, a. 3, ad 10.
[109] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 26, a. 5, ad 3.

the hope and the courage to render punishment are absent.[110] These elements of anger also account for the fact that the perfidy of false friends arouses very deep anger; [111] the Japanese should be kept informed about this. They might also be made aware of the fact that anger does not cause but rather follows the destruction of love.[112] If anger be kept alive by the vivid memory of the injury done,[113] then our enemies should be deeply detested and our people must be confronted constantly with the slogan, "Remember Pearl Harbor." There are some to whom anger under any guise or under any control is undignified. For this reason it must be kept in mind that while just anger desires to inflict evil on another it operates in the name of vindictive justice.[114] Hatred, on the other hand, wishes evil for the sake of evil, and envy wishes evil for the sake of one's own glory.[115] Anger is not found in those who have low-grade intelligence and poor memories, and who are therefore slow to realize, to anticipate, or to remember injuries.[116] What has been said about just anger controlled by reason applies also to righteous indignation which is one of the phases or *filiae* of anger.[117]

Another virtue which needs rehabilitation in national and international relations is virtuous disdain and hatred of crime, even though one is compelled to cherish a degree of charity for criminals themselves. The contemporary tendency is to declare truce with crime or to condone it because of sympathy for or admiration of the wicked. There is a tendency to gloss over the intrinsic viciousness of atheistic communism because of admiration of the successful winter defense of their country put up by the citizens of Russia. There is a tendency to forget the perfidious treason of the Japanese in the admiration of their successful bombings and invasions. There is a tendency among some to condone the ruthless injustice of the Nazis because of respect for their military might. There is too little openly

[110] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 25, a. 3.
[111] *Ibid.*, q. 47, a. 4, ad 3.
[112] *III Sent.*, d. XXVII, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4.
[113] *Ibid.*, d. XXVI, q. 1, a. 2.
[114] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2.
[115] *Ibid.*, q. 46, a. 6.
[116] *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 3.
[117] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 41, a. 2.

expressed contempt of injustice, lies, arrogant pride, and other vicious sins. No just anger can be aroused for the prosecution of a successful war unless there burn in the hearts of the United Nations a love of human rights and a contempt of the crimes which have violated them. No permanent order can be established where the United Nations cherish a secret love for the vices which have made the Axis powers temporarily successful. The American people have been noble in basing their patriotism on the love of their own nation and its freedoms rather than on the hatred of other governments and their peoples. The Axis powers are less fortunate in selecting class, race, and national hatreds as the motives for love of country. But America will lose none of its nobility, and will conserve its dignity in promoting among our people a hatred of current international vices. Such hatred of vice is not incompatible with the love of enemies demanded by Christian living.

Hatred is a repugnance of the will to something that has been apprehended as unbecoming.[118] As a person (*quoad naturam*) an enemy may not be hated but the defect in him which is sin must be hated.[119] Everything like sin interfering with genuine happiness should be detested, whether it exists in friend or enemy.[120] Even God hates sinners in the sense that He withholds eternal happiness from them.[121] Even saintly people may wish evil to those whom they love in charity, for their correction, for the common good, and for the justice of God.[122] Sinners may be loved only because of their humanity and in spite of their crimes which one must hate.[123] The evil, the sin, or the crime in friend or foe may not be loved.[124]

Incidental perhaps to the logic of this situation but not irrelevant is the hatred of Americans evidenced especially by the Japanese. Recent writers, after years of observation, trace this hatred to long years of jingoistic Japanese effort to trade on Oriental "face." Natural envy of our nobility and success

[118] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 29, a. 1.
[119] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 25, a. 6.
[120] *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 7, ad 1.
[121] *Ibid.*, I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 4.
[122] *De Virt.*, q. 2, a. 8, ad 10.
[123] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 25, a. 6.
[124] *Ibid.*, a. 8, ad 3.

as a nation has been lashed into a fury. Aquinas thought that hatred differs from anger in that hatred desires infinite punishment,[125] that it is more universal,[126] that it is more insane and more permanent,[127] and that it is less merciful.[128] The Japanese, along with the Nazis, had and still have delusions of grandeur which respected justice nowhere and based right on might. We of Western and Christian civilization could not recognize them in the importance they thought they were fated to enjoy. They became more angry whether we ignored them or whether we thwarted them. Forgetfulness and opposition to another's will provoke wrath in so far as they are signs of contempt.[129] Anger grew into hatred [130] which was what the jingoistic party in Japan desired. Their hatred is not necessarily, as some of the softer Americans would have us believe, an indication of basic faults in our own nation. Vicious men usually hate the saints because of dissimilarity, because of envy, and because they dislike the rebuke which living virtue always offers to vicious men.[131] Even God is hated not because of Himself but because some of the effects of His government are not acceptable to some individuals and nations.[132] While American democracy is neither saintly nor divine, it has enough superior qualities to make the totalitarian Axis powers feel inferior. It must be emphasized that American purity of intention and nobility will depend in no small degree on its ability to hate the vices against the consequences of which in the Axis powers it is warring.

V. Militant and Gentilitarian Vices

Other rugged virtues essential to the sovereignty of justice, truth, and charity might be introduced and analyzed from the works of the Angelic Doctor. But further elaboration of these rugged and rational qualities is not necessary since his attitudes

[125] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 46, a. 6.
[126] *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.
[127] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 46, a. 6, ad 3.
[128] *Ibid.*, ad 1.
[129] *Ibid.*, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3.
[130] *Ibid.*, q. 46, a. 3, ad 3.
[131] *In Joann.*, xv, lect. 4.
[132] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 13, a. 4; I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 5.

toward vindictive justice, just anger, righteous indignation, and virtuous contempt of crime are typical. It is advisable, however, to present in rapid survey some observations about a few detestable vices which soft Christians have begun to look upon as desirable qualities of civilized persons. These counterfeit virtues can be bracketed by way of introduction with vices that are genuinely degrading. Most of these have been referred to in the course of this presentation.

One must not conclude, because of St. Thomas' insistence on justice, that he can be drafted as a protagonist of savagery, cruelty, or unreasonable anger. He decries as sinful cruelty or excessive punishment of the guilty, and says that savagery is bestial.[133] But the inflexibility demanded by right reason in the infliction of punishment is a virtue called severity [134] which is a part of legal justice.[135] The gentle virtues of clemency and meekness do not restrict severity.[136] They prevent despicable cruelty, savagery, and ferocity,[137] and eradicate sinful anger.[138] Clemency is gentleness of a superior to an inferior reasonably moderating the external act of punishment, while meekness controls the passion of anger from which punitive action proceeds.[139] Ferocity is reprehensible; it is not mollified by gifts; it does not bend before mercy; it refuses mercy even to sucklings, and does not spare the young and defenseless.[140] Mercilessness withdraws benefits and is not a stranger to cruelty or excessive punishment.[141] Inhumanity is cold hard-heartedness to the suffering, and stubborn refusal to help. It is a pet vice of the avaricious.[142] Complete Christian living demands that these bestial qualities of ferocity, cruelty, savagery, mercilessness, and sinful anger be neutralized by the virtues of clemency, mildness, meekness, and mercy. But complete Christian living demands also that these gentle virtues be kept from going to extremes of mildness by truth, justice, vindication, and severity.

[133] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 157, a. 1, ad 2.
[134] *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 1; q. 159, a. 2, ad 2.
[135] *Ibid.*, q. 157, a. 1, ad 2.
[136] *III Sent.*, d. XXVI, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4.
[137] *Summa Theol.*, q. 157, a. 1, ad 3.
[138] *Ibid.*, q. 158, a. 8.
[139] *Ibid.*, q. 157, a. 1.
[140] *In Is.*, xiii.
[141] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 159, a. 1, ad 2.
[142] *Ibid.*, q. 118, a. 8.

An example of this latter correlation is given by Aquinas when he says that vindictiveness is a mean between the vices of cruelity and remissness in punishment, one vice an excess and the other a defect.[143] Again in analyzing meekness he shows that it stands midway between anger which is just and anger which is unreasonable.[144] Also, excess in inflicting punishment is injustice, the savagery of soul that inspires such excess is cruelty; [145] ordinate infliction of punishment is virtuous vindictiveness, and failure to impose just punishment introduces the vices of injustice, criminal pardon, and others.[146]

It is evident that viciousness can be incurred both by an excess of gentleness and by the defect of it. This excessive gentleness takes many forms and is thrown into opposition to several virtues. One of the commonest forms of contemporary overgentleness is *mollities*, sometimes called softness and effeminacy. With it is closely associated delicacy, a kindred vice.[147] Softness and delicacy are vices opposed to perseverance, and they emerge either from natural disposition or from custom.[148] This flabbiness of spirit recoils from sustained effort because of the lack of pleasure.[149] A " softy " refrains from doing even good and necessary works because of difficulties he cannot endure.[150] The fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure. A " softy " is so accustomed to enjoy pleasures that it is difficult for him to endure the lack of them. The " softy " avoids vindictive punishment and other unpleasant duties because they are toilsome and unenjoyable. Softness is not only opposed to perseverance,[151] but it is also a species of luxury and is often a consequence of carnal delectation that softens the spirit and destroys manliness.[152] It is opposed to perseverance because this virtue urges one to sustained laborious work.[153] There may be a close connection in the United States between the increase of softness and the decrease of pioneer regard for

[143] *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3.
[144] *II Sent.*, d. XLIV, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.
[145] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 159, a. 1, ad 1.
[146] *Ibid.*, q. 108, a. 2, ad 2.
[147] *Ibid.*, q. 138, a. 1, ad 2.
[148] *Ibid.*, a. 1.
[149] *Ibid.*, ad 2.
[150] *Ibid.*, ad 1.
[151] *Loc. cit.*
[152] *Ibid.*, q. 154, a. 11.
[153] *Ibid.*, q. 137, a. 1.

rigid control in matters of food, drink, and sex, all superinduced by the widespread collapse of religion.

The overgentleness of so many of our citizens and of their religious leaders cannot be divorced from a defect of courage. Courage is firmness or toughness of spirit, especially in the face of danger.[154] It seeks to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following reason,[155] and stands midway between fear and daring.[156] While the virtue of courage is spiritual, it is advanced in war time by several other conditions like health, strength, an abundance of food, determination of spirit, and experience in war.[157] Real meekness and humility are the results of the same courage [158] which in just circumstances produces endurance of hardships and vigorous action against difficulties.[159] This courage shows itself in a disregard for the danger of death in war,[160] and thus connects with justice.[161] The courageous man is not rash, because he knows when, where, and of what he ought to be reasonably fearful.[162] He knows how to call moderate and virtuous anger into the service of courage.[163] It ought to be a consolation to our men in the service that they have St. Thomas Aquinas on their side in their indignant determination to avenge the atrocities of the Axis powers despite the dangers entailed. Their tough and rational courage will probably inspire some of our soft civilians to desert their fears,[164] to shake off their despair of winning this war,[165] and to quit dodging the difficulties of war and the benefits of peace that will follow.[166] The nonresistance, the overgentleness, the sentimental appeasement, the emotional dread of even rational disdain are too often the manifestations of a timidity that is more wicked than the wickedness of war.[167]

With the vices of softness, delicacy, and timidity, contemporary "gentilitarians" try to glorify into virtues the vices of

[154] *Ibid.*, q. 123, a. 2.
[155] *Ibid.*, a. 3.
[156] *Ibid.*, a. 2.
[157] *In Is.*, iii.
[158] *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.
[159] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 3.
[160] *Ibid.*, a. 5.
[161] *III Sent.*, d. IX, q. 1, quaes. 1.
[162] *De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 13, ad 5.
[163] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 10.
[164] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 41, a. 4.
[165] *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 3.
[166] *In Rom.*, viii, lect. 3.
[167] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 142, a. 2.

insensibility and unjust pardon. Insensibility is a dullness and inanition which, against the dictates of reason, neglects necessary things of life.[168] Unjust pardon (*remissio*), another attempted escape from reason and from the arduous and unpleasant, is the assassin of vindictive justice.[169] The insensible person is so blasé and impervious to pleasure that he cannot be decoyed into the fulfillment of ordinary duty by the allurement of the pleasure which God and nature hold out. Struggle for justice gives no pleasure. Anticipation of victory gives no pleasure. Nothing gives pleasure. Nothing is done. Only blind and dull submission to the " wave of the future " is possible. The unjust pardoner will forgive anything, whether justice, truth, and charity allow it or not. It is, at least for the present, the easiest way out of personal inconvenience. These counterfeit virtues are really vices in disguise, and all the popularity they enjoy among partial Christians cannot condone the damage they have done both to Christianity and to social order in the United States. There can be no real social order where there is apostasy from right and sound reason. These species of " gentilitarianism " enslave reason.

VI. Double Standard Difficulties

Other problems of procedure with our enemies have emerged out of the war, and will need to be decided before peace negotiations are begun. They might be named the problems of the double standards. They are represented in the patent conflict between the ethical standards for international relations articulated by Pope Pius XII—akin to the aims of real democracies—and the standards preached and practiced by totalitarian ideologies of the Axis powers. These problems are ultimately reducible to the fact that real democracy is theistic and totalitarianism is godless. The liberties of American democracy have an affinity with the basic teachings of Christianity; the tenets of totalitarianism are pagan. The peace program of the Pope is based on love, trust, God-given rights, wide ownership,

[168] *Ibid.*, a. 1.

[169] *Ibid.*, q. 159, a. 2, ad 3.

and sacrifice. The objectives of the totalitarian powers are wrapped in hatred, suspicion, state worship, state ownership, and selfishness. Standards of life and conduct are so diametrically opposed that the problems of double standard are tremendous. There will be little hope, after the victory of the United Nations, of winning the Axis governments over to democratic and Christian standards. The United Nations will have to destroy these governments and deal with the representatives of the people in whom there is left some regard for the worth of individual persons and some respect for the rights of God. On the part of the representatives of the United Nations this will call for a principled severity that must not be vitiated by "gentilitarianism." Otherwise there can be no sanctions sufficiently respected to guarantee the observance of natural and international law. Furthermore, Christian gentility will always be looked upon by pagan diplomats and military men as weakness. They will appreciate and respect only the sterner and more rugged virtues sanctioned by Christianity. Christian principles of kindness in competition with power politics have usually suffered at least temporary defeat, just as sincerely Christian business men often take a beating when they are in competition with unprincipled and godless business rivals. At the peace table, the severity of justice will make reasonable the memory that our enemies have declared total war, with all their resources and against all of ours. Civilian population of the Axis powers seem to have been drafted, more or less willingly, to such a totalitarian conflict. Civilian populations of Poland, Holland, Russia, and other conquered countries know that they have been decimated like front-line combatants. Savage reprisals on Axis civilians are forms of cruelty to be eschewed. But medicinal punishment for them will be necessary to convince them that there are laws for nations that are sacred and that totalitarian governments can never again be permitted to exist by the consent, explicit or implicit, of the people. Christian charity, justice, truth, and the continued peace of the world demands severity with peoples as well as with the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Japanese leaders.

VII. Conclusion

The sentimental protest of partial Christianity against the virile virtues is repugnant to the teachings of the Angelic Doctor. Thomas Aquinas with his cosmic philosophy of reality and with his complete synthesis of revealed and philosophical truth is most likely to be right. His realism supports his idealism and his practicality neglects no phase of life. His continued value to public life rests on his refusal to desert reason and intelligence. His loyalty to the intelligence of man and the Omniscience of God will be a bulwark of protection against totalitarianism, latitudinarianism, and " gentilitarianism."

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THE CHARACTERS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC

CLASSICAL logic involves a doctrine as well as a technique. Both are intimately associated because the processes of thought organize themselves ultimately on the strength of their correspondence with the deeper fabric of reality. To be sure, the mind can well go beyond the presentations of consciousness, and build logical patterns of its own which may or may not have a counterpart in new experiences. Yet, the fact remains that, in the last resort, the potential must be justified in terms of the actual, and this may be considered as the basic motivation of the Aristotelian logic. On the other hand, modern logic, as expounded by scientific positivism especially, endeavors to explain the real in terms of the possible. From this angle, which stresses exclusively the formal aspect of science, it is natural that Aristotle's logic should appear as a restricted portion of the vast field which is now known as mathematical logic; and the more so, as it is casually maintained that Aristotle built his logic with his biological and linguistic intuitions at the expense of any mathematical inspiration.

These considerations, however, have value only as consequences of the nominalistic principles which have been arbitrarily monopolizing the evaluation of modern logic. A truer alternative is offered by a combined interpretation of Aristotle's logical technique and ontological doctrine. Hence, the purpose of this essay is to show the real characters of the Aristotelian logic, to emphasize the mathematical aspect of its general background, and to estimate its importance with regard to the recent developments of the science of thought.

I. The Origin of Logic

The idea of necessity, which Plato tried unsuccessfully to impose in his own way on the universe of being, was rediscovered by Aristotle in the concrete world and in the realm of thought separately. In endeavoring to systematize the conditions of this parallelism between being and thought, which the Eleatics had already noticed, Aristotle opened the way to the establishment of logic as a science. In this respect, he well deserves the compliment he paid himself for having created a new science, when he said, without disparagement of others, that the subjects treated in the *Topics* had never before received any scientific discussion.[1]

One can hardly say that a ready-made science of logic came out of Aristotle's mind, as many elements of his system are found in earlier writers. But it is also unfair to consider Aristotle as a mere compiler or systematizer of what had been worked out before in this field.[2] In fact, no complete logical system is to be found in any of his predecessors, although their discussions about mathematics and language have distinct logical implications and prove that they were actively interested in the formal problem of the structure of deductive science.

Plato was aware, of course, of the postulational character of mathematics, which he could not call real knowledge so long as its assumptions were left unexamined.[3] But, though he considered the possibility and the necessity of a higher and more rigorous science, he was able only to describe the aims of dialectic, without establishing it as an independent science. Thinking and reasoning correctly are so natural to the mind, that it seemed scarcely necessary to exteriorize into cold rules the behavior of what we all enjoy as a natural gift. Hence Plato went no further than proposing the gradual mathematization of knowledge as the ultimate practical rule for the rationalization of things [4] and of our knowledge of reality.

[1] *Sophistical Refutations*, 183b 34

[2] Cf. Enriques, *The Historic Development of Logic*, p. 4.

[3] *Republic*, VII, 533 C.

[4] The reduction of pure mathematics to absolute deduction remained but an

It is true, however, that Plato gave in his writings important hints of the later logic, but there is no justification in supplying a science of pure thought by inferences from his own methods, or by a combination of his incidental logical references. As Zeller says, " though we cannot but recognize in Plato essential elements of the Aristotelian logic, it would be a mistake to force these out of their original connection in order to construct from them a Platonic logic on a later model." [5]

Aristotle succeeded where Plato had failed. The supreme science which the dialectic could not establish took shape in the Aristotelian *analytics*. This theory of reasoning was developed in the work forming the *Organon*, which dominated Western thought for more than two thousand years, although its influence on Aristotle's successors was less exclusive than is commonly believed. In its spirit and presentation, it was an entirely new science. Indeed, the Stagirite alone was responsible for the ultimate systematization of the momentous implications of the critical work of the mathematicians and philosophers about the nature and structure of mathematics and language. Moreover, as a result of his own reflections about biology, he integrated into that formal systematization some of the structural characteristics and fundamental implications of that science. These multiple elements of the *Organon* can be shown by developing the implications of the scientific aspects of Aristotelianism.

It is obvious that of all the sciences known at that time mathematics alone could show a sufficient degree of abstraction, accuracy, and systematization, and produce a system of relationships carrying necessity with them. Because of these characteristics of mathematics, the Pythagoreans and the Platonists had already used it extensively in the development of their doctrines. The rational necessity of mathematics became more prominent after the days of Hippocrates, when treatises began to be written on its *elements*, and when certain theories like the

aspiration in Plato's philosophy. After two thousand years, the same ideal has been adopted and worked out more technically, though without a final conclusion, by the founders of mathematical logic.

[5] *Plato and the Older Academy* (Eng. trans. 1876), p. 210.

irrationals were made the object of a profound critical elaboration by various thinkers. As a member of the Academy, Aristotle must have been impressed from the first by the formal perfection of mathematics.

There is an interesting passage in the *Posterior Analytics* which indicates that mathematics was considered, until then, as the practical organon of the thinking mind. Discussing the difference between fact and reasoned fact, Aristotle says: " It is the business of the empirical observers to know the fact, of the mathematicians to know the reasoned fact; for the latter are in possession of the demonstrations giving the causes, and are often ignorant of the fact, just as we have often a clear insight into a universal, but through lack of observation are ignorant of some of its particular instances. These connections have a perceptible existence though they are manifestations of form. For the mathematical sciences concern forms; they do not demonstrate properties of a substratum since, even though the geometrical subjects are predicable as properties of a perceptible substratum, it is not as thus predicable that the mathematician demonstrates properties of them." [6]

The mathematical inspiration of the *Organon* is noticeable in some of its terminology. In the *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle uses the words σχῆμα (scheme, pattern) for the figure of a syllogism, διάστημα (distance) for the proposition, and ὅρος (boundary) for the term. It is not unlikely that he represented geometrically each figure of the syllogism, by using lines for propositions and points for terms. We are reminded further by Ross, that " the terminology is borrowed not from geometry in general, but from the theory of proportion. Not only σχῆμα, διάστημα, ὅρος, but also ἄκρον and μέσον were technical terms in this theory." [7] It may be suggested even that Aristotle thought of the premises in the different figures somewhat on the very general analogy of the various proportions.

For Aristotle, however, the compelling force of a mathematical argument had to be sought beyond its structural

[6] *Posterior Analytics*, 79ª 2-10.

[7] Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 33.

presentation. Relations alone could not justify the necessity of a conclusion; for they are accidents by themselves and indifferent as such to a determined result. This necessity had to be rooted in something more fundamental and substantial than relations, namely, in their very terms and ultimately in the objects of the external world which account for them.

Recognition of this basic importance of terms is implied in the reasons given by Aristotle for the logical excellence of mathematics over dialectic. A mathematical argument is rarely weakened by formal fallacies, because its middle term can be seen, so to speak, with an "intellectual vision," while in dialectic the ambiguity may escape detection; it is more usually in the middle term of an argument that the ambiguity lies, since the major is predicated of the whole of the middle, and the middle of the whole of the minor.[8] Moreover, mathematics takes definitions, but never accidents, for its premises; such is not always the case with dialectic.[9]

Hence, we have to turn to the Aristotelian theory of the universal for an explanation of the necessity which characterizes formal arguments. We have seen that Plato and Aristotle recognized the scientific value of the concept. But of course, their metaphysical standpoints are different; whereas Plato justifies the universals through their participation in the world of ideas as the only realities, Aristotle places their real foundation in the concrete world. The Aristotelian universal is found materially in the individual objects of experience, but it exists formally in the mind. Yet, its essence and properties do not result from any operation of the mind, but from the very reality of the particulars in which it is buried. As we have seen, it was the analysis of concrete things which brought to light the relative necessity of the characters of the universal, and which stressed the logical importance of the notions of species and genus embodying the universal.

Moreover, the necessity which connotes the essence of universals, conditions the processes of the mind as well as the

[8] *Posterior Analytics*, 77[b] 27-33. [9] *Ibid.*, 78[a] 10.

ultimate laws of thought.[10] Thus, judgments are really explications of the analysis of universals. They are not arbitrary constructions of the mind; but they are justified ultimately by the factual relations of the essential characters of the individuals embodying the universals under consideration. On the other hand, the principles of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, express the relations which result from the confrontation of being with itself. As they emerge immediately from the contemplation of being as such, they are perceived by an intellectual intuition which is immediate in its operations and results.

The necessity which is involved in the universals and in the laws of thought, is enshrined in the fundamental forms of language, which is the only means of communicating knowledge. All the sciences, whether theoretical, practical or productive, have to be expressed in language. It is natural, therefore, that the analysis of language should provide a clue to the establishment of a science of pure thought. This expectation is the more justified when one takes into account the confusion which the Sophists had introduced into the realm of thought by their abuse of rhetoric and their deliberate use of fallacious arguments.

The Greeks in general, with their quick wit and ready tongues, were fond of playing upon the words they used. It appears that Heraclitus was aware of the importance of linguistic expression; and that his followers and those of Anaxagoras had developed into arbitrary etymologies the principle that everything has its natural name from which its nature can be known. But it is the controversies of the Sophists which led to a closer study of the forms of speech and of their relation to thought. The subtlety of some of their arguments, like the double dilemma which marked the dispute between Protagoras and his pupil Euathlus, gives an indication of the depth of their linguistic analysis, and of the confusion which could result for thought. In this connection, it is significant to mention the

[10] Chevalier, *La Notion du Nécessaire chez Aristote.*

anti-mathematical discussion broached by the Sophists Protagoras [11] and Antiphon,[12] who defended the empirical character of geometrical concepts. Of the same period are the inquiries of the Eleatics and their controversy with the Sophists, which manifested itself outwardly in the field of linguistics, though it reached deeper into substantial reality. Zeno's arguments could not be disentangled by rhetoric; they had to be ignored by the mathematicians, who developed their methods in spite of the alleged logical blind alley into which they seemed to lead.[13] Yet, there ought to be no essential discrepancy between language and mathematics, if both are manifestations of reason. In fact, the analogy between the form of mathematics and the structure of language pointed to a deeper element of certainty, namely, the concept, common to both. After the discovery of this common factor by Socrates, Greek thought was dominated by the philosophy of concept, and the problem of the relation of language and thought could look to a more constructive solution.

The first steps were taken by Plato who acknowledged the close affinity between speech and thought.[14] He maintained that language is not an arbitrary production of man, and that the purpose of names is to provide us with a picture of the essence of the things they represent. But he reminds us that a picture never reproduces completely its subject, and that the makers of words may have made mistakes affecting the whole language. This may account for the arbitrary formation of certain words, and why most of them do not represent the same view of the world. Hence, we must turn our attention to the things themselves rather than to names, and we must acknowledge the superiority of dialectic which decides on the correctness or incorrectness of the words. It is interesting to note, however, that although Plato claimed that philosophy

[11] Aristotle, *Met.* II, 2 (20).

[12] Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (Diels, B. 13).

[13] It seems that Democritus also investigated the problem of verbal expression (Laertius, IX, 48), and the Antisthenes the Cynic wrote on names and language.

[14] Cf. *Cratylus*, 385 D—390 E; and 422 C—440 E.

should go its own way independently of philology, few literary productions can match the beauty of his Dialogues.

At the time of Aristotle then, the Greek language had already achieved its literary perfection. Most of the poets and writers had given their best to the world; for over one hundred years, Greek was being improved, analyzed, and firmly established in its grammatical, linguistic, and logical aspects. Thus, the founder of the Lyceum had all the required elements for writing his two didactic treatises on *Rhetoric* and on *Poetical Art*. There is little doubt, therefore, that his linguistic interests formed a major source of inspiration for the elaboration of his logical doctrines.

The structure of a Greek sentence is always centered grammatically and logically around the subject. The orientation of the various elements of a proposition is always towards the subject. From its central position, the subject keeps together the attributes, and conditions the proposition as the expression of one or more of its various implications. In fact, a proposition unveils the internal structure of the subject, for the predicate sheds light on the subject by manifesting itself. In the Aristotelian terminology, the words ἀπόφανσις (proposition), κατάφασις (affirmation), and ἀπόφασις (negation), are obviously related to φάος (light), and illustrate the parallelism between the world of experience and the operations of the mind.[15] Truth emerges from this illumination which manifests the ontological participation of certain attributes to the subject under consideration. This ontological participation becomes a logical subsumption in the operational development of an argument, as expressed by a series of transformations from one proposition into another. Such a sequence has its parallel in the hierarchy of predicates, which exemplifies the structural order of the universe.

The linguistic transformations which characterize the processes of thought, are not tautological elaborations of sets of notions and postulates arbitrarily stated as primitive. They

[15] These views are discussed and developed in the remarkable study of D. J. Garcia, *L'Interprétation Historique de la Logique* (Paris, 1940).

result from the analysis and synthesis of concepts which allow the mutual predicability of their elements. It is the verb *to be* which manifests these operations and the generation of each subsequent proposition from the preceding or the initial data. Consequently, the Greeks could scarcely think of a calculus of unanalyzed propositions as in modern symbolic logic; the propositional operations visualized by Aristotle had to be explicit in character, so as to display the paramount importance of the universal.

The operational explication of the processes of thought was confirmed, for Aristotle, by every branch of knowledge. The statements used by the practical and the productive sciences express transformations of materials, or of given situations, with the purpose of exhibiting their participation to the good and the useful. Biological statements are transformations illustrating the hierarchical connections of the organisms. Physical explanations are transformations tending to show how any object of experience embodies the elements. Mathematical operations are transformations exhibiting the various implications of the terms involved. Metaphysical statements also involve transformations, in so far as they illuminate more and more the complex denotation of being and its various manifestations according to their causal development.

In every science, therefore, all thought processes tend to make plain the mutual relations of concepts and their successive participation in the various aspects of being, according to their degree of universality. Hence, all patterns of thinking as such must be fundamentally identical, when considered independently of the subject-matter. From this angle, even demonstrative and persuasive reasoning are alike, though the former deals with necessary sequences, while the latter involves contingent elements. In fact, reasoning consists of a series of propositions obeying the principle of contradiction individually and collectively. Each one of them expresses the attribution to a subject of a compatible property which is either necessary or contingent. In the same argument, these propositions are linked together on the strength of the relations between their terms.

This technique is performed in the dialectical method, which leaves to thought its alertness and its freedom of movement. But it becomes fully articulate and conscious in the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. This explains why the syllogism was not used formally by pre-Aristotelian mathematicians; and why it was universally adopted by mathematical writers after its discovery.

It is important to remember, however, that the description and codification of the processes of thought must not blur or screen their dynamic character. For unless thought displays its dynamism, it becomes tautological, unprogressive, and liable to error. Thought must go forward or perish. By considering it as static in its various stages, the Sophists opened the road to metaphysical relativism. At the time, no theory could check their abuse of loose meanings dressed up in strict grammatical forms. Heracliteanism favored that instability of meanings, while Eleaticism could do no more than point out the contradictions resulting from it. With the philosophy of the concept, however, Aristotle was able to preserve the dynamic quality of thought, and to account at the same time for all mutations, predications, relations, and propositional connections. Moreover, Aristotle did not consider the science of pure thought as a study of words, but as a study of the thought signified by words. It considers thought with reference to its success or failure in attaining truth, and not with regard to its natural history. It is concerned with thought as apprehending, and not as constituting, the nature of things.

These are the differences between logic, on one hand, and grammar, psychology, and metaphysics, on the other. Yet logic is not a substantive science; it is a part of a general propaedeutic to the study of any science, which alone indicates what kinds of propositions require proof, and what sorts of proofs should be required for them.[16] In spite of its formalism, therefore, the Aristotelian logic has a dynamic and progressive character. Hence it would be unfair to suggest that it marked a return to the static view of reasoning. On the contrary, it

[16] *Met.*, 1005[a] 6; *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094[b] 23.

emphasized and improved the value of the Socratic and Platonic methods of reasoning, by making explicit their underlying logical structure.

This discussion indicates that the science of pure thought has its origin in the explication of the mechanism of mathematical reasoning and of the structure of language, coupled with the analysis of the necessity which connotes the essential relations between universals, considered in intension as concepts or in extension as classes. Aristotle called it *analytic* [17] in so far as it studies the methods of demonstration by which the conditions of the structure of science are derived from its possibility. He does not seem to use generally the term *logic*, though it occurred in the lost work *περὶ λογικῶν ἢ κανών* of Democritus.[18] It has been said also [19] that Aristotle applied the term *logic* to those methods which do not start from principles, and therefore have no demonstrative value. But it rather appears, from the *Topics* and the *Sophistic Elenchi*, that he reserved the Eleatico-Platonic name of *dialectic* for the art of debating about the probable. It is interesting to note in this connection that the word *logic* was used in the sense of dialectic in the time of Cicero. The Stoics called *τὸ λογικόν* the study of questions of discourse, rhetoric, grammar, and logic proper, while the Epicureans used the Democritean word *canonic* to denote rules of method. The term *logic* was first used in the sense of logic proper by Alexander of Aphrodisias who applied to it the word *organon* or instrument. The collection of Aristotle's logical works has been referred to as the *Organon* since the sixth century.

Aristotle gave the name of *analytics* to the science of pure thought, because it deals primarily with the analysis of arguments into the figures of the syllogism; [20] and it may be added, because this operation presupposes the analysis of the syllogism into propositions, and of the proposition into terms. The elementary theory of the term and of the proposition is estab-

[17] *Rhetoric*, 1359[b] 10.
[18] Diels, *Vors.* A. 33, B. 10, p. . .
[19] Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (1855), Vol. I, pp. 116, 336.
[20] *Prior Analytics*, 47[a] 4

lished in the first two treatises, the *Categories* and *On Interpretation* respectively, which may be considered as an introduction to the Aristotelian Organon. It may be interesting to mention, in this respect, the significant importance of the doctrine of the predicables. By stressing the function of the genus and the species, and by marking a distinction between the proprium and the accident, it exhibits the biological interests of Aristotle. Further it emphasizes the necessity of an ordered universe with its notion of the definition; the maximum explication of a conception is obtained by identifying it with the combination of its two essential attributes chosen of necessity from among the hierarchy of possible predicables. Finally, it provides a basis for the class-relationships required by the syllogism, and it offers an adequate approach to the modern calculus of classes.

But whatever be the special conditions of scientific knowledge, the mind must be sure of the validity of each step it takes, and this coherence is secured when the rules of the syllogism and demonstration are observed. These basic doctrines of the Aristotelian logic are contained in the next two works, the *Prior Analytics* and the *Posterior Analytics* respectively. The last two treatises of the Organon, the *Tropics* and the *Sophistic Elenchi*, analyze the arguments which may be syllogistically correct, but fail to satisfy one or more of the conditions of scientific thought; in other words, they refer to the art of arguing where it is aimed at the probable.

II. The Value of the Syllogism

The central doctrine of the syllogism is expounded in the *Prior Analytics*. It has been said that, in spite of its name, this treatise was actually written after the *Posterior Analytics*, but the grounds for such a contention are far from being conclusive. Discussing this problem, Ross adduces fresh evidence in favor of the traditional view that the *Prior Analytics* is earlier.[21]

[21] "The Discovery of the Syllogism," *Philosophical Review* (May 1939), pp. 251-272.

He shows that there are more references in the *Posterior* to the *Prior* than the other way round; he submits that the doctrines of the *Posterior* presuppose those of the *Prior* but not conversely; and he refutes the view that the *Posterior Analytics* belongs to an early stage of Aristotle's development in which he was predominantly under his master's influence.

The discovery of the syllogism is entirely due to Aristotle. It is true that the Platonic method of division foreshadowed the Aristotelian process of reasoning from the universal to the particular, but it is precisely the syllogistic link of this progression that is here missing. Aristotle stated clearly this difference of the two methods,[22] when he called the division a powerless syllogism (ὃιον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμὸς), because its conclusion is not necessary. He pointed out that this defect is due to the fact that each step in the progress of the Platonic division postulates an option between two opposite terms, so that the minor term which conditions the conclusion is chosen and accepted without demonstration. On the other hand, the syllogism is "an argument in which, certain things being admitted, something other than these follows of necessity from their essence, without requiring any other elements."[23] This seems to be a considerable improvement of the Platonic method, provided an adequate explanation is given of the subsumption of the minor term to the middle term.

The best illustration of the function and structure of the syllogism is offered by the principle of the first figure, the *dictum de omni et nullo*, which is the basic rule of the various types of syllogisms, as they are always reducible to the first figure. This principle states that "when three terms are so related to one another that the last is included in the middle as in the whole, and the middle is or is not included in the first as in a whole, there is necessarily a perfect syllogism connecting the extremes."[24] This statement involves that the terms of the syllogism are predominantly considered in extension,

[22] *Prior Analytics*, I, 31; *Posterior Analytics*, II, 5.
[23] *Prior Analytics*, 24^b 18.
[24] *Prior Analytics*, 25^b 32.

although their intension is fully operative, in keeping with the Aristotelian theory of the universal and of the proposition. It makes fully explicit the Socratic conception of the essence or universal as the fundamental element of demonstration.[25] The syllogism is justified partly by the formal conditions of its structure, and necessarily by the quiddity of its terms. It manifests the ground of the attribution of this predicate to that subject by means of the middle term which links the two extremes together. In other words, the syllogism facilitates the illumination of a given subject by bringing into relief its various attributes. At the same time, it helps the explication of that subject by making clear its relations with other subjects.

In case the attribution of a predicate to a subject seems to be remote, an adequate number of middle terms may be called upon to actualize the chain of causal relations linking together the two parts of a final conclusion. But even then, such a complex argument (the sorites), can be reduced to a sequence of formal syllogism. Hence, as the ultimate pattern of the discursive explication of a given subject, the syllogism requires three terms only. Moreover, the order of the syllogistic progression is irreversible, because the causal relation between its terms exemplifies the real order of the substantial world. For these reasons, the Aristotelian logic, unlike the modern symbolic logic, cannot countenance any rules permitting the indefinite substitution or mutation of the terms of proposition of an argument, without the strongest qualifications.

Thus the basic form of discursive thought is the syllogism. There is little doubt that Aristotle believed in the congruence of mathematical reasoning with his syllogistic doctrine, for he reduced to the syllogism all the various kinds of arguments.[26] For example, he did not treat the hypothetical proposition and syllogism as separate logical types. He recognized, however, two kinds of conditional arguments: the *reductio ad impossibile*, which assumes that a proposition from whose opposite a false conclusion follows is itself true; and the hypo-

[25] *Met.*, 1078[b] 24.

[26] *Prior Analytics*, 24-27.

thethical argument involving the idea of contingency. He mentioned also the process of reduction proper (ἀπαγωγή), which is more appropriate to mathematics, though it can be used in all sciences, including ethics.[27] This method consists in working back from a given problem to a simpler one whose solution leads to the demonstration of the first, and so on until a problem is reached which can be solved by the knowledge already at hand. The last step in this analysis is the first to be taken in fact. Aristotle realized that the process of reduction, as opposed to deductive exposition, corresponds to the analytical method of discovery and to the method of deliberation in ethics.[28]

Many criticisms have been levelled against the Aristotelian theory of deduction throughout the history of thought. The Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Sceptics, in developing the principles of the Democritean epistemology, took up positions incompatible with the Aristotelian ontologism. In stressing the importance of sensation and the purely formal character of thought, they introduced relativism in the realm of logic, and robbed the syllogism of its actual value and purpose. By exposing the relative elements contained in the criteria of truth, they directed their attacks against the Socratic rationalism, which asserts that we can reach something of the nature of things in themselves. The Sceptics, in particular, denounced the Aristotelian conception of demonstration on the ground that it leads to an infinite regress, and that the uncertainty of sensation, from which all concepts are derived, is communicated also to the understanding.

These doctrines inspired the various nominalistic schools throughout the ages down to the modern Pragmatists and Logical Empiricists. The former maintain that the conclusion which the syllogism purports to prove must be assumed before its premises can be truly stated; hence it cannot be used for imparting new knowledge. The analysis of the pragmatist arguments, which are an elaboration of the Stoic and the

[27] *Prior Analytics*, 25.

[28] *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1112^{b} 20.

Sceptic objections to conceptualism, point to a different doctrine about the nature and value of the universal, so that they can be answered in terms of the Aristotelian theory of the concept.

The Logical Empiricists, pointing to the remarkable development of mathematical logic, flatly deny any possible congruence between the logic of Aristotle and the structure of mathematics; they trace the origin of the rift between the two disciplines to the exclusive subject-predicate pattern of the Aristotelian proposition, which does not cover the variety of relations between the terms of a proposition. It is not proposed here to discuss these positivistic arguments, although their ancestral filiation can be traced back also to the logical controversies of the Stoics and the Sceptics. It may be interesting, however, to show how the Aristotelian logic can, possibly, meet these basic objections.

It is obvious that if Aristotle gave the basic principles of his logic, he did not analyze all the intricate details of the inferential processes and of the various logical problems connected with the science of thought. In particular, he did not develop a logic of relations which should offer a nearer pattern to the structure of mathematics proper. He did not do so, either because the thought did not occur to him, or because the idea of relation was not for him an independent notion, but just another kind of a predicate amenable to the fundamental subject-predicate form. Hence, it should be possible to derive a logic of relations, as well as the various other calculi of modern logic, from the implications of his doctrine.

The solution proposed involves the dissociation of the technique of modern symbolic logic from its positivistic interpretation, and the attempts to explain or integrate this technique within the broad framework of the Aristotelian philosophy properly extended. The basis of this extension is supplied by the analysis of the subject-predicate form interpreted as the ground of the fundamental logical calculi. Indeed, this form may be considered as a unit symbolized by single letters and taken as unanalyzed, thus yielding the calculus of propositions.

It may also be considered generally as the expression of a simple attribution, thus yielding the calculus of propositional functions. Again, it may be considered as expressing relations between classes (and individuals) as in the case of the predicables, thus yielding the calculus of classes. Finally, it may be considered as expressing a relation in general, thus yielding the calculus of relations. Proper adjustments are required to make good this interpretation of the apophanic form, which appears thus to be more fundamental than any other type of relation.

The advantages of this interpretation of the basic elements of modern logic are obvious. The calculi are given a more realistic ground and justified by means of ontological rather than merely pragmatic arguments, and modern logic as a whole is connected smoothly with traditional logic. The unity of thought and knowledge is thus vindicated against the artifical divisions propounded by other systems, and the far-reaching logical and metaphysical intuitions of Aristotle are shown to have in consequence a permanent and universal value.

III. The Structure of Mathematics

Aristotle's views on the structure of mathematics as a science may be gathered mainly from the *Posterior Analytics*, which contains the most important passages relating to mathematics. Although this treatise deals generally with what he had called demonstrative science,[29] most of the illustrations used by Aristotle are mathematical, and suggest that he was inspired by mathematics when laying down the general conditions of science. This does not imply in any way the assimilation of mathematics with science; if the " form " of mathematics exhibits all the characteristics of a science, its " matter," which is ultimately derived by abstraction, and even induction, from the sensible world, limits its object to the consideration of numbers and figures, or of magnitude in general.

The importance of demonstration in the analysis of the structure of mathematics is clearly justified by the fact that

[29] *Prior Analytics*, 24[a] 11.

proof gives a universal value to the knowledge it is applied to. The Pythagoreans raised the study of numbers and figures to the status of a science by showing the necessary connections between the propositions dealing with such objects. Plato improved the technique of mathematics by his method of analysis and synthesis and also by his use of dialectic reasoning. The mathematicians of the Academy and their contemporaries showed what wonderful results could be obtained by these methods. Surely, then, demonstration as such ought to be a subject of inquiry by itself; this is the aim of the *Posterior Analytics*, where Aristotle discusses the features of scientific reasoning in contradistinction to dialectical reasoning.

The relation of the *Prior Analytics*, which deals with the forms common to all reasoning, to the *Posterior Analytics* is that of syllogism to demonstration: "Syllogism should be discussed before demonstration, because syllogism is the more general; the demonstration is a sort of syllogism, but not every syllogism is a demonstration."[30] In fact, demonstration is scientific syllogism, that is, a syllogism which yields true knowledge and not merely opinion.

Faithful to the general inspiration of his method, Aristotle does not describe *a priori* the characteristics of demonstration; but he infers them from the nature of science. Hence, the *Posterior Analytics* may be divided into five principal parts.[31] Aristotle first gives the conditions which must be fulfilled by the premises of any science (I, 1-6). He then infers the properties of demonstration as showing why subjects have certain characteristics (I, 7-34). He next goes on to examine demonstration as a means to the definition of properties (II, 1-10). Then he considers in greater detail various subjects already mentioned in the preceding sections (II, 11-18). Finally, he describes the origin of the immediate propositions from which demonstration begins (II, 19).

As demonstration must yield true knowledge, its premises must be true, indemonstrable, prior to and causes of the con-

[30] *Prior Analytics*, 25^{b} 28.

[31] Cf. J. Zabanella, *Opera Logica* (Venice, 1578).

clusion. They must be true (while those of the syllogism need not be), otherwise the conclusion would not be necessarily true. They must be indemonstrable or immediate, otherwise they could not be first principles, for they ought to be demonstrated: "The necessity of this is obvious; for since we must know the prior premises from which demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end in immediate truth, those truths must be indemonstrable." [32] The premises must be more intelligible than the conclusion and known before it, in as much as when we become aware of them, we perceive their truth more clearly. Finally, they must be causes of the conclusion, in the sense that the facts they state must cause the fact expressed in the conclusion and also that our knowledge of the premises must be the cause of our knowledge of the conclusion.[33]

Aristotle draws an important distinction between formal truth and basic truth. The first is nothing more than self-consistency; [34] while basic truths are those elements in a science the existence of which cannot be proved but must be assumed, as for example, unity and magnitude.[35] Of the basic truths used in the demonstrative sciences, some are particular to each science, and some are common. Analogically, the former are used in relation to the province of the science in question, "for a truth of this kind will have the same force even if not used generally, but applied by the geometer only to magnitudes, or by the arithmetician only to numbers." [36] As examples of particular truths, Aristotle gives the definitions of line and straight.

Common truths are such as "take equals from equals and equals remain," an axiom which Aristotle is fond of quoting. Common truths, common things, common opinions, common axioms, are the names given by Aristotle to the propositions which Euclid calls "common notions" (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*). Hence, Aristotle's explanation of these terms applies to Euclid's axioms also, provided we exclude from them all those with a distinctive

[32] *Posterior Analytics*, 72[b] 20 and 74[b] 5.
[33] *Ibid.*, 71[b] 9.
[34] *Prior Analytics*, 47[a] 8.
[35] *Posterior Analytics*, 76[a] 31.
[36] *Ibid.*, 42.

geometrical character, such as the assumption that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, the parallel-postulate, and the equality of all right angles. As regards the proposition, " Things which coincide when applied to one another are equal," which may be used as a working definition of geometrical equality, it implies the method of superposition for proving equality. However, considering that superposition involves the possibility of motion without deformation, this axiom should be alien to mathematics, which deals with things which do not involve motion.[37] Nevertheless, Euclid could not dispense altogether with the use of superposition, though he certainly disliked this method of proof.

The most fundamental axioms are those basic truths which must be known if one wishes to learn anything at all. They include such universal propositions as the laws of thought, through which all sciences have common relationship one with the other. There are other axioms, however, such that ignorance of them would not constitute a total bar to progress.[38] Though Aristotle does not give a specific example of such axioms, it is fairly certain that he refers to the particular axioms of each science. For example, ignorance of the axioms of quantity is a bar to mathematical knowledge only. In another passage, however,[39] where Aristotle speaks of axioms " such as the law of the excluded middle, the law that the subtraction of equals from equals leaves equal remainders, and other axioms of the same kind," he seems to assimilate the laws of thought with distinctly mathematical axioms. But this casual remark is of little consequence if we take into account the main teaching of Aristotle about the function of axioms in demonstration.

For him, the laws of thought are part of that pre-existent knowledge which is required before the study of any special science. These regulative canons or " common axioms " cannot therefore serve as premises for the proof of all conclusions; by themselves alone they lead to nothing, because they refer only

[37] *Physics*, 198[a] 15. [38] *Posterior Analytics*, 72[a] 15. [39] *Ibid.*, 77[a] 30.

to being as being, while being manifests itself differently in the various sciences. If demonstration is to be possible, it requires the common axioms as well as premises containing the genus and properties of the science to which they refer.[40] The only cases in which the laws of thought are expressly posited as such in demonstration are those in which the conclusion also has to be expressed in that form; [41] and then the proof lays down as its major premise that the major term is truly affirmed but falsely denied of the middle.

The basic truths appropriate to a particular science must refer to the same genus as that of the science, otherwise the conclusion could not be related to them as effect to cause. Consequently it is not permissible to pass from one genus to another even if the axioms which are premises of demonstration be identical in two or more sciences, as in the case of subalternate sciences. Hence the basic truths of mathematics must be axioms referring to being supplemented by a distinctive attribute, that of quantity.

Aristotle goes even further when he draws a distinction between geometrical and arithmetical truths; considering that the genera of these two sciences are different from one another, he disclaims any validity in the proof of geometrical truths by arithmetic.

> In the case of two different genera such as arithmetic and geometry, you cannot apply arithmetical demonstration to the properties of magnitudes unless the magnitudes in question are numbers. Arithmetical demonstration and the other sciences likewise possess, each of them, their own genera. So that, if the demonstration is to pass from one sphere to another, the genus must be the same, either absolutely or to some extent. If this is not so, transference is clearly impossible, because the extreme and the middle terms must be drawn from the same genus. Otherwise as predicated, they will not be essential and they will thus be accidents.[42]

For this reason, it cannot be proved by geometry that opposites fall under one science, or that " the product of two cubes is a cube." This expression does not refer to the duplication of

[40] *Ibid.*, 88[b] 1. [41] *Ibid.*, 77[a] 10. [42] *Ibid.*, 75[b] 4-12.

the cube; it means that the product of two cube numbers is also a cube number.

Because no science is concerned to prove anything outside its own subject-matter, geometry cannot prove of lines any properties which they do not possess as lines, that is, in virtue of the fundamental truths of their particular genus. It cannot show, for example, that the straight line is the most beautiful of lines or the contrary of the circle; these qualities do not belong to lines in virtue of their particular genus, but on account of some property they share with other genera. Therefore, no theorem of any one science in general can be demonstrated by means of another science, unless these theorems are related as subordinate to superior, as for example optical theorems are related to geometry, or harmonic theorems to arithmetic.

This point is emphasized also in a passage where Aristotle says that falsehoods are not all derived from a single identical set of principles; and that these principles are not all inferred from the same basic truths:

> Many of them in fact have basic truths which differ generically and are not transferable; for example, units which are without position, cannot take the place of points which have position. The transferred terms could only fit in as middle terms or as major or minor terms; or else have some of the other terms between them, others outside them.[43]

Hence, there cannot be actually any general mathematical axioms, but only basic truths of arithmetic and basic truths of geometry. Though the expression of particular basic truths of these two sciences might suggest the possibility of more general axioms, these could have no practical value, as their meaning would be ambiguous in view of their reference to different kinds of beings. This may explain, as we shall see, Aristotle's rejection of Antiphon's and of Bryson's methods of squaring the circle, which are based on principles not special to geometry but applicable equally to other subjects. It will be

[43] *Ibid.*, 88a 31.

observed also that Aristotle's distinction between the special axioms of the particular sciences, runs parallel with his view about the classification of the science according to their specific objects.

The other elements of demonstrations besides the axioms or immediately evident propositions, are the definitions and the hypotheses. Definitions are explications of the meaning of terms. They involve assumptions about the existence of genera and their species connoted by the terms. The logical theory of definition is treated in the *Posterior Analytics*, especially in chapters nine, twelve, and thirteen. The definition of a term is obtained by a gradual restriction of the extension of the genus assumed, by means of successive differentiae, until the extension of the term itself is completely circumscribed.

Hypotheses, or postulates, as Euclid called them later, are propositions laid down without proof, though they can be proved, and used without demonstration.[44] These propositions refer explicitly to the terms belonging to each particular science, and state various relationship between such terms. When Aristotle assumes that hypotheses can be proved, he probably means it with reference to knowledge as a whole. Obviously, they cannot be demonstrated within the particular science to which they belong, for otherwise they could be entirely eliminated as elements of demonstration. In other words, hypotheses are only relative and mediate knowledge; in this sense, they differ from the axioms, which are immediately evident.

There are important distinctions between a definition and a hypothesis. When a proposition " asserts either the existence or the non-existence of a subject, it is a hypothesis; when it does not so assert it is a definition." [45] The definition lays something down, as when the arithmetician says that a unit is quantitatively indivisible. To define what is a unit is not the same as to affirm its existence. Definitions require only to be understood, while hypotheses postulate facts on which depend

[44] *Ibid.*, 76[b] 35.

[45] *Ibid.*, 76[b] 35.

the propositions inferred.[46] In the case of arithmetic, the existence of the ideas of unit and magnitude has to be assumed, while the existence of everything else has to be proved. The only things which must be assumed in geometry are points and lines, and all the figures constructed from them, as well as their properties, have to be proved to exist. This procedure was adopted by Euclid, who admits as a proof of existence an actual construction based on accepted principles.

The conventional character of the particular assumptions used in geometrical constructions is clearly indicated by Aristotle. He remarks that such hypotheses should not be considered false, because it is stated that the line which is drawn is a foot longer or straight, when it is actually neither. " The truth is that the geometer does not draw any conclusion from the being of the particular line of which he speaks, but from what his diagrams symbolize." [47] In other words, the geometer never uses his diagrams in order to reason from them; he argues about what they represent, the figures themselves being mere illustrations. Hence, the meaning of " existence " with reference to mathematical objects is independent of their actual symbolical representation. Our knowledge of them is based on existential suppositions having a necessary character, since they are true by themselves. It follows that " demonstration does not refer to external speech, but to the speech of the soul." [48]

These views are closely related to the standard teaching of the Academy; and they illustrate Plato's influence on Aristotle's thought. In fact they are similar to the methodological doctrines expressed in the *Republic* and the *Theaetetus*. Aristotle's appeal to our awareness of the self-evident nature of thought is identical with Plato's belief in the inner sincerity of reason. " Thought is conversation which the soul holds with itself about the things which it examines. . . . Not even in sleep did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of the kind." [49]

[46] *Ibid.*, 72^a 18.
[47] *Ibid.*, 77^a 1. Cf. also *Prior Analytics*, 49^b 35, and *Met.*, 1089^a 20.
[48] *Posterior Analytics*, 76^b 25. [49] *Theaetetus*, 189 C—190.

For Plato, however, self-evident principles are innate in the mind which becomes aware of them through reminiscence, while Aristotle, in rejecting these Platonic views, maintains that the knowledge of these principles is acquired through sensation primarily. It is the unity of experience existing in the soul which makes possible for the mind the apprehension of similarities found in particulars, and their perception as universal elements of thought.[50] With this intellectual vision, the understanding (*διάνοια*) bestows upon its fundamental principles the character of absolute truth. These principles, in turn, are used as elements of demonstration, and help to give to the conclusion of an argument or of a proof the necessity and certainty which characterizes the deductive sciences, or at least that reasonable coherence which makes possible our knowledge in general.

Aristotle would agree with Plato that mathematics and science are a body of deductions from clearly perceived first principles. But he would insist that experience and induction provide many of their elements. Again, he would agree that the method of analytical regression had to be followed by a synthetic progression; but instead of centering this process towards the world of ideas, he would direct it towards concrete reality, and thus stress the parallelism between existence and thought. Finally, he would argue that the ultimate notions obtained by this double discursive method, need not be mathematical in character, as quantity is only an aspect of being.

Consequently, Aristotle had to reject the Platonic view that there is no necessary distinction between mathematics and science, because he had shown that the study of numbers and figures does not unfold the essence of mind and nature, and does not force its results on both. Just like any other branch of knowledge requiring universals, mathematics involves notions which are idealized properties of sensible objects. These notions have not a separate existence, like the Platonic ideas, but they can be isolated by abstraction, so as to provide the matter of

[50] *Posterior Analytics*, II, 15 (5-7).

mathematical demonstration. For Aristotle, then, mathematics is the development of just one aspect of being, namely the category of quantity; and it has been remarkably developed as such by the great scientists of the Alexandrine period, who used extensively the *Organon* in their work. This is so true, that the so-called static character of Greek mathematics is attributed to the influence of the Aristotelian views on quantity and on demonstrative science.

But even the prevalent static character of Greek mathematics encouraged by the Aristotelian doctrines, should not be considered as an outdated conception. Of course, it presents a sharp contrast to the rise of calculus and modern analysis, which display a dynamic character with their legitimate attempt to rationalize change by describing it arithmetically. Yet, more recent tendencies in mathematical theory seem to revive, in a certain way, the Aristotelian dualism between number and the continuum, and the subordination of arithmetic and geometry to the qualitative requirements of the logical doctrine. This is particularly the case with the axiomatic development of projective geometry, of the theory of groups, of the topological systems, and the elaboration of abstract algebras. Indeed, it may be safely said that the characters of the Aristotelian logic, and the inspiration of the peripatetic doctrine, may be used as powerful instruments for the interpretation and justification of many achievements of modern science.

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CHARITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

[*Third Installment*]

IV. CHARITY COMPARED WITH MODERN THEORIES

Before proceeding to a final comparison of the Christian ethic of love of neighbor with modern social "isms," a recapitulation of our progress so far will not be disadvantageous.

In the introductory section we saw that the everlasting quest of man for unity and order is most poignantly and practically expressed in his herculean attempts at the reconstruction of the disordered society in which he lives. Since order requires a certain unity and unity results from a principle, these attempts may be categorized according to the principles which animate them, principles such as those of individualism, classism, statism, racism, natural justice, and lastly, supernatural charity or love of neighbor. This latter, charity, proposed especially in the recent Papal encyclicals on social problems as "the soul of the social order," was explained—its necessity in view of modern chaos in society and the inadequacy of natural justice, its nature as a theological virtue, and its obligation as expressed in the divine precept, "Love thy neighbor." Since an understanding of the order of charity is essential to an appreciation of charity as a principle of social reconstruction (for in its ability to induce order into society lies its social significance) our thesis was formulated in terms of this aspect of charity, and the material divided as follows: first, the order of charity in itself; and secondly, since contrast serves to accentuate understanding, this order in comparison with other contemporary principles of social reconstruction.

The first major consideration was, therefore, the treatment of the order of charity as expounded by the prince of Catholic theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas. The order may be considered in a threefold manner: between God and ourselves, between ourselves and our neighbor, and the order among our

various neighbors. God comes first in the order of charity; He is its source and final end. The self, joined in friendship with God, friendship based on the sharing of eternal happiness, comes next, and then our neighbors, as friends of God and cosharers in eternal felicity. Our neighbors, however, are not all loved equally. For while it is true that all are loved as fellow-pilgrims in the journey to the common eternal home, still there is an hierarchy of preferences to be observed among them. This hierarchy is based on their relation to the principle of charity, the terms of which—the object and the agent—are God and the self. Since God lives, through charity, in the self, and inasmuch as the self refers to God the natural ties of blood and affection that unite him to his various neighbors over and above the supernatural bond of the co-heritage of beatitude, it may be said that the norm for judging of the order of the self's love for others is this: *those who are more closely united to the self—to self not merely as self but to self as united to God—are to be loved more out of charity*. With this as a principle, an order of preferences among neighbors can be established quite in accord with charity, based on the permanence and the intimacy of the unions which bind the neighbors to the self. Some of these relationships were then mentioned in the concluding pages of the second part, and we shall continue our consideration of them after this résumé is completed.

Following the sketch of the order of charity came the review of the historical evolution of modern theories of social reconstruction inasmuch as they are antithetical to that of the Christian ethic, and which, therefore, bring the true doctrine into sharper focus. Peculiarly enough, and yet quite in accord with the dictum of St. Augustine that the world is divided between those who love God even to contempt of self and those who love self even to contempt of God, the unifying characteristic of all the " isms " treated is that of self-interest with various shades and accents. This unholy egoism, which has been christened the " capitalistic spirit," in the sense that it excludes supernatural, extra-economic criteria as effective norms of social conduct, is quite clearly detected in the centuries im-

mediately following upon the high Middle Ages, when the supernatural ethic of love had attained its most perfect societal realization. The factors leading to the breakdown of the Christian unity of civilization and the rejection of the " comprehensive Christian sociological fundamental idea " of love found concrete expression in the Protestant revolt. Through this religious revolution, a great portion of civilized society apostatized from the true faith in God, and with the loss of that faith went the true conception of charity, and with that the whole hierarchic structure of society based on the order of charity. The general course of social history from that time to this is the story of man's efforts to reconstruct society on a new basis.

The primary social heresy was, as has been said, the doctrine of self-interest, often styled " individualistic " or " capitalistic." This is very understandable. If we recall that in the order of charity the fundamental sociological idea, which regulates man's relations with his fellowmen, is the principle that those neighbors are to be loved more who are more closely united to the self as conjoined to God through charity [thou-charity (God plus self),] then it quite logically follows that when, through heresy, faith in God is lost and charity sacrificed, God disappears from the relationship existing between neighbor and self, and then the simple relationship (thou-self) or (thou-self, minus God) is most easily resolved in the interest of crass selfishness.

The historical realization of this transition was effected in the period which may be referred to as " the adolescence of the capitalistic spirit." Under the tutelage of the two great heresiarchs, Calvin and Luther, and their respective theological progeny, and nourished by the commercial revolution and Puritanism, this new individualism grew and waxed strong, until in the time of Adam Smith and the classical school, it boisterously became of age. As it prospered in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and reached its comprehensive expression in Spencer, another current of thought, stemming from the same source, but more

inclined to the organic concept of society, became noticeable. The familialism of Comte, the classism of Marx, the statism of Mussolini and the racism of Hitler are historical progressions in the development of this trend—all trying to resolve the social antimony consequent upon the denial of God and supernatural love of neighbor, and all, though opposing individualism, able only to project human self-love on increasingly larger scales. Instead of the love of neighbor as referable to God [self-charity (thou plus God)], man sought in altruism to love his neighbor in himself (self—thou, minus God). As a result of this, the service of neighbor was made theoretically the ultimate end, to take the place of God, as in extreme collectivism. Yet even this so-called " altruism " was a species of self-love; for it was still man loving man.

After this summary outline of modern theories of social reconstruction, it is necessary to complete the comparison between these and social charity. In the progress of the preceding section, comparisons between the two were made here and there. A more striking contrast can be furnished by, first, delineating the social implications of charity consequent upon its order, thus providing a frame of reference for a second, and more particular comparison in which some pertinent concepts of the separate " isms " will be evaluated. Following this a few observations on the role of social charity in a world largely dominated by these alien ideologists will serve as a concluding section.

An understanding of the application of charity's principle of order among neighbors is more than ample refutation of the " isms " based on class, national, or race interests. Charity does not deny the mutual interests of the working class, the national feeling possessed by fellow-citizens, or the race-consciousness of those of a common blood. Rather it insists that people within these groups love one another more, help one another more,—all in the spirit of a divine, universal love which catches up and supernaturalizes these mutual interests and not, as the ideologists of class and state and race proclaim, independently of and often in opposition to the Christian ethic of love. Their

very exclusion of God as the ultimate principle robs their system of order, and this sacrifice of order brings their mutual interests to chaos instead of fruition.

The doctrine on the order in love of neighbor is a striking challenge to man's free will and his concept of values. Perhaps that is why, in an age of determinism and materialism, an age dating from the " servile will " of Luther and the predestinarianism of Calvin, it is so unpopular. It requires of man that he not simplify into a dogma of self-interest, the struggle between the egoistic and altruistic impulses of individual class, nation, or race. It requires him to weigh spiritual and material values, eternal and temporal, personal and social. It requires of him that he love and aid more those who are more closely united to him, that he distinguish the various types of unions—the *natural* (*carnalis*), arising from the bond of blood, founded in the possessions of life and family, and including parents and children, husband and wife, blood relatives and " in-laws "; the *spiritual*, arising from the bond of religion, founded in spiritual and eternal goods, and embracing members of the Church, of a religious community, the pastor and his people; the *civil*, arising from a political bond, founded in social goods, and existing among citizens, neighbors, fellow-soldiers, benefactor and beneficiaries, etc.; [222] that he regulate his preferences in accordance with the intimacy of these unions in the goods proper to each union, preferring the one closer to the self according to that union and, in goods common to all the unions, preferring those who are, absolutely speaking, more closely united, i. e., the spiritual before civil, the physical before the spiritual.[223] Charity requires of man that in his benefactions he disburse his surplus not only in accordance with the propinquity of the needy, but also in accordance of the degree of their necessity, be it extreme, grave, or common.[224]

Charity is, paradoxically, intensely simple and intensely complex. It is simple as the summit of a giant Gothic cathedral is

[222] Cf. Merkelbach, *Summa Theologiae Moralis*, I, 696.
[223] *Ibid.*, pp. 697-698.
[224] *Ibid.*, 692-693.

simple—aiming all its bulk of masonry with direct oneness to the heavens and God. Like the huge edifice, too, it is extremely complex, of multitudinous parts, great and small, the towering columns and the grinning gargoyles, but all united in worship of the Creator, just as charity directs the acts of all the virtues to God. Too often charity, when proposed as a remedy for the social order, is considered an ineffective, disorganized panacea. It is nothing of the sort. On the contrary, it is the modern "isms" which are, in the long run, ineffective, simply because their principle—individual, class, state, or race interest—is not big or broad enough to accomplish the task at hand. No one who contemplates the delicate hierarchy of social values consequent upon the order of charity can doubt that in its application lies the sociological as well as the eternal salvation of mankind.

Turning now to a more particular comparison of the Christian ethic of love of neighbor with the modern "isms," we shall briefly interpret their essential concepts in the light of charity.

Individualism

The individualistic, or capitalistic, spirit, insofar as it implies a practical denial of supernatural criteria in human life, characterizes, in one way or another, all the modern social "isms," even though communism, statism, and racism sometimes denounce and even deny their parentage. They are children of theological and philosophical individualism, if not of social, political, and economic individualism. The former may be said to have given the general tone to all subsequent social theory; the latter terms are applied more properly to the first particular embodiment of individualist social theory, early liberal individualism. Let us briefly examine each type of individualism in turn.

Theological individualism derives from Protestanism, particularly from Luther and Calvin. Luther's doctrine of private interpretation, justification by faith alone, and the denial of the efficacy of good works, hits directly, of course, at the medieval

ethic of charity, abolishing its theory and its institutions. The dogma, "Be a sinner and sin boldly, but believe more boldly still," is not only theologically false; it is socially anarchic. Calvin's predestinarianism likewise took away from men the true notion of charity, the friendship of God and man, with all the give-and-take of genuine friendship. Salvation was as a business contract, signed and sealed.

This theological determinism soon underwent rationalization through *philosophical individualism* with its denial of free will. Without free will, as Lacordaire [225] was effectively to point out against the spiritual stepsons of the reformers—the rationalists—true love is impossible. Love is based on free will. Its three acts—preference, sacrifice, and union with responsibility—are impossible without free will. With the denial of free will, and consequently, of true love, man had, first of all, no proper basis for choice, an error which leads to an ethereal humanitarianism or a collectivistic love. Sacrifice and devotedness likewise fell by the wayside; self-interest became the dogma of action. Similarly, union of wills and responsibility became outmoded. It was a question of rights and not duties, just as the hate opposed to charity is all getting and no giving. And if the implications of this social dichotomy were not too patent at first, at least the separation between private and social responsibility, individual and public ethics, was a start, a distinction that might well have arisen from the erroneous theory that while all people are loved equally by the interior affection, yet the external manifestations of love vary according to proximity to self.[226]

Social individualism translated this determinism into terms of society. The elemental norm was the Puritan "law of nature," developed by Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, before which man could only let natural forces have free play—*laissez-faire*. Self-love became unsocial without God, and the poor, the beneficiaries of charity, became social outcasts. "A

[225] H. D. Lacordaire, O.P., *Jesus Christ, God, and Man* (London: 1902), pp. 248-252.

[226] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 6.

society which reverences the attainment of riches as the supreme felicity will naturally be disposed to regard the poor as damned in the next world, if only to justify itself for making their life a hell in this." [227]

The jurisprudential aspects of the new theory found expression in parliamentary democracy, the instrument of *political individualism*. It holds that as all men are alike by race and nature, so in like manner all are equal in control of their life; that each one is so far his own master as to be in no sense under the rule of any other individual; that each is free to think on every subject just as he may choose, and to do whatever he may like to do; that no man has any right to rule over other men.[228] This fictitious equality was decidedly alien to the medieval ethic, in which the order of charity posited a hierarchic constitution of society. Love recognizes inequality and reconciles it in the exchange of affection and goods. The equality of political individualism made for social misery and an extreme legalism, of which the Poor Laws [229] were a pertinent and horrible example.

Economic individualism is likewise alien to the true love of neighbor. Its laws of free competition and of supply and demand are but translations of determinism into the mercantilist vocabulary. In the name of *laissez-faire* no labor organization was permitted,[230] no restriction on the accumulation of goods, no social use of wealth through the almsdeeds of charity. These led to the amassing of private property and the attendant evils utterly foreign to the Christian ethic.[231] Bishop von Kettler refers to this " as a mountain of injustice," which rests on property as abused and diverted from its natural and

[227] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 267.

[228] Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Immortale Dei*, Nov. 1, 1885, in *Social Wellsprings* (Milwaukee: 1940), p. 76. This volume contains fourteen Leonine encyclicals in English translation.

[229] Cf. Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-264.

[230] Cf. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Divini Redemptoris*, March 19, 1937.

[231] Cf. the writings of Wm. von Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz, quoted and explained by G. Metlake, *Christian Social Manifesto* (Philadelphia: 1912), pp. 32-46, 152-156, 195-201.

supernatural purpose.[232] The accumulation of extensive private property carried with it a control over money and credit; and it was not long before the theological heresy of faith without works found echo in the economic heresy of credit without wealth. The latest manifestation of economic individualism is the monopoly. Strangely enough, the same bowing to inevitability which lent assurance to the capitalist theory that the busy pursuit of one's private interest would conduce to the public weal is now invoked in a different form to explain away the very institutions capitalist egoism and a perverted "law of nature" called into being. It is now said that monopolies are inevitable. They are not, any more than *laissez-faire* was necessary. Social charity can mitigate monopoly just as it tempered monopolistic tendencies in medieval times.

Bishop von Ketteler, in his paper discussed at the historic Conference of Fulda in September, 1869, made this observation on what he called "economic liberalism," and it may well serve as a concluding paragraph to our treatment of individualism and the ethic of love.

The social question touches the *deposit of faith.* Even if it was not evident that the principle underlying the doctrines of economic Liberalism, which has been aptly styled 'a war against all,' is in flagrant contradiction with the natural law and the doctrine of universal charity, there is no doubt that, arrived at a certain stage of development, this system, which in a number of countries, has produced a working class sick in body, mind, and heart, and altogether inaccessible to the graces of Christianity, is diametrically opposed to the dignity of a human being and *a fortiori* of a Christian in the mind of God, who meant the goods of earth to be for the support of the human race and established the family for the purpose of perpetuating man and educating him physically and morally, and above all to the commandments of Christian charity which ought to regulate the actions not of individuals only, but of every social organization; therefore this system deserves to be rejected for dogmatic reasons.[233]

[232] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[233] *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.

Classism

Pope Leo XIII, in his encyclical letter *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, Dec. 28, 1878, enumerates the fourfold menace of socialism: (1) to religion; (2) to the State; (3) to the home; (4) to property.[234] In our earlier treatment of Marxian socialism we singled out its classism as providing the most pertinent contrast to the doctrine of the order of love of neighbor, inasmuch as it was economic self-interest projected on a wider scale. For our evaluation of classism now, we shall consider it as embodied in the four aspects mentioned by the "Pope of the workingman." First of all, to interpret all society in terms of an economic class fulfilling the determinism of a materialistic concept of history of its very nature implies a rejection of extra-economic criteria and therefore of religion, God, and the supernatural charity which joins man to Him in friendship. Secondly, the claim that "directly contraposed" classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, are the basic units of society necessarily infringes upon the autonomy of the family, since family relationships often give the lie to the validity of the exclusively class distinction. And as far as the order of charity is concerned, familial ties exact a priority of affection which is extremely prejudicial to the Marxian class-consciousness. Thirdly, the State is conceived by Marxism as a mere instrument for the exploitation of the oppressed class, whereas in the Christian economy it is the primary duty of the State to abolish conflict between classes with divergent interests, and thus foster and promote harmony between the various ranks of society.[235] Its relation to charity is succinctly expressed by Leo XIII in his remarks on Christian Democracy as opposed to Socialist Democracy:

> (Christian Democracy) must avoid the other cause of giving offense which consists in paying so much regard to the interests of the lower classes as seemingly to neglect the upper classes, who

[234] Cf. *Social Wellsprings*, p. 15 ff.

[235] Cf. Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Quadragesimo Anno*, May 15, 1931.

nevertheless are of equal importance to the preservation and development of the State. The Christian law of charity . . . forbids this.[236]

Lastly, private property is looked on by Marxism as the source of all class evils. As Bishop von Ketteler, who as a contemporary of Marx witnessed the same abuses of private property, admitted, the notorious dictum ' property is robbery " is something more than a mere lie; besides a great lie, it contains a terrible truth. " We must destroy the truth that is in it, in order that it may become all lie again." [237] However, the remedy is not the reduction of men to a landed equality by communal ownership. The Church recognizes the inequality among men born with different powers of body and mind, and with this the inequality in actual possession of property,[238] and through the operation of charity uses this very inequality as a means of social unity. The great Bishop of Mainz shows how harmoniously the Christian concept of property, private ownership, and common use, fits into a higher plan of God's Providence:

God created the earth with all it brings forth in order that man might derive sustenance from it. God could have attained this end by ordaining a compulsory distribution of goods; but that was not His intention. He wished to give full-play to man's self-determination and free-will; He wished to hand His work over to man, to make a human work of it, that man by doing the work of God might become God-like. He permitted inequality in the acquisition and administration of goods, that man might become the dispenser of His gifts to his fellow-man. Thus was man to be drawn into the life of that love with which God provides for us, and by distributing his goods with the same love with which God intended them for all men, man was to share in the nature of God, which is love.[239]

The just distribution of property will be achieved not by the Marxist forceful expropriation of the expropriators, " but by

[236] Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Graves de Communi*, Jan. 18, 1901, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233.

[237] Cf. Metlake, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[238] Cf. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[239] Cf. Metlake, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

the *interior regeneration of the heart.*"[240] Charity does not deny class interests, nor is it without its practical programme for the realization of these.[241] "It is," says Leo XIII, "a laudable charity not merely to give temporary aid to the working class, but also to establish permanent means of help."[242] But true love does deny the exclusiveness of class-interests, an exclusiveness which is the more base and less practical for being founded on a selfishly economic final end to be attained through revolution.

Statism

The statism of the Fascist, inasmuch as it conceives of the State as an absolute in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, is by this token inimical to the charity whose ultimate end is God. The State is, according to St. Thomas, a perfect society;[243] but it is not the ultimate end of man; God alone is that.[244] It is the function of the State to help man so to live virtuously here that he may live happily hereafter.[245] Accordingly, man's love for the State should not militate against his love of God, or God's Church. In his encyclical on the chief duties of Christian citizens, Leo XIII lays down these principles:

> We have, therefore, to love our country which has given us this mortal life, but it follows of necessity that we should have a greater love for the Church, to which we owe the life that will endure forever. . . . If we wish to come to a right judgment, the supernatural love of the Church and the natural love of our country are principles having the same eternal source, God Himself being the Author and Cause of both. Hence it follows that the one duty can never be opposed to the other. . . . To love therefore these two countries, both our natural and our heavenly country, and to prefer the latter to the former lest the law of man should be deemed

[240] *Ibid.*, p. 48.
[241] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 228-230.
[242] *Graves de Communi, op. cit.*, p. 237.
[243] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 2.
[244] *Op. cit.*, I, q. 2, a. 8.
[245] Cf. *De Regimine Principum*, I, 15.

superior to the law of God, is the chief duty of every Christian and the source of all other duties.[246]

Another occupant of the See of Peter, Pius XI, writing after the rise of the Fascist party to power, speaks of it as " a regime based on an ideology which clearly resolves itself into a true and pagan worship of the State." [247]

The statist ideology, in disrupting the order of love by placing the State before God or the Church, likewise disrupts the order of the love of neighbors. For while, as Mussolini observes,[248] the Fascist in actual fact loves his neighbor, with a love which puts no obstacle to " differentiation of status and to physical distance," he also says that " Fascism repudiates any universal embrace." [249] But with Christian charity, while recognizing that in matters concerning relations between citizens we should prefer our fellow-citizens,[250] still we must love all our fellow men with the same common love of charity insofar as they are referred to the one good common to them all which is God.[251] Though natural and national preferences have their place in love of neighbor, true charity cannot refuse any universal embrace:

> Nor is there any fear lest the consciousness of universal brotherhood aroused by the teaching of Christianity, and the spirit which it inspires, be in contrast with love of traditions or the glories of one's fatherland, or impede the progress of prosperity or legitimate interests. For that same Christianity teaches that in the exercise of charity we must follow a God-given order, yielding the place of honor in our affections and good works to those who are bound to us by special ties.[252]

[246] Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *Sapientiae Christianae,* Jan. 10, 1890, *op. cit.,* pp. 145, 147.

[247] Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Non Abbiamo Bisogno,* June 29, 1931.

[248] B. Mussolini, *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism,* p. 8.

[249] *Ibid.*

[250] Cf. *Summa Theol.,* II-II, q. 26, a. 7, 8.

[251] *Ibid.,* q. 25, a. 1.

[252] Pius XII, Encyclical Letter *Summi Pontificatus,* Oct. 20, 1939.

Racism

Accepting literally the words of Hitler, "All that is not race is trash," let us examine the four basic concepts of Nazism—race, folkish philosophy of life, state and society, the principle of individuality and leadership—as they relate to the Christian ethic of love. First, the primary concept of race as the social determinant is materialistic, and as such is opposed to the conception of charity which is spiritual. In this connection, the citation by Pope Leo XIII in his letter on the abolition of slavery of the words of St. John Chrysostom, is pertinent: "Our advantages flow from that new birth and adoption into the household of God, not from the eminence of our race." [253]

Out of this materialistic concept of race and blood, as we have explained in the preceding chapter, flows the folkish conception of life whose end is "the preservation of the racial existence of man." [254] This positing of the racial existence as the ultimate end of man is obviously contrary to the Christian ethic of the order of love based on God as ultimate end,[255] an error which St. Thomas shows to be contrary to the first commandment of the Decalogue.[256] Pope Pius XI, in his letter to the German people, teaches that

> he who takes the race, or the people, or the State, or the form of government, the bearers of the power of the State, or other fundamental elements of human society . . . out of the system of their earthly valuation, and makes them the ultimate norm of all, even of religious values, and deifies them with an idolatrous worship,

[253] Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter *In Plurimis*, May 5, 1888, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[254] Cf. A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, p. 579.

[255] While Hitler does speak of God and Fate as directing the course of society, the words are to be understood in terms of the "eternal 'race-soul.'" Cf. *Studien zum Mythus des XX Jahrhunderts*, quoted by Micklem, *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church*, p. 21. As Pope Pius observes: "He who, in pantheistic vagueness, equates God with the universe, and identifies God with the world and the world with God does not belong to believers in God." Encyclical Letter *Mit brennender Sorge*, March 14, 1937.

[256] Cf. *The Commandments of God*, pp. 28-29.

perverts and falsifies the order of things created and commanded by God.[257]

The "immortality" of the folkish philosophy of life is quite different from immortality in the Christian sense, which is the continuance of the life of man after death as a personal individual to be rewarded or punished eternally. To designate with the word "immortality" the collective continual enjoyment of life in association with the continued existence of one's people on earth for an undetermined length of time in the future is a perversion of faith, charity, and the moral ordering of the world.[258] The racist State and society, which embody the folkish conception of life, share the same falsity, even though the State is not conceived as an end in itself. It is admittedly a means, but a means to a false ultimate end—the race.

The principle of individuality and leadership, which is the fourth basic concept of Nazism, militates against the order of love of neighbor in two ways. First, regarding individuality, the provision for the purest members of the race to breed apart from the rest, the corollary of which is the prevention of reproduction by the "unfit," bases the order of preferences among neighbors on purely physiological grounds, whereas the order of the Christian love of neighbor, though requiring prudence in use of the reproductive process and giving due recognition to the ties of blood,[259] accepts this relationship only insofar as it is able to be referred to the end of charity. Moreover, true charity does not exclude those not bound to the self by ties of blood, nor does it wage a war of extermination or oppression against those lacking this union of blood, even though these be enemies.[260] Secondly, though we may accept the recognition of personality and its gifts in the leadership principle, still to concede that the militarism of the Party or the Army is the primary school for the understanding and adjustment of the individual of a race is to overlook the moral

[257] Pius XI, *Mit brennender Sorge.*
[258] *Ibid.*
[259] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 8.
[260] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 26, a. 6, 7, 8; q. 25, aa. 6, 8, 9.

influence of the social and civic virtues, and especially charity, on the growth of personality.[261] Christian love of neighbor, through its acts of love, joy, peace, beneficence and self-sacrifice towards all mankind, brings out the best that is in man.

Conclusion

By way of corollary to all that has been said on the social order of love of neighbor in itself and in comparison with the various modern "isms" similarly aiming at the reconstruction of the social order—a comparison which shows quite plainly the superiority and the uniqueness of charity as *the* principle for the true functioning of society—we might append a few observations on the practical significance of the whole idea. Obviously, the stage of contemporary society is largely dominated by social theories alien to that of Christian charity—the "social-religions" as contrasted with the "God-religion"—and one might wonder if ever true charity will come again into its own as the "soul of the social order." Doubtful as the prospects may seem, there are, nevertheless, factors inherent in charity itself as well as in the trends of the time which lend strength to the conviction that a new Christian order may rise out of the present crisis of civilization.

The first factor in the nature of charity itself is the truth that the law of charity does not remove the law of nature, but perfects it by remedying its defects.[262] The social import of this idea has been demonstrated in our discussion of the order of the Christian love of neighbor in which the principle was enuntiated that those who are more closely united to the self are to be loved more out of charity. Grace perfects nature; it does not destroy it or do it violence. It gathers up, supernaturalizes all that is best in human living—its ties and affec-

[261] Cf. Pius XI, *op. cit.* The conscientious observance of the ten commandments of God and the commandments of the Church . . . is for every individual an incomparable schooling of systematic self-discipline, moral training and character formation—a schooling that demands much, but not too much.

[262] Cf. St. Thomas, *In Col.*, 3, lect. 4.

tions for self, family, friends, economic and social class, nation, race, and the broad expanse of humanity—and finds place for all in the grand, pyramidal hierarchy of love whose source and ultimate goal is God.[263]

Correlative to this universality of charity is the futile quest of modern man for a higher social order, a quest which has progressively led him through the errors of individualism, classism, statism, racism, and even the new "theocracy of humanism" in search of a transcendent sociological synthesis. This synthesis can be achieved only through charity whose object, God, transcends a world whose progress and perfection can only be realized in relation to Him. Charity can take all the good that undoubtedly lies in these various "isms"; it can rescue them from the evils that, with equal surety, now result from their lack of proper orientation.

If we consider, moreover, that no other virtue has so great an inclination to act or acts so delightfully as charity,[264] that whoever has charity has all the other virtues,[265] that charity is the bond of perfection,[266] there is the more reason to expect men to appreciate it if only they come to know it. It is a sad experience, in reading the history of social thought, to see how ignorant of charity were the parents of the modern "isms"—Adam Smith, Marx, Spencer, and the rest. Charity has not failed in modern times as a social principle. It has not failed because it has not been tried.

True, charity is a supernatural virtue which comes from God alone, and cannot be acquired by mere human effort; even the dispositions for the reception of charity must come from God.[267] But there are two kinds of knowledge of charity, experimental and speculative; and one without charity can have the second, though not the first.[268] It is not necessary for the new Chris-

[263] Cf. Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris.*
[264] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 2.
[265] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 65, aa. 3, 5.
[266] *Coloss.* iii, 14.
[267] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1um.
[268] *III Sent.*, XXIII, q. 1, 2 ad 1um.

tendom [269] that all possess charity, but only a number sufficient to affect the tone of the society; the others may speculatively, if not experimentally, appreciate it; and since grace does not destroy nature, they should feel no repugnance to cooperating in the life of a society with charity as its principle of order.

For philosophers and theologians with a sociological bent (and we simply must have more such), the subject of charity and the reconstruction of the social order offers a challenge that is well-worthy of acceptance. Pope Pius XI in his encyclical letter on atheistic Communism urges the necessity of promoting a wider study of social problems in the light of the doctrine of the Church. "It is," he says, "of the utmost importance to foster in all classes of society an intensive program of social education adapted to the varying degrees of intellectual culture." Elsewhere in the same encyclical, after specifying charity as more directly calculated to cure social evils, the Pontiff sorrowfully remarks not only that justice is poorly observed, but that the precept of charity is not sufficiently appreciated, is not a vital thing in daily life. "We desire, therefore, Venerable Brethren, that this divine precept, this precious mark of identification left by Christ to His true disciples, be ever more fully explained by pen and word of mouth. . . ." [270]

To be sure, the problem is as large and difficult as the challenge is forceful. Still true scholarship, and especially Christian scholarship, delights in essaying herculean tasks. There is a universality about this problem that will satisfy the most comprehensive and penetrating of intellects; and, at the same time, the observation of social phenomena, the collating and cataloguing of the tremendous body of sociological data acquired in recent years will be a perennial labor of love

[269] For a treatment of the spiritual and temporal problems of a new Christendom, cf. J. Maritain, *True Humanism* (New York: 1938): "For this new epoch in the history of Christian culture the creature will neither be belittled nor annihilated before God; his rehabilitation will not be in contradistinction to God or without God, but *in* God . . . integral humanism, the humanism of the Incarnation" (p. 65).

[270] Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Divini Redemptoris, passim.*

for those given more to method and research. A comprehensive exposition of the social order, perhaps a *Summa Sociologica* embodying a new science of society based not merely on institutions, geography, customs, or political ideologies, but on the social animal himself, man—not only man with his natural faculties and gifts, but man destined for the supernatural, an absorbing personality pulsating with divine grace, powerfully influencing his social milieu through the operation of natural and infused virtues crowned by a universal charity—all this is something to hope for. Towards the realization of that hope, the sociological labors of a group of Christian scholars might profitably be directed.

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THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

I. The Problem of Perception and Contemporary Psychology

FROM its beginning experimental psychology has perseveringly attempted, with an increasingly rigorous precision, to amass all the facts which might throw light on the psychological phenomenon involved in the process of perception. The wealth of material thus gathered, and still being added to by new observations, naturally stimulated endeavors to find for it a rational explanation which would be adequate. A detailed history of opinions, or a step-by-step analysis of these attempted explanations is beside the point here.[1] A brief exposition, systematical rather than historical, will suffice to bring out certain essential aspects of the problem which are the principal issues in a still open discussion.

Associationism, at least in its most recent manifestations, is in agreement with the psychology of form in accepting these postulates:

a) Sensation, in its simplest form, is a pure abstraction; as such, therefore, it is rarely encountered in our cognitive life;[2]

b) The normal human cognitive operation is therefore a complex operation, commonly designated by the name "perception";

c) Concerning the object of perception, the perceiving subject identifies the thing before him, recognizes in it a table, an

[1] Instead of mentioning again the classical works familiar to all psychologists, we shall be content here to refer to expositions that are more accessible: E. Pialat, "Une conception nouvelle de la vie psychique: 'La Gestalttheorie,'" *Revue Néo-Scolastique de Philosophie*, XXXI, (1939), 48-74; T. V. Moore, "Gestalt Psychology and Scholastic Philosophy," *The New Scholasticism*, VII (1933), 298-325; VIII (1934), 46-80; P. Guillaume, *La Psychologie de la forme*, (Paris: Flammarion), 1937.

[2] Cf. E. B. Titchener, *Manuel de Psychologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1922), pp. 354-356, 374; G. Dumas, *Nouveau Traité de Psychologie* (Paris: Alcan, 1936), p. 1.

orange, etc. This identification, however, consists not in the apprehension of the individual concrete substance, but in the substitution of a verbal symbol for a sensory synthesis composed of sensations and images, or a configuration, a structure, a form (*Gestalt*). Consequently, consideration is restricted to what is called the perception of number, of space, of movement, of forms, of positions, etc.[3] In short, despite notable divergences, contemporary psychologists continue on the whole to offer us a rigorously phenomenalist and sensationalist explanation of perception. Keeping in view this preoccupation with the phenomenalist and sensationalist which unites the two explanations and has a strong influence on the ends of investigators, we shall endeavor to define the contrasts which define the two attitudes.

Since each side has recourse to different descriptive concepts, the statement of the problem of perception must be twofold and the procedures employed in resolving the problem itself must reflect opposite methods. Since for associationism, the first complex experience can be reduced to simple elements—into psychic atoms—it fittingly applies the procedures of analysis which have been so successful in chemistry and physics. Perception is broken down into sensations and images, and an attempt made to discover the dynamic principles which initiate and direct the organization of the parts in reconstructing the whole according to an order of growing complexity. Once it is admitted that the establishment of an existential link among the elements of perception results from the exercise of the functions of attention and association, an effort is made to set forth the laws which condition the influence of these functions. Finally, when the content of perception has been translated into terms of signification, on the plane of consciousness, a reconstruction of the history of consciousness from its original flowering until its burial in the obscure depths of the subconscious can be undertaken. A brief description borrowed from one of the

[3] Cf. Boring, Langfeld, Weld, et alii, *Psychology: a Factual Textbook* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1935), pp. 207-273.

protagonists of the movement, the head of the Cornell School, will help to render this abstract schema more understandable:

Our description of the psychology of perception is now complete. It has embraced four principal points. First, according to the general laws of attention and the special laws of the connection of sensations, the sensations have been joined, united, incorporated into a group. Secondly, this group of sensations is completed by images. Thirdly, this complementary group possesses a fringe, a background, a context, and this context is the psychological equivalent of its logical meaning. Fourthly, the meaning can fade from the consciousness and the conscious context can be replaced by an unconscious nervous disposition. If we transpose this description into genetic terms, we have, as the first form of perception, a certain sensory complexus enclosed in a kinesthetic framework. There then takes place an invasion of the consciousness by images which eventually modify the complexus and its framework and can, in time, replace to a great extent the sensory elements of the former and substitute itself entirely for the latter. The images themselves are far from immutable: they change and grow weak; they tend more especially to reduce themselves to a common denominator, the verbal image—a sort of symbolical shorthand replacing the primitive ideography of the mind. Finally the central complexus can appear as a pure skeleton of that which it was at first, it is no longer but a simple symbol of its original complexity and its kinesthetic framework may no longer appear at all: henceforth a certain physiological organization sustains the meaning.[4]

As might be expected, this theory had a considerable repercussion in the domain of educational psychology. In fact, its influence, intensified and prolonged by the astonishing favor with which behaviorism was met everywhere in America, is still preponderant. In spite of its reactionary attitude towards associationism, whose curiosity regarding the content of our mental experiences and whose interest in the introspective method it does not share, behaviorism is satisfied with carrying its analytical method over into the field of conduct. In keeping with the procedures formerly employed in the study of perception, it began by seeing in a certain behavior a composite gathering of reflexes which are later linked up by adaptation

[4] E. B. Titchener, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-377. See also G. Dumas, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

and habit.[5] Practically speaking, such a conception entailed a radical readaptation in the manner of envisaging mental development by the communication of knowledge, and the development of personality by the inculcation of habits. Thus, on this continent, the great majority of the theorists of education, allowing themselves to be deeply impressed by the incontestable authority of E. L. Thorndike and above all by the massive array of his experimental contributions,[6] came to deny nearly all educational value to formal education—to what we call general culture—and to proclaim the necessity of the utmost specialization in teaching methods.[7] A far-reaching reaction has begun to take shape, a reaction at once interesting and liberating, but to which we cannot here give the consideration it deserves.[8]

If we turn to the point of view of the Gestalt theory, the position of the problem is appreciably modified. It is well to bear in mind the essentials of its solution to the problem:

a) The psychologists of the associationist school begin by

[5] Cf. R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1931), p. 94. To show the parallelism existing between the description of perception offered by behaviorism and that offered by associationism, we cite the following text: "It is important to realize that objects, events and their properties *as we perceive them* are the outcome or result of definite bodily processes. The perception of snow, for example, involves (1) retinal stimulation, (2) possibly also the stimulation of other receptors, (3) transformation of the stimulus energy before it reaches the receptors and also in the receptors, (4) release and propagation of neural impulses and (5) regrouping and repatterning of the neural impulses at various stages of their journey in the neural system. In order fully to understand the perception of an object, we must relate the perception to every one of these stages of bodily activity" (Boring, Langfeld, Weld, et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 274-275).

[6] Cf. especially: *Educational Psychology*, Vol. II. *The Psychology of Learning* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913); *Human Learning* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1931); *The Fundamentals of Learning* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932).

[7] For a complete and authorized résumé of the conception of learning which has become classical in this school of psychologists we refer the reader to P. Sandiford, *Educational Psychology* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), pp. 183-206, 275-300.

[8] Cf. G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* (New York: Holt and Co., 1937), pp. 248-285.

supposing a sort of jumbled matter out of which the mind, through the intermediary of its synthetical functions, constructs an object, a fact, which it perceives. Thanks to its work of grouping and organizing, a form arises from this scattered collection of indifferent elements. For the partisans of the Gestalt theory, on the other hand, forms or structures should be considered as the primitive elements or points of departure.

b) The problem of perception is therefore not reducible to the question of what grouping of sensations produces a represented form, but to defining the conditions which are responsible for the apparition of a form and the laws which regulate its transformations.

c) For the Gestalt theory, the intellectual fact does not introduce into the domain of perception a factor which is properly speaking original. At the most, it implies a certain enfranchisement from " the fixations inherent in the initial mode of representation," a power of reorganizing representations, operating when new relations between the objects are perceived.

d) For the associationist theory, perception comes into being only when the data of sensation have been grouped in the categories of experience and have, by this fact, acquired a significance; in other words, the influence of the memory commands the *whole* organization. On the other hand, the gestaltist interpretation admits no more than a secondary influence of memory on the organization of perception. Hence it refuses to find a sufficient explanation of perception in " the meaning which experience has bestowed on primitive inorganic sensations." In fact,

> in order that the object acquire a meaning it is necessary that it already exist as a sensible object by virtue of its intrinsic characteristics. The influence of memory is secondary to this organization which it implies but does not explain. The specific, concrete properties of the figure and the setting are not explained by differences of familiarity or practical interest. Here there exists a difference of *aspect*, primary in relation to what is added by education. A thing which was not distinguishable from its background would be a very bad object of perception and it is hard to

see how our habits would be able to graft themselves upon it; on the contrary, they are easily poured into the mould offered by the perceptive organization of the object.[9]

One immediate consequence of these premises imposes itself upon the theorist of educational methods. If psychological reality is in keeping with this new description, is it not necessary to agree that the child in learning and the scientist in experimenting do not proceed gropingly, by "trial and error," by the critical selection of the means recognized as efficacious? Research would never encounter an impasse but would rather be a continued sequence of partial solutions, obtained by sudden adaptations or immediate intuitions. Relying less upon a disordered activity and the repetition of fortuitous attempts than upon his effort of reflection and attention, the subject would react unceasingly to the entire situation and to the interlacing of relations which give it meaning.[10]

It is worthy of note that the precursors of the Gestalt Psychology—Ehrenfels and Meinong—had undergone the influence of the Scholastic thought which dominated the teaching of their master, Franz Brentano.[11] Hence, according to them, elements of intellectuality penetrated even our perceptions as factors of organization or interpretation of the sensory data. Although, under its present form, the Gestalt theory appears before us as the prolongation of their reaction against classic associationism, their hold remained too hesitant and weak to prevent its partisans from slipping towards a radical sensationism. Nevertheless, thanks no doubt to the definitely intellectualist character of its beginnings and the abundant factual matter that it has recently furnished in its effort to break away from outmoded forms and to create new ones better adapted to the complexity of reality, the theory exerts a powerful attraction upon those scientists who have again taken up contact with the

[9] P. Guillaume, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[10] Cf. L. A. Pechstein and F. D. Brown, "An Experimental Analysis of the Alleged Criteria of Insight Learning," *The Journal of Educational Psychology*, XXX (1939), pp. 38-52.

[11] Cf. T. V. Moore, *op. cit.*, VII, 298-316.

Scholastic tradition. To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to glance at the recent works of A. Gemelli [12] and T. V. Moore.[13] Unfortunately, these men, who manipulate experimental techniques with perfect dexterity, as soon as they venture upon philosophical terrain, show signs of a too hasty and insufficient assimilation of the main Scholastic theses. All in all, despite certain misinterpretations and the incomplete nature of their description of the perceptual processes, they retain the merit of having brought out elements of explanation whose importance cannot be overestimated. They are principally these:

a) The Gestalt theory, in full agreement with Scholastic philosophy on this point, denies the possibility of explaining perception by means of an atomist and associationist interpretation.

b) The object of perception is an organized *whole* (*gestaltete*), and this is immediately encountered as such in the consciousness, thanks to a primary sensory synthesis brought about by the *sensus communis* whose nature and function have been perfectly described to us by Aristotle and St. Thomas.

c) Nevertheless, perception cannot be confounded with that " organic configuration " or that " sensory organization," as is the case in the gestaltist interpretation. As can be seen by experience, signification, which is implied in perception as the condition for adequate identification of the object, remains distinct from the configuration, although inherent in it.

d) In perception, then, the sensory synthesis appears as a *primary* element independent of our previous experiences. But, since the end of perception consists in the identification of the object, it is necessary to admit a *secondary* intervention on the part of experience and memory which, through the inter-

[12] Cf. " La Psicologia della Percezione," *Acta Pont. Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq. et Religionis Catholicae* (Taurini-Romae: Marietti, 1936), II (1935), pp. 80-119.

[13] Cf. *op. cit.*; also " The Scholastic Theory of Perception," *The New Scholasticism*, VII (1933), pp. 222-238; *Cognitive Psychology* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1939), pp. 325-333.

mediary of signification, influences the definitive orientation of the sensory organization.

According to the authors in question, nothing thus far seems too brutally opposed to a compromise with the gestaltist interpretation. But discord breaks out when these Scholastic psychologists, agreeing with several others on this point,[14] dare to offer a description of perception which transcends the data of radical sensationism. However, it must be noted that certain among them—Moore in particular—seem to incline toward an exaggerated intellectualism.

This systematical exposition of the principal attempts to explain the phenomena of perception accounts for certain tendencies which appear in various educational theories. All these proposed explanations fall short of their object in failing to utilize thoroughly the data observed; they leave room for an interpretation at once less fragmentary and more gratifying to the experimenter.

II. Elements of a Thomistic Theory of Perception

A theory of perception lifted out of the context to which it is related must necessarily present the schematic, truncated appearance of a partial sketch which needs to be integrated into a more ample structure. The one which we will endeavor to elaborate here will be fully intelligible only to minds already familiar with the profound gnoseological speculations of Aristotle and St. Thomas. But we believe that those who follow it to the end will be strengthened in the conviction that from this theory alone can be derived an interpretation which in no way does violence to the conclusions imposed by the facts.

First of all, it is important to note that two general characteristics eliminate the confusion which might result in an insufficient differentiation of the perceptual process in relation to other cognitive processes. On the one hand, perception is a

[14] Cf., for example, C. Spearman, *Les Aptitudes de l'homme* (transl. by F. Brachet. Paris: Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiérs, 1936), p. 145. J. Bourjade, *L'intelligence et la pensee de l'enfant* (Paris: Alcan, 1937), pp. 88-93, may also be cited among the theorists of education.

total grasp of the object which falls on the senses. Nevertheless, it is not a question of that group of conditions explored by the Gestalt school, which can establish upon a given foundation a clearly outlined structure, which in turn will be translated in the consciousness into a sensory configuration. The process that puts us in contact with the superficial appearances of the object, even in so far as they present a certain degree of organization, belongs to the order of sensation and not to the order of perception. This is a point to which we shall return. In passing, it is interesting to note that in order to explain this power of totalization which unites variegated aspects of the same object in a perceptual synthesis, certain contemporary authors agree with St. Thomas in not hesitating to pass beyond phenomena to the radical unity of the knowing subject.[15]

On the other hand, perception is also recognizable as an *immediate* grasp of the object. To explain better the sense of this affirmation a summary description of the modalities of human knowledge is demanded. In a general way we distinguish within ourselves a knowledge which we qualify as *intellectual,* whereby we attain the intelligibility in things, and a knowledge which we qualify as sensible or *experimental.*[16] By experimental knowledge we mean a knowledge (a) which is

[15] This conception, at once so profound and so realistic, can never be sufficiently opposed to the caricature of mental life left us by the undeservedly famous "faculty psychology," the pale substitute with which the adepts of a decadent Scholasticism gradually replaced the traditional psychology. St. Thomas expresses himself thus: "Homo cognoscit singularia per imaginationem et sensum, et ideo potest applicare universalem cognitionem quae est in intellectu, ad particulare, *non enim proprie loquendo, sensus et intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque* (*De Veritate,* q. 2, a. 6, ad 3)." In our own time we find an analogous affirmation from the pen of W. Stern: "Perceptual Gestalten are autonomous on their level; they *give* to the sensory material organized within them the laws of precision, completeness, transposability, etc. But they are not autonomous for levels above themselves; on the contrary they *receive* their laws and even their existence from a superordinate principle, the *person.* No Gestalt without a 'Gestalter' (former of Gestalten). Perceptions occur as Gestalten because the person as a whole is able to apprehend the world only in separate wholes of a lesser order" (*General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint,* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938, p. 114).

[16] "Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus quod universale secundum rationem est notum, singulare autem secundum sensum" (*Summa Theol.,* I, q. 86, a. 1).

concerned with a singular thing,[17] and (b) which requires the presence of the object known.[18] Consequently, memory, in spite of the concrete nature of its content, is not, properly speaking, knowledge as it in no wise implies the reception of something new.[19] It is the same for the imagination, which pursues, not existential reality, but an " appearance," an *idolum*, a fiction.[20]

There is another distinction of capital importance, and it seems strange that precisely those among the neo-scholastics who have approached the study of the problem of perception have consistently misunderstood it. We mean a division of experimental knowledge which presents a striking parallel with that which is established in intellectual knowledge and expressed by the concepts " intellect " and " reason." [21] There is, first of all, an *immediate* experimental knowledge wherein the object, which is the accidental sensible (*sensibile per accidens*), is grasped without inquisition or reasoning as soon as the sensible thing becomes present to us. This is what we call *perception*.[22] Beyond this there is a discursive experimental knowledge wherein the object—a concrete relation, a particular cause, a contingent existence—is attained through the intermediary of a collation among the intentions (*intentiones*). This is what we shall call with the ancients the *experimentum*—experience.[23]

[17] " Est enim in nobis experientia, dum singularia per sensum cognoscimus " (*Ibid.*, I, q. 54, a. 5, ad 2).

[18] Cf. *Ibid.*, I, q. 58, a. 3, ad 3, where St. Thomas attributes *experience* to angels and demons " secundum quamdam similitudinem," that is, in so far as they attain, like us, *present* sensible things, " prout scilicet cognoscunt sensibilia praesentia." See also *De Sensu et Sensato*, lect. 1, n. 11.

[19] Cf. *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, lect. 4, nn. 352-353.

[20] Cf. *III De Anima*, lect. 4, nn. 632-633.

[21] " Apud nos ea quae *statim* naturaliter apprehenduntur, intelligi dicuntur " (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 58, a. 3). . . . " Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere; ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam " (*Ibid.*, I, q. 79, a. 8).

[22] " Perceptio autem experimentalem quamdam notitiam significat " (*Ibid.*, I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2). We hasten to add that for St. Thomas everything contained in the sensible object is not the object of perception, " sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur," as he himself takes care to emphasize (Cf. *II De Anima*, lect. 13, n. 396).

[23] " Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria

Without doubt, it is to bring out this distinction that St. Thomas applies to the *cogitative* operation a nomenclature that makes sense only in reference to intellectual knowledge. Thus, after using the Aristotelian designation " passive intellect " (*intellectus passivus*),[24] he asserts that it also deserves the name " particular reason " (*ratio particularis*) because one of its functions is to bring about rapprochements between the " individual intentions " in the same way the " universal reason " (*ratio universalis*) does between the " universal intention." [25]

From what has been said the external characteristics of perception have been treated sufficiently to distinguish it from all other cognitive processes. Perception, by attaining the underlying substantial reality in the concrete, leaves us with a synthesis which while transcending by far the sensory synthesis of definitely phenomenalistic aspect offered by the common sense (*sensus communis*), integrates it in its proper category. By the fact that it is experimental knowledge, perception gives guarantees of realism and originality which the imaginary or mnemonic syntheses do not possess. By this same fact it is distinguished from intellectual perception [26] which is abstract knowledge that neglects in the concrete the conditions of actual existence and regards only an internal structure, an intimate law, essential relations, which will be identical in all the subjects in which they are found. Finally, by its character of immediateness, perception is distinguished from experimental discursus which,

receptorum " (*I Metaphysicorum*, lect. 1, n. 15). It is evident, then, that perception has for its aim the apprehension of those singulars whose comparison, *after the manner of reasoning*, will lead to the " *experimentum*." For the classical description of this process, see the text of *II Posteriorum Analyticorum*, lect. 20, n. 11.

[24] " Passivus intellectus corruptibilis est. . . . Tamen haec pars animae dicitur intellectus, sicut et dicitur rationalis, inquantum aliqualiter participat rationem, obediendo rationi, et sequendo motum eius. . . . Sine hac autem parte animae corporalis, intellectus nihil intelligit " (*III De Anima*, lect. 10, n. 745).

[25] " Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur: quae est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium " (*I Metaph.*, lect. 1, n. 15). See also *II De Anima*, lect. 13, n. 396 and *III*, lect. 16, n. 845.

[26] Cf. P. Hoenen, " De origine primorum principiorum scientiae " *Gregorianum* XIV (1933), pp. 153-184.

basing itself upon data furnished by perception, arrives at an image stripped of all the more accessory contingencies. That is, it arrives at a judgment of fact, a beginning of scientific generalization, or at a concrete judgment of value which engages the affective side and gives the impulse to our activity. Perception is insufficient to supply this new extension of experimental knowledge which must appeal to memory to supplement the necessary data.[27]

The perceptual process is capable of a profound analysis beyond the purely descriptive treatment we have attempted, and since nothing enlightens us more on the nature of a functional process than the study of its object, we shall consider the object of perception. We have already admitted that for the Thomistic psychologist this object is none other than the accidental sensible (*sensibile per accidens*), that is, the concrete substance. This affirmation, as all are aware, goes against phenomenalistic prejudices, which still dominate contemporary scientific thought, but are beginning to repel the better minds who are coming to realize the attractive perspectives opened up by philosophical speculations.

First of all, what exactly do we mean by an "accidental sensible," a *sensibile per accidens*? Those familiar with the terminology of St. Thomas know that in opposition to the *sensibile per se* which produces in the sensory organ an alteration determining the species or modality of the sensation, the *sensibile per accidens* is that which causes no modification in the sense as such.[28] More precisely, two conditions permit the identification of the *sensibile per accidens*:

a) It must be presented conjointly with that which is perceived by the sense *per se*, as when the white thing is at the same time a *man*.

[27] "Ex sensu fit memoria in illis animalibus, in quibus remanet impressio sensibilis; ex memoria autem multoties facta circa eamdem rem, in diversis tamen singularibus, fit experimentum; quia experimentum nihil aliud esse videtur quam accipere aliquid ex multis in memoria retentis" (*II Post. Anal.*, lect. 20, n. 11).

[28] See on this subject the limpid text unfortunately only too often neglected or misinterpreted, of *II De Anima*, lect. 13, nn. 393-394.

b) It must be perceived by the subject simultaneously with the quality which is modifying his sensory organ.[29]

The *sensibile per accidens*, then, is that which is immediately perceived by the subject knowing at the same time that one or the other of his sensory organs is actuated by its specific stimulus. This supposes, of course, a cognitive activity which accompanies and prolongs the sensory activity. The function whereby we reach that which is contained in the content of the sensation,[30] and yet which transcends the assimilative powers of the latter, is attributed by St. Thomas to the cogitative power or to the intellect accordingly as it is directed towards the concrete substance or the abstract nature.[31]

We cannot pause here to study intellectual perception which is characterized on its own level by a veritable immediateness, but which is necessarily prepared by an experimental discursus which is more or less elaborate.[32] We are obliged to admit that the neo-scholastics of our acquaintance who have undertaken the study in reference to contemporary theories have made serious errors on the true nature of sensible perception. Either they seem to have completely ignored (as is the case with T. V. Moore and A. Gemelli) the preponderant role the cogitative power plays in intellectual cognition [33] or else, when they have suspected the importance of this intervention, they have (like C. Fabro [34]) confused perception, or immediate experimental

[29] Cf. *II De Anima*, lect. 13, n. 395.

[30] Cf. *II Post. Anal.*, lect. 20, n. 14.

[31] "Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquentem, vel movere seipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam eius, unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere. Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam . . ." (*II De Anima*, lect. 13, n. 396).

[32] Cf. M. J. Congar, "Le role des images dans l'abstraction intellectuelle selon Cajetan," *Revue Thomiste*, (numero double: nov. 1934—fevr. 1935), pp. 225-245.

[33] See the writings of those authors already mentioned at the beginning of the present work.

[34] Cf. "Knowledge and Perception in Aristotelico-Thomistic Psychology," *The New Scholasticism*, XII (1938), pp. 337-365.

knowledge, with the *experimentum*, or discursive experimental knowledge.

More precisive was the psychological intuition of the older Scholastics who have left us a description of sensible perception admirable in its firmness and exactness. We are already acquainted with the principal elements which entered into its elaboration: distinctive characteristics of perception, ontological content of perception, role of the cogitative power. Henceforth we have only to follow in detail the evolution of this process and situate it in its gnoseological context. For greater conciseness we shall have a recourse once more to a systematic exposition:

a) Let us suppose that a certain object be placed for a moment in my hands. We all know that its resistance, its temperature, its color, its sound, its smell, etc., immediately begin to exert a specific stimulus upon my sensory organs. But, in keeping with contemporary psychologists, St. Thomas explicitly affirms that this stimulus will assume a different modality according to the dimensions of the object, its disposition, its conformation, its state of rest or motion, etc. In a word, the specific stimulus will be necessarily shaped according to the conditions deriving from the quantitative determination of the object.[35] We are here in presence of an objective configuration, called by St. Thomas a " sensible by nature " (*sensibile per se*), in which he distinguishes a proper sensible (*sensibile proprium*) and a common sensible (*sensibile commune*) in order to satisfy the demands of psychological analysis.

[35] " Differentiam autem circa immutationem sensus potest aliquid facere dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad ipsam speciem agentem; et sic faciunt differentiam circa immutationem sensus sensibilia per se, secundum quod hoc est color, illud autem est sonus, hoc autem est album, illud vero nigrum. . . . Quaedam vero alia faciunt differentiam in transmutatione sensuum, non quantum ad speciem agentis, sed quantum ad modum actionis. Qualitates enim sensibiles movent sensum corporaliter et situaliter. Unde aliter movent secundum quod sunt in maiori vel minori corpore, et secundum quod sunt in diverso situ, scilicet vel propinquo, vel remoto, vel eodem, vel diverso. Et hoc modo faciunt circa immutationem sensuum differentiam sensibilia communia " (*II De Anima*, lect. 13, n. 394).

b) This objective configuration affects the subject perceiving it after the manner of a multiple stimulus. But one ought not to conclude from this that the configuration cannot cross the threshold of consciousness without undergoing a falsifying disjunction. In fact, the common sense (*sensus communis*), which is the center of convergence of all sensory activity,[36] presents us with an organic and living synthesis that is the conscious reproduction of the objective configuration, a synthesis that is not a reconstruction but is immediately grasped in its original unity.[37] Nevertheless, it should be noted that if we were to stop there we should know the organized ensemble of the sensible appearances of an object only as the determinant of the sensory configuration that has just made its appearance in the consciousness. Even though we should not know the significance of these sensible properties, we would know that they are not a product of our imagination.[38]

c) At this juncture, the necessity of having recourse to an intervention of the cogitative power, which alone attains the singular substance, becomes more and more obvious. In fact, by themselves and outside of the subject to which they refer, accidents have neither existence nor unity. This comes down to saying that, once detached from their subject, accidents lose all ontological consistency and offer no hold to knowledge under any form whatsoever.[39] This will suffice to help us glimpse something of the nature of the new synthesis presented to us

[36] "Et licet sensus exteriores sint plures, tamen ultimum, ad quod terminantur immutationes horum sensuum, est unum; quia est quasi quaedam medietas una inter omnes sensus, sicut centrum, ad quod terminantur omnes lineae, quasi ad unum medium" (*III De Anima*, lect. 12, n. 773).

[37] St. Thomas, while attributing to the "*sensus communis*" the power of distinguishing between the different sensory changes, shows that this power presupposes the primacy of synthesis: "Ostendit quod oportet simul utrumque cognosci. . . . Hoc autem non potest esse, *nisi simul ea apprehenderet*, idest in illo instanti, pro quo iudicat esse altera. Manifestum est ergo quod simul cognoscit utrumque. Ergo sicut est inseparabilis potentia, id est una et eadem quae cognoscit utrumque eorum inter quae iudicatur differentia, ita oportet quod in inseparabili tempore apprehendat utrumque" (*III De Anima*, lect. 3, n. 605).

[38] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2.

[39] Cf. *VII Metaph.*, lect. 4, nn. 1252-1254.

by what we shall call with Cajetan the " simple functioning of the cogitative power " (*simplex cogitaivae operatio*) and to explain its character of immediateness. What appears to us is the concrete substance, upholding this very complex structure with its qualifications, its determinations, assuring it an inalienable originality in the midst of all existing things. No material detail escapes this total view: the nuances are precise, the lines clear, the outlines sharp. We know how difficult it is for a child to recognize as a dog an animal—actually a dog—whose appearance presents to the child differences from that of his own dog which an adult would hardly notice. Likewise a slight diversification of clothing suffices to trouble a child's perception of a person he knows.

d) This explanation brings to light the role played by perception in the more general process of human knowledge. Perception is a first contact with a given object, completely individuated and therefore containing inexhaustible virtualities, a sort of unlimited invitation to further cognitive activity. As Cajetan,[40] following Averroes,[41] has taken care to emphasize

[40] " Sed ut clarior pateat supradictorum et materiae huius intellectus, notandus est modus quo Aristoteles hoc in loco putat ex sensu cognitione generari cognitionem principiorum: hoc enim plurimum proderit. Cum vidisset Aristoteles quod intellectus non movetur nisi ab intelligibili in actu, et res intelligibiles (prout sunt in particularibus sensibilibus) esse intelligibiles (in potentia valde remota) eo quod plurimum materialitatis habeant, posuit ipsas res intelligibiles deferri primo ad sensus, ut in eis positae sine materia magis approprinquant ad hoc quod fiant intelligibiles in actu. Deinde quoniam in sensibus exterioribus et communi positae multas habent conditiones materiales posuit eas poni in cogitativa, ad hoc ut proximae fiant intelligibilitati, et quoniam *simplex cogitativae operatio* non sufficit universaliter ad hoc ut res per eam cognita sit tantae spiritualitatis, ut possit actione intellectus agentis fieri actu intelligibilis, posuit *frequentem conversionem et operationem cogitativae circa eamdem rem,* disponere rem illam ut cogitatam, ad hoc ut proxima sit intelligibilitati in actu, et habilis sit ut eam transferat intellectus agens in ordinem intelligibilium in actu. Habent autem vim taliter disponendi huiusmodi actus frequentati pro quanto habent vim collectivam, et adunativam particularium in unum quasi universale, quod est objectum experimentalis habitus, qui ex frequentia talium actuum generatur. Cum enim terminus ultimus istius processus sit cognitio vere universalis, consentaneum est ut id, quod ultimum medium et simillimum termino est, sit quasi universale (quod universale confusum possumus appellare). Sic autem re disposita et reducta ad tantam spiritualitatem, operatione intellectus agentis fit vere universalis et intelligibilis in

with his customary keenness and depth, perception—called here *simplex cogitativae operatio*, (simple functioning of the cogitative power) by analogy, no doubt, with intellectual simple apprehension—furnishes us with an image which, at least in most cases, needs to be decanted or dematerialized in order to become intelligible in *proximate* potency. This task of reduction and schematization which, in order to leave a concrete beginning for generalization, strips away the notes which are too accessory and individual, marks a new phase in the process of knowledge. It is to be identified with that " gathering together of individual intentions " (*collatio intentionum individualium*), that discursive, experimental knowledge of which the old Scholastics speak, and should consequently be regarded as *normally* following the simple perception of the concrete. The synthesis at which it arrives is relieved of details, impoverished; yet in a sense it is less confused, for the links connecting it with its origins are more explicit and more exactly appreciated. In this synthesis we recognize the image which is sufficiently " spiritualized " for the universal to be drawn from it by abstraction. But to follow the process of human knowledge to its final stages would be beyond the scope of this study.

Nevertheless, before we conclude, there is a further point worthy of discussion, that is, the extent to which intellectuality

actu et movet consequenter intellectum possibilem ad sui cognitionem " (*Commentaria in libros Poster. Anal. Aristotelis* (Venetiis, apud Junctas, MDLVI), lib. II, c. 13 (19), fol. 111rb. Cited by C. Fabro, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-359). For a more detailed exposition of Cajetan's thought on this subject, we refer the reader to M.-J. Congar, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-245.

[41] " Non intendebat (Arist.) quod sensus comprehendit essentias rerum, sicut quidam existamaverunt, hoc enim est alterius potentiae qui dicitur intellectus, sed intendebat quod sensus cum hoc quod comprehendunt sua sensibilia propria, comprehendunt intentiones individuales diversas in generibus et speciebus: comprehendunt igitur intentionem huius hominis individualis et huius equi individualis, et universaliter intentionem uniuscuiusque decem praedicamentorum individualium, et hoc videtur esse proprium sensibus hominis . . . Et ista intentio individualis est illa quam distinguit virtus cogitativa a forma imaginativa *et expoliat* eam ab eis quae sunt adiuncta cum ea ex istis sensibilibus communibus et propriis et reponit ea in rememorativa " (*Commentaria super libros Aristotelis de Anima*, ed. Veneta, 1562, t. VI, lib. III, t. 6, fol. 154r. Cited by C. Fabro, *op. cit.*, p. 354).

is discernible in human perception. We have alluded above to the exaggerated intellectualism contained in the interpretations proposed by certain neo-scholastics.[42] In view of the long description just given, it should be evident that our conception of the problem cannot be open to a like charge. Therefore, instead of delaying in useless discussion, we shall simply try to show at what point intellectuality insinuates itself into the perceptual process.

All know, in a general way, that our sensibility has origin in an intellectual soul, and receives thereby a certain ennoblement, which, without affecting its essential constituents, transforms the modality of its activity.[43] As to perception, this originality finds expression in three characteristics which we shall now endeavor to define.

Considered from the point of view of the object, human perception appears to be incomparably more extensive than that of the animal. Whereas every material *thing*, as such, in that it possesses an individual existence, offers a hold to this sensible apprehension, it is only by its useful or harmful aspect that it strikes the animal. The sheep indeed perceives this lamb and this grass, but not as this lamb and this grass; this lamb is perceived by it in so far as it is *nourishable*, and this grass in so far as it is *nourishment*. In a word, everything that does not constitute for the animal a beginning or a term for its activity necessarily transcends its power of perception. In the animal, in contrast to what takes place in man, the limits of action are those that circumscribe the field of perception.[44] Even if we

[42] By way of example, we cite here several lines of the summary in which Father T. V. Moore resumes his thought: "The interpretation of experience is intellectual cognition, transcending sensation and imagery. When one arranges proper conditions, it is found that perception, or the interpretation of experience, goes through certain stages: a) A general knowledge best expressed by the word "something." b) More detailed information which arises by assimilating the incoming sensation to past intellectual categories of experience. . . . The past categories of experience, to which a sensory presentation is assimilated in the process of perception, were termed in the Middle Ages: *species intelligibiles*" (*Cognitive Psychology*, p. 332).

[43] In this sense, St. Thomas affirms: "Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 77, a. 7). See on this subject K. Michalski, "La sublimation thomiste," *Angelicum*, XV (1937), pp. 212-222.

[44] "Cogitativa *apprehendit* individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod

were to envisage perception exclusively as a principle directing action, it is impossible to deny the ennobling influence of intellectuality. Animal perception orientates activity in a single direction which the animal itself is powerless to modify; to the same stimulus it habitually reacts in the same, easily foreseen way. Furthermore, at this level, perception could not give birth to a supple and many-sided activity which takes into account the adaptations required by the infinite variety of circumstances. Human perception, on the contrary, initiates a "rational" process which allows the child to escape early this double determinism.[45]

Finally, with man, perception is a source of disinterested enjoyment, of esthetic enjoyment.[46] For him alone knowledge

contingit ei, inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum. Aestimativa autem *non apprehendit* aliquod individuum, secundum quod est sub natura communi, sed solum secundum quod est terminus aut principium alicuius actionis vel passionis; sicut ovis cognoscit hunc agnum, non inquantum est hic agnus, sed inquantum est ab ea lactabilis; et hanc herbam, inquantum est eius cibus. Unde alia individua ad quae se non extendit eius actio vel passio, *nullo modo apprehendit* sua aestimativa naturali" (*II De Anima*, lect. 13, n. 398).

[45] "Eorum autem quae a seipsis moventur, quorumdam motus ex iudicio rationis proveniunt, quorumdam vero ex iudicio naturali. Ex iudicio rationis homines agunt et moventur; conferunt enim de agendis; sed ex iudicio naturali agunt et moventur omnia bruta. Quod quidem patet tum ex hoc quod omnia quae sunt eiusdem speciei, similiter operantur, sicut omnes hirundines similiter faciunt nidum: tum ex hoc quod habent iudicium ad aliquod opus determinatum, et non ad omnia; sicut apes non habent industriam ad faciendum aliquod aliud opus nisi favos mellis; et similiter est de aliis animalibus" (*Q. D. De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1).

[46] "Sensus autem, ut dicitur in *I Metaph.*, in princ., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem et propter utilitatem: unde et utroque modo contingit esse delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam cognitionem tamquam bonum quiddam, proprium est hominis, ideo primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum; delectationes autem sensuum, inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus animalibus" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 31, a. 6). "In aliis enim animalibus ex aliis sensibus non causantur delectationes nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus; sicut leo delectatur videns cervum vel audiens vocem eius, propter cibum. Homo autem delectatur secundum alios sensus, non solum propter hoc, sed etiam propter convenientiam sensibilium . . . sicut cum delectatur homo in sono bene harmonizato . . ." (*Ibid.*, II-II, q. 141, a. 4, ad 3). See also: *Ibid.*, I, q. 19, a. 3, ad 3; I-II, q. 35, a. 2, ad 3; II-II, q. 167, a. 2.

is a delight; for him alone everything which has color, shape, proportions pleasing the eye, everything that gives a harmonious sound, is an occasion for emotion. If, on the contrary, we perceive in an animal a flash of curiosity or satisfaction at the appearance or sound of something, we do not doubt for a moment that this new perception contains a promise of satisfaction for its appetite, an invitation to rest or well-being.

III. Conclusion

Some, perhaps, will consider our procedure too abstract. We have deliberately abstained from reviewing the facts of observation which we suppose to be present in the memory of every philosopher worthy of the name, in order that we might devote ourselves to the explanations which those facts have suggested to investigators belonging to different schools. To approach the roots of a very difficult problem which has been confused by innumerable controversies, we felt that comparative study of the various attempts at interpretation was necessary. Following this, we have utilized the data offered by the powerful Scholastic synthesis, in an endeavor to elaborate a description of human perception which would enlighten us as to its true nature and its properties, and would bring out the precise significance of the facts gathered by experimentation. Thomistic philosophy we believe offers as an approach to the study of contemporary psychology that sure and firm lucidity which is at the basis of every truly progressive enterprise.

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THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Part III

The End of the State: Happiness

(continued)

IN THE preceding sections of Part III, we established two propositions of crucial importance to the theory of Democracy—two principles which are indispensable to understanding the demonstrability of the truth that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government. The first of these propositions was that human life can be perfected in time by a purely natural happiness, which is truly a last end *simpliciter* because it is not ordained to any greater good as a means, even though it is subordinate to another last end which is a greater good, namely, the supernatural happiness of eternal beatitude. The second proposition consisted in the definition of natural happiness, what it is and what it is not. Let us repeat the definition which we proved to be true: happiness is activity in accordance with perfect virtue in a complete life attended by a sufficiency of the goods of fortune. This definition conceives natural happiness as the strictly proportional analogue of supernatural beatitude: each is a whole of goods; each leaves nothing to be desired in its own order because it consists in the possession of all good things, the one successively in the process of a whole life, the other simultaneously in an eternal rest.[203]

[203] Vd. Part III, Section 3, *supra*, in The Thomist, IV, 1. There is no difficulty in understanding the distinction between natural happiness and supernatural beatitude, for they differ not only as ends to be attained by natural and supernatural means, but also by reason of the radical diremption between time and eternity. What does require care, however, is the distinction between two perfections which occur in time, i. e., between natural happiness and supernatural contemplation, which is an inchoate participation in, and a remote anticipation of, the beatific vision. When this distinction is understood, it will be seen that natural happiness does not consist in contemplation, for supernatural contemplation is obviously excluded, and purely natural contemplation (i. e., the activity of the speculative

Natural happiness, thus defined, is the end of the state. As we have shown, the very naturalness of the state, its necessity as a means, depends upon the existence of this end.[204] No

virtues) is only a partial good, albeit the most worthy, and no partial good can be identical with happiness. Furthermore, the division into active and contemplative does not apply to the natural dimensions of human life, but only to the life of grace; human life naturally lived is (in a sense already explained) a life of work, not of rest, and intrinsically a social life. Hence we can also define natural happiness in the following terms: work in accordance with the social virtues, in a complete life, lived politically, enriched by the fruits of the common good, as well as supplied sufficiently with the goods of fortune. Vd. Section 3, *supra, loc. cit.*, p. 178, and fn. 198 and 198a.

On the point that natural happiness leaves nothing to be desired *which is naturally attainable in this life*, that it leaves no *natural*, as opposed to *transcendental*, desire unsatisfied, see fn. 148, 149a, and 161 *supra*. This truth must not be exaggerated, however, to the neglect of the equally important fact that natural happiness is essentially imperfect. Wherein lies this imperfection? The answer turns on a distinction between two aspects of the good as an object of desire: (1) we desire to obtain a good we do not now possess; (2) we desire to retain a good we now enjoy. The good is not only an object to be attained, but to be preserved from loss. We not only seek the good but work to persevere in it. (Vd. Part II, *supra*, in THE THOMIST, III, 4, pp. 595-97.) Now no temporal and natural good is immutable. With the attainment of such goods, the will cannot rest, for even if no more goods remained to be sought, the achieved goods would have to be preserved; as subject to loss unless we work to preserve them, they remain objects of desire. The essential imperfection of natural happiness, then, arises from the mutability and impermanence of the goods which constitute it. Although natural happiness can satisfy every natural desire which is a motion toward the attainment of some type of good, the desire to persevere in the goods attained, or to increase them, cannot be finally satisfied in the realm of time and change. (Cf. *III Cont. Gent.* 48; also *ibid.*, 39, wherein the defect of the best natural knowledge is made clear.) The imperfection of the natural last end is thus seen in the paradoxical fact that it is an end which can never be fully achieved: it can never be so fully reached that desire itself is abolished and the will is at rest. We have already indicated this by contrasting natural and supernatural happiness as a happiness of work and a happiness of rest—the one a happiness perpetually becoming, the other a happiness eternally in being. (Vd. Part III, Section 3, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 149-151, 166.) There can be no rest in time within the orbit of natural motions. Only in eternity and in the supernaturally granted knowledge of God, can there be rest, the abolition of all desire, the complete quiescence of the will. But although the imperfect (natural) end cannot put an end to desire, it functions as the end at which natural desire perpetually aims. In the order of time and natural operations, there cannot be a *terminal* end, an end which terminates desire; but there can be a *normative* end, an end which sets the measure of *attainable* perfection at which natural desire can *effectively* (not transcendentally) aim.

[204] Vd. Section 2, *supra, loc. cit.*, esp. pp. 132-36.

other end—neither eternal beatitude, nor supernatural contemplation in this life—can account for the state as originating naturally in response to a natural need—the need of a rationally social animal for political community in order, not merely to live, but to lead a good human life, the life of virtue.[205] A fundamental metaphysical truth is regulative of our analysis at this point. Whatever has its being as a natural means must also have causal efficacy in the attainment of a natural end; from which it follows that no natural means can ever operate merely as an instrumental cause in the attainment of ends which, being supernatural, require supernatural means as the principal causes. This truth can be stated in another way: whatever has the efficacy of an instrumental means in an order of causality which transcends its mode of being must also have the efficacy of a principal means in an order of causality which is commensurate to its mode of being. Hence, since the mode of being of the state and of the acquired virtues is natural, their efficacy as means cannot be entirely instrumental; on the contrary, they must be able to operate *primarily* as principal means and, therefore, toward the attainment of a purely natural end.[206]

[205] The reader must remember that the common good (i. e., the *bonum communitatis*) is not the end of the state when the state is viewed as a means; and, furthermore, that the common good is an intermediate end, which requires that it be ordained, within the natural order, as a means to a greater good, also natural. Whatever operates naturally as a means must be able to work for a natural end. The analysis presented in Part II *supra* (THE THOMIST, III, 4) should prevent any reader from confusing or identifying happiness, the perfection of an individual human life, with the common good, which is the well-being and welfare of a community *as such*; but it is necessary to remind the reader here of the ambiguity of another traditional phrase. "The good of civil life" is sometimes used as equivalent in signification to "the common good," and sometimes as meaning natural happiness, for that, being the life of the social virtues, is impossible apart from civil circumstances. We shall use the phrase in the latter sense exclusively. Vd. Part III, Section 3, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 144-46.

[206] "Every instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself: thus natural heat produces flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw works for the completion of the bench by cutting. Accordingly if there is a creature that works as an instrument of the first creator, it must do so by some action due and proper to its own nature. The

This being true, there would seem to be no difficulty about accounting for the achievement of happiness in terms of the operation of purely natural causes. But, unfortunately, an absolute consideration of the relation of means to ends does not suffice, because it abstracts from the actual condition of man's fallen nature, and so leads to a false simplicity in the practical order where we must concern ourselves with using means that are available. The practical problem is not whether the acquired virtues are principal means to natural happiness, but whether, in view of the actual condition of fallen nature, men can acquire these virtues by purely natural operations. What is here said about the acquired virtues applies equally to the state as a natural means, for the question is not whether the common good serves happiness, but whether, in a *de facto* consideration of man's nature, the common good itself can be naturally procured.[207]

We turn at once to the consideration of this theological problem in Section 4. Subsequently, in Section 5, we shall consider what is, in contrast, more properly a political question and for the philosopher—the problem of the state as a means to happiness, in view of the fact that the state seems justified in asking men to risk their lives for the common good. And finally, in Section 6, we shall try to show what bearing this whole discussion of happiness has upon the theory of Democracy.[208]

effect corresponding to the instrument's proper action precedes in the order of generation the effect which corresponds to the principal agent: for the cutting of the wood precedes the form of the bench, and digestion of food precedes the generation of flesh" (II *Cont. Gent.*, 21).

[207] We pointed out, in Part III, Section 1 (vd. *loc. cit.*, p. 130), that the order of three questions must be carefully observed: *whether natural happiness is* precedes the discussion of *what such happiness is*; and both are logically prior to the question, *how can it be attained?* It is important to stress the posteriority of this third question, because, no matter how it is answered, the prior proof that natural happiness is, and the prior analysis of what it is, stands unaltered. The same thing is true of beatitude. That it is and what it is are prior, in the order of understanding, to the more difficult, and also more practical, question concerning the means, their source, their availability, their use, etc.

[208] This order of topics conforms to the outline of Part III, given in the Preamble thereto. Vd. *loc. cit.*, pp. 129-130.

4. With respect to the dogma of man's fall from grace in consequence of original sin, there are two errors which must be avoided. The first is the error of supposing that fallen nature is *deprived merely* of the preternatural and supernatural gifts which man would retain so long as he deserved to remain in Eden. If one accepted the false supposition that integral human nature exists in this world, one would have no reason to doubt that man as he is has sufficient competence to acquire the natural virtues and to attain thereby the sort of happiness in this life which is his connatural end. If the fallen nature were in no way weakened or disordered, if original sin in no way interfered with the pursuit of natural goods—goods which are due to the nature—then we could proceed to discuss the attainment of natural happiness entirely in philosophical terms, and without any reference to theology.[209]

The second error consists in supposing that fallen nature is *entirely deprived* of its capacity for seeking the good. Those who hold this view use the word " corrupt " to signify a nature in which the inclination to virtue is not merely weakened or diminished by original sin, but completely destroyed. In terms of this false and pessimistic conception of man as he exists in the world, there could be no philosophical discussion of the pursuit of natural happiness, nor for that matter could the philosopher (even in the light of theology) consider the cooperation of natural with supernatural causes. The efficacy of natural causes being totally abolished, there could only be a theological account of moral acts in terms of a theory of grace which regarded grace as supplanting nature, rather than as elevating and restoring it. Error in the understanding of fallen nature necessarily leads to an erroneous conception of grace.

[209] On this interpretation, there could be no defense of Maritain's proposition that, adequately considered, moral and political philosophy must be subalternated to theology. Moral and political philosophy would be *incomplete* as practical knowledge because they dealt only with natural ends; but in treating such ends, and the means thereto, the philosopher could speak adequately, not only theoretically but practically, without appealing to anything but natural principles. Cf. fn. 161 *supra*. Vd. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, New York, 1940: pp. 161-176, 188-201.

The Thomistic interpretation of the consequences of original sin avoids both of these errors. To the question, whether sin diminishes the good of nature, St. Thomas replies:

> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.
>
> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz., the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Human acts produce an inclination to like acts. Now from the very fact that a thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary is necessarily diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.[209a]

In Thomistic terms, the two errors we have mentioned arise from failing to understand this threefold distinction among the goods of nature. The error at the pessimistic extreme seems to suppose that sin destroys the good of nature in the first sense, for so long as natural principles remain, such as reason and will, they must retain some efficacy as powers operating toward a connatural end—the end of virtue.[210] The error at the optimistic extreme seems to suppose that sin merely deprives man of the good of nature in the third sense, without in

[209a] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 1.

[210] "The good of nature that is diminished by sin is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely" (*Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 85, a. 2). Cf. *Ibid.*, a. 3; and also, II-II, q. 164. For a description of the state of innocence, in which human nature is elevated by original justice to a condition superior to the hypothetical condition of integrity apart from supernatural gifts, vd. *ibid.*, I, qq. 94-101.

any way having an effect on the inclination to virtue and virtue's end that is the tendency of nature's powers. And just as the one error leads to a false conception of grace, so the other results in a denial of the need for grace to enable men to achieve those goods which are their natural due.

Our task is to solve the problem which results from a proper understanding of fallen nature and its need for grace. When we use the word "corrupt" to refer to human nature as it exists in the world, we shall mean only what St. Thomas means in using this word, namely, a nature weakened and disordered by original sin; wounded in the sense that the efficacy of its natural powers is impaired; sinful in the sense that, as a result of its deordination from God, it is inclined to evil as well as to good.[211] And when, henceforth, we refer to a *de facto* consideration of man's life in the natural order, we shall mean a consideration of moral and political problems, not merely with reference to the *fact* of the fall, but in the light of that *interpretation* of the fact which denies man's competence to achieve natural happiness unaided, but does not withdraw all efficacy from natural causes. In contrast, by an *absolute* consideration we shall mean a discussion of means and ends in relation to human nature, *not as it is*, but on the *hypothesis* of an uncorrupted or integral condition.

We have already seen that there is no problem if fallen nature is simply nature deprived of supernatural habiliments,

[211] In regard to St. Thomas's use of the word "corrupt," vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 82, aa. 2, 4; q. 83, a. 4; q. 85, aa. 1, 2, 3; also q. 109, a. 2, subsequently quoted in our discussion of grace.

In regard to the precise character of the disorder or corruption which is due to original sin, vd. *IV Cont. Gent.*, 52: "Man was from the beginning so fashioned that, as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance, but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection, since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about, God by His grace would supply. Whereas no sooner did his reason turn away from God, than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul." Original justice consisted in the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason—"God supplying by grace that which nature lacked for this purpose." As a result of sin man not only forfeited this gift of grace (i. e., original justice), but also suffered an actual disorder in the powers of his specific human nature.

rather than nature suffering the loss of its own integrity. But it is equally true that no problem exists if the only ultimate good, the only last end *simpliciter*, is supernatural beatitude. In the first place, neither integral nor corrupted nature can achieve a supernatural end without supernatural means, in relation to which, as principal causes, all natural means must function instrumentally. And, in the second place, the incompetence of natural means with respect to a supernatural end is true in terms of an absolute mode of consideration, and quite apart from a *de facto* consideration of man's actual condition. Even with human nature in its integrity, the acquired cardinal virtues are not sufficient, by themselves, to help man achieve any greater good than his natural end. Since it is admitted that the fall does not destroy nature, but only weakens it, it remains within the power of fallen nature to achieve some of the partial goods which are objects of natural appetite. fallen nature is hindered only from obtaining *the whole good* which is its due. Now if the only whole of goods (i. e., the only last end, the only happiness) is supernatural beatitude, then man's natural condition may complicate his pursuit of happiness, but it does not generate a special problem, because such an end is not due his nature even in its integrity. The special problem we are considering, therefore, cannot be understood except in terms of two facts: first, the weakened condition of fallen nature, and second, a purely natural whole of goods which as constituting the happiness of temporal life is the end commensurate to nature in its integrity.[212]

[212] In carrying this discussion forward, we shall not mention supernatural contemplation in this life, which is strictly not a species of happiness, as are eternal beatitude and the perfection of a whole temporal life, but is rather an imperfect participation here and now of the beatific vision—what St. Thomas calls an "inchoate beatitude." Without supernatural causes, such contemplation would be impossible for human nature even in its integrity; in this respect it does not differ from what is truly the supernatural last end; and, therefore, it raises no special problem we need consider here.

It should be emphasized again that those who deny temporal happiness as *a perfect end in the natural order*, due to misconceptions about the objects of natural desire (vd. fn. 148 and 149a *supra*), must acknowledge that the incompetence of fallen nature becomes unintelligible for them. For the special incompe-

There is one further point to be observed, of major importance for the understanding of this problem. Suppose someone were still to say—in spite of all our efforts at proof to the contrary—that the common good (i. e., the *bonum communitatis*) is the only natural end in the temporal order, that beyond the common good there are only supernatural ends, whether in time or in eternity, and that the common good is an end *secundum quid* which, as intermediate, is ordained to serve these higher, but supernatural, goods. We mention this supposition, which is demonstrably false, for two reasons. In the first place, the aetiological problem is unaltered. Those who persist in this error must face, in terms of it, exactly the same problem that we do in terms of the truth about natural happiness, because *if* the common good is the supreme objective of man's natural activities (if it is the highest good which is commensurate with his nature in its integrity), *then* the wounded condition of fallen nature must impede its complete attainment, as much as that weakened condition makes the full achievement of natural happiness impossible. The incompetence of corrupt nature to obtain all the good that is due the integral nature bars man equally from procuring the common good in its perfection and from fulfilling his capacity for happiness. Both frustations flow from the same cause, i. e., the inability of fallen man perfectly to acquire the cardinal virtues (as interconnected) through the unaided exercise of his natural powers. To whatever extent the cardinal virtues cannot be perfectly acquired by fallen man, to that extent he is defeated in his efforts to realize the ideal common good of the political community, as much as in the pursuit of his individual happiness.[213]

tence of fallen nature must be understood in terms of its inability to achieve the whole good that is proportionate to nature in its integrity. If the integral nature had no connatural object—an end naturally attainable because commensurate with the full efficacy of natural means—then it could not be true that fallen nature is debarred from this proportionate good by the reduced efficacy of natural means. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 5, ad 3.

[213] Once it is admitted that the political order has a certain autonomy, and hence that the common good has a certain status as an end, albeit intermediate or *secundum quid*, the problem arises concerning the full accomplishment of this

This leads us to see, in the second place, that the crux of our problem is formulated by questions concerning the cardinal (*natural*) virtues. Can they be acquired by fallen man to any extent, or in any way, without supernatural aid? Can they be acquired perfectly with supernatural aid? In either case, is the natural end attainable in a proportionate degree? However these questions are answered, the answers apply to the efficacy of human efforts with respect to the common good as well as to happiness. Furthermore, in our *de facto* consideration of how man attains natural happiness, we can, for the time being, concentrate on the acquired virtues as principal means, because, though the state is also a principal (and productive) means to happiness and though the common good is a constitutive part thereof, both the state's good operation and the realization of its common good depend causally on the acquisition by individual men of the natural, cardinal virtues.[214]

With the problem focussed by these questions, we can now proceed to its solution in three stages: (1) by an *absolute* consideration of the acquired virtues as means; (2) by a *de facto* consideration of their acquisition; and (3) by an application of these analyses to the aetiology of fallen man's pursuit of natural happiness.

(1) Within the sphere of human habits which can be regarded as virtues, there are many grades of inequality. Although all virtuous habits are good, they are not good in a univocal sense.[215] There are two criteria in terms of which

purely natural good by fallen man. Unfortunately, those who tend to regard the common good as the ultimate end, both temporarily and naturally, sometimes fail to raise the question about its attainment with the same theological precision that they always apply to the accomplishment of a purely natural happiness in this life.

[214] The converse aetiological problem—how the state helps men to acquire the natural virtues—will be considered in Section 5 *infra*. In that analysis of causal dependence, we shall see how the state plays the role of a principal productive cause of natural happiness.

[215] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1: "When we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally, and to accident relatively. Such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things."

virtues can be distinguished as perfect and imperfect: according to the end they serve, and according to their status as habits. By reference to their ends, we distinguish the theological and the infused moral virtues as perfect, in comparison with all the acquired virtues as imperfect.[216] But within the sphere of the natural virtues (natural both as to end and acquisition), we distinguish the cardinal virtues as perfect, in comparison with the intellectual virtues (excepting prudence) as imperfect; and this distinction is partly by reference to end, and partly by reference to the mode of the habit itself: by reference to end in so far as the cardinal virtues make a man good simply, whereas the intellectual virtues make him good only in a certain respect; [217] by reference to the mode of the habit in so far as the intellectual virtues confer only an aptitude for good work, whereas the cardinal virtues are habitual inclinations toward the performance of good deeds.[218] Now with respect to the cardinal virtues which alone among all the natural virtues conform perfectly to the notion of virtue, there is still a further distinction according to their mode of being. For the cardinal virtues can either exist perfectly or imperfectly according as they are or are not interconnected. If any cardinal virtue is possessed in the absence of the others, it exists imperfectly, that is, it has the status of a disposition, easy to change, rather than of a habit, difficult to change.[219] And since mode of operation

[216] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 2; q. 63, aa. 3, 4; q. 51, a. 4. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 61, a. 5.

[217] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 56, a. 3; q. 57, a. 1.

[218] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 56, a. 3; q. 57, a. 1; q. 61, a. 1; q. 66, a. 3. What is here said is not inconsistent with the superiority of the intellectual virtues simply as habits of man's highest power.

[219] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, q. 65, a. 1: "Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance, for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected; since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well, and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected." Cf. *ibid.*, q. 58, a. 4, ad 3.

follows upon mode of being, cardinal virtues which exist imperfectly (in the status of dispositions) will function imperfectly as means to the end to which they are naturally ordained. Since it is possible for a virtue to be perfect, with respect to the end it serves (thus, each cardinal virtue is perfect in contrast to each intellectual virtue), and yet this perfect virtue may not exist or function perfectly (thus, one cardinal virtue in separation from the others is imperfect in status and operation), it is necessary to describe the adequate means to natural happiness as virtues perfect in both ways—i. e., the cardinal virtues existing perfectly through interconnection.[220]

From this analysis we reach certain conclusions concerning the causality of the acquired cardinal virtues. (a) They, and they alone, function as principal means to natural happiness,

[220] This analysis is confirmed and summarized by St. Thomas's account of three grades of virtue in *De Virt. Card.*, q. 1, a. 2. Here, neglecting entirely the intellectual virtues as essentially imperfect even with respect to the natural end, he sets up the following hierarchy: (1) moral virtues which, being disconnected, have only the status of dispositions; (2) the interconnected cardinal virtues; (3) the interconnected supernatural virtues. Although the first are imperfect by comparison with the second and the third, they are, in a sense, more perfect than the intellectual virtues because, even though they function dispositively, they dispose a man toward the whole natural good rather than merely confer an aptitude for some particular good work. The second grade of virtues (unlike the first which, being without prudence, "do not have the aspect of virtue perfectly") can be called "perfect by comparison with the human good." Nevertheless, he says, they are not perfect absolutely because they do not attain to the ultimate end, i. e., the supernatural as opposed to the natural end. "Therefore, they, too, are deficient in the true aspect of virtue," just as moral inclinations without prudence are deficient in the true aspect of virtue. Hence, the third grade of virtues, which are without any deficiency or imperfection, are those which are interconnected through charity (as the virtues of the second grade are interconnected through prudence), i. e., the theological virtues and the infused moral virtues. And St. Thomas concludes by saying: "Thus, if we take the virtues as absolutely perfect, they are connected because of charity, because no such virtue can be had without charity, and he who has charity has them all. But if we take the perfect virtues in the second grade with respect to the human good, thus they are connected through prudence, because without prudence no moral virtue is possible, nor can one have prudence if he be lacking in moral virtue. Nevertheless if we take the four cardinal virtues according as they import certain general conditions of virtue, it can also be said that they have connection from the fact that it does not suffice to any act of virtue that one of these conditions be present unless all are."

just as the supernatural and infused virtues are the principal means in this life toward the attainment of supernatural beatitude.[221] (b) The acquired cardinal virtues, when subalternated and elevated by the supernatural virtues, may also function as instrumental means toward supernatural ends.[222] (c) Operating as principal means toward natural happiness, the acquired cardinal virtues have two grades of efficacy, according as, through interconnection, they function perfectly, or as, through disconnection, they function imperfectly. (d) The only condition which must be satisfied as prerequisite to the perfect functioning of the acquired cardinal virtues as principal means to happiness is that they be interconnected with one another, whether this interconnection be viewed as a togethernesss of the moral virtues through a common dependence on prudence, or as a participation by each of the four cardinal virtues in the general conditions of virtue common to them all.[223] This last point is true, of course, only in the context of an absolute consideration of the virtues, but it is analytically important, nevertheless, to insist upon its truth in relation to human nature in its integrity; for to say that, absolutely considered, the perfect existence of the acquired virtues depends upon their being connected through charity would be to deny the absolute causal commensuration of natural means to their natural end.[224]

[221] The supernatural virtues are also, of course, the principal conditions prerequisite to the enjoyment of participated beatitude in this life, i. e., supernatural contemplation.

[222] "The virtue ordained to an inferior end does not produce an act ordained to a superior end except by the mediation of a superior virtue" (*De Virt. in Com.*, 10 ad 4). Maritain describes the instrumental cause as one "which, only exercising its own causality in the degree to which a superior agent makes use of it for its own end, produces an effect higher than its degree of specific being" (*True Humanism*, New York, 1938: p. 143). Cf. fn. 206 *supra*.

[223] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, aa. 3, 4; q. 65, a. 1. Cf. fn. 220 *supra*.

[224] Observing the distinction between perfect and imperfect virtue in terms of ordination to a supernatural or a natural last end, St. Thomas plainly says that the imperfect virtues can be without charity. "It is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man; and when they are thus acquired, they can be without charity,

(2) But the question arises whether the natural virtues can be perfectly acquired by man in the actual condition of his nature. The foregoing analysis merely tells us, absolutely speaking, what is required for a perfect existence of the natural virtues and, hence, for their perfect functioning as means toward the attainment of natural happiness. It does not tell us whether by the unaided exercise of his powers man is able to acquire the natural virtues perfectly and so attain his natural end completely. We must pass, therefore, to a *de facto* consideration of fallen man's competence in the sphere of natural goods.

Let us observe the theologian's answer to this question. Considering whether man can *will* or *do* any good without grace, St. Thomas says:

even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly, and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 2). The argument for this last point turns on the relation between the infused moral virtues and infused prudence, which parallels the relation between the acquired moral virtues and acquired prudence. Since prudence with respect to a supernatural last end cannot be apart from a rectification of the will toward this end, and since such rectification requires charity, "it is evident, therefore, that neither can infused prudence be without charity, nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence." Here St. Thomas is referring only to infused prudence and the infused moral virtues as dependent for their coexistence upon charity. He is not considering here whether fallen man is competent to acquire the moral virtues perfectly, i. e., as interconnected with one another through acquired prudence. The *de facto* consideration of these matters belongs to the treatise on grace. In the treatise on the virtues, St. Thomas proceeds analytically in Question 65 to define the connection of different types of virtue *inter se*: in Article 1 he is making the same point that Aristotle made in the *Ethics*, VI, 13, namely, that the acquired moral virtues exist perfectly only when they are connected with one another and with prudence; and in Article 2 he undertakes a parallel analysis of the infused moral virtues, which depend not only upon infused prudence but upon charity. In neither case does he raise the question whether, without grace, men can acquire the natural virtues perfectly. In fact, his remark about the Gentiles—many of whom, he seems to say, were able without charity to acquire moral virtues productive of good works directed to a natural end—must be interpreted in the light of what is said later in the treatise on grace. It cannot mean that the natural virtues can, in fact, be perfectly acquired apart from grace. It must be understood hypothetically: if the natural virtues could be so acquired without grace, they could exist perfectly without charity.

Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever. But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, such as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfill it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as the sick man can of himself make movements yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured. And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz., in order to do and to wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz., in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.[224a]

There are three points here which must be carefully distinguished. The first point is that, apart from grace, nature needs Divine help in order to accomplish its own work. As in physics we understand all natural causes to be secondary causes which always depend upon the cooperation of the First Cause, so in moral matters we must regard all natural means as secondary, even when they function as principal means toward a natural end. A secondary principal means is not an instrumental means. It can be a principal means, just as a natural cause can be a principal cause, though both are secondary in relation to the First Cause upon which they depend. This fundamental metaphysical truth applies to the efficacy of human nature in a condition of integrity as well as of deficiency.

[224a] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

Moreover, the Divine help here being considered is not the same as the addition of grace to human nature, whereby it is healed or elevated, for this mode of Divine help extends to every natural thing in so far as it operates naturally in any way or condition.[225]

The second point is that man needs Divine assistance in order to do works of surpassing good, that is, works beyond the efficacy of his natural powers, and through such works to attain supernatural happiness. Man needs such assistance both in a state of integrity and in his corrupt condition, for in neither case is nature adequate to the accomplishment of a supernatural end. God gives man such assistance by the gift of grace. Through the infusion of supernatural virtues, "gratuitous strength is superadded to natural strength" so that man "can do and wish supernatural good." This is the primary function of grace: to elevate nature to what is above it. And since the supernatural good is above nature both in its integrity and its deficiency, this mode of elevation is required by man in either condition.

The third point is that human nature in its present deficiency needs Divine assistance in order to achieve the good that is proportionate to man in his integrity. This is a secondary function of grace: to elevate, not nature, but *fallen* nature, to the level from which it declined through sin. Here gratuitous strength must be superadded to deficient natural strength as a therapeutic or restorative measure. The healing power of grace is needed only by fallen man; and only in the case of fallen man does grace perform both functions—enabling him to reach an

[225] It is in the light of this point that we must understand what St. Thomas means when he says "it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end by means of his natural principles, *albeit not without the Divine assistance*" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 1). The clause we have italicized refers to Divine assistance only in the sense of the cooperation of the First Cause with secondary causes; whereas, in contrast, the aid which man receives from God in the way of "additional principles whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness" is the gift of grace, for thus man is elevated to an end beyond his powers, not merely sustained in their natural operations.

end *absolutely* beyond his powers, and restoring the vigor he needs to pursue natural happiness, which is beyond his powers only *relatively*, i. e., relative to the defect of his powers as the result of sin.

Since we are here concerned with the attainment of natural happiness by fallen man, the third point alone requires further analysis. We have distinguished two modes of elevation by grace: on the one hand, the elevation of nature, integral or defective, to the plane of supernatural goods; on the other hand, the elevation of fallen nature to the plane of natural goods. This second mode of elevation differs from the first in that fallen nature is not totally incompetent with respect to natural goods, as nature in any condition is completely incompetent with respect to supernatural goods. The effect of grace, in this second mode, is to make it possible for fallen nature to " do *all* the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing." Emphasis must be placed on the word " all " because, as St. Thomas points out, " human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good." Even in a state of corrupted nature, man can, by the unaided exercise of his natural powers, achieve *some* of the goods which are his due. Now natural happiness consists, as we have seen, in the possession of *all* natural goods. Hence, it follows that natural happiness cannot be perfectly achieved by fallen man unless the efficacy of his powers is restored by grace. Postponing an examination of the full significance of this fact, let us interpret it aetiologically. The perfect achievement of natural happiness depends on the perfect possession of the acquired virtues. The fact that man cannot achieve natural happiness without grace must mean that, unless his natural powers are restored to their true vigor by grace, he cannot through their exercise acquire the natural virtues perfectly. It must mean also that without grace man can acquire the natural virtues imperfectly (i. e., in some degree of disconnection and, hence, as having the status of dispositions in some degree of stability less than that of true *habitus*). In short, although the acquired virtues, absolutely considered, can be connected and exist perfectly

apart from grace and charity, a *de facto* consideration of man's infirmity as the result of sin reveals the causal dependence of human powers upon the restorative efficacy of grace for competence to acquire the natural virtues perfectly.[226]

The two ways in which grace elevates fallen nature correspond to two modes of causality on the part of the acquired virtues. With respect to the supernatural end, the conjunction of the infused with the acquired virtues confers upon the latter an instrumental causality which they could not have by themselves even as perfectly existing. With respect to the natural end, the conjunction of the infused with the acquired virtues restores the latter to the vigor of that principal causality which properly belongs to these means in a condition of natural integrity. In addition to these two, we must recognize one other sort of causality on the part of the acquired virtues. Apart from the infused virtues, the acquired virtues, to whatever extent they exist imperfectly, function as principal means with respect to the natural end, albeit inadequately. By reason of what they are, they cannot exist in any degree without having some causal efficacy, even though it falls short of sufficient virtue to obtain the whole temporal good of man. To attribute principal causality to the acquired virtues does not deny their dependence on the First Cause.[227] It is only to say that that is their primary mode of causality, whether it is exercised inadequately apart from the infused virtues, or adequately with the help of grace.[228]

[226] Vd. fn. 224 *supra*. We thus concur in the conclusion which M. Maritain has reached concerning this problem (vd. *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 145-154), but we disagree with his interpretation of the relevant Thomistic texts. The two articles in the treatise on virtue (65, 1, 2) do not support this conclusion because there St. Thomas is engaged in an absolute consideration of the natural and the infused virtues, in which mode of consideration there is no causal dependence of the one upon the other. The authority of St. Thomas in support of this conclusion is rather to be found in the treatise on grace (109, 2), where the mode of consideration is *de facto*. Cf. Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 224 ff.

[227] Vd. fn. 225 *supra*.

[228] Cf. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 210-16. The two ways in which moral philosophy is subalternated by moral theology parallel the double subalternation of the acquired by the infused virtues. On the one hand, moral philosophy is

(3) We can now make explicit two conclusions which have already been indicated. These conclusions answer our main question, whether man as he actually is can attain natural happiness in this life. Both answers are affirmative. The first is that, with grace, natural happiness is completely attainable.[229] The second is that, without grace, natural happiness is attainable *in some degree short of completeness*, that degree being proportionate to whatever degree of efficacy the acquired virtues possess in their imperfect mode of existence part from the infused virtues and charity. Nothing need be added to what has already been said in order to certify the first of these conclusions, though certain difficulties surrounding it must be resolved. Before we attempt that, however, let us be sure that the significance of the second conclusion is clear, and that its truth is evident.

The truth of the second conclusion follows from the fact that, in the words of St. Thomas, " human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good." That the virtues which can be acquired by fallen nature, apart from grace, have only the imperfect status of dispositions, does not deprive them of all causal efficacy but only of their adequacy as means. To whatever extent a man is able to acquire true virtues, he posseses the means for living a good human life. According as a man is more or less virtuous, so will he lead a more or less happy life. Fully to understand the point that is here involved, it is necessary to observe a distinction between natural and supernatural happiness with respect

instrumentally employed by the theologian in the consideration of those practical truths, concerning ends and means, which belong to faith alone; on the other hand, moral philosophy becomes practically adequate as the principal discipline for dealing with natural truths in the practical order only when it is guided by the light of faith. Vd. *ibid.*, pp. 174-205, 217-20. Cf. fn. 161 and 209 *supra*.

[229] Cf. " A Dialectic of Morals," in *The Review of Politics*, III, 3, p. 381. " If grace makes possible the integral possession of the natural virtues, then it not only enables a man to direct his life toward a supernatural end, but also enables him to possess natural virtue in such a way that the temporal happiness, due his nature, can be achieved. With God's help a man can live well on earth if, but for the grace of God, he cannot " (*ibid.*, fn. 43).

to existence in degrees. Between salvation and perdition, there is an absolute discontinuity, an infinite gap, though it remains true, of course, that there are gradations of both blessedness and damnation. But in the sphere of natural happiness, there is a continuum of degrees between the most happy and the most unhappy of human lives. The finite whole of goods which constitutes natural happiness can be more or less possessed in the course of a complete life, precisely because *it is a whole and can be approximated by the accumulation of partial goods.* The less happy man is not separated from the more happy man by the chasm which divides Hell from Heaven. In the natural order, the metaphysical truth that everything has as much goodness as it has being can be given moral significance. In proportion as a man fulfills his capacities for *human being* through the acquisition of virtue, to that degree he is not only good as a man but is able to lead a good life. In the natural order, and apart from grace, there is no distinction *in kind* between happiness and unhappiness, but only a difference *in degree* between the more and the less happy, or the less and the more unhappy. It may be objected, however, that the factor of grace introduces a distinction in kind between men who, enabled to have the natural virtues perfectly, achieve natural happiness completely, and men who, unable to acquire virtue except imperfectly, can never attain *all* temporal goods. This must be granted. But then it will be said that, since happiness consists in the possession of all good things, there is an absolute distinction between happiness and unhappiness in the natural dimension of human life; moreover, this accords with the fact that there is a distinction in kind between the status of habit, which the acquired virtues can have when nature is restored by grace, and the status of disposition above which they cannot rise without grace. All this must be admitted, and yet the point remains because the distinction " in kind " here noted is not like the separation between the blessed and the damned. In the natural order, this distinction becomes another sort of distinction in degree, for the contrast is only between a *complete* and an *incomplete* attainment of the same end. Moreover,

with grace as without grace, all men do not have acquired virtue to the same degree. Hence, to our original statement (that, without grace, human life can be more or less *incompletely* happy) we must now add that, with grace, men can be more or less *completely* happy.[230]

We must now return to the first conclusion, in order to complete this phase of our discussion by considering a difficulty that attaches to it. It would appear that, with the help of grace, a man is able to work for two last ends concurrently—natural happiness and eternal beatitude. But these two last ends are irreducibly two in the sense that natural happiness is not an intermediate end, i. e., not a means to supernatural happiness.[231] How shall we understand this duality of ends within the unity of Christian moral life? There are several ways in which an answer can be formed. In the first place, we should remember that the duality of ends corresponds to the

[230] This conclusion is confirmed by a consideration of the absurdity to which its denial reduces us. The common good of the political community is a work of the acquired virtues. Now let us suppose that when the acquired virtues do not exist perfectly, through the restoration of nature by grace, they are incompetent to work for the common good *in any degree*, whence it would follow that the common good must exist in some degree of completeness or not at all. But, then, how shall we understand the existence of ancient pagan cities and modern secular states? To understand the obvious facts of history, we must see that the common good can exist either *completely* or *incompletely*, and in either case in some degree. To whatever extent a population possesses the acquired virtues, apart from grace, to that extent it is able to work for and establish the common good in some degree of incomplete attainment. The superiority of what might be called a Christian state is relative to the inferiority, not to the non-existence, of other political communities, as it would have to be if the common good could not be incompletely established in some degree by the operation of the natural virtues, acquired imperfectly in the absence of grace. The force of this *reductio ad absurdum* applies to natural happiness, as well as to the common good, for both are ends achieved by the exercise of natural virtue. Cf. fn. 274 *infra*.

This conclusion may also throw some light on what St. Thomas meant when he spoke of the natural happiness which many Gentiles enjoyed as a result of acquired virtue. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 2. Cf. fn. 224 *supra*. It was an approximation to natural happiness, corresponding to the way in which virtues having the status of dispositions approximate the operative efficacy of virtues having the status of habits.

[231] Cf. Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 179-80. Cf. *True Humanism*, pp. 13-14, 169-71.

dualism of the natural and supernatural orders, in both of which the man of grace is simultaneously engaged, for grace does not abolish nature, but restores it to its own vigor as well as elevates it beyond its created power.[232] In the second place, we should observe that, although the natural end is not ordained as a means to the supernatural end, it is nevertheless subordinate thereto as an inferior to a superior good. Furthermore, there can be no conflict between those two ends, of the sort which might occur if one required acts that would impede the attainment of the other.[233] In the third place, we should note how the unity of the moral life is preserved by the fact that it is through the operation of the same virtues that a Christian works simultaneously for two distinct ends. The acquired and the infused virtues cooperate, though not in the same way, as means toward both the natural and the supernatural end: toward the natural end, the natural virtues functioning *principally*, the supernatural virtues rendering them efficacious in this work; toward the supernatural end, the supernatural virtues functioning prinicipally, the natural virtues serving *instrumentally*, elevated by conjunction with superior causes.[234]

[232] "Nature elevated by grace above itself does not therefore lose its natural activities and ends, and human nature is not just exalted in any fashion, but is raised to a formal participation in the uncreated life. There are two worlds of different kinds. In the compound of animal nature and reason and grace which makes up human life, two different worlds—the world of nature and the world of (participated) Deity—meet and interpenetrate one another" (Maritain, *Science and Wisdom*, pp. 179-80).

[233] The dualism here is not the Averroistic enormity of two autonomous realms—reason and faith—which exist together in man's life without being thoroughly harmonious with one another. The Thomistic disposal of the fallacy of "two truths" applies to a fallacious conception of "two ends." Vd. *I Cont. Gent.*, 7. Both sorts of truth, that of reason and that of faith, come from God, though one is acquired naturally and the other is received supernaturally; hence, from the fact that both are true, and that both are from God, we must conclude, says St. Thomas, that there can never be any conflict between them. Similarly, since both ends are good, since any goodness which man can enjoy, whether by natural accession or supernatural gift, is by Divine allotment, it follows that there can be no conflict between the pursuit of natural happiness and the good works which merit salvation, when both are performed through the help of grace.

[234] In terms of this, we can understand Maritain's remark that, "man only orders his life effectively to his natural last end if he keeps his eye also on his

Such things can be said to answer the question, but nothing can be said which will completely remove the mystery that confronts us. We cannot penetrate sufficiently into the union of grace and nature, the cooperation of natural and supernatural causes, fully to understand how a single moral act can, despite its atomic singleness, be at once a motion toward two ends which are irreducibly two. Nor should we expect to fathom this mystery, for it lies in the mysterious nature of grace itself, as a principal cause, employing the instrumentality of natural causes. The obdurateness of this mystery signifies that we have reached the limits of analysis, not that analysis has failed to yield its proper fruits. The conclusions which solve the problem of how natural happiness is attained by fallen man are not invalidated by the fact that they entail consequences which are not, and cannot be, completely intelligible to us.[235]

5. Natural happiness being attainable, what part does the state play as a means? We are asking this question in abstraction from the variety and gradation of political forms. The question here is not whether one form of good government is a

supernatural last end" (*Science and Wisdom*, p. 182). The remark should, perhaps, be completed by saying that a man must keep his eye on his natural last end in order to direct his life effectively to his supernatural last end. A full understanding of the sinfulness of suicide will illuminate this point. There is a natural goodness about human life which we are not permitted to discard wantonly, even if our motive be to sacrifice a lesser for a greater happiness. Salvation itself can be *inordinately* desired, and such excessive, and hence sinful, zeal arises from a failure to render to each last end what is its due. There is, in short, an irreducible tension in human life between the spiritual and the temporal, the supernatural and the natural. As Maritain says, there is "in the soul itself and in the moral life of the person two zones or domains corresponding to the classical distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, between the kingdom of God and the 'political' world or the world of culture" (*Science and Wisdom*, p. 213). Cf. *True Humanism*, p. 129; *The Things That Are Not Caesar's*, New York, 1931: pp. 5 ff., 83-84, 173; *Scholasticism and Politics*, New York, 1940: pp. 225-228.

It may be said that what is here required of man—that he keep his eyes at once on two ends so radically divergent in plane—must result in a sort of moral strabismus or, even worse, schizophrenia. That man can remain clear in vision and one in soul despite these demands upon him is the mystery of the unity formed by grace and nature.

[235] Vd. Part III, Section 1, *supra, loc. cit.*, p. 131.

better means to natural happiness than another, but rather what causality any type of just political regime is able to exercise in serving ultimate ends. To answer this question, we must consider the state in relation to the causes we have already discussed.

Like the acquired virtues, the state can function only as an instrumental means toward supernatural ends (either supernatural contemplation in this life, or beatitude), and then only as subalternated to and ministerially used by the church. The The state is related to the church, in the sphere of extrinsic causes, as the acquired natural virtues are related to the infused and supernatural virtues, in the sphere of intrinsic causes. Among extrinsic causes, the church alone can function as a principal means toward supernatural ends. But with respect to natural happiness, the state is a principal means, cooperating with the natural virtues in a complex pattern of reciprocal causality.

We must remember, in the first place, that the state is both an end and a means. As an end, the state is the common good, existential or ideal, and virtuous political activity is required for its procurement or enhancement.[236] As a means, the state, like the virtues, is both a constitutive means and a productive means to happiness. It is a constitutive means in so far as the common good is itself a partial good, responding to man's natural desire for social life; the enjoyment of social goods is as indispensable a part of human happiness as the possession of health and wealth, the enjoyment of pleasure and knowledge.[237]

[236] The incompetence of fallen nature apart from grace is, of course, as critical a fact with respect to the achievement of the common good, as with respect to natural happiness. Cf. fn. 230 *supra*. In so far as the church plays the role of an extrinsic cause cooperating with the infused and supernatural virtues, and in so far as both together are indispensable for the restoration of fallen nature to competence, the church is itself a cause, though indirectly, of the state's well-being and advancement. The common good of purely secular states must, therefore, be a diminished good, as natural happiness attained through purely natural means must be an incomplete perfection. Cf. Maritain, *Scholasticism and Politics*, pp. 83-88, 100-101; and Ch. VIII, IX.

[237] It should be obvious at once that we are viewing the same good in two aspects when we regard the state as an intermediate end (i. e., the common good

It is a productive means in so far as the institutions and agencies of government operate as efficient causes either to provide certain goods which are indispensable parts of happiness or to facilitate and support the operation of the virtues as the intrinsic, the direct, productive causes of a good human life. There is no difficulty in understanding the way in which the state works with respect to the provision and distribution of economic goods, the care and maintenance of health, the availability of pleasures through an amplitude of recreational facilities. Nor is there any difficulty about the state's agency in the sphere of intellectual virtues, for by its educational program it cultivates, and by its cultural institutions it encourages, knowledge and art. But there is a problem about the state's causality with respect to the cardinal virtues for two reasons: first, because the well-being of the state itself depends causally upon the exercise of these virtues by the primary political agents who must work to maintain and improve the common good; and second, because the state by itself is not adequate, even as an extrinsic cause, in the formation of the cardinal virtues.

The first of these difficulties is resolved by the fact that the state is not cause and effect with respect to the same elements in its population. It operates as a cause primarily with respect to the morally immature members of its population, those who are still in the process of character formation. Neglecting here its repressive and corrective enforcement of the laws against vicious disturbers of the public peace, we need only recognize the way in which the state, through every variety of political regulation, contributes to the training of the young, in order to understand how the state is productive of the cardinal virtues in an inchoate form.[238] When individuals pass from immaturity to maturity—which is measured morally by the transition from

to be achieved), and as a constitutive means (i. e., the common good as an essential element in the order of goods which constitutes happiness).

[238] For a fuller discussion of "inchoate virtue" as a stage in the acquisition of true and perfect virtue, and as the precise locus of the state's efficiency as a productive means, vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, pp. 383-85.

inchoate to genuine virtue—they become responsible political agents, and the causality is reversed: the state which served them as a means, working for their moral development, now profits as an end which they, in turn, serve by a virtuous dedication of their efforts to the common good.

The second difficulty is partly solved by the distinction, already noted, between the moral virtues in an inchoate condition and as genuinely formed. The virtues are genuinely formed, whether imperfectly or perfectly, only through the exercise of reason on the part of the individual agent. Not only must each individual acquire virtuous habits through his own good acts, but for the habits formed to be genuinely virtuous, the acts must follow the rule of reason which that individual himself actively exercises and applies. Good acts can be performed, however, under extrinsic regulation by the reason of another, supported by persuasive or coercive force (i. e., rewards and punishments). When they are so executed and oft repeated, they generate inchoate virtues (dispositions of the appetite toward right ends), and this formation enables prudence gradually to emerge when the reason of the individual becomes competent in the choice of means. The inchoate virtues are, in short, a preparation for the acquisition of genuine virtue through an intrinsic rule of reason.[239] The mission of the state with respect to the formation of the cardinal virtues can go no further than this work of preparation. That follows from its mode of operation as an extrinsic cause. But even so its efficiency is inadequate. It needs the cooperation of two other institutions: so far as a purely natural acquisition of virtue is concerned, it needs the help of the domestic community in this work of preparation (i. e., the work of training the immature and so generating the inchoate dispositions toward virtue); and so far as fallen nature is incompetent to acquire virtue perfectly, it needs the help of the church

[239] If inchoate virtue were not a stage in the acquisition of genuine virtue, the circular causality that is set up by the dependence of the moral virtues upon prudence and the dependence of prudence on the moral virtues, could not be circumvented. Vd. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, in fn. 238 *supra*.

through whose ministry grace is available to men. The relation between the state and the family is that of cooperating factors which belong to the same order of natural causes. But church and state do not cooperate as causes belonging to the same order, for each is ordained to a distinct ultimate end. The relation between state and church, as extrinsic causes, parallels the relation between the natural and the supernatural virtues. Just as the acquired virtues become adequate as principal means to natural happiness only through conjunction with the infused virtues, so the state becomes adequate as a principal means (in its own sphere of extrinsic, productive causality) only through conjunction with the church. As thus subalternated to and elevated by the church, it remains a principal means to its own proper end (i. e., natural happiness); it does not become merely an instrumental means toward the supernatural end which defines the mission of the church.[240]

[240] More than any contemporary thinker, Maritain has made clear this double relation between church and state. Each cooperates with the other in respect to that other's proper end, toward which that other works as a principal means. As cooperating with the church toward supernatural ends, the state functions instrumentally; as cooperating with the state toward the natural end of temporal happiness, the church functions through the ministry of grace to restore natural causes to their full competence. Cf. *True Humanism*, Ch. II, VI. It is doubtful, however, whether the ideal of good order among these causes has ever been fully realized in the concrete embodiments of history. As Maritain points out, mediaeval Christendom tended in practice to subordinate the secular arm primarily to the performance of its instrumental functions. "In the mediaeval order the things that are Caesar's, while being clearly distinguished from the things that are God's, filled to a large extent a *ministerial* function with regard to them: to this extent they were *instrumental causes* with regard to the sacred, and their proper end ranked as a means, in relation to eternal life" (*True Humanism*, p. 143). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 169-171. To this extent mediaeval Christendom was defective as a culture, slighting natural happiness as a finite and imperfect final end, and the role of the acquired virtues as principal means within the autonomous order of natural goods. Modern secular culture embodies, of course, the exactly opposite error, both in theory and practice. Through its denial of supernatural ends, and the principal means thereto, it is defective in a much more crucial respect.

Whether Maritain's dream of a new Christendom will ever be realized on earth is difficult to judge. The ideal he has in mind calls for so delicate a balance between disparate factors, so just an appraisal of temporal and eternal values, and such understanding of the mystery of grace and nature, that one may be permitted to

The role of the state as a means to happiness (both as a constitutive part thereof, and as productive of, or cooperative with, its other conditions) is now clear. Its peculiar inadequacies as a productive means present no further difficulties, but its limitations must be remembered. The state cannot be expected to have greater efficacy than properly belongs to it as a natural and an extrinsic cause.

A difficulty does arise, however, from another quarter; in fact, a difficulty so great that it has led many to be satisfied with an easy half-truth. The state, it would seem, can become an obstacle to the individual's pursuit of happiness. Does it not rightly demand the sacrifice of individual goods for the sake of the common good? Do not virtuous men feel called upon to lay down their lives for their country's welfare, thus apparently setting its continued well-being above the happiness of a completely rounded life? If these things are so, how can we say that the state is a means to the happiness of its individual members, that the common good is only an intermediate end in the temporal order? But one must also ask, in the light of the truth about natural happiness, how one can say that the common good is anything but a partial good, or that the state is not a means ordained by its very nature to individual happiness as its end. The contradictory answers which these questions seem to elicit generate an antinomy in the natural order—an apparent conflict between the claims of the individual and the state, happiness and the common good, to take precedence over each other.[241] Failure to solve this antinomy has

despair of its human achievement, though one may also continue to hope that its fulfillment is intended, and will be brought into being, by Providence.

[241] This antinomy is more perplexing than the one which M. Maritain has frequently discussed, *because it is entirely in the natural order.* In terms of his distinction between the individual and the person, he has been able to subordinate the individual to the state with respect to temporal goods, and the state to the person with respect to supernatural and extra-temporal goods. Vd. *True Humanism,* pp. 127-130; *The Things That Are Not Caesar's,* pp. 125 ff.; *Three Reformers,* New York, 1932: pp. 20-24, 193-195; *Freedom in the Modern World,* New York, 1936: pp. 47-53; *Scholasticism and Politics,* pp. 67-77. But we are here dealing with a conflict between purely natural goods, because the happiness which claims to take

led men to the violent extremes of either individualism or totalitarianism; and the resultant controversy is made bitter by the fact that each extreme holds on to a half-truth which it cannot, and should not, surrender, but which it must not exaggerate into the whole truth at the expense of denying the complementary part. That, of course, is precisely what happens when the totalitarian, rightly demanding the sacrifice of individual goods and the risk of lives for the state's welfare, denies that individual happiness matters at all (unless it be nothing but the idolatrous joy of mystic union with the state); and when the individualist, on his side, rightly affirms that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are ends which the state must serve, but (with the folly of anarchism) comes to regard the state as an evil thing, encroaching upon the individual because it asks a price for its services. There is no choice between these extremes, even though the totalitarian position becomes increasingly objectionable as it tends to make a travesty of the common good, and even though the individualist, usually less of a villain at heart, has caught an essential truth in his caricature of Democracy—the truth that all men have, by nature, temporal rights above the state. There is no choice because nothing less than the whole truth is enough, either in theory or in practice. But if we will not be satisfied with half-truths, we must resolve the antinomy which shatters the whole into irreconcilable fragments. The contradiction we have indicated must be shown to be *merely apparent*. Without any appeal to supernatural fulfillments, we must see man as an end and as a means, and the state as a means and an end, each ordered to the other in such a way that natural happiness remains the last end in the temporal order, while the common good, though only an intermediate end, retains a value which imposes obligations upon the individual, even to the risk of life itself.

Here, as always, an apparent contradiction is resolved by making distinctions and by specifying the diverse respects in

precedence over the common good is as truly natural and temporal as the common good itself. Vd. fn. 258 *infra*.

which a thing can have manifold relations. Our prior analysis of the common good,[242] has already provided the distinctions needed for a partial resolution of the antinomy—partial in the sense that it takes care of every aspect of the problem except one, and that one presents the most difficult case. Let us briefly state this partial resolution in order to concentrate on the special case which calls for special treatment.

What is called an " individual good " must be understood in two senses: (a) as individual because it perfects the being of a single man or his life; (b) as individual because it is an accidental good, relative to this man's individual differences in power or circumstance, rather than a good which this man shares with all others because of their common human nature. What is called " the common good " must be understood in two senses: (a) as common because it perfects the well-being of the community as such, the organized multitude of men rather than any individual man; (b) as common because it is an essential good, relative to man's specific nature, rather than an accidental good which belongs to this man alone in his individual difference from all others. Now it is obvious at once that a good may be individual in sense (a), and also common in sense (b). Such a good is happiness, which is the same for all men and yet is the perfection of each of them individually, and not of them as an organized multitude. And all the essential parts of happiness are common goods in this sense; moreover, all the constitutive parts of happiness, except *the common good* (i. e., the *bonum communitatis* which is a good common in both senses of the word), are also individual goods in that, like happiness itself, they perfect the being or life of an individual. And in so far as even *the common good* is enjoyed by individuals as a constitutive part of their happiness, it is an individual good in this sense.

By what principle is any good ordered to any other, subordinated thereto, subject to sacrifice therefor? There are two such ordering principles: (1) that an inferior good be subordinated to a superior good, and if there ever be conflict

[242] Vd. Part II, *supra, loc. cit.*, pp. 598-607.

between the lesser and the greater good, the former must, of course, be sacrificed; (2) that a means be ordered to its end, in such wise that the means be sought no further than it serves the end.

Now, according to the first principle, all accidental goods are ordered to essential goods. It is permissible to seek accidental goods only in so far as they in no way impede the pursuit of essential goods, or encroach upon their continued possession. Accidental goods are entirely superfluous; no natural rights are founded in them. In this sense, and only in this sense, *individual* goods (*qua accidental*) are ordered to *the common good* (*qua essential*). But in this sense, it must also be said that, quite apart from *the common good*, which is only one of the essential human goods, each individual, in the pursuit of his own happiness, must be prepared to sacrifice such accidental goods if they in any way interfere with his obtaining the essential constituents of the whole of goods in which his happiness consists. One example will make this clear. Wealth is an essential component of happiness, but not in *any* quantity. A sufficiency of external goods is indispensable for life itself, and hence for a good life. But beyond that sufficiency, any excess in quantity of wealth is superfluous to *man as man*, though such an excess may appear to be good to this individual, according to his peculiar desires and circumstances. Not wealth *per se* but any quantity of wealth which exceeds the human need for sufficiency is an accidental good, relative in its goodness to individual, not specific human, needs. Hence in the pursuit of his own happiness, each individual must seek wealth only to a degree that is proportionate to its place in the order of goods constituting the whole; and if excessive wealth or undue desire for external goods ever stands in the way of obtaining any other essential good, such superfluous wealth must be readily sacrificed or the inordinate desire must be rectified so that the order of desires conforms to the order of goods (i. e., of desirables). Similarly, if excessive individual possession of wealth in any way impairs the common good of the political community, the individual can claim no right for this purely accidental good

against the paramount right of the community to so appropriate or apportion eternal goods (by taxation, regulation, etc.) that the welfare of the state be preserved or advanced. The principle which justifies this sacrifice of the individual to the common good is here the same as in the pursuit of happiness: accidental goods are superfluous and individuals can indulge in their possession only so long as they do not interfere with the attainment of essential goods. The only difference is that, in the one case, the individual is morally obliged to order his own desires by this principle, whereas, in the other case, the state has the extrinsic authority to enforce such just demands upon its members.

According to the second principle, all partial goods must be subordinated to the whole of goods, because partial goods are constitutive means to the possession of the whole, and hence no partial good should be sought beyond the point where it serves this end. This principle applies to the ordering of essential goods, according as they are partial and means, or the whole and the end. In terms of it, *the common good* is ordered to *happiness*, as the lesser to the greater good, the part to the whole, as well as by reason of the fact that the state is also a productive means, an extrinsic efficient cause, of happiness, and must, therefore, be ordered to its end. To prefer the common good to happiness is the same type of error, though not as egregious, as preferring health to happiness. No such question of preference should ever arise, however, because if each partial good is desired only so far as it is essential to happiness, and not in any accidental excess, there will be no conflict between the parts and the whole. For this reason, we need not speak here of *sacrificing* the common good to happiness, as before we stated the conditions under which accidental goods must be sacrificed, e. g., when such an individual good as wealth in accidental excess impedes the common good, it must be sacrificed to the maintenance of that essential good.

All of this can be summarized in language which reveals the oversimplification of the traditional formula, namely, that the good of the whole is greater than the good of the part, and

hence that the latter must be ordained to the former. In this formula, " whole " usually stands for community, and " part " for an individual human being. But what is usually forgotten is that the " good of the whole " in this sense is a partial good, and that there is one " good of the part " (i. e., happiness) which is the whole of goods. The truth being complex, it can be fully expressed only by saying that the whole good of each part (the happiness of each man) is greater than the partial good which is the good of the whole (the community), though such goods of the parts as are uniquely individual (accidental) are inferior and must be sacrificed to any partial good which is essential (such as the good of the whole, i. e., the common good) and certainly to happiness itself (which is the whole of goods).[243]

When the truth is so stated, is the antinomy resolved? If the state never called upon its members to sacrifice anything but accidental goods in its behalf, no problem would remain. But the facts are otherwise. There seem to be circumstances in which the state asks men to jeopardize their health and even their lives for the common good. If this demand is just—*and let us concede at once that it is*—then it would appear that the common good takes precedence over happiness, for if a man endanger his health and risk his life for the common good, he would seem to be foregoing the pursuit of happiness (which requires health and certainly life). Such sacrifice could be regarded as just only if the common good were greater than the happiness of this individual or that. But, according to the analysis of goods we have made so far, that is false. Hence the antinomy persists if it is true, on the one hand, that individual happiness is always paramount over the common good, and if it is just, on the other hand, for the state to ask individuals to surrender their hold upon goods or conditions essential to the pursuit of happiness. We have, however, succeeded in focussing the issue in a way that may help us to solve the antinomy, for we now see that the claims of individual and state conflict only under very special circumstances—in fact, only under condi-

[243] Vd. Part II, *supra*, fn. 58; Part III, *supra*, fn. 120, 130, 169.

tions that can be described as emergencies in which the very endurance of the state is threatened by the *vis major* of natural cataclysms (such as earthquakes, epidemics, etc.) or by the violence of that man-made catastrophe which is martial aggression.[244]

Let us examine briefly a few obvious cases of civic emergency. During a serious epidemic, which endangers the state's well-being by threatening to decimate its population, all men, not only physicians and nurses, can be impressed into the service of public health, even at the risk of their own health, and perhaps life. When a community is similarly threatened by earthquake or flood, all its members can be similarly expected to assume perilous risks. In times of peace, not only are officers charged

[244] The *only* truth in the many passages, in the writings of both Aristotle and St. Thomas, which seem to say that the common good takes precedence over individual happiness (by appeal to the too-simple formula that "the good of the whole is greater than the good of a part")—the only truth in all these texts is the truth of a very special case, which is an exception from the generally prevailing ordination of the state to the service of man's good. That special case is made by the dire emergencies in which the survival of the state itself is at stake. Clearly the state must survive if it is to perform its service as a means to individual happiness. To salvage a means which is indispensable to the end each man seeks, individual men, it would seem, must place the means before the end. But this cannot be true. In short the truth about the just demand which the state makes upon its members under emergency conditions must somehow be made consistent with the greater truth—the truth of a superior principle—that the state is a means and individual happiness the end. We are challenged here to show how an apparent exception proves the rule. Cf. fn. 251 and 263 *infra*.

A point of method should be observed. In any analysis, the principles should be inductively formulated by reference to the normal, not the exceptional, case. The principles of political philosophy should, therefore, express the relation of the state to man in terms of the ordination that is exhibited under conditions of peace and security. These are the normal (i.e., the ideal) conditions, even if they are not statistically normal (i.e., the most frequent). The apparent reversal of this ordination is found only in the abnormal conditions of war and catastrophe. The traditional statements about the supremacy of the common good, which we are here criticizing, seem to place primary emphasis upon abnormal emergency conditions. By this error in method, principles are developed which explain the special case at the expense of making the general case appear to be abnormal or even unintelligible. The opposite procedure is obviously sounder: to formulate principles which apply without any difficulty to the normal situation, and then to solve the difficulties which arise in the abnormal case. And, it should be added, such difficulties must be solved without altering the principles in the least respect.

with enforcing the law duty-bound to risk their lives in the apprehension of criminals, but so, in fact, is every citizen obligated to assist the police, if there be such need, or even, in the absence of police, to undertake alone the dangerous task of blocking the path of desperate criminals. This case is misunderstood if it is supposed that the *duty* here is as between one individual and another, the one risking his health or life to protect the life or property of another. The obligation in *justice* is rather a civic duty to protect the peace and order of the community against the ravages of crime.[245] The public peace of a community is as much menaced, though seldom as dramatically, by the spread of unchecked crime within its borders, as by the advance of unchecked aggressors upon its territorial domains. Hence the duty of a citizen in time of peace is no different from his duty in time of war, though under the conditions of modern warfare, which efface the ancient distinction between soldiers and non-combatants, every member of the community is more likely to experience the precariousness of a frontline position in defense of his state's well-being. The emergency of war differs from the emergency of crime in one other respect: not only is it usually a more intense emergency, having a more widespread impact upon the whole population simultaneously, but it raises a question of justice, which crime by definition does not. Absolutely speaking, no citizen can be justly required to take part in a purely predatory, or unjust, attack upon a neighboring community. The use of military force against outsiders is justified only in defense, just as the use of police power within the state is justified only by crime. We need not here become perplexed by the subtleties, which tend to become sophistries, in the casuistry of arguing that

[245] An obligation in *justice*, which generates a *civic* duty, must be distinguished from an obligation in *charity*, which generates a personal duty to one's family, one's friends, and even to all one's fellowmen united in brotherhood under sonship to God. We shall return to this point shortly. Vd. fn. 255 *infra*. Here let it suffice to mention the formation of vigilante groups in frontier communities to illustrate the civic duty which every member of the community has to protect its peace and order by assuming the sort of risks that professional police are supposed to face in the pursuance of their official duties.

this war is defensive, and hence just. Our present concern is only with those principles of justice which generate civic duties to perform strenuous acts at great risk to individual welfare for the sake of preserving the community from ruin.[246]

All of the emergency situations we have reviewed—and they are sufficiently typical to represent those which have not been mentioned—have the following elements in common: (a) the health or life of the state is *threatened*; (b) the health or life of its members is *risked*; (c) the *obligation* which is imposed upon individuals to assume the risk has its source in *natural justice*, not in supernatural charity. When these three elements are properly understood, the antinomy can be resolved, at least so far as principles are concerned, if never perfectly in actual practice. The key to the solution lies in the very nature of justice, and in the proportionality between two *probabilities*—the *threat* to the state, on the one hand, and the *risk* to the individual, on the other. Let us consider each of these in turn.

Justice is the virtue by which human acts are directed to the common good, but the acts of the other virtues, such as fortitude and temperance, are also drawn, by the command of justice, into the service of the common weal.[247] Yet all the natural virtues, justice included, are ordained as principal means to one ultimate end—not the common good, but that natural happiness which consists in a whole life lived according to virtue. Hence any virtuous acts which justice commands, especially those deeds of supreme fortitude in facing mortal peril, must be directed *ultimately* to the happiness of the individual agent, even though, as acts of justice, they are *proxi-*

[246] The following pages were written before Sunday, December 7, 1941. They were not intended to be prophetic, though they now appear to have great pertinence to our present national situation. If they are philosophically true and thereby deal universally with the problem of happiness and the common good in time of war, they must, of course, apply to the ordeal which each of us now faces. It is necessary to remember, however, that a wise application of principles to an instant case cannot be accomplished without the qualifications of competent casuistry.

[247] "Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly; but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 5, ad 4). Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, aa. 6, 12.

mately intended to serve the common good. There is no difficulty here, because the common good is, by the very nature of the state itself, an intermediate end and a necessary means to natural happiness. It is the function of an intermediate end, not only to be an intrinsically worthy good in itself (a *bonum honestum*), but also to *mediate* between the act which serves it and the more ultimate good which it in turn serves (for it is also in this respect a *bonum utile*). Furthermore, the intention of an ultimate end entails the intention of all the means which that end necessitates as indispensable to its attainment. Hence there can be no conflict between the intention of such means and the intention of the end; the demands of justice with respect to the common good can never be inconsistent with the causality of all the natural virtues in the production of individual happiness. Speaking in utter strictness, justice, like natural love, is partly selfish, despite its *apparent* ordination of one man to the good of another. The appearance here of complete altruism is seen as illusory when we bear in mind that the good of another—whether of a single individual, or of the organized multitude—is an indispensable means to each individual's own welfare, because he is a social animal, and because he needs the life of the community to sustain his own life, and its benefactions to support his own pursuit of happiness.[248]

[248] Because it is only partly selfish, justice is also altruistic in part. Justice falls between two extremes: the immorally selfish act, which considers self to the total exclusion of the other; and the supernaturally unselfish act, which considers the other to the point of forgetfulness of self. Being both virtuous and natural, the act of justice is neither totally selfish nor totally unselfish. The acts of justice, like the acts of every other natural virtue, aim at the well-being of the agent and, in this sense, they are concerned with self; but the acts of justice, and of every other virtue in so far as they are commanded by justice, also aim at the common good, and hence at the good of others as involved in the common good. Vd. fn. 249 and 255 *infra*. When, henceforth, we refer to the selfishness of justice, we mean only to contrast it with the complete altruism of charity, and not to imply that its acts are devoid of any consideration for others.

In the sense in which justice is selfish, human love has a note of selfishness about it. Only God, only the superabundant in being and goodness, can love others with complete generosity; for only God is the perfect agent, incapable of added perfection, working only to communicate, not to acquire, perfection. Every other creature must work to an end that is its own perfection. Man comes closest

Homicide and larceny, arson and perjury, are *crimes* because they imperil the peace and order of a civil community; and this is true even of such non-criminal acts as breach of contract or fraudulent misrepresentation. Every act which the positive law prohibits is deleterious to the common good, either directly as in the case of criminal misdemeanors and felonies, or indirectly as in violations of what is called the civil code. In short, every act of justice refers to the common good and, paradoxically, by that

to loving man in the Divine way when, through the motions of charity, he loves *all* his fellowmen for love of God. For such love he must be supernaturally elevated; he must participate in the Divine love. By this supernatural love, a man loves all men as belonging to God and as potential friends of God Who is his Friend; by his natural benevolent love, man loves those who are bound so closely to him as to be "other selves." The element of self-perfection is, then, present in both; but in natural love, this consideration is more to the fore, and the scope of that love is extremely limited; in supernatural love, self may be entirely forgotten—though never excluded—and, moreover, such love is completely universal in scope. Natural love gives more than is required, whereas natural justice gives only what is due. Yet, even so, natural love does not extend to all men, as does supernatural love, nor is it, like the latter, complete in its forgetfulness of self. When sacrifice is understood as an act which is a complete giving, apart from all return, it will be realized that only God can sacrifice in the fullest sense of the world. Justice does not move a man to sacrifice, and love does so only in proportion as it approximates the Divine love. The precepts of charity must, therefore, never be confused with the Golden Rule, for the latter is a maxim which expresses the sort of selfishness that is proper to justice—the giving that stops at strict due and calculates recompense. Vd. fn. 253 *infra.*

There is one radical exception to the foregoing account of natural love, and that concerns man's natural love of God. It is natural to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit to be sought and loved, St. Thomas tells us (vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3). Now God is the supreme and infinite good; "hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things" (*ibid.*). But without grace man cannot act according to this love. Although integral man does not need "the gift of grace in order to love God above all things naturally, he needed God's help to move him to it" (*ibid.*); that is, man naturally "loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good"; whereas, through charity, man "loves Him as He is the object of beatitude" (*ibid.*, ad 1). The love of God does not exceed nature's integral power, but to act in full accordance with such love does. "Nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength; but to love God above all things is not such an act" (*ibid.*, ad 2). In a state of corrupt nature, however, man loves himself before God; grace is needed to restore order among the objects of natural love.

very fact is selfish, because the common good is not an end in itself; it is a means to the individual happiness which each man seeks, but can only achieve through virtue, justice included.[249] From all of which it follows that no obligation which arises from justice can withdraw a man from the pursuit of his own happiness to the service of some alien good, for no other natural good a man can serve is really good except as a part of, or a means to, his individual happiness.

How, then, can justice require us to risk our lives, or anything essential to happiness, such as health, even in those emergencies in which the state's survival is threatened? The answer turns on the fact that what is required is only a *risk*, and not an *absolute surrender*, of these essential goods. *The risk of life is not suicide.* Regardless of how dire the emergency may be, the state cannot ask a man to kill himself for its good. Nor can the state kill men who have not forfeited their lives by criminal attack upon the social welfare. Whether or not the capital punishment of criminals is justified by retributive justice, it is certainly true that, apart from the sort of violence through which a man declares himself to be an enemy of the state, the state cannot kill men without committing the injustice of murder. Suppose a famine or a pestilence, and suppose that it would be obviously expedient, in the protection of the whole community, to kill a few—the aged or the infected.

[249] It may be objected that the natural law commands one not to harm one's fellow man and to render to each his due, and that the natural law, being prior to the civil community and its positive legal institutions, imposes this obligation *absolutely* and entirely apart from the common good. This is a false interpretation of the natural law. There are many precepts (all of them first, or indemonstrable, principles) which analytically expand the simple injunction of the natural law to seek the good—i. e., the natural last end. To seek happiness, we must seek all its component parts, its constitutive means: we must seek wealth and health, pleasure and knowledge, and the common good. The precept which is expressed by "Do good to others, harm no one, and render to each his own" is not the whole of natural law (which is expressed simply by "Seek the good,"—i. e., the whole of real goods). It is rather one of the partial principles of natural law which stands to the whole principle, as the parts of happiness stand to the whole. And the part here being considered—a partial good which belongs to the whole order of goods that constitute the end—is the common good. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 10, a. 1, ad 3; a. 2, ad 3.

Is it not perfectly obvious that such expedients cannot be resorted to because they violate justice? And they violate justice because they wrongly place the common good before and above the inalienable rights of each individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.[250] Though it deprives men of less than life, the sterilization of the unfit is also judged to be against natural law, and contrary to justice, regardless of how strong a case can be made out, on clear factual grounds, for its expediency. Now if the common good were the highest good, if within the sphere of purely natural means and ends the common good were the last end, whatever was *truly expedient* as a means to the common good would be *naturally justified.*

These things not being so, we return to the important distinction between the *probability of risk* and the *certainty of sacrifice.* And the probability of risk is related to another probability—the *probability of threatening ruin* which confronts the state in dire civic emergencies. If it were possible to know with certitude that, despite all efforts, the state was doomed to perish in this emergency, there would be no point to risking one's life, nor could that risk be justly required; just as, if it were possible to know with certitude that the act one was about to perform for the state's defense would lead to death, the act could not be obligated or rendered in justice for it would be murder (by the state which demanded it) or suicide (by the individual who, believing himself bound in justice, renders it). To stay within the bounds of justice, we must stay within the domain of probabilities, in which there is a proportionality between the probable risk the individual undertakes and the

[250] Again we see that the truth depends upon the subordination of the common good to a natural last end, and not merely to supernatural ends of superior worth. For if it were true that the only good superior to the common good is supernatural beatitude, the individual would have no natural and inalienable rights against the state. If this were the case, what would prevent a Christian state from providing the plague-stricken with the Last Sacraments and then lining them up against a wall and shooting them? Such an act would certainly be for the common good, and would not interfere with the attainment of their ultimate supra-temporal good by the individuals who had been removed for the sake of the community's welfare and, in a sense, dispatched from their temporal misery to their eternal happiness.

probable threat the state faces. Within this domain we can understand why the state can ask, and why the individual can render, a service that *appears* to violate the order of natural goods. The violation is only apparent because the risk the individual takes is balanced against another probability which threatens him. If the state were to perish, the individual himself might not survive the catastrophe, or at least its consequence would be a drastic impairment of the conditions he needed for continuing his pursuit of happiness. He, therefore, risks his life in the hope, not only of his own survival, but of the community's preservation and future prosperity, so that, the emergency being surmounted, the danger past, peace and safety once more regained, the state will continue to play its normal role as a common good to be enjoyed and as a means to be used. Within the sphere of probabilities, which permit men to cherish hope in the face of risks and threats, the individual does not *naturally* hope for the state's safety with no concern for his own fate, nor does he hope for his own survival with no thought of his community's endurance; rather he hopes that good fortune will attend his efforts in respect to both goods, and he hopes for both because either without the other would frustrate the intentions of his natural appetite. Moreover, the order of his hopes follows the order of his intentions: as both biological subsistence and a benevolent society are means necessitated by happiness as the end, so does he hope for his own survival and the state's endurance as indispensable conditions prerequisite to the attainment of happiness. These two goods are not only means to the same end, but they are reciprocally means to each other, though not with the same stress under conditions of safety and peril, for whereas under circumstances of peace and security society provides its members with aid in the struggle for subsistence, the reverse causality predominates in times of war and impending disaster, when men must help the state survive. Because these two means to happiness (individual subsistence and society's endurance) are thus co-implicated in reciprocal causality, because the emergency situation involves two inseparable risks, not one, the individual is not

free to disregard one threat and to protect himself entirely against the other. His individual happiness is doubly threatened by the emergency: it is as much threatened by the probability that the community will not endure unless its members will assume risks proportionate to this danger, as it is threatened by the probability that he may perish if he undertakes to prevent disaster to the community. Clearly, then, it follows that when a man acts in such situations with the fortitude that justice commands, he is not exalting the common good above his individual happiness; and when the state justly exacts such conduct from its members, it is not preferring its own life to the life of its members, but rather regarding both as means to happiness and both as inseparably threatened.

Each member of the community enjoys its common good, and profits by the state's ministry to his individual welfare. Each individual must, therefore, be prepared to pay a price, in effort and risk, for these benefits, because he cannot avoid such effort and risk without risking their total loss. But since, in a just community, all share equally in the fruits of the common good, and all profit proportionately from its benefactions, the principle of justice requires a fair distribution of burdens to balance the distributive justice of properly shared goods. It is this principle which completes our resolution of the antinomy. If the burdens of effort and risk are justly distributed among the members of a community, each is called upon to do no more than the rest in the protection and support of goods they commonly enjoy and proportionately share. No man would then be sacrificing himself in any way for his fellows. Justice, be it remembered, never calls for sacrifice or generosity; it exacts only a just price; it asks only for what is due. Accordingly, if distributive justice prevails with respect to common goods and common burdens alike, then each man who acts justly in the performance of his civic duty in times of emergency, cooperates with his fellows for the social welfare so that it in turn will continue to support the welfare of himself. Each acts with all for the good of all because upon that depends the good of each. And no risk of life can be too great so long as it is proportionate

in its probability to the probability of disaster which threatens the state, and so long as one man's assumption of risk is not proportionately greater than another's.

Thus is resolved the apparent antinomy which arises from what seems to be a conflict between the common good and happiness.[251] But this solution is not perfect. On the side of practice, it must be corrected and completed by a *de facto* consideration of man's fallen nature and by regard for the weakness of its motivations. On the side of principle, it must be qualified and supplemented by a consideration of supernatural ends, and by regard for the supernatural dimension of human aspirations. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance to insist that, on purely natural grounds, the principle of justice resolves the antinomy, because it is reason's right to claim that, without help from faith, it can dispose of the false issue between individualism and totalitarianism—that it can know the whole truth here, from which these extreme positions depart by exaggerating half-truths. None of the solution's defects in actual practice—many of which arise from the deficiency of natural justice without grace—alter the truth of the solution in principle; nor do the qualifications which must be added when supernatural causes and ends are considered subvert the natural principles; on the contrary, they appear to be supplementary.

In very small primitive societies, and in isolated frontier communities (such as stockaded settlements in the American wilderness surrounded by hostile savages), the principle of distributive justice upon which the solution depends actually seems to have historical exemplification in relatively successful

[251] It must be remembered here that we have been considering the problem entirely in terms of justice, because it is only in these terms that there is an *apparent* antinomy—only if justice demanded the *sacrifice* of individual life for the state's well-being, would there be a conflict between the common good and happiness as ultimate ends in the natural order. (Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, 146, wherein St. Thomas considers the justice of capital punishment.) We have not considered the motivations of patriotism or the fact that, in time of war, a few men may give so much for so many. Whether it springs from natural love entirely, or whether it draws its strength from the resources of charity, patriotism leads men to the performance of acts which cannot be required by justice. The state cannot *justly* ask for the devotion of patriots; it can demand only that citizens do their duty. Vd. fn. 248 *supra*.

practice. It would be difficult to say that such successes were accomplished by men whose acquired virtues had no vigor from grace; but, on the other hand, it would be equally difficult to say that, in such compact communities, the imperfectly acquired natural virtue of justice was not competent to solve the problem practically when the emergency arose. The defective application of the natural principles in the practices of complex and large societies, such as all civilized states in which there is an elaborate hierarchy of functions and classes, may proceed as much from the gross magnitude and intricate structure of these communities as from the inadequacy of acquired virtue without grace. The complexity of civilized societies so increases the difficulty of achieving distributive justice even in times of peace and security, and even, be it said, in Christian states where the church strengthens the political regime in its own line of causality, and where grace restores the efficacy of nature, that there is *a fortiori* grounds for expecting a large degree of failure in times of storm and stress. How much more so is such failure to be expected in modern secular states which are both enormously complex and also radically deprived, by their secularism, of the help human governments and individual men need.

But the help of grace, and the ministry of the church, must not be viewed exclusively in terms of their assistance to the operation of natural principles—whether the institutions of government or the operations of acquired virtue. The whole situation takes on another dimension when supernatural ends are the objects of human aspiration, and supernatural means become available for their attainment. The shift is marked by the appearance of two elements which have no place in the purely natural order—the fortitude of heroic virtue, and the altruism of charity. As we have seen, the intentions of natural justice are selfish. They do not regard the good of another man *as such*, but only as a part of the community which must be preserved for one's own good. Now just as natural justice and natural love are selfish, so neither is heroic. Neither leads men to martyrdom.[252] Though natural love is less selfish than

[252] It may be objected that heroism is an indisputable fact in pagan societies—

justice, in that it involves some genuine forgetfulness of self, and though natural love, unlike justice, impels men to the generosity of sacrifice, it remains, nevertheless, on the plane of imperfect action, in which the agent always seeks to perfect himself as well as another, and in fact regards the other as an extension of self—as an *alter ego*. In this sense, the promptings of natural love never deviate from the fundamental tendency of natural desire—*for each thing to seek its own perfection.*[253] For

that the literature of Greece and Rome, for example, is rich in the examples of men who *genuinely sacrificed* their lives for their country in martial exploits. Such heroism may be further explained by pagan beliefs in the immortality of the soul and in the rewards awaiting heroes in the Elysian Fields hereafter. And the Japanese today may be offered as another example of a people among whom there are heroes—men who almost commit suicide for their country's welfare and who do so because of a "religious" belief in the Emperor. But on closer examination it will be found, we think, that such heroism is spurious and that there is no sacrifice involved because there is no forgetfulness of self; the deed is done for the sake of the reward—whether that be a place of distinction among the departed shades, or the lasting glitter of one's name and fame in the memory of men. The predominant motivation among the ancient pagans was not the privileges and pleasures accorded the brave in the Elysian Fields. Even apart from such myths about the hereafter and such tenuous "beliefs" in an immortal soul, the pagan "hero" would have been motivated by a concern for his good name—pride of self and pride in family, to be gratified by the sort of "immortality" which a man wins when he is honored in the enduring records of his people. So long as this is the motivation, there is neither generosity in the act, nor sacrifice; hence no true heroism. The Christian martyr does not seek martyrdom *as such*. Vd. T. S. Eliot, *Murder in the Cathedral*, New York, 1935. The Christian hero does not calculate his reward in heaven. His act proceeds entirely from his love of God and love for his neighbor. Moreover, unlike the pagan, he is not serving the common good primarily, but the well-being of his fellow men, for which the common good is a means. Vd. fn. 255 *infra*.

[253] Vd. Part II, *supra*, pp. 596-97, fn. 43, 45. Vd. also fn. 248 *supra*, in which the mitigated selfishness—the altru-egoism—of natural justice and natural love are compared. For clarity of understanding, it is necessary here to define the precise sense in which we are speaking of love as "natural." Desire can be called "natural" in two distinct senses: (1) as opposed to the rational (or the sensitive), desire is natural if it is appetitive tendency apart from knowledge or estimation of the object, and thus we oppose natural to elicit desire; (2) as opposed to the supernatural, desire is natural if it is appetitive tendency, natural or elicit, which is not elevated to the plane of supernaturally appointed ends, and thus we oppose the natural desire for happiness, including even the transcendental and ineffective desire for beatitude, to hope which is a supernatural, elicit, and effective desire for beatitude. If, then, we make our primary division between natural and elicit

the fullness of generosity in sacrifice and for complete selflessness, we must look to the precepts of charity which impel men to give, not only more than is due, but unstintingly.[254] The heroic discharge of civic duty in defense of the common good, like the self-immolation of the martyr in witness to his faith, flows in its perfection from that charity through which men love God, and their neighbors as themselves in God's bosom. Here there is the altruism and generosity of transcendent sacrifice, which does not calculate the commutations and distributions of what is justly due. Here the sacrifice may serve the welfare of another individual directly with no thought of fair requital; or if it serve the common weal directly, it does so for the ultimate benefit of the multitude of others who will survive to reap its fruits.[255] It does not bargain risk of loss against the

desire, according as appetite is not or is determined by knowledge of the object, we can further subdivide elicit desire into natural and supernatural, according as the knowledge of the object is naturally acquired or supernaturally received, and according as, in the latter case, the will is elevated to the supernatural plane of effective motion toward a supernaturally known end. Now similar distinctions can be made in the sphere of love. Love is either natural or elicit, and elicit love is either natural or supernatural, the latter being charity, as supernatural desire is hope. Furthermore natural elicit love can be divided into the sensitive and the rational: the former is usually called "concupiscent love" and the latter "benevolent love." Of these, the former is entirely acquisitive and hence entirely selfish; but the latter is the source of actions which aim at the perfection of another, the loved one, as well as at the perfection of self, and here selfishness is mitigated by concern for the other, even though that other is one's other self. We have been using the phrase "natural love" to signify the natural as opposed to the supernatural, not the natural as opposed to the elicit; and also to signify the benevolent (i.e., the rational) not the acquisitive (i.e., the sensitive) mode of elicit human love. Justice is less selfish than acquisitive love or any other motion of the sensitive appetite; and benevolent love is less selfish than justice in the sphere of the rational appetite, though it, in turn, is more selfish than charity as a supernatural virtue of the will.

[254] Vd. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, qq. 26, 27.

[255] The sharp difference between the selfishness of justice and the altruism of charity is revealed by the difference in their relation to the common good. Justice directs men to the common good, and to the good of individual fellow-men *only in so far as* their good is involved in the common good, the reason being that justice, like the other natural virtues, aims at the happiness of the individual agent and, in aiming at the common good, justice aims through it, as an intermediate end, to natural happiness (*of self*) as the ultimate end; but this it could not do if it

probability of profit which may redound to self if the transaction eventuates fortunately.

The hero and the martyr ask no requital, but the supernatural virtues which impel them to love's generous acts do not prescind, nevertheless, from the hope for the reward which flows from the Divine mercy and justice. Such men act not only from supernatural charity, but also in supernatural faith and hope. It is only in terms of such motivations that Maritain's analysis of sacrifice can be verified.

> When a man gives his life for the community's sake, he accomplishes, through an act of such great virtue, the moral perfection by which the person asserts his supreme independence as regards the world. By losing himself temporally for the city's sake, the person sacrifices himself in the truest and most complete fashion, and yet does not lose the stakes; the city serves him even then, for the soul of man is not mortal, and there is eternal life.[255a]

Apart from the supernatural dimension of human life—its causes, its aspirations, and its ends—there is only the justice of distributed risks and the calculation of temporal burdens in relation to temporal requitals.[256] It would be utterly false to explain the risking of individual life for the common good in terms of man's immortal soul and eternal destiny and *at the same time* to talk of such acts as flowing from the obligations of natural justice. To do so would be to confuse natural and supernatural principles. But it is not inconsistent to say, in view of the weakness of fallen nature, that natural justice, imperfectly

aimed at the good of another individual *as such*. In contrast, charity directs men to the good of *all* their neighbors as potential friends of God. Charity aims at the common good only in so far as it is a means to the well-being of each individual; hence, in aiming at the common good, charity aims through it, as an intermediate end, to the happiness of others, the Divine good (i. e., beatitude), as the ultimate end. Thus we see two things: that justice is divided against charity as consideration of one's self is divided against thoughtfulness for others; and that the common good is not an ultimate end for either justice or charity, but always mediate as a means to the happiness—natural or supernatural—of self or of others.

[255a] *Politics and Scholasticism*, p. 73.

[256] We mention justice, and omit natural love, because the antinomy we have been considering turns on the demands of justice, and not the benefactions of love. Vd. fn. 251 *supra*.

acquired, is insufficient to solve in practice the antinomy between the common good and happines, however perfectly such principles enable us to solve the problem in theory.[257] Moreover, the supernatural virtues which accompany charity not only strengthen the natural virtues in their own sphere of operation, but raise men to the level where, acting from charity, they pass from selfishness to altruism, from the calculations of justice to the generosity of love, from the cooperation of all for the sake of each to the sacrifice of one for the sake of all. Yet even on this level, the fundamental truth about the state in relation to man is confirmed, for even as on the level of justice men serve the state only to gain their own ultimate natural end, so on the level of charity, as Maritain points out, the city still serves the man who, losing his mortal life for the city's sake, gains thereby the eternal good of his immortal soul. The common good, in short, never takes precedence over happiness, natural or supernatural; the good of the civil whole is never greater than the whole good of its human parts, corporeal persons in this life or spiritual beings hereafter.[258]

[257] If it were possible, in a complex modern society, for each man to think that everyone else was bearing proportionate burdens and risks—as that is almost certainly known by the members of a small frontier community—then the natural virtue of justice would be sufficient: the just man would not hesitate to face the greatest risks for the community's welfare. But since in any large and complex society, the ideal of distributive justice is very imperfectly realized, and individuals are beset by doubts about the full cooperation of their fellow men in a common cause, natural justice is not enough to impel men to take the risk which may turn out, in fact, to have been a sacrifice, because it exceeded the risks others have assumed. In such a situation, love is required. Only through love for one's fellow man is anyone impelled, beyond mere justice, to take the chance of doing more than others. And it is certainly a question whether natural love is enough. The truly heroic cannot be accomplished without charity.

[258] Maritain's solution of the antinomy seems to us to be inadequate, or even false, because it appeals to supernatural principles. The antinomy between the common good and individual happiness arises entirely in terms of natural goods; it occurs entirely within the order of natural means and ends. Therefore, it cannot be solved except in natural terms. In our view, Maritain's radical error here consists in failing to consider the natural last end, or arises from obscuring its precise character as a distinct end by considering it as if it were almost identical with the common good as that flows back to the members of the community. (Vd. fn. 241 *supra*.) He then resolves the antinomy by subordinating the common good to the

6. Thus is completed the whole first stage of our undertaking in this series of articles. We have now shown that the conclusion concerning Democracy is demonstrable, by answering objections and meeting difficulties supposed to arise from the untenability of that conclusion in the light of traditional principles. What remains to be done, of course, is the demonstration itself. That will aim to establish the *truth* of the proposition which we have so far been defending only with

extra-temporal end of the immortal person, whereas it should be subordinated to the quite temporal end of the mortal individual—who, by the way, is also truly a person even though corporeal, if the meaning of "person" is *an intelligent substance*. (Vd. fn. 130a *supra*.)

This manner of thinking is clearly revealed in a recent article by M. Maritain, "The Immortality of Man" in *The Review of Politics*, III, 4, pp. 411-27. We are not denying that a man who sacrifices his life to speak the truth against a tyrant—even if the act is not required for the common good—is truly a hero; we are only saying that such heroism cannot be *justified* by concern for the common good, and even less by the desire for natural happiness, to which, in fact, it seems to be antagonistic. With respect to supernatural ends, a man may act from a certain contempt of this life, as *almost worthless* in comparison with the infinitely greater worth of eternal life. But it is the ultimate and genuine worth of this life which justifies a man's risking it for the common good, at the peril of losing the common good upon which the fulfillment of this life's potentialities depends. (What truth there is in the preceding sentences must be reconciled with the more fundamental truth that is expressed in fn. 234 *supra*: "a man must keep his eyes on his natural last end in order to direct his life effectively to his supernatural last end.")

The disaster of France in the current war may require an explanation in terms of the lack of enough heroism among the people and their leaders, which, in turn, signifies the lack of supernatural motivations. Vd. Maritain, *France My Country*, New York, 1941; cf. Yves Simon, *La grande Crise de la Republique Française*, Montreal, 1941. But this only means that natural justice is inadequate under the conditions of modern society (vd. fn. 257 *supra*), not that natural justice is inadequate in principle to sustain an effective morale among a people at war. There is certainly impressive evidence that the promptings of natural morality had become extremely weak in large portions of the French community and that, on the contrary, an unjust pursuit of individual (i. e., accidental) goods at the expense of the common good prevailed—not only to the detriment of the common good but also to the defeat of the individual (i. e., essential) good of happiness itself.

To insist that natural principles must be sufficient to solve what *appears* to be an antinomy arising in purely natural terms is not to proclaim the self-sufficiency of man. Everything we have said should disabuse the reader of that interpretation. In the order of execution, man is not sufficient unto himself: without God he can do no good; and especially in a corrupt condition, is he dependent upon grace even for vigor in the pursuit of natural ends. Vd. fn. 274 *infra*.

respect to its *intelligibility*. If this proposition could not have been understood in terms of the fundamental principles of moral philosophy, it would have been unintelligible, and there would have been no need for further inquiry into its truth.

We do not, and cannot, pretend that our thesis about Democracy was obviously compatible with traditional principles, or immediately intelligible in terms of the prevailing understanding (among exponents of *philosophia perennis*) of the order of goods. Had it been so, the several objections we have considered could not have had sufficient warrant to deserve such extended analyses as we have undertaken to answer them. On the contrary, these analyses were necessitated by the fact that with respect to certain fundamental points traditional theory is defective. The objections arose from adherence to traditional theory on the very points in which it is crucially deficient.

The deficiencies are of two sorts. For the most part, they are inadequacies in analysis which can be readily supplemented; but in consequence of these inadequacies there are one or two matters about which the truth has not merely been obscured, but wholly denied. The two major inadequacies which we have tried to remedy are (1) an incomplete analysis of the common good, which failed to distinguish between the common good as *finis causa* and *finis effectus*, and hence which failed to understand the *possibility* of a plurality of common goods achievable by governments intrinsically unequal in justice;[259] and (2) an incomplete analysis of the order of all human goods, which failed to distinguish the natural happiness of individual men from the well-being of their civil community (i. e., *bonum commune hominis* from *bonum commune communitatis* within the natural order), and hence which failed to understand the natural end of the state.[260] In consequence, a major error resulted, for the common good was *falsely* affirmed to be the highest natural good in the temporal order, and man's natural dignity (i. e., his natural worth as an end the state must serve)

[259] To remedy this defect was the work of Part II *supra*.

[260] To remedy this defect was the work of Part III, *supra*, Sections 1, 2, 3.

was *falsely* denied.[261] The whole truth about the order of goods, and a satisfactory account of means and ends (both natural and supernatural), cannot be grasped so long as natural happiness is omitted, or its constitution is misunderstood. That such omission and misunderstanding have prevailed throughout the tradition cannot be denied by anyone who has studied the traditional texts dealing with the order of goods, the disposition of means and ends, and the meaning of happiness. The origin of the fault may be attributed to Aristotle's *Ethics,* in so far as Book I and Book X require careful reconciliation, but that could have been accomplished by the commentators and followers. Because it was not, inadequacy and error resulted, and have long prevailed.

When, therefore, we say that the Theory of Democracy is consonant with traditional teaching, it would be disingenuous of us not to add that this calls for a radical re-examination of many traditional texts, and a rejection of some long-standing errors of interpretation. With respect to natural happiness, for example, it is only necessary to read St. Thomas in the light of difficulties arising from the apparent conflict between *Ethics,* I and *Ethics,* X;[262] but with respect to the common good, it is *necessary to reject as false* all the passages in which St. Thomas declares that the common good is supreme in the natural, temporal order; or, *if* this is not a fair interpretation of all those texts in which St. Thomas says that the common good takes precedence over the individual good because the good of the whole is greater than the good of its parts, *then* we must at least reject this false interpretation of what St. Thomas *seems*

[261] The correction of this error was begun in Part II and in Part III, Sections 2, 3, *supra,* but it was not completed until, in the present article (Section 5 *supra*), the apparent antinomy between man and the state (i.e., between the claims of happiness and the common good to take precedence over each other in the natural order) was resolved in such a way that, although individuals may be called upon to risk their lives for the social welfare, the common good they thus serve remains throughout a means to the happiness they seek. Vd. Part II, *supra,* fn. 58, wherein the antinomy to be resolved was first indicated. Cf. also Part III, fn. 130 *supra.*

[262] Vd. the commentary on *Summa Theol.,* I-II, qq. 3-5; and *III Cont. Gent.,* 34-48, 63, given in Part III, *supra,* Section 3.

to say, even though it has prevailed among his commentators and followers to this day.[263]

Despite the qualification which we feel obliged to add, we reiterate that the Theory of Democracy has been shown to be acceptable to Aristotelians and Thomists, because it rests upon

[263] The texts in question are too numerous to permit an exhaustive enumeration. It will suffice to cite a fair sampling of them chosen from a variety of contexts. Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 65, a. 2; I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3; q. 90, a. 2; II-II, q. 26, a. 4, ad 3; q. 39, a. 2, ad 3; q. 58, aa. 5, 7, 9, ad 3, 12; q. 65, a. 1. All of these passages seem to argue from a purely *metaphorical* resemblance between the relation of an organic or substantial part to its substantial whole, on the one hand, and the relation of a human individual, which is a whole substance, to the non-substantial whole which is the civil community, on the other. Man is not a part of the state as the arm is part of the body. (Cf. Part II, *supra*, fn. 59, 60, 68.) There is one passage in the *Summa Theologica* which speaks in a contrary vein: "We observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him" (I, q. 60, a. 5). Here, clearly, the supposition ("if man were a natural part of the city") is a statement contrary to fact. But reason, which is the principle of virtuous action, recommends that, *in certain circumstances*, a man act for the good of the whole *as if he were a natural part* of the community. When these circumstances are properly specified as constituting the emergency situations in which the endurance of the state is threatened, and when reason's recommendation is understood in terms of the calculation of one risk (the probable "danger of death") against another risk which is equally undesirable (the probable loss of the common good), there is nothing in the inclination of the social virtues (i.e., the tendency of justice itself or of the acts prompted by justice) which gives the common good precedence over individual natural happiness among the goods of the temporal order. Vd. Section 5 *supra*. In short, neither by nature nor by reason is man subordinated to the state as means to end; on the contrary, both by nature and by reason, the being and goodness of the state is as a means to individual happiness, for the end in any order is always the whole of goods, and every partial good is a means thereto, whether constitutive, or productive, or both. If man were by nature a part of the civil community—as the arm is by nature a substantial part of the body—then it would be contrary to both nature and reason for man to conceive his whole good (his happiness) as including the good of the whole (the common good).

One further point. The fact that man is a substantial being and the state is an accidental being (and hence man is not a substantial part of the state) must not be confused with the fact that both happiness and the common good, as *goods simply*, are convertible with *being relatively* which is second act (or accidental being), not first act (or substantial being). Vd. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1;

the principles of their philosophy and because it calls for a supplementation of those principles only where they are inadequate, or for a rejection of certain notions which are none the less false for having been repeated through the centuries. Quite apart from our thesis about Democracy, these deficiencies should be remedied and these errors repudiated in order to bring traditional political theory to a fuller expression of the truth. An adequate and correct account of the common good and of natural happiness, in themselves and in relation to one another, is requisite for a true understanding of man's political activity and life, even if it be false that Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government.

But the situation is actually otherwise. Not only has the Theory of Democracy required us to rectify traditional political doctrine, but these rectifications also ensure the intelligibility of the proposition about Democracy and, removing obscurities, show that its truth *can be proved*. The bearing of a plurality of common goods (each a *finis effectus*) has already been explained: a moral hierarchy of political forms (i. e., forms of government) is *possible* because the several forms of government, unequal in justice, are respectively the effective means to establishing states which are unequally good (i. e., the common good of which is either diminished or ample).[264] There was no difficulty about showing this because, the common good being the end of political activity and political institutions, a moral gradation among the means (according to the elements of justice they incorporate) became immediately intelligible in terms of a correlative gradation among the ends (the possibility of diverse existential common goods). For the same reason, there is now a difficulty in explaining the moral hierarchy of states in relation to the one end they all serve—natural

cf. "A Dialectic of Morals," *loc. cit.*, fn. 18. Hence there are two distinct arguments here: one against the error of supposing that the common good is greater than happiness *because* the state subordinates man as substantial whole does substantial part; the other against the error of denying that, in the order of goods simply (all of which are accidental in being), happiness is the whole of goods, of which the common good is a part.

[264] Vd. Part II, *supra*, esp. pp. 624-52.

happiness. To complete our analysis, this difficulty must be overcome. Since the end of the state is happiness, it is now necessary to show how states which are unequally good as ends of political activity are unequally good as means to happiness. The state being an intermediate end in the order of natural goods (both a *bonum honestum* as end and a *bonum utile* as means), a full account of its goodness requires us to understand how its *utility* as a means is proportioned to its *worth* as an end. It is inconceivable that, among several intermediate ends, the one which is of greater worth in itself should also have less efficiency with respect to the ultimate end they compete to serve.[265]

To solve the problem indicated, we must distinguish between the common good as an end and as a means, in two ways. First, as an end to be achieved, the common good is a good *collectively* enjoyed by the members of the community, but as a means to be used the common good is a good *distributively* employed in its ordination to the happiness of individuals. This follows from the nature of happiness as a good which is common

[265] This is inconceivable because the goodness of anything which is a means, even though it also be an end, comes from the ultimate end in a given order. The much misused maxim, that the end justifies the means, becomes true only when it becomes precise in this sense: the only end which justifies every means (which determines its moral goodness) is the ultimate end. And no intermediate end justifies any means unless it functions as a mediator between that means and the ultimate end. In other words, if any political act or institution is morally good because it works for the common good, it must also work for happiness; and if one is better than another because it achieves a greater common good, it must also somehow achieve a greater happiness. But here a difficulty arises because, unlike the common good, natural happiness may be attained in *various degrees*, but it does not exist in several essentially distinct grades. What, then, does it mean to say "achieve a greater happiness"? This is the problem which remains to be solved. Cf. Part III, *supra*, Section 1 at p. 126: "It is necessary to show that the several grades of common good are, as means, not equally efficient in the production of human happiness; in fact, there must be a perfect correlation between the grade of intrinsic goodness (i.e., justice) possessed by each type of common good (Royal, Republican, and Democratic) as an intermediate end, and the degree of efficiency it is able to exercise as a means to the ultimate end *simpliciter*"—*simpliciter*, of course, in the natural order, not absolutely.

to all men *only essentially, not existentially.*[266] Second, as an end to be achieved, the goodness of the common good is its *intrinsic worth* to the community of men who enjoy it *collectively*, but as a means to be used the goodness of the common good is its *extrinsic efficiency* in *distributing* the conditions of happiness to individual men who must live together politically in order to realize the ultimate perfection of their human lives. The two distinctions are thus seen to be correlated. But the question still remains, what is meant by the distributive efficiency of the common good, and how is one common good superior to another as a means in this way? The same question can, of course, be asked in terms of the state, for the existential common good in any grade is identical with the existence of a state in that grade of well-being. Since such phraseology is more usual, let us formulate the question thus: what is meant by the distributive efficiency of the state as a means to happiness, and how is one kind of state superior to another when it so functions as a means? (The *kinds* of states being considered are identical with the three grades of existential common good: the Royal state, the Republican state, and the Democratic state.)

We arrive at an answer by seeing how one of two possibilities is eliminated and how the other is necessitated. The two possibilities which exhaust the situation are: (1) that the efficiency of the state is measured by the *greater degree* of happiness produced, and that one state is more efficient than another through providing men with the conditions for a *greater happiness*; (2) that the efficiency of the state is measured by a *wider distribution* of happiness among its members, and that one state is more efficient than another through providing *more men* with the conditions of happiness. The first alternative is rendered impossible by the nature of natural happiness, and by the way the state functions as a means. As we have seen, natural happiness can be attained completely or incompletely, and in either case the attainment may be further qualified by degrees which

[266] Vd. Part II, *supra*, pp. 600-607.

reflect the intensity of the natural virtues either subalternated to the supernatural virtues or functioning inadequately apart therefrom.[267] But these differences in attainment represent a *continuous* variation in degrees of happiness as the perfection of a whole human life; they cannot be understood as distinct grades of happiness differing essentially in kind, as natural happiness differs from supernatural beatitude.[268] Furthermore, if the differential efficiency of diverse kinds of states as means were to be interpreted in terms of their being able to produce essentially distinct grades of happiness, not only should such distinct grades of happiness be discoverable, but there would have to be some explanation of these differences in efficiency in terms of an intelligible functional relationship between the grade of justice embodied in the state and the grade of happiness attained by its members. But there is neither evidence for the one, nor any way of conceiving the other. Finally, we know that the virtues are the intrinsic productive causes of happiness, whereas the state, in so far as it is a productive means, functions only as an extrinsic cause, either through aiding the formation of genuine virtue by disciplining the immature at the stage of inchoate virtue, or by providing the conditions which all require for the development and exercise of genuine virtue. Hence the degrees of natural happiness vary continuously with degrees of strength in the virtues, but not with the grade of goodness in the state, for to whatever extent a state is just it provides *some* men with requisite conditions for becoming happy, whether or not these men utilize their opportunities; moreover, the extrinsic conditions which the state provides will be used more or less effectively according as individual men acquire the natural virtues more or less adequately, and it is with respect to the latter factor that degrees of happiness will directly vary—assuming, of course, a certain constancy in the deliverances of fortune.

The elimination of the first alternative not only brings us to the second, but also reveals its necessity. Several means can

[267] Vd. Part III, Section 4, supra, at pp. 295-98. [268] Vd. *ibid.*, at pp. 304-06.

vary in efficiency only by producing more or less of the same good which is their end. But this is possible in two ways: either by a quantitative difference in the end as achieved by any individual capable of attaining it, or by a quantitative difference in the number of individuals who are helped to reach the same end of which they are all capable. The exhaustiveness of these two possibilities being evident, the elimination of the first, as shown above, necessitates the second. That the second possibility affords us the true explanation of the way in which different kinds of states can be more or less efficient means to happiness, is confirmed by what we have already seen about the nature of the state as a means, namely, that it *functions distributively*. It is further confirmed by the fact that, though the employment of the conditions for happiness which the state, as an extrinsic cause, provides depends upon the voluntary conduct of individuals, the intrinsic moral character of the state itself (its grade of justice) determines the extent to which these conditions are distributed, that is, whether they are afforded only a few men, or many but not all, or all. Here is an obvious correlation between the inequality of the three kinds of states in their intrinsic justice (and hence the three grades of common good as ends) and their inequality in extrinsic efficiency (and hence the three grades of common good as means). The more just a state is, the more efficient will be its distribution of the conditions of happiness, i. e., *by making them available to more men.* Now when we say that the end of the state is the happiness of men, we do not mean "the greatest happiness of the greatest number"; for, on the one hand, the state being an extrinsic cause cannot determine the degree to which its conditions will be used for the attainment of more or less happiness by each man; and, on the other hand, the state being naturally required by every man in order that he may lead a good life, the state is naturally ordained to the happiness of each man—*to the happiness of the greatest number only if that be all.* Hence, absolutely speaking, the best state will be that which aims at the happiness of every man by an unrestricted distribution of those conditions of human welfare which any state is able to provide;

and less good states will be those which to a greater or less extent impose some restrictions upon their benefactions, according to the number or character of the men whom they deem worth serving as ends. Since such restrictions are, absolutely speaking, unjust (because all men are by their common human nature equally entitled to the benefactions of the state, and because distributive justice demands an equal treatment of equals), the degree of distributive efficiency manifested by the several kinds of states flows directly from the grades of distributive justice by which they are themselves established.[269]

But, it may still be asked, in what way do the imperfectly just states withhold the conditions of happiness from some men? The answer must obviously be in terms of the full poli-

[269] This analysis enables us to place an interpretation upon a famous passage in Aristotle's *Ethics*, more acceptable than the usual one which finds it another text for the precedence of the state over the individual. Aristotle says that "though it is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation" (*Ethics*, I, 2, $1094^{b}8$). Now if "nation" here be understood to mean "all the people" *distributively*, and not the multitude taken *collectively* (i. e., as politically organized), the passage means that the state which provides the conditions of happiness for all men is, absolutely speaking, the best state, though any state which provides the conditions of happiness for some men, even for a few, is to that extent good and just. Cf. fn. 130 *supra*. This interpretation is supported by the equally famous passage in the *Politics*, where Aristotle says that "the best form of government is one under which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily" (VII, 2, $1324^{a}23$). Now, if Aristotle really means *every* man here, the point is beyond dispute, but we have reason to suspect that he means only every *free* man, or every man who, on some false criterion of privilege, is entitled to be a citizen. Our suspicion is justified not only by Aristotle's doctrine of natural slavery, as expounded in *Politics*, I, but also by such an explicit statement as the following: "a state exists for the sake of the good life, and not for the sake of life only; if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice" (*Politics*, III, 9, $2180^{a}30$-35). In short, Aristotle has the truth *implicitly*, in so far as he definitely proclaims that the best state is the one in which every (free) man is provided with the conditions of his happiness; he is prevented from reaching the truth explicitly by his own fatal, and almost incredible, error about natural slavery. Once this error is expunged, the whole truth shines forth clearly. All men are born free, or, as Aristotle himself says in one place, man (*not some men*) is born for citizenship (*Ethics*, I, 7, $1097^{b}11$). To be born free and to be born for citizenship are equivalent; and through their equivalence we see that the state must provide all men with the conditions of happiness by admitting all to the political role proper to free men—the status of citizenship.

tical status to which men can be admitted, or from which they can be barred, and the rights and privileges appertaining thereto. The political status necessary for the pursuit of happiness is citizenship. Happiness, as we have seen, is the good of *civil* life; this good cannot be attained or enjoyed by those who are deprived of civil status—who cannot claim the rights and privileges or exercise the duties and functions of citizenship. The happy life is a social life, a life of work according to the inclinations of the social virtues, whether it be primarily engaged in the speculative, or primarily in the practical, undertakings of reason. But no man can achieve social maturity—either in the discharge of obligations or in the performance of functions—unless he has the duties and does the work of a citizen. Active participation in the common good is an indispensable part of happiness, and this is granted only to those who have the status of citizenship. Others may passively enjoy some of the fruits of the common good (as children share in the common good of the domestic community), but this condition of subjection, as opposed to citizenship, not only keeps a man from becoming a political adult, but also deprives him of that full possession of the common good as a work in which he is himself actively engaged. Finally, happiness as the life of virtue requires the development of prudence, for that is indispensable to the transition from inchoate to genuine virtue. But the man who is either a political slave or a political subject is either wholly or partly dispensed from that exercise of his practical reason, out of which true and perfect prudence grows. Hence, it follows that the condition of citizenship is necessary for the complete development of prudence, and so also for the attainment of the moral maturity that is marked by a genuine, as opposed to an inchoate, formation of the cardinal virtues. Unless a man achieve such maturity, he cannot become happy, he cannot lead a life enriched by the possession of all good things through activity in accordance with perfect virtue. We have ignored the political distribution of economic goods and other external conditions of human welfare because, for one thing, they will be unequally distributed among men of unequal

political status, and, for another, it is chiefly through the status of citizenship that the state provides men with the conditions of a good human life.[270]

At the opposite extreme from citizenship, the status of the slave confirms the truth about citizenship. The slave has only the economic status of an instrument to be used. He totally lacks the political status of a man as an end to be served. It is beyond dispute that the status of slavery is absolutely incompatible with the pursuit of happiness. The slave may be provided with all the external goods which are needed to sustain life. He may even enjoy certain simple pleasures and be exempt from the pain of brutal treatment. But this is not enough for human happiness. The slave is totally excluded from participating in the fruits of the common good; though a member of the community's population, he is beyond the pale of its political life and deprived of both those civil and those cultural opportunities which are indispensable for the development and exercise of the moral and intellectual virtues. Enslavement is, therefore, properly defined as the alienation of the good which is peculiar to a human life. Such alienation follows necessarily from the exploitation of a man as an economic instrument. If there were natural slaves, as Aristotle supposed, the Aris-

[270] Much that is *merely said* here (especially the points about subjection and about prudence) will subsequently, in Parts IV and V, be given adequate analytical treatment. But even prior to such supporting discussion the main line of reasoning is certainly plain: the end of the state is the happiness of each man; this follows from the very nature of the state as necessitated by the fact that, without it, men can live, but cannot lead good human lives; hence, by its very nature the state works as a means to man's end by providing him with the conditions of a good human life, i. e., the conditions of happiness; but economic goods, which the state can provide, are the conditions of mere living; they are not peculiar to living well; what is peculiar to living well or humanly is the opportunity to develop and exercise the virtues, both moral and intellectual; both sorts of acquired virtues are social, in that they require the cooperation of men living and working together; hence the state provides men with the conditions needed for happiness by giving them the civil status indispensable for enjoying the good of civil life; such civil status is perfectly realized only in citizenship (we need not pause here to consider the imperfect civil status of the subject as opposed to the citizen); therefore, in giving them the opportunities and privileges, as well as the rights and duties, of citizenship, the state provides men with the conditions of a good human life.

totelian conclusion would be completely true, namely, that such hypothetical creatures (neither men nor brutes) could not be humanly happy.[271] We shall subsequently prove that the Aristotelian hypothesis of the natural slave is false because self-contradictory.[272] But the truth of the Aristotelian conclusion remains, though it is transposed from natural to moral terms: if no man is a natural slave, then any man who is exploited as an instrument, and has the peculiar good of his human life totally alienated from him, is unjustly enslaved; but whether he is a slave by nature or by injustice makes no difference to the result: degraded below the level of human status, the man who is enslaved is deprived of the conditions needed for living a good human life; debarred from civil status, he is not supported by the state in the pursuit of that happiness which is the good of civil life. Hence it follows that, absolutely speaking, any state in which slaves are members of the population, but excluded from the narrow circle of political membership, is a state which is both imperfectly just (intrinsically) and also imperfectly efficient (extrinsically) in functioning as a means, because it falls short of distributive perfection: it fails to provide the conditions of happiness for every man who belongs to its community.

The sharp contrast between the extremes of slavery and citizenship also makes clear the critical importance of a right conception of natural happiness. Let us suppose that natural happiness did not exist, and that the only happiness for man was either supernatural beatitude hereafter or that inchoate participation in beatitude which is supernatural contemplation in this life. On this false hypothesis, it would make no difference to a man whether he was a slave or a citizen, for his pursuit of happiness would depend *intrinsically* on possession of the supernatural virtues and *extrinsically* on the ministry of the church. On this false hypothesis, the nature of the state would be unintelligible, for it would have no necessity as a principal means to any end; the state would not be in a position

[271] Vd. *Politics*, III, 9, 1280[a]30-35.

[272] Vd. Part IV, *infra*.

to provide men with the conditions needed to attain happiness; it could be viewed only as instrumental cause working in subalternation to the church by maintaining a peaceful and orderly community in which the church would operate as the principal extrinsic cause in providing men with the necessary conditions. In such a view of the state, the abolition of slavery might still be argued in terms of justice, but it could not be argued in terms of happiness, and this would result in another unintelligible consequence, namely, that a more just state would not necessarily be one which more efficiently functioned as a means in the service of man. Even if we made the slighter error of supposing that natural happiness exists but that it is identical with natural contemplation (i. e., the activity of the acquired speculative virtues), the role of the state as a principal means would be denied. Though in this case, slavery might be an obstacle to the pursuit of happiness, political subjection, as opposed to citizenship, would not be; on the contrary, the political subject who was exempt from major civic responsibilities might thereby be facilitated, through leisure and detachment, in the attainment of the speculative virtues. On this false hypothesis, there would also be the unintelligible consequence that a less just state (restricting citizenship to some and keeping others in subjection) could be regarded as more efficient in its operation as a means to provide men with the conditions of happiness. Thus we see that the fundamental truths about the state (and especially about the perfect correlation between the hierarchy of states in terms of intrinsic justice and the hierarchy of states in terms of extrinsic efficiency, i. e., as means to happiness) depend upon the truth about the existence and character of natural happiness; i. e., they depend upon the complete denial of the two false hypotheses, which are reduced to absurdity by the consequences they entail.

The foregoing analysis throws light on another facet of the whole truth. We have already seen that the natural virtues cannot be perfectly acquired by fallen man without the restorative efficacy of grace and apart from the supernatural virtues.[273]

[273] Vd. Section 4, *supra*.

Even though the acquired virtues are the principal means to natural happiness, they cannot function adequately unless they exist perfectly (i.e., in the status of habits through interconnection). The same thing must be said about the state as an extrinsic cause of natural happiness. It is always a principal means to this end, but the adequacy of its functioning depends upon subalternation to supernatural agencies and factors. Supposing for the moment the truth we shall subsequently prove (that Democracy is the best state because, in consequence of its distributive justice, it provides the conditions of happiness for all men), the efficacy of Democracy depends upon the cooperation of causes which are outside the political, as they transcend the natural, order. In the extreme case of a purely secular Democracy (from which the ministry of the church was totally excluded), or in the more likely case of a Democracy which was merely neutral with respect to Christianity (in which some men might have grace), the state would still function as a principal means to its natural end, but its efficacy would be seriously impaired, for though it provided all men with the conditions of happiness, only some would be enabled by grace fully to avail themselves of these conditions by acquiring the natural virtues perfectly. The converse situation must also be considered: in any state which is less just than Democracy, men might be enabled by grace to acquire the natural virtues perfectly, even though they were subjects or slaves; but though they thus possessed the natural virtues, their lack of civil status would prevent them from exercising these virtues as *principal* means in the pursuit of natural happiness; in this situation, the natural virtues would function only as *instrumental* means to supernatural happiness. This confirms a point already made, namely, that the status of slavery or subjection presents no obstacle to the attainment of supernatural ends. But the lack of grace absolutely bars the way to the attainment of supernatural ends, and leaves nature's vigor impaired for the pursuit of the natural end. The fact that the natural virtues can have their proper function diminished in two ways—(1) by being reduced to the role of merely instrumental causes, and (2) by

being inadequate as principal causes—shows man's need for both Democracy and religion. Considering every man in relation to both natural and supernatural ends, we see that without Democracy some men will be debarred from natural happiness because, lacking civil status, their natural virtues will be limited in operation to the role of instrumental causality; and without religion some men will not only be debarred from supernatural happiness but will also be impeded in the pursuit of natural happiness because, even though they have civil status as a condition for the operation of their natural virtues as principal causes, this operation will be inadequate for the complete attainment of happiness by men whose wounded nature has not been healed.[274]

If the distinction between slave and citizen exhausted all the possible positions a man might occupy, the demonstration of Democracy could now be simply accomplished, for it would only require the proof that there are no natural slaves and

[274] This conclusion has great significance for the problem of the purely secular or merely neutral state, in contrast to the Christian state. We shall return to its fuller consideration in Part VI *infra*. (Vd. fn. 229, *supra*, and cf. T. S. Eliot, *The Idea of Christian Society*, New York, 1940; C. Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State*, New York, 1937; A. Hyma, *Christianity and Politics*, Philadelphia, 1938.)

Here we wish to make only one comment on the relation between Democracy and religion. That Democracy is, on moral grounds, the best form of government, can be proved entirely in terms of natural evidences and natural reason. There need be no appeal whatsoever to what is known by faith or through Revelation. But this truth about Democracy is theoretic in mode, albeit practical in its object and direction to the end of action (i. e., it is a speculatively-practical truth). The truth about Democracy cannot be actually put into operation successfully apart from the guidance of religious knowledge and the help of religious institutions and practices. Without grace, and without the ministry of the church, fallen man can neither achieve and sustain the perfect common good of the Democratic state, nor can they in their own lives utilize the conditions which Democracy provides for the complete attainment of natural happiness. In short, Democracy does not depend upon religion in the order of intention (and at the speculatively-practical level on which natural ends are defined) but it does depend upon religion in the order of execution (and especially at the practically-practical and prudential levels on which reason must make a right judgment about the means to be used). The ideal of Democracy is not, as Maritain claims, Christian in principle, but it does require what Maritain calls "the Christian leaven" to be realized in fact. Cf. *Scholasticism and Politics*, Ch. III, IV.

hence that the enslavement of men is, absolutely speaking, always unjust. But if this were so, it would also follow that only a generic distinction could be made between states in terms of justice: every government which enslaved men because its tyrannical rulers exploited men as means would be unjust; and every government which avoided tyranny because its rulers exercised political power proximately for the common good and ultimately for human happiness, would be just. But the demonstration of Democracy as the *best* state requires, as we have seen, specific distinctions among three just forms of government which concur in being generically good. Hence the distinction between slavery and citizenship does not suffice and we must consider the intermediate case of political subjection. The political subject is neither degraded to the economic status of a slave, nor is he granted the full political status of a free man, which depends upon political equality between rulers and ruled. As the difference between slavery, on the one hand, and subjection or citizenship, on the other, must be understood in relation to the generic distinction between tyrannical and just government; so the difference between subjection and citizenship must be understood in relation to the specific distinction between Royal and Republican government, i. e., in terms of the principle of constitutionality. Hence, in order to prove our conclusion about Democracy, we must not only argue against natural slavery and show that any enslavement is, absolutely speaking, unjust; but we must also argue against political subjection and show that non-constitutional government is, absolutely speaking, less just than constitutional government. This will be the work of Part IV to follow. Beyond that we must show, still absolutely speaking, that all men are entitled to citizenship and hence that the Republican form of constitutional government is less just than the Democratic form. When this is done, in Part V to follow, the demonstration of Democracy as the best form of government will have been completed.[275]

[275] In Part IV, we shall not only argue the injustice of slavery, and prove the distinction between subject and citizen, but we shall undertake an analysis of the

We have just stated the steps of the demonstration in terms of justice. It can also be stated in terms of happiness. The two sets of terms should be seen in perfect correlation with one another. The statement we are now about to make not only affords a compact synopsis for the demonstration to follow; it also summarizes the work of Parts II and III in preparing for that demonstration.

I. Royal Government and the Royal State: A (B, C)

A. *Just* by only *one* principle of justice: a just exercise of political power for the common good.

B. *Least efficient* as a means to the end of the state—the happiness of men.

Explanation: In a Royal state, no men are citizens in a strict sense, for apart from constitutional government the status of citizenship does not exist. But the ruling class in a Royal state, whether that comprise just one man or the few who as his deputies participate in his status, have full political freedom and full participation in the common good for which they actively work. Those who have the status of rulers in the Royal state thus have the political conditions needed for a happy human life. All the rest are either *subjected* or *enslaved*.

two virtues which are so important to political theory—prudence and justice. The analysis of prudence is necessary for the distinction between subjection and citizenship (vd. fn. 270 *supra*). The analysis of justice is necessary in order to relate justice as the virtue of an individual to justice as a moral quality of governments and constitutions; the three elements of political justice which we have so frequently referred to must be understood in relation to the traditional distinctions between general and specific justice and between the parts of the latter. In Part V, we shall deal with liberty and equality in relation to justice. Current discussions of the ideal of Democracy tend to over-emphasize either liberty or equality as the chief goods which Democratic institutions enshrine. We shall try to show that neither liberty nor equality is a political good except in terms of justice.

One further point. The emphasis on the qualification expressed by the phrase "absolutely speaking" should not be overlooked or ignored. Relative to historic circumstances, a form of government which is absolutely less just than another may be more fitting; in which case that less just form of government would be the best, relatively speaking. Even slavery can be justified in relation to certain circumstances, though it is always absolutely unjust. We shall consider these matters in Part VI to follow, when we apply the Theory of Democracy to an interpretation

C. CORRELATION: Because it is (1) established by what is intrinsically the least just among the several forms of good government, the Royal state is (2) identical with the least perfect common good, and (3) serves the happiness of men least efficiently, i. e., by the most restricted distribution of those conditions which the state should provide for all men.

II. REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLICAN STATE: A B (C)

A. *Just* by *two* principles of justice, the additional principle being: a just constitution of political power.

B. *More efficient* than Royal Government as a means to the end of the state—the happiness of men.

EXPLANATION: In a Republican state, the status of citizenship exists, as it does not in a Royal state, because constitutional government entails political equality between those who at a time occupy the offices of rule and those who are ruled. The name for the status of being ruled as an equal is "citizen." But in a Republican state, *only some men are citizens, not all.* Those who are not admitted to citizenship in a Republican state will be either slaves or subjects. In this respect, the status of the disfranchised classes does not differ in the Royal and the Republican states. In both, slavery may be abolished, but in both subjection must remain: in the Royal state, because there is no status like citizenship for those who do not exercise ruling power; in the Republican state because it lacks the principle of distributive justice, by which deficiency Republican government is inferior in goodness to Democratic government. Hence only those who hold governmental office and those who are ruled as citizens, enjoy the political equality which belongs to all men.

of the actual facts of political history, and try to reach an understanding of political dynamics—the motions of progress and decay, political revolutions, etc.

C. Correlation: Because it is (1) established by what is intrinsically a more just form of government than is the Royal state, the Republican state is (2) identical with a more perfect common good, and (3) serves the happiness of men more efficiently, i. e., by a wider distribution of those conditions which the state should provide for all men.

III. Democratic Government and the Democratic State: A B C

A. *Just* by *three* principles of justice, the additional principle being: a just distribution of full political status, i. e., citizenship and equality.

B. *Most efficient* as a means to the end of the state—the happiness of men.

Explanation: In a Democratic state, all men are admitted to citizenship, with the exception of those who must be treated as subjects because they are morally or intellectually incompetent. The distinction between the Republican and the Democratic state turns on the grounds for disfranchisement: in the Republican state, unjust criteria of privilege, such as wealth, the accidents of birth (family, race), etc., operate to exclude some men from citizenship; in the Democratic state, the principle of distributive justice eliminates all of these false privileges, and with the exception of those who are charges upon the state by reason of mental or moral deficiency (i. e., the feebleminded, the insane, and felons), all men are justly accorded political equality through the grant of citizenship. Moreover, there can be no political slaves in the Democratic state, as there can be in the Republican state. And, finally, it should be observed that those who are treated as political subjects are also public charges: being unable to rule their own lives, being incompetent to become, or remain at, the head of a family, these men are neither ruled as equals (i. e., as citizens), nor competent to rule others (i. e., capable of holding public office). To speak of political subjects as public charges is to indicate that their status in the political community is analogous to that of children in the domes-

tic community. (Political subjection in the Republican state must not be confused with political subjection in the Democratic state, because in the former case many are unjustly treated as subjects, whereas in the latter case, none are. That man is unjustly subjected who does not deserve to be treated as a public charge.)

C. CORRELATION: Because it is (1) established by what is intrinsically the most just form of government, the Democratic state is (2) identical with the most perfect common good, and (3) serves the happiness of men most efficiently, i. e., by the widest distribution (restricted only by justice) of those conditions which the state should provide for all men.

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(To be continued.)

BOOK REVIEWS

A Companion to the Summa (I: The Architect of the Universe). By Walter Farrell, O.P. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1941. Pp. vii + 457, with index. $3.50.

Those who have been so agreeably instructed in the moral theology of St. Thomas through Father Farrell's splendid exposition of the second part of the *Summa Theologica*, will not be disappointed in the latest addition to his series of "companions" to the *Summa*. *The Architect of the Universe* corresponds to the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa*, and it reveals to us the great edifice of Thomistic speculative and dogmatic doctrine with the same clarity and charm which were evident in the portrayal of the moral principles (*The Road to Happiness* and *The Fullness of Life*).

As Father Farrell has explained, these companions to the *Summa* are neither books about the *Summa* nor are they commentaries on the *Summa*. They are the *Summa* itself reduced to a form more understandable to the average modern layman, who would like to know something of the thought of the Angelic Doctor, but who feels the need of a preparatory conditioning before venturing alone into the profound depths of the *Summa* itself. *The Architect of the Universe*, therefore, like its two predecessors, "is a beginner's book in a much more literal sense than is the *Summa Theologica*, explicit as Thomas was in aiming his book at beginners" (p. vii). But the *Companion to the Summa* should not be read only by beginners. The professional philosopher and the teacher of philosophy can find in Father Farrell's work a chance both to review the thought of St. Thomas in its organic completeness, and to see how profound thoughts can be given a clear and beautiful expression. Father Farrell is especially gifted with the ability to explain an idea by the use of apt metaphors and analogies.

In *The Architect of the Universe* the order of questions discussed corresponds generally with that of the *Prima Pars* of the *Summa*. (In a few instances the author rearranges the sequence of questions.) The first chapter is devoted to an explanation of the nature of wisdom, a description of theological wisdom as the sovereign of both speculative and practical sciences, and praise of Thomas Aquinas, in whom were united the wisdoms of the philosopher, the theologian, and the saint. Father Farrell then proceeds to show to the reader this wise man at work in his treatment of the great problems regarding the existence of God, His infinite perfections, the divine knowledge and love, and the nature of divine providence. After a rather short chapter on the Trinity, Father Farrell continues with an explanation of the remaining questions pertaining to God's creative act, the angelic world, the nature of man and the condition of our First Parents,

and the government of the universe. Not all questions are given space proportionate to that which they receive in the *Summa*, but I think Father Farrell has been wise in giving greater attention to those problems which are of greater value and interest to the modern reader. The chapters on the nature of man and on the government of the universe are exceptionally good.

The author usually begins the discussion of each new problem with a brief account of the non-Thomistic solutions which have been advanced by various philosophers, and he concludes the chapter with pertinent comments which reveal by comparison the superiority of the Thomistic doctrine. As frequently pointed out by Father Farrell, the two principal evils characteristic of the modern spirit in its attitude toward the great problems of philosophy are a distrust of reason as an instrument of truth, and a certain moral and intellectual cowardice, a "cowardice that would surrender rights, hopes, ideals, success, independence and control in order to escape responsibilities, disappointments, failure, labor and self-control" (p. 449).

In reading this excellent presentation of the thought of St. Thomas, one cannot but reflect on what the modern world has lost in exchange for its material gains. With the supplanting of theology and metaphysics by the more "practical" sciences directed to the domination and control of physical nature, we have been progressively blinded to the ultimate reality of our universe, its Creator, and to the real nature and destiny of man. Surely, no enduring reconstruction of our world, after the present forces of totalitarianism have been defeated, will be possible unless we learn again that true wisdom which acknowledges the supremacy of the Divine Architect and which sees the true place of the human person in the hierarchy of the universe.

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From Aether to Cosmos—Cosmology. By CELESTINE N. BITTLE, O.F.M. CAP. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941. Pp. v + 498, with index. $4.00.

Father Bittle continues his series of textbooks in Scholastic philosophy to give us the most complete treatment of problems cosmological yet to be had in English. In accordance with his general method, the presentation has the advantages of doctrinal summaries concluding each chapter, definitely specified recommended readings, a helpful glossary of terms, and a bibliography with an abundance of English titles. The distinctive feature of the book lies in its inclusion of a thorough summary of the contemporary findings and theories of experimental physics and chemistry relevant to the central problem of the essential constitution of bodies.

Father Bittle departs from Aristotelian-Thomistic cosmology in several details. The order of Aristotle is abandoned; motion, the proper passion of bodies, no longer retains its predominant place nor is it the basis of systematization. Indeed, it does not merit special treatment or definition; it is merely described in the midst of the discussion of time. Thus any philosophic discussion of action, passion, locomotion, and alteration is either brief or entirely omitted. In general, this may be due to the author's preoccupation with what Thomists regard as a formidable difficulty, the application of hylomorphism to inorganic nature, but only as a difficulty, and not a justification for tampering with the nature and unity of natural philosophy as a science. This preoccupation may also have led Father Bittle to a too cursory examination of the traditional Scholastic cosmology. Objections which a comprehension of the terms would dispel are treated as valid and questions are left open when previous definition necessitates a choice, as in the consideration of the plurality of substantial forms. However, the author's studious and purposive avoidance of any overly metaphysical implications may be the reason.

More fundamental is the reiterated deference to natural science, its methods and discoveries. At times, with its overemphasis upon the dependence of cosmology, this attitude amounts to suberservience. Knowledge gained without instruments or controlled experiment is termed pre-scientific; Aristotle is admired for his effort, commiserated for his achievement; medieval thinkers—Capreolus, John of St. Thomas—are dismissed with an historical nod, their contributions unconsulted or given no reference; only on the data furnished by science can be built a philosophy with a possibility of correct solution and adequate interpretation. The book itself is in contradiction: the definitions of time, space, place, etc., are those of Aristotle; the most modern of erroneous theories are condemned by reduction to and upon the basis of analyses furnished by the Stagirite and St. Thomas; the numerous scientific facts have given rise to no new principle nor reversed any old ones. Science has affected cosmology as science should affect philosophy. It has illuminated the truths of philosophy by copious illustrations, has provided clear-cut cases of principles at work, has widened the interpretative range of ultimate solutions. It has not rendered philosophy more profound by changing the measurements of the world, nor has it deprived natural philosophy of its autonomy. The failure of Aristotle and St. Thomas to distinguish philosophy from science, and the inadequacy and falsity of the latter as they knew it, should not blind us to the truth that Scholastic philosophical cosmology of today is the fruit of their labors.

Withal, *From Aether to Cosmos* is distinctly welcome to both teacher and student of cosmology. Clarity of exposition, liberality with examples, lucid condensation of difficult material (as relativity), all recommend the book in the face of debatable methodological strictures. To further the

avowed aim of a "broader synthesis of science and philosophy," the inclusion of a chapter dealing with the interrelations of these bodies of knowledge as developed by Maritain, Adler, and others might be suggested.

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The Psychology of Aristotle. By CLARENCE SHUTE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv + 148, with index. $2.00.

This is a sympathetic, if somewhat unusual, treatment of Aristotle's *corpus psychologicum.* It represents a painstaking analysis of all the important texts of the Stagirite, bearing on the problems of the soul and human nature. These texts range from the *Physics* to the *Nicomachean Ethics,* with most of the emphasis laid on the *De Anima* and *Parva Naturalia.*

I have said that the treatment is somewhat unusual. By this I mean that to a Thomist who has habituated himself to reading the Aristotelian texts in the perspective set by Aquinas, there are real difficulties in reconciling Mr. Shute's interpretation of the Stagirite with what we have commonly come to regard as the traditional view. This is not a brief for the tradition; yet it does seem to imply a rightful Thomist claim to a hearing when the exegesis of the Stagirite's texts is at stake.

At any rate, one might ask such questions as these: did Aristotle actually teach that powers do not exist except when active (p. 64); that practical intellect is a function of a body possessed of organs (p. 65); that sensation and knowledge (and not sensitive knowledge and intellectual knowledge) are essentially diversified (p. 87); that error is found in sensation (p. 102); that mind is the thinking process itself (p. 100); that the soul is identical with the potentialities of the organism (p. 125).

I am reminded of a remark of Dr. Wolfson at Harvard (a profound student of all the ancient and medieval philosophers) that of all the thinkers who labored over the intricate texts of the Stagirite, Thomas Aquinas probably came as close as anyone to understanding the true *mens aristotelica.* The great Peripatetic unquestionably needs clarifying distinctions and sharpened contrasts in order to grasp the drift of his psychological analysis; and I fear that Mr. Shute, despite the freshness of his biological or organismic approach, has failed to perform these necessary services for the Stagirite.

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Hegel's Hellenic Ideal. By J. Glenn Gray. New York: King's Crown Press, 1941. Pp. viii + 104. $1.50.

Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. By Herbert Marcuse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941. Pp. xiv + 431. $3.75.

There was a time when Hegel's philosophy, much criticized and little read, appeared as the apex of abstrusity and as the most striking example of the divagations of a philosopher who cared nothing for facts. The Neo-Hegelian school, prominent mainly in England and in Italy, did not attract much notice outside of its own circles. Today, things have become somewhat different. We are sufficiently distant from Hegel to view him in the historical context in which he belongs, and sufficiently objective, one may hope, to acknowledge what is great and what is true in Hegel's conception. Studies of serious criticism, based on a thorough knowledge of Hegel's intellectual world, and attempts at an appreciation of his philosophy have become more frequent in recent years.

Mr. Gray's little book is such an objective and scholarly contribution to our understanding of Hegel. Anyone who is even slightly acquainted with the ideas of this philosopher is impressed by the great place Greek thought, Greek art, and Greek civilization hold in his mind. Though not blind to the disadvantages of ancient Greece and fully aware of the progress achieved by history since Periclean times, Hegel still felt that these ages came closer to some ideal than any others. Of him is especially true what Mr. Gray states as a general characteristic of German idealism, that its " permanent value consists in its poetic apprehension of empirical phenomena, its artistic appreciation and religious insight." The interest of this school focussed on " the meaning of events, their relevance to human experience, not on recording and interpreting facts."

Mr. Gray starts with a clever analysis of Hegel's vision of history, his conviction that human affairs prove, in the ultimate and long term, to be rational, his basic conception that history is mankind's march towards a more and more perfect freedom to be achieved by the gradual actualization of the spirit. The fundamental categories of Hegel's philosophy of history are clearly stated. Chapter II deals with young Hegel's discovery of the Greek. He was then inclined to evaluate Greece, its history, and civilization more highly than he did in his mature years. At first, he had no very clear view of the progress Christianity achieved. Later, the influence of Hölderlin, Schiller, and other prophets of classic beauty wore away. The retrospective mood of romanticism was replaced by a strong emphasis of forward movement. But he could not conceive of history as a wholehearted progress. If Christianity had freed the individual and enhanced the dignity of the human person, something also had been lost, that is, the harmony and the

unity of society, the beauty pervading everyone's life, and, most of all, the awareness that freedom can be realized only if the individual is thoroughly embedded in the life of the community, that is, the state. It was Hegel's idea to bring about a perfect synthesis of modern freedom and the Greek idea of realization of the individual within and through the community.

Not less learned than Mr. Gray's book, Mr. Marcuse's work is of a different nature. The book has two main theses, although they are not announced explicitly. One is that to evaluate Hegel one has to consider his philosophy as a precursor of Marxian dialectics; the other is that Hegel is quite unjustly reproached for having paved the way for totalitarianism.

The book has two parts. The first deals with "The Foundations of Hegel's Philosophy." The author develops in a very instructive way the various stages of Hegelian thought, and makes extensive use of the writings of Hegel's youth. The reader will profit much by following the progress from the earliest conceptions to the philosophy of politics and of history. This exposition, although striving for objectivity, is in a way "colored" by the first of the propositions mentioned above. Hegel's philosophy is, perhaps, envisioned too much from the angle of social philosophy. True, hardly any thinker before Hegel gave as much attention to the phenomena of history and of social life, but one might question the notion that society and history represent the truly basic aspects of this philosophy.

The second part describes "The Rise of Social Theory." While Hegel, notwithstanding his interest in social philosophy, remained essentially a philosopher, there developed, principally through his influence, a true theory of society as a science, as a system based on facts and not mainly on ideas. Hegel's dialectic took on another shape in the hands of Kierkegaard. The chapter on this philosopher is, to the present reviewer's mind, not very satisfactory. Another development is characterized by the names of Feuerbach and Marx. There follows an interesting chapter on "Positivism and the Rise of Sociology," Saint-Simon, A. Comte, the positive philosophy of the state as conceived by F. J. Stahl, and, finally, the foundation of sociology by Lorenz von Stein are analyzed.

The concluding chapter has for its title "The End of Hegelianism." The British Neo-Idealism, of Bradley or Bosanquet, appears to the author as a dead end. On the other hand, Marxian dialectics underwent a profound change in the hands of the Revisionists. The alleged relation of Italian Fascistic philosophy (Gentile) to Hegel is mere appearance. The basic ideas are utterly different from those Hegel himself held. Nor is German National Socialism an offspring of Hegelian Idealism. On the contrary it is eminently antagonistic to the latter, so much so that Hegel has been severely criticized and his philosophy declared incompatible with the new ideology. It is, therefore, so the author concludes, not possible to

see in the recent developments in Germany the result or the continuation of Hegelianism.

The facts, of course, must be admitted. The antagonism referred to by the author evidently exists, but this is not a sufficient proof of essential independence. Although Hegel's conception of the state is not the one advocated by Rosenberg and others, and although these writers oppose *Volk* to *Staat*, there is indubitably a great similarity between the way they conceive of *Volk* and the way Hegel conceived of *Staat*. Dependence, in things ideological, does not necessarily mean wholesale acceptance. Also a negation may depend on a position it negates and be inconceivable without this position preceding it. Hegel alone cannot be made responsible. It is quite true that he would have repudiated the modern conceptions and considered them as a serious falling back to a lower level of history. But without Hegel and his successors, however far their ideas may be from those of the Rosenbergs, Schmidts, and others, one hardly can imagine these ideas to have arisen.

Though the Marxist slant in Mr. Marcuse's book somewhat falsifies the outlook on Hegel's world, one may recommend this work to anyone desirous of getting a comprehensive view of Hegelianism and its subsequent developments. A not too extensive, yet useful, bibliography is added.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Legal Realism and Justice. By Edwin N. Garlan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. xii + 161, with bibliography and index. $2.00.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of this book is its precision and consequent clarity. The title is scrupulously exact; the approach to the realists of the last few decades is philosophically objective in its treatment of "The Problematic in Justice," "The Indeterminate in Justice," and "Legal Justice." It is only in the last two chapters—"Philosophic Justice" and "The Unity of Justice"—that the author's own opinions are unveiled.

Clearly the author's knowledge of the realists is that of a master. His critical dissection of individual opinions is the expert penetration of a truly philosophic mind with an edge as sharp as a scalpel. It is astounding to see the dismembered opinion reassemble itself and come to life a totally different thing under the vitalizing influence of Dr. Garlan's kindly interpretations of what the authors must have meant. This happens again and again, providing eloquent testimony to the author's charity and to the brilliant recognition that only by such tortured interpretations could these opinions be squared with sanity.

All this gives rise to great hopes from the last two chapters, making more bitter the disillusionment of their philosophic emptiness. Dr. Garlan has a philosophic mind; it is tolerantly mature in the field of criticism, but constructively it brings out no more than the sad penalty paid for intellectual malnutrition. His masters have been too much for him. He cannot escape the limits of legal decisions and rules in his philosophizing on justice; that is to say, he has not yet broken down the barriers that exclude him from the field of philosophy. A prophet would not be taking a serious risk with his reputation in predicting that such a mind would not long be content to remain in such barren fields.

Both the bibliography and the index are remarkably well done.

Historical Introduction of the Theory of Law. By J. Walter Jones. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. Pp. 300.

Beginning with the Greeks and pursuing the diverse theories of law down to modern Russia, Italy, and Germany, the author has produced a pocket encyclopedia of legal theory. Both terms of this description of an excellent book are fully justified. The book is encyclopedic in its scope and detailed references; but it is pocket size in the incredible brevity which gives more than a paragraph to a theory only with rarity and extreme reluctance.

The subject matter is united under eleven wide theories of law: The Civilians; The Historical School and Codes; The Sovereignty Theory; The Law of Nature; Public and Private Law; The Fiction Theory; The Psychological Theories; The Metaphysicians; The Pure Theory; Law and Economic Theory; "Revolutionary Legality." Throughout the study the author has been abstemiously objective.

English Political Pluralism. By Henry Meyer Magid. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. Pp. 100, with bibliography and index. $1.25.

This book is a study of Figgis, Cole, and Laski as the most prominent figures in the English pluralistic movement. Not historical in its development, the study attempts to evaluate the contribution of this movement to the analysis of freedom.

The essay concludes that "the nature of freedom can be discussed more adequately on the basis of a distinction between social freedom (freedom in the community) and political freedom (freedom for parties)." In arriving at this conclusion, the author, after his orderly and profound study of the three pluralists, brushes aside the necessity of natural law and an ultimate good in explaining the unity of law and rushes to the championing of political parties. The party system is more than a system of freedom, it is a form of government, the most satisfactory device yet invented to organize diverse interests in the community for changes of public policy.

It seems fairly evident that the author has been badly scared by totalitarianism, so badly, in fact, that he would make of democracy not even a conscientious policeman, as some of his liberalist predecessors preferred, but a reluctant referee of group brawls. Democracy's proper setting, he says, is the existence of diverse ways of life practiced by various groups in the same community; its work as a government is to settle the problems arising from a clash of these groups.

What Nietzsche Means. By G. A. Morgan, Jr. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941. Pp. xviii + 408. $4.00.

Here is an author to whom the subject he treats evidently means a great personal experience and who, accordingly, is serious and honestly enthusiastic about the ideas he explains. Dr. Morgan, Associate Professor of Philosophy in Duke University, prefaces his book by a personal confession. Nietzsche, to him, is "an oasis of life in the desert of the post-war period. Amid the sands of humanitarian optimism, when Western civilization was a foolish ostrich, he met my thirst for a mind fresh and fearless and deep." You cannot argue with a personal experience, and you

cannot criticize enthusiasm. The present reviewer cannot and will not enter into an analysis of Nietzschean philosophy, nor inquire whether it is truly an oasis or merely a—*fata morgana.*

As the book stands, it is a very exhaustive statement of Nietzsche's ideas. It is, perhaps, more systematic than the texts justify, and this notwithstanding the fact that the author is fully aware of this danger. It also takes Nietzsche's philosophy too much as a consistent whole. The author, of course, is conscious of certain changes and developments in his hero's ideas. He often contrasts " the later Nietzsche " with the author of earlier works. But there are more inconsistencies than he is willing to recognize.

The work of Dr. Morgan may serve well as an introduction to Nietzsche's ideas. Sometimes the translations are a bit doubtful. The author often adds the German word in brackets. Several texts, however, ought to have been given in the original, because they allow for an interpretation different from the one preferred by the author. The " Selected Bibliography " is, compared with the enormous number of works and articles written on Nietzsche, short. A serious drawback is that the author never considers any adverse or critical opinion. For example, he lists in his bibliography an article by Scheler (leaving out the important study on the *Rehabilitation of Virtue*), but does not in the text refer to Scheler's comments. Another point, too, would have deserved consideration. Practically nothing is said about the influences which contributed to the formation of Nietzsche's philosophy. The few references to Schopenhauer, Hegel, and others, are quite insufficient. Thus, the book is in fact only on " What Nietzsche Means," as Dr. Morgan understands him.

Irving Babbitt, Man and Teacher. Edited by Frederick Manchester and Odell Shepard. New York: Putnam, 1941. Pp. xiii + 337. $3.00.

This book consists of thirty-nine biographical essays on Irving Babbitt. All the authors assert the greatness of Irving Babbitt both as a man and as a teacher; unanimously they liken him to Socrates and Johnson. To be likened to one of these men is no mean honor, but to image both of them is a tribute rarely given to any man.

The shadow of Socrates hovers over him as he follows the maieutic and heuristic methods of leading the student to a precise definition of a term or the meaning of a word. Socrates is seen again in Babbitt as he philosophizes or moralizes on human conduct. The figure of Johnson looms up in him as he labors over the literary works of great men, muttering his approval of the masters, Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, and Buddha, and fulminating against lesser lights, especially Rousseau.

In the educational world, although during his lifetime he was stigmatized

as a radical, Babbitt can be more truly called a reformer. He maintained that "the most practical way of promoting humanism is to work for a revival of the almost lost art of reading," which sounds like the present-day call of Hutchins and Adler towards a true liberal education.

In the philosophical world Babbitt is classified as a Humanist. From his study of the masters he found what he thought were the principles of a full human life. Man, as analyzed by Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, and Buddha, provided him with the natural principles of good conduct. The Christian idea of grace as an exterior source of good human conduct was repugnant to him. Whatever may have been his distaste for Christian dogma and grace, it must be noted that he did appreciate the effect that Catholic teaching had upon the moral life of its adherents as far as decency and restraint are concerned.

The essays are interesting and well written. The one by Paul Elmer More provides a deep understanding of the "inner man" of Irving Babbitt. Some of the essays are repetitious but this is to be expected when a number of authors recall a common friend. All of them portray Babbitt as a very powerful person, a learned man and a unique teacher.

Marriage and the Family. By JACQUES LECLERCQ. New York: Frederick Pustet, 1941. Pp. xx + 387, with index. $4.50.

This is one of the important modern Catholic efforts in the field of social philosophy. Skillfully combining the philosophical, religious, and sociological aspects of marriage, Doctor Leclercq has written a work which is admirably adapted for the private library or the public classroom. With such headings as: Principles and Social Implications of the Family, Chastity the Guardian Virtue of the Family, Free Love Ethics, Birth Rate and Birth Control, Woman in the Family and in Society, the Child in the Family and in Society, as pivotal points for discussion, the author has constructed a scholarly fabric which will wear well and long. This eminent Louvain professor does not content himself with the theory of the various theses; history and the findings of sociologists are brought in as witnesses to the practical effects of the doctrines proposed or the errors refuted. Throughout there is a note of commendable restraint, and the opinions of dissenters are refuted with a courtesy which is sometimes lacking in books on social philosophy. The translation from the original French by Rev. Thomas R. Hanley, O. S. B., is a most successful one.

This Way Happiness. By REV. CHARLES P. BRUEHL, PH. D. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941. Pp. xiv + 241, with index. $2.50.

Dr. Bruehl's complaint on page 20 that "especially since Kant, ethics has taken on a somewhat grim and sour mien" gives us the key to this

work. Accordingly he calls it "Ethics in Homespun," and, in his own words, "it seeks to unstiffen ethical teaching and recast it in a less rigid mold." Hence the book is above all a practical and readable presentation of moral philosophy; it is offered to the college student and the general reader. Thus it was written with one eye on the classroom and the other on the armchair. We would have preferred a single aim, in this case, an ethics for the general reader. However, the book, with supplementation by professor and student, could be used as a basic text for college ethics. Any text requires some supplementation, and probably the greatest value of this book to the college student would lie in its use as a supplementary text. To the general reader the work will be valuable for the practical presentation of ethics it offers. By giving to Catholics rational basis for their attitudes and actions, it should go far to counteract the apologetic attitude of many who find it embarrassing always to be swimming against the stream.

The Thomistic Theory of the Passions and Their Influence on the Will. By Richard R. Baker. Notre Dame, Indiana: 1941. Pp. vi + 147.

Dr. Baker's work is a simply written and extremely clear account of the structure of the appetitive act on the sensitive level. The author has given serious thought to the problem, and has presented the philosophic aspects of passion with such success that we wish to see him go on to develop the empiriological factors of his problem. A tremendous amount of information regarding the physiology of the emotions is now available to any philosopher who has the inclination and aptitude for correlating such information with the philosophy of emotional life. Dr. Baker has given us ample guarantee of his ability to perform such a task.

One problem which lies strictly within the ontological dimension, but which is not treated in the present work, concerns the possibility of what one might call tendential species that determine the appetites in a way analogous to the intentional species that determine the cognitive powers. Perhaps later on the author will investigate this interesting possibility.

Regards sur les Sciences Experimentales. Edited by Noël Mailloux, O. P. Montreal: Les Editions de L'Œuvre de Presse Dominicaine, 1942. Pp. 187.

It is always a pleasure to receive the annual report on the meeting of the ACFAS. Professor Mailloux is an indefatigable student of human nature and his psychological knowledge has been extended into one of the

most important spheres of modern action—the practice of pedogogy. Science, he rightly contends, has enormously enlarged our purview on the meaning and usefulness of speculative truth; and it is the task of a dynamic Thomism to avail itself of all advances along the lines of investigative research.

In the present symposium the following scholars have contributed papers towards the establishment of a sound methodology in the teaching of the experimental sciences: Noël Mailloux, O.P., J. E. A. Marcotte, Jean Martin, Robert Dolbec, Léo G. Morin, C.S.C., Jules Brunel, J. Emile Jacques, Roger Gauthier, Jacques Rousseau, Cyrias Ouellet, Abel Gauthier.

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